JUDGMENT : 1. - This second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff- landlord-Ahmed Farooq s/o Hazi Mohd. & his four sons Abdulla Farooq, Abdulla Haroon, legal representatives of predeceased son Abdulla Salam and Abdul Tahir against the respondent defendant-tenant Harish Chandra s/o Umrao Chand and others, being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 3/12/1996 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur in Regular Civil Appeal No. 19/87 reversing the eviction decree passed by the learned trial court in eviction suit No. 4/85 (Ahmed Farooq & Ors. v. Harish Chandra & ors.) filed by the plaintiff landlords in the year 1985 in respect of suit shop No. 11 situated in Abdulla Building 'A', Station Road, Jodhpur, which was intially let out to defendant tenant at monthly rent of Rs. 40/- per month and defendant tenant continued to occupy the said shop at the same rent of Rs. 40/- though the trial court fixed the mesne profits at Rs. 100/- per month while decreeing the suit No. 4/85 on 28/3/1987. The plaintiff landlords filed the eviction suit inter alia on the ground that default in payment of rent and bonafide necessity for setting up the crockery business for the son of plaintiff Ahmed Farooq, namely; Abdulla Farooq, who was 25 years of age at the time of filing suit in the year 1985 and is now about 52 years of age. Usual amendments in the pleadings, appeal and revision against interim orders prolonged the trial and in the course of first appeal filed by the tenant, namely Regular Civil Appeal No. 19/87 (Harish Chandra & anr. v. Ahmed Farooq & Ors.), which came to be allowed by the learned Addl. Usual amendments in the pleadings, appeal and revision against interim orders prolonged the trial and in the course of first appeal filed by the tenant, namely Regular Civil Appeal No. 19/87 (Harish Chandra & anr. v. Ahmed Farooq & Ors.), which came to be allowed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur on 3/12/1996 by which the eviction decree of trial court was reversed and thus being aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff landlords have preferred the present second appeal under Section 100 Civil Procedure Code on 13/2/1997 in this Court in which, while admitting the present second appeal, the coordinate bench of this Court framed the following substantial questions of law on 19/2/1997:- "(1) Whether the finding of the Lower Appellate Court on the question of reasonable and bonafide necessity is vitiated when it did not care to discuss and deal with the well considered finding of the Trial Court, which held that the shop in question is required by the plaintiff, Abdulla Farooq for carrying on his business of selling utencils and crockery, reasonably and bonafidely. (2) Whether the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court on the question of reasonable and bonafide necessity is vitiated when the court said as to why the plaintiff Abdulla Farooq did not carry on the Hotel business, instead of selling utensils and crockery on the first floor. In other words can court ask the plaintiffs to carry on a different business than what he proposed to do. (3) Whether the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court is wrong when it fixed the standard rent at Rs. 50/- per month by misconstruing the rent note and in holding that rent was Rs. 20/- per month on 1.1.62. (4) Whether the Lower Appellate Court was wrong in holding that the shop vacated by legal representatives of Dan Mal has been let out to Shri Mohan Lal at a rent of Rs. 5,000/- per month by misreading evidence." 2. 50/- per month by misconstruing the rent note and in holding that rent was Rs. 20/- per month on 1.1.62. (4) Whether the Lower Appellate Court was wrong in holding that the shop vacated by legal representatives of Dan Mal has been let out to Shri Mohan Lal at a rent of Rs. 5,000/- per month by misreading evidence." 2. The bone of contention between the parties and the ground on which the appellate court has reversed the eviction decree while deciding issue No. 1, 1-A and 1-B at page 10 to 18 of its impugned judgment are two fold (i) that the plaintiff landlord had the first floor space of five rooms available in Abdulla Building 'B' situated at Station Road in front of Abdulla Building 'A' in which the suit shops No. 11 on the ground floor are situated and the plaintiff landlord could use the said first floor space in Abdulla Building 'B' for setting up the crockery business of Abdulla Farooq in these premises, which was available at the time of filing of the suit itself, but the wife of the appellant landlord No. 1 Ahmed Farooq and mother of four sons, named above, had started the small hotel business in the said five rooms as Taj Hotel and (ii) that during the pendency of the appeal by tenant before the first appellate court, another shop No. 1 in Abdulla Building 'B' had become available to the plaintiff landlord through an eviction decree against one Danmal in the year 1990, of which vacant possession was obtained in 1993 only according to the plaintiff landlord and, therefore, the defendant tenant contends that such shop in Abdulla Building 'B' measuring 11 ft. in front, 17 ft. in depth and of 4 ft. width at the back side, a triangular shop, adjacent to the stair case of the Taj Hotel started by the wife of appellant No. 1 existed.The landlord rebutted this contention of tenant on the ground that the appellant No. 1 Ahmed Farooq after his retirement from Railways as TTE in the year 1992 set up his own business in the name & style of M/s. Jodhpur Travels in the said vacant shop after eviction of Danmal in the eviction decree. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. J.R. Patel, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-landlord relying upon various case laws, discussed hereinbelow, submitted that the well settled legal position in this regard is that the landlord is the best judge to adjudge his business and personal need and the tenant can hardly dictate terms in this regard, nor the first appellate court could substitute its own opinion as to which premises would be suitable for carrying on the business by the family members requiring the suit premises. He, therefore, submitted that there is no dispute that in Abdulla Buiding 'A', suit shop No. 11 in possession of defendant tenant where he was carrying on the business of selling and repair or bicyles existed on ground floor, where plaintiff' sons - appellant No. 2, Abdulla Farooq wanted to start his crockery business, was the most suitable for him and the tenant could not contend that the triangular shop No. 1 in Abdulla Building 'B', which had become available to the father of the plaintiff appellant No. 2, who has started his business of M/s Jodhpur Travel Agency after his retirement from Railways as TTE, is suitable for setting up the crockery business as against the suit shop, which was of much bigger size of 15' x 30' & much more suitable for the said son. 4. Learned counsel Mr. J.R. Patel also contended that in Abdulla Building 'A' the plaintiff family owned only shop Nos. 4. Learned counsel Mr. J.R. Patel also contended that in Abdulla Building 'A' the plaintiff family owned only shop Nos. 11 and 12 out of which shop No. 11 was in the possession of defendant tenant and one flat on the first floor, namely flat No. 25 in the said property which was in fact mortgaged with the Ex-Ruler of Jodhpur on 1.4.1942, which mortgage was redeemed by the plaintiff family on 1.11.1968 and the said suit shop was best suited for starting the crockery business for appellant No. 2 - Abdulla Farooq and the alleged alternative accommodation available on first floor and the shop No. 1 under staircase in Abdulla Building 'B' which became available during the pendency of first appeal were not at all suitable as, firstly, the tenant could not insist upon the landlord that he should set up the crockery business on the first floor, where the mother of the appellant No. 2 had set up her hotel business known as Taj Hotel, nor such first floor space was even available for starting the crockery business and secondly in the triangular shop, which had become available to the appellant-plaintiff No. 1 - Ahmed Farooq, who retired from the post of TTE in Railways in the year 1992, the appellant-plaintiff No. 1 had started his own travel agency in the name of M/s Jodhpur Travels and, therefore, appellant No. 2 - Abdulla Farooq could not direct or insist upon his own father to permit him to start his own crockery business instead of father choosing to start his travel agency business there. 5. Learned counsel Mr. J.R. Patel, therefore, urged that the bonafide need of the appellant No. 2 - Abdulla Farooq could not be said to have wiped off, satisfied or eclipsed with such triangular shop No. 1 in Abdulla Building 'B' and consequently the learned trial court was justified in decreeing the suit, whereas, the learned first appellate court on wholly an erroneous assumption has reversed those findings and held that such triangular shop was suitable for the appellant No. 2 - Abdulla Farooq to start his crockery business. He submitted that the substantial questions of law framed above deserve to be answered in favour of the plaintiff landlord and setting aside the appellate court's decision, the eviction decree of the learned trial court deserves to be restored. 6. Per contra, Mr. He submitted that the substantial questions of law framed above deserve to be answered in favour of the plaintiff landlord and setting aside the appellate court's decision, the eviction decree of the learned trial court deserves to be restored. 6. Per contra, Mr. M.C. Bhoot, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Arpit Bhoot, vehemently opposed these submissions and urged that the alleged need of the plaintiff's son cannot be said to be bonafide because even at the time of filing of the suit he had an alternative accommodation available on the first floor in the form of five rooms in Abdulla Building 'B', where he could very well set up his crockery business and it cannot be said that the first floor space was not appropriate for setting up the crockery business and secondly at least when shop No. 1, which is said to be triangular in shape, could also be used by him to set up his crockery business, once it became available upon eviction of previous tenant - Danmal in the year 1990/1993, as contended by the plaintiff landlord and the evidence on record has come in the form of statements of Abdul Salam (R.W. 5) and Kailash Chand Jain (R.W.4), an employee of M/s Jodhpur Travels that M/s Jodhpur Travel was owned by one Mohan Lal Jain and was not owned and run by the appellant No. 1 - Ahmed Farooq, father of Abdulla Farooq and, therefore, the need was neither bonafide nor reasonable in the first instance and secondly, if such need was there, the same could very well be satisfied with shop No. 1 situated in Abdulla Building 'B' and consequently learned counsel Mr. M.C. Bhoot submitted that the learned first appellate court was justified in allowing the tenant's appeal and reversing the trial court's eviction decree. 7. I have heard the learned counsels at length. The legal position in relation to bonafide and reasonable necessity is fairly well settled now by catena of judgments and some of them have been discussed in a recent pronouncement by this Court in the case of Gopal Krishan & ors. v. Kishan Lal & anr. - S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 197/2009 decided on 25/9/2012 and the legal position can be summarised thus:-CASE LAWS RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENT-TENANT 8. v. Kishan Lal & anr. - S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 197/2009 decided on 25/9/2012 and the legal position can be summarised thus:-CASE LAWS RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENT-TENANT 8. The judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, three Judges bench decision in the case of M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma & ors., (1981)3 SCC 36 heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant tenant, Mr. M.C. Bhoot, dealt with a case arising under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1947, in which the definition of landlord required him to be the 'owner' of the building, who has a right to occupy the suit premises in his own right, where eviction was sought for bonafide personal requirement of landlord under Section 11(1)(c ) of that Act & where the eviction is sought by the landlord, who no longer remained owner of the suit property and having lost all interests in the property, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while refusing eviction on the ground of bonafide necessity to such a landlord, who was not owner of the property and, therefore, did not fall within the definition of the 'landlord' under the Bihar Act, made some observations, which are strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant tenant here. Those observations in para 18 of the said judgment are quoted below for ready reference:- "Before turning to the next topic, a word about the judicial approach to the question of personal requirement of the landlord under the Rent Act would not be out of place. The learned judge of the first appellate court while upholding the claim of personal requirement of respondent 1 has observed as under: "It is for the plaintiffs to decide whatever they think fit and proper. It is not for the defendant to suggest as to what they should do. The defendant has led evidence to show that the plaintiffs have got some more houses at Girdih.... The defendant appellant has also filed certified copy of judgment of one suit No. 47/73 which is Ext. only to show that plaintiffs have got a decree for eviction with respect to the other house at Giridih. I have already pointed out earlier that it is for the plaintiffs to decide which of the houses is suitable for them. The defendant appellant has also filed certified copy of judgment of one suit No. 47/73 which is Ext. only to show that plaintiffs have got a decree for eviction with respect to the other house at Giridih. I have already pointed out earlier that it is for the plaintiffs to decide which of the houses is suitable for them. It is not for the defendant to suggest that the house which will fall vacant in the near future is most suitable house for the plaintiffs". This approach betrays a woeful lack of consciousness relatable to circumstances leading to enactment of Rent Acts in almost all States in the country. The time honoured notion that the right of re-entry is unfettered and that the owner landlord is the sole judge of his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act the landlord can re-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement of landlord. When examining a case of personal requirement, if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison de'etre of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the Court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the Court. It would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. It would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the landlord's greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at the market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court administering the Rent Act to bear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature in enacting the same. The Court must understand and appreciate the relationship between legal rules and one of necessities of life-shelter-and the way in which one part of the society exacts tribute from another for permission to inhabit a portion of the globe. In 'The Sociology of Law', edited by Pat Carlen, the author examines the rent and rent legislation in England and Wales and observes as under: "The prevailing paradigms of neoclassical economics and empiricist political theory have determined the conceptual insularity of law and legal institutions, with the result that they and other social events appear as random existences independent of their historical formation. The force of any theory of law must of course lie in its explanatory power, and this in turn depends on the wider image of social relations which produces it". 9. Since the definition of 'landlord' contained in Rajasthan Act is significantly different from the definition contained in Bihar Act, without any such Explanation curtailing the ambit & scope of eviction sought under Section 13(1)(h) of the Act for personal requirement of landlord, learned counsel for the defendant tenant cannot draw any support from these observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court. 10. More over, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court itself in a recent decision of two Judges bench in Satyawati Sharam v. Union of India, (2008)5 SCC 287 , which has been later on reaffirmed by three Judges bench decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra & anr. 10. More over, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court itself in a recent decision of two Judges bench in Satyawati Sharam v. Union of India, (2008)5 SCC 287 , which has been later on reaffirmed by three Judges bench decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra & anr. v. Super Max International Private Ltd. & Ors., (2009)9 SCC 772 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly noticed that even the trend of Apex Court has shifted from pro-tenant from 1950s to 1990s to pro-landlord from 1990s onwards. The relevant extracts from the judgments in case of Satyawati Sharma (supra) & Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. are quoted below for ready reference : "12. There has been a definite shift in the court's approach while interpreting the rent control legislations. An analysis of the judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant. In these cases the Court consistently held that the paramount object of every rent control legislation is to provide safeguard for tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of people looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the background of acute scarcity thereof. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later judgments." The relevant para 71 of the judgment of Apex Court in Super Max International (P) Ltd. (supra) is quoted below for ready reference : "71. We reaffirm the views expressed in Satyawati Sharma and emphasise the need for a more balanced and objective approach to the relationship between the landlord and tenant. This is not to say that the Court should lean in favour of the landlord but merely that there is no longer any room for the assumption that all tenants, as a class, are in dire circumstances and in desperate need of the Court's protection under all circumstances. (The case of the present appellant who is in occupation of an area of 9000 sq. ft. in a building, situate at Fort, Mumbai on a rental of Rs. 5236.58/-, plus water charges at the rate of Rs. 515.35/- per month more than amply highlights the point)" 11. (The case of the present appellant who is in occupation of an area of 9000 sq. ft. in a building, situate at Fort, Mumbai on a rental of Rs. 5236.58/-, plus water charges at the rate of Rs. 515.35/- per month more than amply highlights the point)" 11. In view of this, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the defendant tenant on M.M. Quasim's case (supra) is rather misplaced and not applicable in the facts of the present case. 12. In Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah, AIR 1998 SC 994 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances held that action of the landlord was not bonafide when during the pendency of proceedings, the other shop behind the suit shop had fallen vacant but the same was given to the daughter-in-law of the landlord and it was not stated that her need was greater than son's business and there was no explanation as to why it was not suitable for landlord's son. This judgment on its own facts is clearly distinguishable from the facts of present case, therefore, is of little help to the appellant-defendant-tenant. 13. The decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008)10 SCC 497 was relied upon by the learned counsel for the purpose of submitting that the appellate court in the present case did not deal with all the points discussed by the trial court. Learned counsel submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the first appellate court is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind the finding recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should not forget that the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and, hence, the trial court's conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court possesses the same powers as that of original court but they have to be exercised with proper care, caution and circumspection and when a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial court in appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well-established principles of law or unreasonableness. 14. 14. The proposition of law narrated above is also well settled but this Court finds that here the trial court has dealt with all the issues raised before the trial court regarding bonafide need of the landlord and returned the proper and cogent findings in the present case but the learned appellate court reversed such findings without any cogent reasons & on its own assumptions about suitability of alternative accommodation not leaving it to the landlord to decide. Therefore, the proposition of law, as narrated above, stands met fully in the present case.CASE LAWS RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF-LANDLORD 15. In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors., (2005)8 SCC 252 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the eviction is sought for bonafide requirement of landlord, the relevant date on which the said need has to be adjudged is the date of filing the suit and subsequent events taking place during the period of litigation like engaging in other activity or business for which premises in question is required do not upset such bonafide need unless such subsequent events are of such a nature & dimension as to completely eclipse such need and make it lose significance altogether and the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying the landlord relief when litigation at last reaches the final stage. 16. In G.C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin & Ors., 2002 WLC (SC) 91, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "9. It is settled position of law that bona fide requirement means that requirement must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive and is not a mere desire or wish. In Datatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde and Another, 1999(4) SCC 1 ], this Court while considering the bona fide need of the landlord was of the view that when a landlord says that he needs the building for his own occupation, he has to be prove it but there is no warrant for presuming that his need is not bonafide. It was also held that while deciding this question, court would look into the broad aspects and if the court feels any doubt about bona fide requirement, it is for the landlord to clear such doubt. 10. In Raghunath G. Panhale (D) by Lrs. It was also held that while deciding this question, court would look into the broad aspects and if the court feels any doubt about bona fide requirement, it is for the landlord to clear such doubt. 10. In Raghunath G. Panhale (D) by Lrs. v. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co., 1999(8) SCC 1 ] this Court inter alia held that it was not necessary for landlord to prove that he had money to invest in the new business contemplated nor that he had experience of it. It was a case for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord for non- residential purpose, as he wanted to start a grocery business in the suit premises to improve his livelihood. 11. Regarding financial capacity of the appellant, the courts below have held that appellant did not have financial capacity. From records, we find that the appellant had produced revenue records to show his ownership over agricultural land in additional to the suit premises and made a categorical statement that he would be able to raise fund from financial institutions. Both the courts below with mathematical precision considered this aspect while coming to the fact that he does not have financial capacity. We are of the view that these are irrelevant consideration as the question of having necessary fund to start the business is not at all necessary in view of the law laid down by this Court in the above decision namely Dattatraya Laxman Kamble (supra). That apart, as the appellant has got immovable property, it would not be difficult for him to raise necessary fund and therefore we hold that the finding on this point of the courts below is not sustainable." 17. In Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996)5 SCC 353 , the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement observed as under:- "The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dicate to the landlord how and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court was rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thought that because of her age she needed to be looked after. It is no concern of the courts to dicate to the landlord how and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court was rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thought that because of her age she needed to be looked after. That was a lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. The gratuitous advice given by the High Court was uncalled for. There is nothing to show that she had any kind of right whatever to stay in the house of the family friend. On the other hand, she was there merely by sufferance. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. The High Court was in error in laying down that the test is availability of alternative accommodation and not the legal right to such occupation in adjudging the bonafides of the claim of the landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. In considering the availability of alternative accommodation, the Court has to consider not merely whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The appellant had established her bonafide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances." 18. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999)6 SCC 222 , the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 13 held as under:- "The term bonafide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bonafide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bonafide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord." 19. From the evidence on record and reasons given by the courts below, this Court is of the opinion that it was wrong on the part of defendant tenant to insist that the appellant No. 2 Abdulla Farooq s/o Ahmed Farooq could set up his crockery business for which he had gained experience for one year with Mohd. Hussain - P.W.3, on the first floor space available to appellant No. 1 - Ahmed Farooq, which comprised of five rooms and wife of the appellant No. 1 had set up her small hotel business known as Taj Hotel. 20. In view of settled legal position, it is for the landlord to choose the premises which would suit his requirement and it hardly lies with the tenant to dictate the terms to landlord and suggest the landlord to satisfy his business need with available premises, which may or may not belong to the person for whose need the eviction is sought. The trial court in the present case at page 10 had clearly found that this first floor is not at all suitable for setting up the crockery business for appellant No. 2. 21. However, the learned first appellate court not emphasising much about the said first floor space, reversed the eviction decree on the ground that a triangular shop in Abdulla Building 'B' has become available to the father of the appellant No. 2 - Abdulla Farooq, which fact was subsequently brought on record by way of application under Order 41 Rule 27 Civil Procedure Code filed by the defendant tenant and since the said shop No. 1 had already became available in the year 1990, on which point learned counsel for the plaintiff landlord differed and submitted that vacant position of the said shop was only received after execution proceedings only in 1993 and after his retirement as TTE from the Railways in 1992 the plaintiff landlord Ahmed Farooq himself wanted to set up his own travel agency business in the name of M/s Jodhpur Travels, but the learned first appellate court held on the basis of evidence of R.W.4 Kailash Chand Jain, employee of M/s Jodhpur Travels that since on the receipt book/bill book "Shri Mahaveerai Namah" was handwritten on some carbon copies of Bills, vide Ex.D, R.W.1/1, which would indicate that business in the said premises was carried on by a person belonging to Jain community as against the Muslim community to which the plaintiff landlord belonged in the present case, therefore, the appellate court wrongly concluded that the appellant No. 1 himself was not carrying business in the name and style of M/s Jodhpur Travels and in fact the said shop No. 1 after eviction by Danmal was let out again to one Mohan Lal Jain. This premise taken by the learned first appellate court is wholly erroneous in the opinion of this Court. Merely because in the cross examination of R.W.4 - Kailash Jain has stated that there was handwritten inscription "Shri Mahaveerai Namah" on Ex. DR. This premise taken by the learned first appellate court is wholly erroneous in the opinion of this Court. Merely because in the cross examination of R.W.4 - Kailash Jain has stated that there was handwritten inscription "Shri Mahaveerai Namah" on Ex. DR. W.1/1 - on one & two leafs of the Bill Book, even though name of Ahmed Farooq with Jodhpur Travels is printed & this inscription was not printed at all, without clearly stating that Ahmed Farooq has no connection with M/s. Jodhpur Travels, as against the documentary evidence led by appellant No. 1 - Ahmed Farooq for registration of M/s Jodhpur Travels with the Government Authorities like Shop & Establishment Act etc., the learned first appellate court could not have concluded that appellant-plaintiff No. 1 was not doing his own business in the said shop No. 1, which had become available in the year 1990/1993. Even assuming for argument sake that appellant plaintiff - Ahmed Farooq instead of doing his own business of Travel Agency had entered into any business arrangement with one Mohan Lal Jain, though such an inference is not called for in the present case, even then it does not lie with the defendant tenant to contend that such business was not belonging to appellant No. 1 himself and said shop No. 1 may be deemed to be available for satisfying the need of setting up the crockery business for appellant No. 2 - Abdulla Farooq, son of Ahmed Farook, once landlord says that such shop is not suitable for setting up his crockery business. The learned first appellate court in para 33 of its judgment itself has ultimately not relied upon the statement of R.W. 4 - Kailash Chand Jain finding him to be making contradictory statements. 22. As aforesaid, it is for the landlord to adjudge & satisfy his need and the said shop No. 1 which is triangular in shape and of awkward measurements, as given above, cannot be said to be appropriate and suitable shop available to the landlord as against the suit shop measuring 15' x 20', which is in possession of the defendant tenant situated in same area & road on the opposite side. 23. 23. Therefore, the learned first appellate court has apparently fallen in error in substituting its own wisdom and decision for that of the landlord, who alone is the best judge in this regard as held in various decisions discussed above and the learned trial court was justified in decreeing the suit upon establishing of the bonafide and reasonable necessity of the landlord. 24. Accordingly, the present second appeal of the appellant-landlords deserves to be allowed and the same is hereby allowed & answering the substantial questions of law framed as above in favour of the plaintiff landlords & against the respondent-defendant-tenants and setting aside the appellate court's judgment and decree dated 3/12/1995, the eviction decree of the learned trial court dated 28/3/1987 is restored. The second appeal of plaintiff is allowed with no order as to costs. 25. The respondent-defendant-tenants shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property to the appellant-plaintiff (landlord) within a period of six months from today and shall pay mesne profit @ Rs. 2000/- per month commencing from October, 2012 and will further continue to pay the mesne profit each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the appellant-plaintiffs till the vacant possession is handed over to the plaintiffs & defendants shall also pay arrears of mesne profit/rent, if any within three months, otherwise such amount will carry interest at the rate of 9% p.a. and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit, the period of six months for eviction shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction would become executable forthwith. The defendant-tenant shall also not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit premises or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same and, if so created, the same would be treated as void. The defendant-tenants shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. The defendant-tenants shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit shop is not handed over or mesne profits are not paid to the appellant-plaintiff/landlord within a period of six months from today, besides expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the appellant-plaintiffs shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. Copy of the judgment be sent to both the parties and trial court forthwith. *******