Secretary, Raghunathpur High School v. Mihir Kumar Hazra
2012-03-14
ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, SHUKLA KABIR SINHA
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, J. 1. FACTS One Mihir Kumar Hazra, the respondent above named approached the learned single Judge in 1993 by filing C.O. 972 (W) of 1993 for a direction upon the District Inspector of School to approve and regularize his service with effect from November 16, 1987 as a Bio-Science teacher in Raghunathpur High School in the District of 24- Parganas (South). After exchange of affidavits the matter appeared before the learned single Judge when His Lordship vide judgment and order dated July 9, 1995 allowed the writ petition. In the writ petition Mihir claimed that the Managing Committee appointed him in 1987 by issuing a Letter of Appointment dated November 16, 1987 as Assistant Teacher in a vacant post. He joined the school on November 16, 1987 and he was working since then against a paltry salary from the school authority. Subsequently, the school got a sanctioned post in which he wanted to be regularized. The District Inspector filed an Affidavit-in-Opposition wherein we find, learned Single Judge passed an order dated January 13, 1993 against the school and the State respondent not to interfere with his service and 3 release him the salary. The school also filed affidavit. School came to know of the pendency of the writ petition from the office of the District Inspector when the Head Master visited the said office on October 18, 1993. School obtained a copy of the writ petition from the Law Cell of the District Inspectors office on November 4, 1993. The school totally denied the claim of the teacher. Petitioner was never appointed in the school, in fact he was not having appropriate qualification. The then Secretary of the school possibly manipulated the records to accommodate him. In effect, the school totally denied any relationship with Mihir. 2. THE learned Judge heard the matter and disposed of the same by judgment and order dated July 6, 1995. THE learned Judge was of the view that since there were two permanent vacancies duly sanctioned by the authority he should be regularized in such post. His Lordship was of the view that petitioner succeeded in establishing his case for getting approval of his appointment as a Bio-Science teacher. His Lordship directed regularization. Being aggrieved, the school preferred an appeal.
THE learned Judge was of the view that since there were two permanent vacancies duly sanctioned by the authority he should be regularized in such post. His Lordship was of the view that petitioner succeeded in establishing his case for getting approval of his appointment as a Bio-Science teacher. His Lordship directed regularization. Being aggrieved, the school preferred an appeal. THE Division Bench passed an interim order to the extent that in case Mihir would lose in the appeal, he 4 would refund the salary, if any received by him in the mean time. THE appeal was pending and was awaiting its disposal. In the mean time, the Managing Committee was time to time reconstituted. It was alleged that the new Managing Committee took charge on November 1, 2009. THE new Headmaster took charge on September 16, 2009. Neither of them was aware of pendency of the appeal. In 2010 Mihir moved another writ petition being W.P. No.19110(w) of 2010. Upon receipt of the copy of the writ petition, for the first time, the school came to know of the existence of the earlier order. The school was also surprised to know that the appeal had been dismissed on June 27, 2006 as nobody had appeared on behalf of the parties. The second writ petition was, in effect, an attempt to implement the earlier order dated July 6, 1995. The learned Judge passed an interim order and observed that so long the appeal was not restored the authority was bound to comply with the earlier order. In this backdrop, we heard the application for restoration and the application for condonation of delay of one thousand five hundred and ninety six days. CONTENTIONS 3. MR. Koushik Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the managing committee did not have any knowledge of pendency of the appeal. The earlier managing committee, while handing over of charge, did not hand over any document pertaining to the pendency of the appeal. The managing committee that took charge in 2009 did not have any idea about the appeal, far to speak of order of dismissal. They only came to know about such fact from the copy of the writ petition filed in 2010. He drew our attention to the relevant paragraphs in the application wherefrom we come to know that the present Managing Committee was elected on November 1, 2009.
They only came to know about such fact from the copy of the writ petition filed in 2010. He drew our attention to the relevant paragraphs in the application wherefrom we come to know that the present Managing Committee was elected on November 1, 2009. They came to know of the fact upon getting copy of the writ petition that was filed in 2010. They immediately took resolution for restoration. Such resolution was taken on October 5, 2010 and the application was made on November 30, 2010. Hence, there was no delay and/or latches on the part of the new Managing Committee in approaching this Court for restoration of the appeal. MR. Chatterjee also furnished xerox copies of the documents upon copies being furnished to the respondent to show that there had been interpolation in the minutes of the meeting. Resolution was sought to 6 have taken to justify the claim of the respondent no.1. He also drew our attention to the fact that the corresponding records of the school would otherwise not show his presence. According to him, the respondent no.1 was never engaged by the school. He never worked in the post. 4. PER contra, Mr. Ghosal contended that even if this Court would give full credence to what had been stated in the applications, the factum that the Headmaster was an ex-officio member of the Committee and was supposed to know of the pendency of the appeal could not be ignored. Mr. Ghosal referred to the verification clause to show that the deponent did not take the responsibility of the statements made in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the petition. Mr. Ghosal further contended that the learned single Judge categorically passed an order directing the school to implement the earlier order passed on July 6, 1995. The authority was thus bound to comply with the said order. In fact, contempt proceeding was pending before His Lordship. Mr. Ghosal further contended that the learned single Judge in the judgment and order impugned, considered each and every contention of the school as well as the State made in their respective affidavits. 7 Once there was categoric adjudication in favour of the respondent no.1 and the State having accepted such position having not appealed therefrom, the school was not entitled to raise any question. According to Mr. Ghosal, the appeal had no merit at all.
7 Once there was categoric adjudication in favour of the respondent no.1 and the State having accepted such position having not appealed therefrom, the school was not entitled to raise any question. According to Mr. Ghosal, the appeal had no merit at all. Hence, no useful purpose would be served by restoring the same after condonation the delay. On the issue of condonation of delay, Mr. Ghosal contended that the delay was unusual. No sufficient cause was shown. Hence, the appellants were not entitled to condonation of delay and the said application would deserve dismissal. Once the application for condonation would be dismissed the restoration application and the appeal would automatically fall having no legs to stand upon. He relied on three decision of the Apex Court reported in All India Reported 1970 Supreme Court Page-652 (A.K.K. Nambiar Vs. Union of India), All India Reporter 1981 Supreme Court Page- 733 (Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another Vs. State of Gujarat) and 2011 Volume-VII Supreme Court Cases Page-69 (Amar Singh Vs. Union of India and Others). 5. WHILE giving reply, Mr. Chatterjee once again reiterated that the new Committee took charge on November 1, 2009 whereas the present Headmaster took charge little earlier being September 16, 2009. Hence, neither the Headmaster nor the Managing Committee members did know of the pendency of the appeal or the order of dismissal as the case may be. Mr. Chatterjee contended that the Bio-Science teacher post was duly filled up in accordance with law and there could be no scope for appointment of the respondent no.1 in the said post. He referred to the Inspection Report submitted by the District Inspector of School in 1993 wherein the District Inspector observed that there was no such agenda on the relevant date to approve the appointment of Mihir. The Headmaster as well as the other teachers expressed their surprise about such appointment. No record could be found giving hint to Shri Hazras appointment in the school. The District Inspector observed that there was interpolation and erasing in the subject resolution. In 1995 further inspection was held when the similar situation arose. In 1994 the claim of Hazra was rejected by the District Inspector in a reasoned order passed on January 6, 1994. 9 6.
The District Inspector observed that there was interpolation and erasing in the subject resolution. In 1995 further inspection was held when the similar situation arose. In 1994 the claim of Hazra was rejected by the District Inspector in a reasoned order passed on January 6, 1994. 9 6. WE also find that the Bio-Science teacher post was filled up by a teacher in 1976 that was confirmed by the District Inspector in a Memo dated July 29, 1999. WE have also seen the supplementary affidavit filed by Mihir pursuant to the liberty granted by us wherefrom it appears that in 2007 he made a representation for permission to join the school. OUR VIEW We have considered the rival contentions as well as the decisions cited at the Bar. The relevant factors, in our view, are however not in dispute. The present Committee as well as Headmaster both came in 2009. That categoric averment could not be denied by the respondent no.1. Hence, the explanation offered by them to the extent that they were not in the know of the appeal was plausible. In an application for condonation of delay the Court would only see whether there was any sufficient or plausible cause for delay. The respondent failed to show that the applicants were aware of the pendency of the appeal or the order of dismissal as the case may be. If we look to the chronological events we would find that the school was all through out opposing his entry. He admitted such fact in 10 2007 in his letter. Hence, there was no reason why the school would allow their appeal to be dismissed in 2006 and wait till 2010 for making an application for restoration that would reduce the scope of offering resistance. The concept of limitation is to have finality in a controversy within a reasonable period. If an appeal in a writ proceeding is dismissed for default there would be no specific period of limitation prescribed in law for filing application for restoration. At the same time it would be the duty of the applicant praying for restoration, to show that he was prevented from sufficient cause. 7. THIS restriction is imposed only to avoid callous litigants who sleep over their right if any, so that finality is reached in a litigation on an eventuality.
At the same time it would be the duty of the applicant praying for restoration, to show that he was prevented from sufficient cause. 7. THIS restriction is imposed only to avoid callous litigants who sleep over their right if any, so that finality is reached in a litigation on an eventuality. A party approached the learned single Judge for adjudication of a controversy. The learned single Judge adjudicated the issue on contest and gave his verdict that would become final and binding upon to the parties to the said litigation. The issue could only be revived by way of an appeal by the aggrieved party. Once the appeal was filed and it was allowed to be dismissed for default the right of the appellant stood extinguished giving finality to the verdict of the learned single Judge. Even then a further opportunity is given 11 to the appellant to pray for restoration that too, within a reasonable period so that the issue could not be kept hanging for eternity. Question thus remains, what would be the reasonable cause. We have no hesitation to say that the scope of the phraseology "reasonable cause" is too wide. It is a relative term giving wider scope to the Court to arrive at a positive conclusion as to whether the party claiming benefit was entitled to it or not. The only yardstick which could be applied therein, is to have a conclusion by the Court that in the opinion of any prudent man, the causes shown by the applicant were reasonable and just. Once such test is positive the applicant would be entitled to restoration. The period is not of so much importance. It would only narrow the scope of discretion, nothing else. 8. IN the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh (Supra), the Apex Court was of the view that the delay must occur within the period of limitation. IN the instant case, the school was not in the know of pendency of the appeal. School would mean the Headmaster or the Managing Committee who run this school. School being a juristic person would always act through Managing Committee.
IN the instant case, the school was not in the know of pendency of the appeal. School would mean the Headmaster or the Managing Committee who run this school. School being a juristic person would always act through Managing Committee. The earlier Managing Committee was negligent in not taking any step in the appeal, might be to favour the respondent, that would not, per se, prevent the Managing Committee lawfully elected to run the school, to make application for restoration, claiming ignorance of the factum of pendency of the appeal or the order of dismissal as the case may be, at the relevant time. We are not oblivion of the fact that in an application for restoration or an application for condonation, as the case may be, the Court is not competent to consider the factual matrix. Mr. Ghosal cautioned us on that score. However, in course of his submission he referred to various factual matrix Mr. Ghosal invited us to demonstrate that the concerned teacher was all through out discriminated by the school. Mr. Chatterjee also drew our attention to the documents mentioned above. On being invited by the parties, we gave a cursory look to the facts. We thus cannot shut our eyes to the serious lapses alleged by the present Managing Committee in the matter of giving purported appointment to the respondent no.1. We are aware that dismissing application for condonation would automatically revive the order of 13 the learned single Judge dated July 6, 1995 and would thus give rise to a claim to implement the same as recognised by the subsequent order dated October 4, 2010. If the version of the Managing Committee on factual matrix was correct it would be a travesty of justice to dismiss the application for condonation or restoration, as the case may be. On the other hand, it would be proper for the Court to hear the parties on merits and decide the appeal after restoring the same we are prompted to say so being encouraged by the Apex Court observation in a case of the like nature. We thus quote paragraph 14 of the decision in the case of State of Bihar and Others Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Another reported in All India Reporter 2000 Supreme Court Page-2306.
We thus quote paragraph 14 of the decision in the case of State of Bihar and Others Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Another reported in All India Reporter 2000 Supreme Court Page-2306. "Looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, as noticed earlier and with the object of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned, we are of the opinion that sufficient cause has been made out by the petitioners which has persuaded us to condone the delay in filing the petitions. Dismissing the appeals on technical grounds of limitation would not, in any way, advance the interests of justice but admittedly, result in failure of justice as the impugned judgments are likely to affect not only the parties before us, but hundreds of other persons who are stated to be senior than the respondents. The 14 technicalities of law cannot prevent us from doing substantial justice and undoing the illegalities perpetuated on the basis of the impugned judgments. However, while deciding the petitions, the reliefs, in the case can appropriately be moulded which may not amount to unsettle the settled rights of the parties on the basis of judicial pronouncements made by the Courts regarding which the State is shown to have been careless and negligent. It is paramount consideration of this Court to safeguard the interests of all the litigants and persons serving the Police Department of the State of Bihar by ensuring the security of the tenure and non disturbance of accrual of rights upon them under the prevalent law and the rules made in that behalf. Accordingly delay in filing the petitions is condoned." 9. MR. Ghosal heavily relied on the decision in the case of A.K.K. Nambiar (Supra) on the issue of verification. In our view, once the factum was not in dispute particularly the entry of the Headmaster and the new Managing Committee in the school administration in 2009, it would be travesty of justice to dismiss the petitions on mere technical plea. Thus, we reject the contention of MR. Ghosal on the verification clause. 10. WE accordingly hold that the applicants were able to show sufficient cause that prevented them from approaching this Court earlier for restoration. RESULT CAN 9292 of 2010 and CAN 9820 of 2010 succeed and are allowed. Delay is condoned. Order dated June 27, 2007 dismissing the above appeal is recalled.
Ghosal on the verification clause. 10. WE accordingly hold that the applicants were able to show sufficient cause that prevented them from approaching this Court earlier for restoration. RESULT CAN 9292 of 2010 and CAN 9820 of 2010 succeed and are allowed. Delay is condoned. Order dated June 27, 2007 dismissing the above appeal is recalled. Appeal no.1034 of 1998 is restored and is directed to be placed in the next monthly list for hearing. CAN 9292 of 2010 and CAN 9820 of 2010 are disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs. DIRECTION Urgent Photostat copy will be given to the parties, if applied for.