Judgment : K.K. Sasidharan, J 1. These two writ petitions are directed against the order dated 23 September 2011 in M.A.Nos.196 and 195 of 2008 in O.A.No.492 of 2007 whereby and whereunder, the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal was pleased to set aside the common order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai dated 2 July 2008 in I.A.No.805 of 2007 and I.A.SR. No.5375 of 2007 holding that the Tribunal has no authority to extend the time limit stipulated in the award passed by the Lok Adalat. 2. The facts as disclosed in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition in W.P.No.28367 of 2011 are taken to narrate the background facts. THE FACTS:- W.P.No.28367 of 2011:- 3. The first petitioner is a registered partnership firm and the other petitioners are the partners. The firm took financial assistance from Indian Bank, Guindy Branch. The property owned by the father of the second petitioner was given as collateral security. Similarly, the property owned by petitioners 5 and 6 were also given as collateral security. 4. Subsequently, the partners constituted a Public Limited Company in the name and style of M/s. Panggo Exports Ltd, and consequently, the firm was dissolved and the assets and liabilities of the firm were taken over by the newly floated Company. After such conversion, the petitioners continued to avail credit facilities from the Bank. Since there was default in the matter of repayment of the loan amount, the Bank initiated proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal in O.A.Nos.1726 and 1727 of 1998. During the pendency of the original applications, the petitioners and the Bank agreed to refer the matter to the Lok Adalat for settlement. Accordingly, the parties appeared before the Lok Adalat and ultimately, the matter was settled in and by which, the petitioners have agreed to pay a sum of Rs.16,00,000/-in full and final satisfaction of the claim in O.A.No.1726 of 1998. The claim in O.A.No.1727 of 1998 was settled for a sum of Rs.4,00,000/-. The petitioners have agreed to pay the amount on or before 15 March 2005 failing which, liberty was given to the Bank to claim the entire amount. 5. Thereafter, the Lok Adalat awards were produced before the Debts Recovery tribunal and the Tribunal passed orders on 10 September 2004 disposing of the original applications in terms of the Award. 6. The petitioners have agreed to pay the amount on or before 15 March 2005 failing which, liberty was given to the Bank to claim the entire amount. 5. Thereafter, the Lok Adalat awards were produced before the Debts Recovery tribunal and the Tribunal passed orders on 10 September 2004 disposing of the original applications in terms of the Award. 6. The petitioners thereafter paid a sum of Rs.4,00,000/-on 14 February 2005 in full and final satisfaction of the claim in O.A.No.1727 of 1998. 7. The petitioners defaulted in paying the amount claimant in O.A.NO.1726 of 1998 in accordance with the Lok Adalat Award. 8. The petitioners have filed an application in I.A.No.5375 of 2007 to condone the delay of 1090 days in complying with the Lok Adalat Award dated 10 September 2004 and for a direction to the Bank to accept the payment with interest from 10 September 2004. 9. The petitioners in their affidavit filed in support of the interlocutory application in O.A.No.1726/1998 submitted that Thiru.D.Govindaraj, Executive Partner of the Firm, who was conducting the affairs, became bedridden and he was hospitalized for a long time. During the said period, the Company had to face many cases launched by the Registrar of Companies, the Provident Fund and E.S.I. Authorities. Thiru Govindaraj died in the meantime. Another partner of the original firm Mr. Pandian died of cancer on 11 March 2011. All these contributed for the delay in making payment. Accordingly, the petitioners prayed for condoning the delay and a direction to the Bank to receive the agreed amount in full and final satisfaction of the claim along with interest. 10. The Bank filed a counter affidavit opposing the claim made by the petitioners. According to the Bank, there was a default clause attached to the Lok Adalat Award and as such, the Bank had the option to claim the entire amount. Bank also contended that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extent the time stipulated in the Lok Adalat Award. 11. The Debts Recovery Tribunal considered the factual matrix in the light of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court and observed that it is open to the Courts and Tribunals to extend the time prescribed in the Lok Adalat Award in deserving cases. The Tribunal accepted the reasons given by the petitioners for the delay and accordingly, the applications were allowed. The Tribunal accepted the reasons given by the petitioners for the delay and accordingly, the applications were allowed. The Petitioners were directed to pay a sum of Rs.16 lakhs with interest @ 15% p.a. from 10 September 2004 in full and final satisfaction of the claim made by the Bank in O.A. No.1726/1998. 12. The petitioners, thereafter, paid the amount and it was also received by the Bank of course without prejudice to their contention in the matter. 13. The order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal on 2 July 2008 was taken up by the Bank before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal in M.A.Nos.195 and 196/2008. 14. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal found that there was a default clause and as such, in the event of making default in the matter of payment, the Bank was at liberty to claim the entire amount. The Appellate Tribunal was of the view that the Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot in any way traverse beyond the Lok Adalat Award. According to the Appellate Tribunal, the Bank agreed for one time settlement, after giving considerable reduction and as such, Debts Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extent the time. Accordingly, by setting aside the common order dated 2 July 2008, the appeal was allowed. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners are before this Court. THE SUBMISSIONS:- 15. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners contended that the Bank agreed to settle the matter and accordingly, original applications were referred to the Lok Adalat and ultimately, the issues were settled. The Lok Adalat Awards were later produced before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and accordingly, orders were passed in terms of the award. Therefore, the Lok Adalat Award became an enforceable award. The Debts Recovery Tribunal having passed an order in terms of the award, was fully justified in extending the time prescribed in the award, having found that the petitioners have justifiable reasons for seeking extension of time. According to the learned senior counsel, the Debts Recovery Tribunal followed the judgment of the Supreme Court and correctly extended the time. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal without considering the factual matrix and the binding precedent, set aide the well considered order passed by the Original Authority. It was further contended that the petitioners have shown sufficient reasons to condone the delay and those reasons were accepted by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal without considering the factual matrix and the binding precedent, set aide the well considered order passed by the Original Authority. It was further contended that the petitioners have shown sufficient reasons to condone the delay and those reasons were accepted by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal was not justified in interfering with the discretionary order passed by the original authority. 16. The learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Periyakkal and Others vs. Dakshyani [ 1983 (2) SCC 127 = (1983) 96 L.W. 110 S.N.J; State Bank of India vs. Vijay Kumar [2007 (11 SCC 369] and a judgment of this Court dated 28.04.2008 in Indian Bank vs. M.S. Gnanasoundari and others [W.A. No.462 of 2008] in support of his contention that in spite of passing an award by the Lok Adalat, the court retains power to extend time. 17. The learned counsel for the first respondent contended that the normal rule with regard to extension of time would not be applicable in the case of one time settlement. According to the learned counsel, the Bank agreed to settle the matter with a hope that they would get the amount at the earliest. The Bank was made to believe that payment would be made within the time indicated in the award. The petitioners have not paid the amount within the time prescribed under the award and in fact, they have not paid the amount at the time of filing the petition also. The Debts Recovery Tribunal blindly followed the decisions cited by the petitioners without ascertaining the application of those decisions to the facts of the case. The learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union Bank of India and anr. Vs. panchanam Subudhi in C.A.No.1355 of 2009 dated 2 March 2009 in support of his contention that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for extension of time in the matter of one time settlement. 18. The first petitioner availed financial assistance from the Guindy Branch of Indian Bank. Vs. panchanam Subudhi in C.A.No.1355 of 2009 dated 2 March 2009 in support of his contention that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for extension of time in the matter of one time settlement. 18. The first petitioner availed financial assistance from the Guindy Branch of Indian Bank. The details regarding formation of a Company and its subsequent taking over of the assets and liabilities of the firm ”Sri Chakra leathers” by the newly Floated Company are all unnecessary for the purpose of disposal of these writ petitions and as such we are not dealing with those aspects. 19. The Bank sanctioned as many as four loans to the first petitioner and it was duly secured by creating equitable mortgage of the properties owned by the father of the 2nd petitioner and petitioners 5 and 6. 20. The first petitioner failed to honour the commitments and this made the Bank to initiate proceedings before the Dabts Recovery Tribunal Chennai in O.A.No.1726 of 1998 and 1727 of 1998. During the pendency of the original application, the parties expressed their desire to settle the matter and as such, the applications were referred to the Lok Adalat conducted by the High Court Legal Services Authority. The Bank agreed to receive a total sum of Rs.16 lakhs in full and final satisfaction of their claim in O.A.No.1726 of 1998 subject to the condition that the entire amount should be paid on or before 15 March 2005. The application in O.A.No.1727 of 1998 was settled for a sum of Rs.4 lakhs payable on or before 15 March 2005. 21. The awards passed by the Lok Adalat in L.A. Case Nos.658 and 643 of 2004 respectively were placed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The Tribunal taking into consideration the settlement arrived at between the parties, disposed of the original proceedings in terms of the Lok Adalat award. The order dated 10 September 2004 in O.A.Nos.1726 and 1727 of 1998 show that the awards were placed before the Tribunal, resulting in passing two separate orders by the Tribunal. 22. The petitioners have discharges the entire amount in O.A.No.1727 of 1998 on the basis of the Lok Adalat award. 23. The petitioners were expected to pay a sum of Rs.16 lakhs on or before 15 March 2005. However, they failed to pay the amount. 22. The petitioners have discharges the entire amount in O.A.No.1727 of 1998 on the basis of the Lok Adalat award. 23. The petitioners were expected to pay a sum of Rs.16 lakhs on or before 15 March 2005. However, they failed to pay the amount. Even though there was a default clause giving liberty to the Bank to recover the entire amount claimed in O.A.No.1727 of 1998 in case payment was not made on or before 15 March 2005, the fact remains that the Bank did not avail of the said liberty and no action was taken to recover the entire amount. 24. While the matters stood thus, the petitioners have filed two applications before the Debts Recovery Tribunal in L.A.SR.No.5375/2007 and I.A.No.806 of 2007 with a request to condone the delay of 1090 days in complying with the Lok Adalat Award, which culminated in passing an order on 10 September 2004 and to direct the Bank to receive the entire amount of Rs.16 lakhs with interest from 10 September 2004. 25. The petitioners in their affidavit filed in support of the interlocutory applications explained the reasons or the delay. There were criminal prosecutions against the first petitioner by the statutory authorities on account of their failure to pay the ESI and P.F. contribution. The working partner by name Thiru. Govindaraj was hospitalized and he died subsequently. All these factors contributed for the delay in making payment. Therefore, the petitioners made an appeal to condone the delay. 26. Though the applications were opposed by the Bank by filing counter, the Debts Recovery Tribunal opined that the petitioners have made out a case for condoning the delay and accordingly, the applications were allowed. 27. The common order was challenged before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal without considering the reasons which actually weighed with the petitioners to file the application for condoning the delay and the failure on the part of the Bank to take steps to recover the entire amount in spite of the liberty granted earlier, set aside the order and dismissed the applications. THE ISSUES:- 28. The issues raised on the facts of this can be placed under two heads: (i) Whether Lok Adalat Award can be modified by the Debts Recovery Tribunal by extending time? THE ISSUES:- 28. The issues raised on the facts of this can be placed under two heads: (i) Whether Lok Adalat Award can be modified by the Debts Recovery Tribunal by extending time? (ii) In case modification is possible, whether it would cover one time settlement cases containing a default clause?” ANALYSIS – LAW:- 29. The first issue is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in P.T. Thomas vs. Thomas Job [ 2005(6) SCC 478 – 2006-I-L.W. 314]. (a) In P.T. Thomas, the appellant filed a suit for recovery of possession and mandatory injunction. The suit was decreed as prayed for. During the pendency of the first appeal before the District Court, at the instance of the respondent, the dispute was referred to the Lok Adalat. The matter was settled in the Lok Adalat culminated in passing an award on 5 October 1999. As per the award, the appellant was directed to pay a sum of Rs.9.5 lakhs to the respondent within a period of two years and on payment of such amount, the respondent was directed to execute the document. There was a default clause in the said award, stipulating that in case the appellant failed to pay the amount, he would forfeit his right to the property and he would only be entitled to a sum of Rs.3.5 lakhs payable by the Respondent. Though the appellant called upon the respondent to accept the amount and execute the sale deed, respondent neither recovered the notice nor took any steps to comply with the award. The appellant thereafter filed an Execution petition before the Subordinate Court. The respondent opposed the prayer for execution on the ground that deposit was not made even after the period as stipulate din the Lok Adalat award. The subordinate Court rejected the said contention and passed an order for execution. The said order was challenged before the High Court. (b) The High Court allowed the appeal opining that the appellant was not having funds with him to have the sale deed executed and that the subordinate Court has no power to extend the time prescribed under the Lok Adalat award. The said order was challenged before the High Court. (b) The High Court allowed the appeal opining that the appellant was not having funds with him to have the sale deed executed and that the subordinate Court has no power to extend the time prescribed under the Lok Adalat award. (c) The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the issue in extensor and held that Lok Adalat award is deemed to be a decree of the Court which has referred the matter to the Lok Adalat and as such, the Court has got jurisdiction to extend the time. The Supreme Court said:- “16. In our opinion, the award of the Lok Adalat is fictionally deemed to be a decree of court and therefore the courts have all the powers in relation thereto as it has in relation to a decree passed by itself. This, in our opinion, includes the powers to extend time in appropriate cases. In or opinion, the award passed by the Lok Adalat is the decision of the court itself though arrived at by the simpler method of conciliation instead of the process of arguments in court. The effect is the same. In this connection, the High Court has failed to note that by the award what was put to an end was the appeal in the District Court and thereby the litigations between brothers forever. The view taken by the High Court, in our view, will totally defeat the object and purposes of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and render the decision of the Lok Adalat meaningless. 30. The decision of the Debts Recovery Tribunal holding that the Tribunal has got jurisdiction to extend the time limit prescribed under the Lok Adalat award is therefore legally correct. 31. The second issue relates to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to extend time in case the matter relates to one time settlement, accompanied by a default clause. 32. The second issued referred to above requires to be considered in the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is true that the early recovery of the amount due alone would prompt the Bank to agree for one time settlement. However, merely because there is a default clause, it cannot be said that the Court is powerless to extend time. It is true that the early recovery of the amount due alone would prompt the Bank to agree for one time settlement. However, merely because there is a default clause, it cannot be said that the Court is powerless to extend time. In case the borrower demonstrates that unforeseen events stood in the way of his honouring the commitment and agrees to pay interest for the delayed period, the Tribunals would be justified in granting extension. There is no straightjacket formula in all such cases. The facts of a particular case would not justify extension of time even for a few weeks. Therefore, each case has to be decided in the light of the peculiar facts without generalizing the matter. 33. The Reserve Bank of India has issued detailed guidelines with respect to one time settlement. The guidelines framed by the Nationalized Banks contain provisions regarding extension of time for the purpose of payment of amount arrived under one time settlement. 34. While considering a writ petition challenging the order passed by the Union Bank of India rejecting the request for extension of time to pay the one time settlement amount, in W.P.No.4218 of 2008 [M/s.Narmatha Textiles Ltd., vs. Union Bank of India, dated 23.08.2011], we have also considered the relevant provisions regarding condonation of delay. The guidelines framed by the Bank indicate that in genuine cases where borrower could not arrange the amount within the prescribed time schedule due to delay in sale of assets or arranging funds from relatives/friends etc. some flexibility is needed. As per the guidelines, in case the delay is not inordinate and the borrower is willing to pay interest for the period of delay, the Bank should agree for extention of time by charging interest for the delayed period. In case the delay is more than six months, decision should be taken at the higher level. Therefore, it is not as if the bank is powerless to grant extension of time to pay the one time settlement amount. 35. When there are guidelines issued by the Reserve bank of India permitting extention of time subject to payment of interest for the delayed period, it cannot be said that the Tribunal was not justified in extending the time. It is true that an element of discretion is involved in such cases. 35. When there are guidelines issued by the Reserve bank of India permitting extention of time subject to payment of interest for the delayed period, it cannot be said that the Tribunal was not justified in extending the time. It is true that an element of discretion is involved in such cases. The reasons advanced by the borrower for the purpose of granting extension of time under one time settlement should be considered in the light of the background facts. 36. The guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India wanted the Bank of distinguish between willful defaulters and defaulters due to circumstances beyond their control. Reserve Bank of India called upon the banks to take a tough stand against willful defaulters and a sympathetic view in case of those defaulters who could not make payments due to circumstances beyond their conduct. 37. In the subject case, there were two awards passed by the Lok Adalat culminated in passing two orders by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in O.A.Nos.1726 and 1727 of 1998. The petitioners have duly complied with the direction in O.A.No.1727 of 1998 by paying the amount before the cut off date. However, they were not in a position to pay the decree amount in O.A.No.1726 of 1998 on account of various reasons indicated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. Even though the bank was given liberty to claim the entire amount in case payment was not made before the cut off date prescribed in the Lok Adalat, the fact remains that the Bank has not taken any steps to recover the amount. The Bank would be justified in their contention, in case they have taken action earlier by invoking the default clause. The Bank never exercised the option. It was only the petitioners who have approached the Tribunal and they expressed their desire to pay the entire amount with interest for the delayed period in case the delay is condoned,. The petitioners have therefore proved their bona fides. 38. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal appears to have adopted a strict interpretation of the Lok Adalat award and having found that there was a default clause opined that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the time. The petitioners have therefore proved their bona fides. 38. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal appears to have adopted a strict interpretation of the Lok Adalat award and having found that there was a default clause opined that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the time. Though the Debts Recovery Tribunal placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.T.Thomas, the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal failed to consider the said judgment and decided the matter purely on the basis of the default clause as contained in the Lok Adalat award. 39. Section 21(1) of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987, provides that every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil Court as the case may be, an order of any other Court. In view of the statutory position that the award passed by the Lok Adalat is deemed to be a decree, it cannot be said that the reference Court has not jurisdiction in relation to the decree passed by the Lok Adalat. When the Lok Adalat Award is considered to be a decree passed by the Civil Court, necessarily, it should be construed to be a decree passed by the Trial Court and therefore, the Trial Court would retain the power to extend time in appropriate cases. As observed by the Supreme Court in P.T.Thomas, the award passed by the Lok Adalat is the decision of the Court itself. 40. The Supreme Court in P.T.Thomas while considering the power of the Trial Court to grant extension of time, in spite of indicating a cut off date by the Lok Adalat, observed that the attempt of the Court should be to give life and enforceability of the compromise award and not to defeat it on technical grounds. 41. The Supreme Court in Periyakkal and Others vs. Dakshyani [ 1983 (2) SCC 127 ] observed that even in the case of a compromise decree, the Court retains the jurisdiction to extend the time. The Supreme Court indicated that in case time is prescribed for deposit and the memorandum of companies containing such time limits is produced before the Court and the Court passes a decree in terms of the compromise, this would give the Court jurisdiction to extend the time is appropriate cases. 42. The Supreme Court indicated that in case time is prescribed for deposit and the memorandum of companies containing such time limits is produced before the Court and the Court passes a decree in terms of the compromise, this would give the Court jurisdiction to extend the time is appropriate cases. 42. In State Bank of India vs. Vijay Kumar [2007 (1) SCC 369] the issue before the Supreme Court was again one with regard to the extension of time granted by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in spite of prescribing a cut off date for payment by the Lok Adalat award. 43. In Vijaya Kumar, the dispute was settled before the Lok Adalat and accordingly, Debts Recovery Tribunal passed an order in terms of the compromise. There was a stipulation with regard to payment and a failure clause, setting out the consequence of failure of payment according to the time schedule. The borrower having defaulted in making payment, filed a writ petition before the High Court explaining the difficulties on account of which payment could not be made in time. The High Court extended time. When the matter was taken up in appeal by way of Special Leave, the Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of the High Court granting extension of time in spite of prescribing a time limit and failure clause in the Lok Adalat award. 44. In Indian Bank vs. M.S. Gnanasoundari and others, judgment dated 28 April 2008, [W.A.No.462 of 2008], a Division Bench of this Court considered an identical issue regarding extension of time in spite of passing a Lok Adalat Award prescribing time limit for payment and a default clause. The Division Bench having convinced about the bona fides in seeking extension of time allowed the claim of the borrower in spite of noticing that the Bank, invoking the default clause, filed an application for passing an order determining the liability as claimed earlier with subsequent interest as ordered by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, allowing the said claim. Accordingly, Division bench confirmed the order passed by the learned single Judge cated that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has jurisdiction to pass an order to condone the delay in the matter of payment of balance amount as per the award passed by the Tribunal based on the compromise entered into by the parties before the Lok Adalat. The facts of the present case are also identical in nature. The facts of the present case are also identical in nature. 45. The appellate Tribunal was carried away by the default clause and that resulted in allowing the appeals preferred by the Bank. While observing that the petitioners have to take the award in its entirety, on account of the default clause, the Appellate Tribunal conveniently omitted to refer the binding precedent. 46. Though there was no necessary to pass a separate order by the Tribunal after passing an award by the Lok Adalat, the fact remains that in the subject case, such an order was passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The Court which passed the decree retains the jurisdiction to extend the time for compliance. Therefore, the Debts Recovery Tribunal was fully justified in allowing the applications, by condoning the delay. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal clearly erred in setting aside the well considered order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal on the basis of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court. Therefore, we are inclined to set aside the common order passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. CONCLUSION:- 47. In the result, the writ petition are allowed. The common order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal dated 10 September 2004 is restored. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. No costs.