Judgment :- 1. Animadverting upon the common order and decreetal orders dated 10.01.2012 passed by the learned I Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore in I.A.Nos.558, 595 and 763 of 2011 respectively in LAOP No.120 of 1999, these civil revision petitions have been focussed. 2. Heard both sides. 3. Broadly but briefly, narratively but precisely, the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of these three revision petitions would run thus: (i) The immovable property concerned was acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act; whereupon, proceedings were initiated for disbursal of the amount and the revision petitioner, who is one and the same, viz., R. Kondasamy Naidu in all these revision petitions, received the amount without prejudice to his claim for enhancement and got the matter referred to the Sub-Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Before the Sub Court, he litigated and got order for enhancement of compensation also. As such, after passing of the said order, the respondents/third parties in these revision petitions, viz., the revision petitioner's children filed separate applications and objected for releasing of the amount in favour of the revision petitioner herein mainly on the ground that he is the Kartha of the family and the property acquired by the Government was the ancestral property, over which, they had respective shares. The Sub Court also in response to the respondents/third parties passed the common order to the effect that the enhanced amount ordered by it shall not be released to the revision petitioner. (ii) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said common order passed by the Sub Court concerned, these three civil revision petitions have been preferred more or less on the same grounds. 4. The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner would put forth and set forth her arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus: a) The Hon'ble Apex Court in the following two decisions, (i) (2006)12 SCC 300 [Shyamali Das vs. Illa Chowdhry and others] and (ii) (2006) 13 SCC 574 [P.K.Sreekantan and others vs. P.Sreekumaran Nair and others] virtually resolved the conflicting views, which emerged under Section 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act and as such, the points raised by the respondents/third parties in these revision petitions are no more res integra. b) The Reference Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is having no power at the instance of a third party to pass any restraint order to the effect that the enhanced amount adjudged by it shall not be released in favour of the person, who got the enhancement, in view of the dispute between such petitioner and the third party. Accordingly, she would pray for setting aside the order of the lower court by allowing these revision petitions. 5. Per contra, in a bid to torpedo and pulverise and to make mincemeat of the arguments advanced on the side of the revision petitioner, the learned advocates for the respondents/third parties, in unison would pilot their arguments, the pith and marrow of the same would run thus: (i) The revision petitioner herein is none, but the respondent-third parties' father, who represented them as Kartha in the land acquisition proceedings as well as before the Sub Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. However, of late, his attitude got changed and by having a volte face, he decided to take away the entire enhanced compensation amount for himself without coming forward to share the same with his children and that alone necessitated the respondents/third parties to file the said applications before the Sub-Court seeking such restraint order, which was passed in the interest of justice, warranting no interference in these revisions. (ii) Out of the three children, only the two sons of the revision petitioners, viz., Janagaraj and Selvaraj filed a suit before the Sub Court, Coimbatore, claiming their shares; as such, pendente lite, if the revision petitioner is allowed to take away the enhanced amount, then certainly, the respondents/third parties would be left in the lurch and they would not be able to enjoy the fruit of the decree, if any that would be passed in the suit filed by them. Accordingly, the learned Advocates would pray for the dismissal of the revision petitions. 6. The point for consideration is as to whether the Reference Court under the Land Acquisition Act, viz., Sub Court, which acquired jurisdiction in view of the reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 18 of the Act, had jurisdiction to pass the impugned common order dated 10.01.2012 in I.A.Nos.558, 595 and 763 of 2011 respectively in LAOP No.120 of 1999? 7. 7. I would like to extract here under the relevant paragraphs from the precedents of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (i) (2006)12 SCC 300 [Shyamali Das vs. Illa Chowdhry and others] "19. The Act is a complete code by itself. It provides for remedies not only to those whose lands have been acquired but also to those who claim the awarded amount or any apportionment thereof. A Land Acquisition Judge derives its jurisdiction from the order of reference. It is bound thereby. His jurisdiction is to determine adequacy or otherwise of the amount of compensation paid under the award made by the Collector. It is not within his domain to entertain any application of pro interesse suo or in the nature thereof. 20. The learned Reference Judge, therefore, was entirely correct in passing its order dated 22-6-2004. A finding of fact was arrived at therein that the appellant was not a party interested in the proceeding within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act. The said order attained finality. It could not have, thus, been reopened. Another application for impleadment, therefore, was not maintainable. It may be true that in the proceeding of a suit, the court can in a changed situation entertain a second application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. But, the learned Reference Judge having opined, while passing its order dated 26-2-2004, that the appellant was not a person interested, in our opinion, a second application despite the subsequent event was not maintainable. 21. It is one thing to say that a proceeding under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act was maintainable at the instance of the appellant. She was given an opportunity to file the same by the Calcutta High Court in terms of its order dated 22-9-2000. She did not avail the said opportunity. Having not availed the opportunity, in our opinion, she was not entitled to be impleaded as a party. 22. This Court had some occasion to consider the question as to who would fall within the ambit of the term “person interested”. 23. In Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar1 it was opined that a State who claims ownership of the land in question was not a party interested stating: (SCC p. 147, para 36) “If it was government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. 23. In Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar1 it was opined that a State who claims ownership of the land in question was not a party interested stating: (SCC p. 147, para 36) “If it was government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to the pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the civil court for determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference made by the Collector to the court was wholly without jurisdiction and the civil court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the civil court suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared so.” 24. In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran2 this Court opined: (SCC p. 565, para 7) “7. It is well established that the Reference Court gets jurisdiction only if the matter is referred to it under Section 18 or 30 of the Act by the Land Acquisition Officer and that the civil court has got the jurisdiction and authority only to decide the objections referred to it. The Reference Court cannot widen the scope of its jurisdiction or decide matters which are not referred to it.” 25. We may also notice that prima facie the appellant cannot be said to have any right, title and interest in the property but we do not intend to express our final opinion thereupon as the matter is pending consideration before the civil court. 26. A disputant is entitled to an interim order, provided he is a party thereto. If for one reason or the other, he cannot be impleaded as a party to the proceeding, the court would have no jurisdiction to pass any interim order in his favour. 27. If the impleadment application was not maintainable, it was required to be dismissed in limine. It could not have been entertained only for pressing an interim order. If for one reason or the other, he cannot be impleaded as a party to the proceeding, the court would have no jurisdiction to pass any interim order in his favour. 27. If the impleadment application was not maintainable, it was required to be dismissed in limine. It could not have been entertained only for pressing an interim order. Law does not contemplate exercise of such a jurisdiction by a court of law. Any such order passed is Coram non judice." and (ii) (2006) 13 SCC 574 [P.K.Sreekantan and others vs. P.Sreekumaran Nair and others] . "11. The Reference Court derives jurisdiction from the reference made. References under Section 18 and Section 30 are conceptually different from each other. The decree in terms of Section 18 is different from the one in terms of Section 30. Remedy available in terms of Section 55 of the Act is against a decree. The question whether Reference Court can deal with the question covered by Section 30 of the Act in a reference made under Section 18 of the Act and vice versa has been the subject-matter of judicial determination. In Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Secy. of State for India in Council1 it was held that the jurisdiction of the courts under the Act is a special one and strictly limited to the terms of Sections 18, 20 and 21. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's award and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Therefore, it is certain that when the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation that alone is the matter referred and the court has no jurisdiction to determine or consider anything beyond it. 12. In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran2 the question related to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Act vis-à-vis Section 18. Determination in terms of Section 30 has settings of a decision in the partition suit. In Ajjam Linganna v. Land Acquisition Officer3 it was held that the Reference Court has no power to convert the reference under Section 30 into one in Section 18 of the Act at the instance of those who did not apply for reference earlier. 13. Determination in terms of Section 30 has settings of a decision in the partition suit. In Ajjam Linganna v. Land Acquisition Officer3 it was held that the Reference Court has no power to convert the reference under Section 30 into one in Section 18 of the Act at the instance of those who did not apply for reference earlier. 13. Every tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not only entitled but bound to determine whether the matter in which it is asked to exercise its jurisdiction comes within the limits of its special jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain facts or circumstances. Its obvious duty is to see that these facts and circumstances exist to invest it with jurisdiction, and where a tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the statute that creates it and that statute also defines the conditions under which the tribunal can function, it goes without saying that before that tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a matter, it must be satisfied that the conditions requisite for its acquiring seisin of that matter have in fact arisen. As observed by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan Wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan Bahadoor4, wherever jurisdiction is given to a court by an Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in that Act it is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction for if they be not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. (See Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra5.) 15. Above being the position, the High Court's view that it was impermissible to deal with the matter covered under Section 30 of the Act while dealing with a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act is irreversible." A mere poring over and perusal of those decisions would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot exercise its jurisdiction beyond Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. 8. Hence, I am of the considered view that in so far as the limited power of the said Court exercising its power under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is concerned, it is no more res integra. 9. 8. Hence, I am of the considered view that in so far as the limited power of the said Court exercising its power under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is concerned, it is no more res integra. 9. The above narration of facts would demonstrate and exemplify that the Sub Court, which was seized of the matter under Section 18 of the Act, over stepped its function by passing such restraint order. The Court had no jurisdiction at all at the instance of the respondents/third parties to pass such an order. If at all, the respondents/third parties had any right over the said property, then they should have made claim by invoking Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act and they should have approached the Collector for getting the claim referred under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to the court. But, so far this case is concerned, no reference at all emerged under Section 30 of the Act and only at the instance of the revision petitioner herein, the matter was referred by the Land Acquisition Officer to the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act and in such a case, the respondents/third parties had no locus standi to petition the said court and the Sub Court also had no jurisdiction to pass such common order. 10. Needless to say that the parties, who already approached the regular civil court with a suit should have got their further remedy worked out by filing appropriate application. However, the learned Advocates appearing for the respondents/third parties herein would implore and entreat that some interim remedy might be given by this court till they work out their remedy in a wholesome manner before the civil court, but such an argument cannot be countenanced and upheld as that would amount to deciding something quite antithetical to what the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down as law in the aforesaid two precedents. 11. The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner would also cite the judgment dated 28.03.2011 passed by the Hon'ble Apex court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) ... 2011 C.C.No.4549 of 2011, which is extracted here under for ready reference: "Delay condoned. The Special Leave petition is dismissed. 11. The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner would also cite the judgment dated 28.03.2011 passed by the Hon'ble Apex court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) ... 2011 C.C.No.4549 of 2011, which is extracted here under for ready reference: "Delay condoned. The Special Leave petition is dismissed. However, four weeks' time is granted to make payment as per the judgment of the High court." And pithily, as per which, the Sub Court was bound to release the amount and in such a case, this court cannot pass any order quite against the said provisions of law. 12. In the result, the common order and the decreetal orders passed by the Sub Court is set aside and all these civil revision petitions are allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.