Judgment :- Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. The substantial question of law; the only issue; for decision in this employer's appeal under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is as to whether the Commissioner erred in law in applying Section 8 of the Act, thereby refusing to act on an agreement under which the dependents of the deceased workman accepted amounts from the employer in settlement of the claim for compensation. 2. The workman died on 7.8-.2005 leaving behind mother, widow and two minor sons. The claim was filed before the Commissioner in 2006 by the mother, the widow and a minor son. The other minor son was impleaded later Preliminary enquiry was held on 25.8.2006 and 27.10.2006. Thereupon the claim was admitted and numbered as WCC No.72 of 2006. On 4.1.2008, a petition was filed stating that the parties have arrived at a settlement and an order may be passed in terms of that. It was stated therein that an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- was received by the widow of the workman; of which, Rs.50,000/-each have been deposited respectively in the name of the mother and the widow, and another Rs.50,000/-as a joint fixed deposit in the name of the minor sons of the deceased workman. The workman's widow, who was the second applicant, deposed before the Commissioner in terms of the aforesaid settlement. The Commissioner noted that the said payment made by the employer to the applicants cannot be treated as payment of compensation in view of the provisions of the Act, which inhibits direct payment of compensation to dependents of a deceased workman. Accordingly, the compensation was determined ignoring the payment of that sum. 3. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the Commissioner erred in law in relying on Section 8 of the Act, thereby refusing to act on Ext A2 agreement between the parties and that Ext.A2 agreement is a bonafide transaction, which has also been spoken to by the second applicant. It is pithily pointed out that the fact of the matter remains that the payment of the entire amounts given by the employer to the dependents of the deceased workman is unimpeachable as those amounts were deposited in a bank. It is pithily pointed out that the fact of the matter remains that the payment of the entire amounts given by the employer to the dependents of the deceased workman is unimpeachable as those amounts were deposited in a bank. The Commissioner ought to have adopted a pragmatic approach to find that the appellant employer had paid compensation to the satisfaction of the claimants and therefore Ext.A2 agreement is valid and eligible to be acted upon, it is argued. 4. The learned counsel for the respondents, who were the claimants before the Commissioner, points out that though the impugned order has been issued by the Commissioner as enjoined by law, as a matter of fact, Ext.A2 agreement was entered into and acted upon bonafide and amounts have been deposited in the names of dependents, as deposed by the workman's widow before the Commissioner. 5. Subsection 1 of section 8 of the Act provides, inter-alia, that no payment of compensation in cases of death shall be made otherwise than by deposit with the Commissioner, and no such payment made directly by an employer shall be deemed to be a payment of compensation. However, an employer may make to any dependent, advances, on account of compensation, of an amount equal to three months' wages of such workman and so much of such amount, as does not exceed the compensation payable to that dependent, shall be deducted by the Commissioner from such compensation and repaid to the employer. Subsection 2 of that section provides that any other sum amounting to not less than ten rupees which is payable as compensation may be deposited with the Commissioner on behalf of the person entitled thereto. Thus, statute inhibits any direct payment to the claimants except to the extent of the aforesaid limit and provides that payment of compensation in excess of that limit shall be only by deposit with the Commissioner. That provision is a protective legislation insulating the dependents of workmen who die as a result of employment injuries. Such dependents form a class by themselves and belong to the challenged, vulnerable and weaker sections of the society. The provisions in sections 8 (1) & (2) are intended to exclude any situation or opportunity, which could be abused against the interest of that marginalised category of the society. Such dependents form a class by themselves and belong to the challenged, vulnerable and weaker sections of the society. The provisions in sections 8 (1) & (2) are intended to exclude any situation or opportunity, which could be abused against the interest of that marginalised category of the society. Section 8 of the Act, in effect protects the dependents of a deceased workman against any kind of exploitation or fraud by or on behalf of the employer or any third party, in relation to compensation payable to them under that provision. No payment of compensation, otherwise than by deposit with the Commissioner, in respect of a workman whose injury has resulted in death, is to be recognized, except to the extent provision for such payment is made in section 8 itself and eligible to be reckoned while calculating the total amount payable as compensation under section 8. No employer can plead to have discharged the liability to pay compensation in such cases, without making deposit before the Commissioner, even if the employer does not dispute the liability and is prepared to pay off the entire amount due to the dependents of the deceased workman in terms of the Act. 6. The distribution of compensation among the different dependents of a deceased workman is a matter within the authority of the Commissioner in terms of subsections 4 to 8 of section 8 of the Act, Such power includes the authority to decide on various matters provided for in those subsections. Issues relating to identifying and classifying the dependents of the deceased workman are exclusively within the domain of the Commissioner. Equally, the power to make provisions on case to case basis, having regard to the situation of the dependents of a deceased workman, is with the Commissioner. The legislature has envisaged and provided the manner in which the challenged dependents of a deceased workman have to be protected through the statutory provisions and by the authorised statutory authorities. The empowerment of the Commissioner in this regard, as its inexcusable corollary, casts the duty on the Commissioner to ensure that all such cases are appropriately taken care of as envisaged and enjoined by those provisions. Those are not matters to be left to the bargains between the employer, on the one hand, and the dependents of the deceased workman, on the other. Those are not matters to be left to the bargains between the employer, on the one hand, and the dependents of the deceased workman, on the other. It is the avowed duty of the Commissioner to ensure the statutory protection of the dependents of a deceased workman, as provided for in terms of the aforesaid laws, as and when such situations arise in any given case. This provision also categorically rules out the possibility of the employer settling any claim and paying off the dependents of the deceased workman, without depositing the compensation due under the Act before the Commissioner as enjoined. 7. Formidable support for the aforesaid view is available on the legislative materials themselves. Section 3(1) of the Act provides that if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the Act. Section 4 prescribes the different amounts to be paid as compensation in different situations, including where death results from the injury. The Act envisages and provides for payment of compensation in cases of injuries which do not result in death and also for cases of death, where death results from the injury. As already noted, section 8 specifically deals with distribution of compensation in respect of a workman whose injury has resulted in death. Subsection 1 of Section 28 of the Act provides, among other things, that where the amount of any lump sum payable as compensation has been settled by agreement, or where any compensation has been so settled as being payable to a woman or a person under a legal disability, a memorandum thereof shall be sent by the employer to the Commissioner, who shall, on being satisfied as to its genuineness, record the memorandum in a register in the prescribed manner. Pause here to rewind the legislative history; to note that until they were repealed by Act 7 of 1924, the words "or to a dependent" occurred after the words "to a person under a legal disability" in section 28 (1). Pause here to rewind the legislative history; to note that until they were repealed by Act 7 of 1924, the words "or to a dependent" occurred after the words "to a person under a legal disability" in section 28 (1). The exclusion of the words "or to a dependent" from the legislative provision that then existed is intrinsic legislative material unequivocally demonstrating the legislative intention and command that there can be no settlement in relation to cases where compensation is payable under section 8 of the Act, in respect of a workman whose injury has resulted in death. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, it has to be stated that law does not recognize any settlement between an employer and the dependents of a workman, of a case where compensation is payable under section 8 of the Act. No settlement could be recorded under section 28, in relation to a case where compensation is payable under section 8 of the Act. Therefore, Ext.A2 is of no value to bind the dependents of the deceased workman. The Commissioner has, therefore, acted in accordance with law in deciding the quantum of compensation payable under section 8 of the Act without reference to Ext. A2 settlement between the parties. 9. Now, another aspect arising on the facts of the case and the materials on record needs to be noted. Ext.A2 is shown to have been entered into also on behalf of the two minor sons of the deceased workman. The right of a minor to compensation under the Act is a legitimate statutory entitlement. There cannot be any ground on which a parent or guardian could deprive a child of the benefit by any concession that they offer. No such concession by the parents or guardian can be recognized in law, even in cases which would be available for settlement of section 28 of the Act. In such a situation, the courts and judicial authorities have also a role of parens patriae as regards the minors involved in such litigations. Quintessentially, this farsightedness of the laws is writ large in section 28, which embodies protective provisions in favour of persons with legal disabilities. The statutory authorities have to keep their eyes wide open to protect such persons and provide necessary support on account of their eligibility to protection from State, on account of their legal disabilities, of which minority is a species. The statutory authorities have to keep their eyes wide open to protect such persons and provide necessary support on account of their eligibility to protection from State, on account of their legal disabilities, of which minority is a species. Having noticed Ext.A2, we deem it appropriate to sound that the aforesaid words of caution are relevant while dealing with agreements or settlements which would fall under section 28 to the Act. Neither the mother, nor the paternal grandmother of the two minors in the case in hand, could have entered into any agreement on behalf of the minor children of the deceased workman. 10. We have looked into the entire materials, including the contents of Ext.A2. Under that document, amounts are stated to have been paid on 27.4.2007. The second applicant, who is the widow of the deceased workman, deposed before the Commissioner that she had received an amount of Rs.1,50,000/-from the respondent and out of that, amounts at the rate of Rs.50,000/-have been deposited in her name; in the name of the mother of the workman; and, in the names of his children, jointly, in the State Bank of Travancore. In the light of what we have found above, in terms of the provisions of the statute, there was no room to entertain any such contention during the course of proceedings before the Commissioner. Nor is there any ground to entertain the plea of the appellant based on such a factual premise, as a substantial question of law in this appeal. 11. However, looking at the contents of Ext.A2 and the fact that the first and second claimants stand by it, we are inclined to accept that the said transaction is a true and bonafide one and that respondents 1 and 2 have received such amounts. Yet, the powers conferred on the Commissioner under the Act would be wholly insufficient for that authority to accept any such plea or to act on such material. But, in an exceptionally exceptional case like the one in hand, on being satisfied about the bonafides of the plea and materials, is this Court, sitting in appeal, powerless that it has to leave unresolved, the muddle in which the parties have placed themselves; may be, due to inadequate assistance in conducting the proceedings before the Commissioner? But, in an exceptionally exceptional case like the one in hand, on being satisfied about the bonafides of the plea and materials, is this Court, sitting in appeal, powerless that it has to leave unresolved, the muddle in which the parties have placed themselves; may be, due to inadequate assistance in conducting the proceedings before the Commissioner? Section 30 of the Act which provides for appeal to this Court, against the decision of the Commissioner, prescribes certain restrictions, including as to the requirement of substantial question of law, to interfere with the verdict of the Commissioner. It also enjoins certain conditions for the appeal, including by way of deposit. At the same time, it does not provide for, or regulate, the procedure that this Court has to follow or adopt in the matter of dealing with the admission, hearing and decision-making in the appeal. Therefore, the age-tested principle which applies is that when an appeal lies to an established Court, without prescribing the procedure for dealing with such appeal, that Court would apply such rules, principles and practices as would apply in dealing with appeals relating to the subject matter of the litigation. That is to say, if the content of the appeal and the subject matter of the proceedings from which it arises are predominantly "civil" in nature, the appellate court will guide itself to decide that appeal as it would decide a civil appeal. Similarly, if the subject matter is predominantly "criminal", rules, principles relating to practice and procedure in criminal appellate jurisdiction would govern. For support, see New India Assurance Co. Ltd. versus Pathumma(1986 KLT 553) and the Privy Council judgments referred to therein; Secretary of State for India versusChellikani Rama Rao and Others(AIR 1916 PC 21) and R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar and another versus R. Chandrasekahara Thevar(AIR 1948 PC 12). This principle persuades us to exercise authority in accordance with the provisions contained in Rule 33 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is a tool available to an appellate court governed by that Code, to be used in extremely deserving situations, to mould the relief in such a way as to render complete justice between the parties. We are satisfied that the power of this Court in that regard needs to be exercised in the case in hand. We are satisfied that the power of this Court in that regard needs to be exercised in the case in hand. Ends of justice would be satisfied, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, if the amount of Rs.1,50,000/-is given due credit to as on 27.4.2007, without, in any manner, reducing otherwise the compensation amount or the interest accruing thereon in terms of the impugned award and in accordance with law. Such credit will be reconciled as on the date of deposit of the compensation due under the impugned award, before the Commissioner. It is so ordered. The appellant is not entitled to any other relief. In the result, this appeal is ordered confirming the impugned order of the Commissioner and directing that due credit shall be given to an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- as directed above, without in any manner reducing otherwise, the compensation amount or the interest accruing thereon, in terms of the impugned award and in accordance with law. The appellant is not entitled to any other relief. No costs.