Judgment :- 1. The challenge in this writ petition is to the award passed by the first respondent herein dated 30.01.2002 passed in I.D.No.137/2001, confirming the order of termination dated 12.01.1998 passed by the third respondent herein. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was employed originally in the year 1963 as Maist fry for handling food grains at the Madras Harbour, as employed by the Regional Director (Food), Southern Region, Madras. The petitioner has become the employee of the Food Corporation of India [hereinafter referred to as 'FCI']. The employees working in the FCI are governed by The Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1971, if they are staffs and if they are workmen, they are governed by the Model Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The petitioner, being a workman, is governed by the Model Standing Orders. 3. The petitioner was having unblemished record of 24 years of service. The petitioner was the founder and President of the FCI Employees' Cooperative Thrift and Credit Society. In the year 1983, the Elected Board was superseded by the Government and a Special Officer was appointed and the Special Officer initiated surcharge proceedings under Section 87 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 against the President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Thrift Society for certain shortage of funds. Simultaneously, criminal proceedings were also initiated against the President and others. The criminal case was pending at the time of filing this writ petition, which ultimately ended in acquittal by the judgment dated 29.06.2007 passed by the 16th Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai in C.C.No.5691/1987. 4. The petitioner was suspended by the order dated 17.08.1987 on the ground of his implication and involvement in a criminal case on the allegation of falsification of accounts and misappropriation of funds of the FCI Employees Cooperative Thrift and Credit Society. Thereafter, only in the year 1997, a communication dated 9.12.1997 was received from the third respondent herein calling the petitioner to appear before the Enquiry Committee on 15.12.1997 at 11.30 a.m. The petitioner was called to appear before the Enquiry Committee without serving any show cause notice. However, the petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Committee on 15.12.1997. Thereafter, only in the year 1997, a communication dated 9.12.1997 was received from the third respondent herein calling the petitioner to appear before the Enquiry Committee on 15.12.1997 at 11.30 a.m. The petitioner was called to appear before the Enquiry Committee without serving any show cause notice. However, the petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Committee on 15.12.1997. During the said enquiry, no witness was examined and no document was produced and marked and only certain questions have been put to the petitioner as to whether the petitioner was willing to repay the said amount. 5. The petitioner denied the allegations made against him and further stated that he has filed an appeal against the order of surcharge proceedings for the recovery of the amount before the Co-operative Tribunal. The petitioner was not given opportunity to produce his evidence or document. Thereafter, the petitioner was dismissed from service by the order dated 12.01.1998 passed by the third respondent herein on the ground that falsification of accounts and misappropriation of FCI Employees' Cooperative Thrift and Credit Society's funds have been proved. Thereafter, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, challenging the termination order dated 12.01.1998 before the Central Government Tribunal-Cum- Labour Court, Chennai, namely, the first respondent herein in I.D.No.113/99 and subsequently, renumbered as I.D.No.137/2001. The Tribunal passed an Award dated 30.01.2002 confirming the termination order passed against the petitioner. Being aggrieved against the said Award, the present writ petition is filed with the above said prayer. 6. Mr. Abudukumar Rajarathinam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that the impugned award is liable to be set aside and put forward the following contentions: (1) The termination order was passed by placing reliance on Sections 23(1) and 23(3) (v) of the Standing Orders for the Workmen employed at Madras Harbour and the instant case would not come within the purview of the said provisions, as the allegation levelled against the petitioner is only in respect of forgery and misappropriation of the funds relating to the FCI Employees Cooperative Thrift and Credit Society. (2) The respondents 2 and 3 have not conducted any enquiry in the manner known to law by serving any show cause notice or by issuing any charge memo and by examining any witness and producing any document and not even the enquiry report was submitted before the authorities concerned before passing the order of termination dated 12.01.1998 and as such, the whole proceedings is vitiated. (3) The respondents 2 and 3 have conducted an eyewash enquiry without following fair procedure and without affording any opportunity to the petitioner inspite of the specific direction contained under Section 23(4) of the Standing Orders and as such, the order of termination was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. (4) The termination order was passed in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and as such, the impugned award is liable to be quashed. (5) The petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case initiated on the basis of the same, similar and identical charges during the pendency of this writ petition and as such, the order of termination passed through the so-called disciplinary proceedings is liable to be quashed. (6) The suspension order was passed against the petitioner as early as on 17.08.1987, whereas the enquiry was conducted in the year 1997 and the termination order was passed only on 12.01.1998 and there is no explanation for such an inordinate delay and on that ground itself, the entire proceedings is vitiated. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in order to substantiate his contentions, placed reliance on the following decisions: “(1) Glaxo Laboratories (I) Limited v. Labour Court, Meerut and Others reported in 1984 I L.L.J. 16 (2) Shri Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and another reported in 1985-I L.L.J. 527 (3) Indian Express & Chronical Press v. M.C.Kapur reported in 1974-II L.L.J. 240 (4) State of Uttaranchal and Others v. Kharak Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 (5) Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 (6) G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 (7) P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636 (8) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Another reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 738” 7. Per contra, Mr. Per contra, Mr. M. Imthias, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 contended that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned award. It is contended that the proceedings initiated against the petitioner on the basis of Sections 23(1) and 23(3)(v) of the Standing Orders are well within the competence of the FCI, as the petitioner proved to have committed misconduct on the allegation of misappropriation of the funds of the FCI Employees Cooperative Thrift and Credit Society and on the basis of the orders passed in the surcharge proceedings under Section 87 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 that the order passed by the Tribunal, as per the surcharge proceedings, reached its finality as the petitioner has not preferred any appeal against the said order. It is contended that in respect of the powers of the FCI for initiating action against the petitioner, in a similar matter arising out of misconduct committed in respect of the same Thrift Society, this Court has taken a view that such action is maintainable. In support of such contention, the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3, placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) Unreported order of this Court dated 09.02.2010 passed in W.P.No.2319/2010 (2) Unreported order of this Court dated 25.03.2010 passed in W.P.Nos.25915/2009 etc. Batch (3) Unreported Division Bench decision of this Court dated 30.06.2010 passed in W.A.No.899/2010 and (4) High Range Estate Employees' Association (CITU) and another v. Industrial Tribunal and another reported in 2008 (2) L.L.N. 897. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 further contended that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice, as the petitioner was well aware about the allegations levelled against him and in the enquiry, questions have been put to the petitioner pointing out the allegations levelled against him and the petitioner has admitted the allegations levelled against him and as such, there is no question of submitting any enquiry report by the Enquiry Officer as the questions put to the petitioner and the answers elicited from him itself is sufficient and the same is construed to be an Enquiry Officer's report. 9. 9. I have given my careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions put forward by either side and thoroughly scrutinized the entire materials available on record and perused the impugned award dated 30.01.2002. (I) PROVISION UNDER SECTIONS 23(1) AND 23(3)(v) OF THE STANDING ORDER FOR WORKMEN EMPLOYED AT MADRAS HABROUR OF FCI CANNOT BE INVOKED IN RESPECT OF THE ALLEGATIONS LEVELLED AGAINST THE PETITIONER AS THE SAID ALLEGATIONS ARE IN RESPECT OF THE CONDUCT OF THE PETITIONER SAID TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED OUTSIDE THE PREMISES OF THE PORT : 10. Before proceeding to consider the above said crux of the issue involved in this matter, it is relevant to refer the provisions of Sections 23(1) and 23(3)(v) of the Standing Order for Workmen Employed at Madras Harbour of FCI which reads hereunder: Disciplinary Action “23(1).A listed worker may be suspended as a measure of punishment for a period not exceeding seven days at a time, or removed from the list without notice with consequent loss of right to be employed, in the event of his being found guilty of a misconduct. ...... (3) The following acts and omissions shall be deemed as misconduct;- ...... (v) Theft, fraud, dishonesty or pileferage of any property belonging to the employer or anyone else, in the port premises.” A cursory reading of the above said provisions would make it abundantly clear that the worker of FCI is liable to be proceeded with disciplinary action in respect of the misconduct alleged to have been committed in the Port premises. The fact remains that as far as the case on hand is concerned, the petitioner has been implicated on the allegation of misappropriation said to have been committed while the petitioner was functioning as the President of the FCI Employees Thrift and Credit Society, Chennai and the respondents have initiated disciplinary action as per the provisions of Sections 23(1) and 23(3)(v) of the Standing Orders for Workmen employed at Madras Harbour of FCI. It is pertinent to note that the Thrift Society is situated outside the Port premises and in a different place and further, the materials produced before this Court does not disclose that the FCI is having any financial or other interest in the said Society or having any control over the function, business affairs and management of the Thirft Society. 11. Mr. 11. Mr. K. Abudukumar Rajarathinam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner put forward the first and foremost contention to the effect that the respondents cannot invoke the provisions of the Standing Orders 23(1) and 23(3)(v) on the ground that the alleged misconduct was said to have been committed by the petitioner outside the premises of the Port. By making such submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the action of the employees as per Standing Order 23(3)(v) is non est in law. The fact remains that the petitioner alleged to have committed misappropriation and other offences only in respect of the FCI Employees Cooperative Thrift and Credit Society and the said Society office is situated far away from the Port premises. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Thrift Society is an independent entity and the Company/Corporation has no financial or other interest in the said Society nor does it have any control over the affairs, management, function and finance of the Thrift Society. The said factor is not disputed by the respondents 2 and 3. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 that the provisions of Sections 23(1) and 23(3)(v) of the Standing Orders are very much applicable to the petitioner who alleged to have committed misconduct, misappropriation and other offences in respect of the Thrift and Credit Society, as the same was established exclusively for the employees of the FCI. 12. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Limited v. Labour Court, Meerut and Others reported in 1984-I-L.L.J 16. The relevant portion of the said decision is to be incorporated hereunder: "7. Therefore, the primary question that needs consideration is whether the various acts of misconduct collocated in Cl.10 would constitute misconduct punishable under S.O.23, if committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof or irrespective of the time place content, they are per se such acts of misconduct that they would be punishable notwithstanding where and when they were committed." 8.......The scheme of the Act would show that the certified standing orders have more or less a statutory flavour. If that be so, ordinary canons of construction of a statute would be attracted where a dispute arises about the construction or interpretation of a certified standing order. (emphasis supplied) 9. No canon of construction of a statute is more firmly established than this that the purpose of interpretation is to give effect to the intention underlying the statute and therefore, unless the grammatical construction leads to an absurdity, it is safe to give words their natural meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys the intention. If two constructions are possible, it is equally well established that the construction which advances the intention of the legislation, remedies the mischief to thwart with which it is enacted should be accepted. ..... 11....To enable an employer to peacefully carry on his industrial activity, the Act confers powers on him to prescribe conditions of service including enumerating acts of misconduct when committed within the premises of the establishment. The employer has hardly any extra territorial jurisdiction. He is not the custodian of general law and order situation nor the Guru or mentor of his workmen for their well regulated cultural advancement. If the power to regulate the behaviour of the workmen outside the duty hours and at any place wherever they may be was conferred upon the employer, contract of service may be reduced to contract of slavery............. (emphasis supplied) Therefore, keeping in view the larger objective sought to be achieved by prescribing conditions of employment in certified standing orders, the only construction one can put of Cl.10 is that the various acts of misconduct therein set out would be misconduct for the purpose of S.O.22 punishable under S.O.23, if committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof. What constitutes establishment or its vicinity would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.......... A Statute is regarded as penal for the purpose of construction if it imposes fine, penalty or forfeiture other than penalty in the nature of liquidation of damages or other penalties which are in the nature of civil remedies. It is a general rule that penal enactments are to be construed strictly and not extended beyond their clear meaning. See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition Vol.44 paragraphs 909, 910 at page 560. It is a general rule that penal enactments are to be construed strictly and not extended beyond their clear meaning. See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition Vol.44 paragraphs 909, 910 at page 560. It cannot be seriously questioned that S.O.22 is a penal statute in the sense that it provides that on proof of misconduct penalty can be imposed. It cannot be disputed that it is a penal statute. It must therefore, receive strict construction, because for a penalty to be enforced, it must be quite clear that the case is within both the letter and the spirit of the statute. If the expression 'committed' within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof is given a wide construction so as to make the clause itself meaningless and redundant, the penal statute would become so vague and would be far beyond the requirement of the situation as to make it a weapon or torture. A clause with a statutory flavour 'like legislation must at all costs be interpreted in such a manner that it could not operate as a rogue's charter'. Davis and Sons v. Alkin (1977) I.C.R. 662. If any misconduct committed anywhere irrespective of the time-place content where and when it is committed is to be comprehended in Cl.10 merely because it has some remote impact on the peaceful atmosphere in the establishment, there was no justification for using the words of limitation such as 'committed within premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof'. These are words of limitation and they must cut down the operation of the house. Therefore, these words of limitation must receive its due share in the interpretation of Cl.10 and Cl.10 cannot receive such a construction as to make the words of limitation wholly redundant. ...... 19. Having examined the matter both on principle and precedent, it would clearly emerge that Cl.10 of S.O.22 which collects various heads of misconduct must be strictly construed being a penal provision in the sense that on the proof of a misconduct therein enumerated, penalty upto and inclusive of dismissal from service can be imposed. We see no reason for departing from the well-established canon of construction that penal provisions must receive strict construction, and not extended beyond their normal requirement. We see no reason for departing from the well-established canon of construction that penal provisions must receive strict construction, and not extended beyond their normal requirement. The framer's intention in using the expression 'committed' within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof are the words of limitation and they must receive due attention at the hands of the interpreter and the clause should not receive such broad construction as to render the last clause redundant..........................The statutory obligation is to prescribe with precision in the standing order all those acts of omission or commission which could constitute misconduct. In the face of the statutory provision it would be difficult to entertain the submission that some other act or omission which may be misconduct though not provided for in the standing order would be punishable under standing order 23. Upon a harmonious construction, the expression 'misconduct' in S.O.23 must refer to those acts of omission or commission which constitute misconduct as enumerated in standing order 22 and none else. 20.......Relying upon the earlier decision of this Court in Rohtak Hissar District Electricity supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [1966-II L.L.J. 330] the Court held that everything which is required to be prescribed has to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is none the less a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. Accordingly, the contention of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in S.O.22 can be punished under S.O.23 must be rejected.” (emphasis supplied) 13. In Indian Express & Chronical Press v. M.C. Kapur reported in 1974-II L.L.J 240, the Hon'ble Apex Court dealt with the same question and the relevant portion of the said decision is incorporated as under: “3. On receipt of that letter the general manager of the company served a charge sheet on September 5, 1965, on M.C. Kapur. In Indian Express & Chronical Press v. M.C. Kapur reported in 1974-II L.L.J 240, the Hon'ble Apex Court dealt with the same question and the relevant portion of the said decision is incorporated as under: “3. On receipt of that letter the general manager of the company served a charge sheet on September 5, 1965, on M.C. Kapur. He was charged with the following: (i) Misappropriating the funds of the society. (ii) Getting false cash memo prepared. (iii) Falsification of accounts of the society. (iv) Refusal to account for the amount of Rs.2,500/- of the society. (v) Coercing the society to make payment to Raj Sweets, New Delhi. (vi) Refusal to hand over change as treasurer even after your resignation had been accepted and thus keeping the society's money and books with you unauthorisedly. …..... 5. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Employees Co-operative Society was an altogether independent concern or organisation and the appellant's company had no financial or other interest in it nor did it have any control over its management, functioning or finance. According to the Tribunal, provision of certain amenities to the Employees Co-operative Society by the company did not alter the character of the said society. Hence, the conduct of M.C. Kapur in regard to the affairs of the society could not be regarded as affecting in any manner the smooth and efficient working of the Press where he was employed... …... (emphasis supplied) 7......In view of the findings of the Tribunal the charges which were found proved by the enquiry officer would not be covered even by cl.(b) of the Standing Order 15(2). At any rate, on the finding of the Tribunal the order which was made was fully justified and we find no reason to interfere with it.” 14. It is also pertinent to note that the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Limited v. Labour Court, Meerut and Others reported in 1984-I-L.L.J 16, was also followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a later decision in Shri Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and another reported in 1985-I L.L.J. 527. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision has held as hereunder: “4...... The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision has held as hereunder: “4...... The legal proposition as stated by the High Court would have necessitated in-depth examination, but for a recent decision of this Court in Glaxo Laboratories v. The Presiding Officer [1984-I L.L.J. 16] in which this Court specifically repelled an identical contention advanced by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel who appeared for the employer in that case observing as under at pages 24, 25: “Relying on these observations, Mr. Shanti Bhushan urged that this Court has in terms held that there can be some other misconduct not enumerated in the standing order and for which the employer may take appropriate action. This observation cannot be viewed divorced from the facts of the case. What stared in the face of the Court in that case was that the employer had raised a technical objection ignoring the past history of litigation between the parties that application under S.33A was not maintainable. It is in this context that this Court observed that the previous action might have been the outcome of some misconduct not enumerated in the standing order. But the extracted observation cannot be elevated to a proposition of law that some misconduct neither defined nor enumerated and which may be believed by the employer to be misconduct ex post facto would expose the workman to a penalty. The law will have to move two centuries backward to accept such a construction. But it is not necessary to go so far because in Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. Employees Union, [1966-I L.L.J. 443], this Court in terms held that the object underlying the Act was to introduce uniformity in terms and conditions of employment in respect of workmen belonging to the same category and discharging the same or similar work under an industrial establishment, and that these terms and conditions of industrial employment should be well-established and should be known to employees before they accept the employment. If such is the object, no vague undefined notion about any act, may be innocuous, which from the employer's point of view may be misconduct but not provided for in the standing order for which a penalty can be imposed, cannot be incorporated in the standing orders. If such is the object, no vague undefined notion about any act, may be innocuous, which from the employer's point of view may be misconduct but not provided for in the standing order for which a penalty can be imposed, cannot be incorporated in the standing orders. From certainty of conditions of employment, we would have to return to the days of hire and fire which reverse movement is hardly justified. In this connection, we may also refer to Western India Match Company Ltd. v. Workmen [1973-II L.L.J. 403], in which this Court held that any condition of service if inconsistent with certified standing orders, the same would not prevail and the certified standing orders would have precedence over all such agreements. There is really one interesting observation in this which deserves noticing. Says the Court: In the sunny days of the market economy theory people sincerely believed that the economic law of demand and supply in the labour market would settle a mutually beneficial bargain between the employer and the workman. Such a bargain they took it for granted, would secure fair terms and conditions of employment to the workman. This law they venerated as natural law. They had an abiding faith in the verity of this law. But the experience of the working of this law over a long period has belied their faith.” Lastly, we may refer to Workmen of Lakheri Cement Works Ltd. v. Associated Cement Companies Ltd. [(1970) 20 Indian Factories & Labour Reports, 243]. This Court repelled the contention that the Act must prescribe the minimum which has to be prescribed in an industrial establishment, but it does not exclude the extension otherwise. Relying upon the earlier decision of this Court in Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others [1966-I L.L.J. 330], the Court held that everything which is required to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as vaying what is prescribed. In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex-post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is none-the-less a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex-post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is none-the-less a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. Accordingly the contention of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in S.O.22 can be punished under S.O.23 must be rejected.” In the above said decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court after placing reliance on the Glaxo's case (cited supra), further proceeded to consider other earlier decisions and ultimately, held as hereunder: “4.... It is well-settled that unless either in the Certified Standing Orders or in the service regulations an act or omission is prescribed as misconduct, it is not open to the employer to fish out some conduct as misconduct and punish the workman even though the alleged misconduct would not be comprehended in any of the enumerated misconduct.” (emphasis supplied) 15. In P. Vasuand Another v. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation and Another reported in (2007) 6 MLJ 1628 , this Court followed the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Glaxo's case [ 1984-I-L.L.J 16 ] and held as hereunder: “11. In this connection, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners cited a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and Others AIR 1984 SC 505 : (1984) 1 SCC 1 : 1984-I-L.L.J. 16 : 1984 (1) LLN 57. The relevant passage in the said judgment in paragraph 23 reads as follows at P. 25 of LLJ: “In short, it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. Accordingly, the contention of Sri Shanthi Bhushan that some other act of misconduct which would be per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in Standing Order 22 can be punished under Standing Order 23 must be rejected.” 12. Accordingly, the contention of Sri Shanthi Bhushan that some other act of misconduct which would be per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in Standing Order 22 can be punished under Standing Order 23 must be rejected.” 12. The same view was expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in S. Alamelu v. S.E. Electricity System 1990-II-LLJ-96 and J. Dhanaraj v. T.N. Electricity Board 1995-I-LLJ-931 : 1995 (1) L.L.N. 1198. The above authorities make it very clear that no disciplinary action can be taken against an employee if such act has not been enumerated in the Standing Orders. In the present case on hand, as I discussed already, the misconduct that has been attributed against the petitioners is that they have participated in the agitation, got arrested and put in prison. The said act or omission does not find place in Order 24 (xxx) of the Certified Standing Orders which invites disciplinary action. ....... 14. The discussion made above will amply establish that the respondents have issued the impugned proceedings, the reading of which will demonstrate that it does not constitute any misconduct as enumerated under Clause 24(xxx) of the Certified Standing Orders. Since I have come to the conclusion that the said provision cannot be invoked against the petitioners for the reasons stated above, I am inclined to interfere with the issuance of the charge memo to the petitioners.” (emphasis supplied) 16. This Court also in Management of Madura Cemently Pvt. Ltd., Manamadurai v. Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court, Madurai and Others reported in 2006 (3) LLJ 955, relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Glaxo's case [1984-I-L.L.J 16 ] as hereunder: “6. (a) The Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1984 (1) LLN 934 (Glaxo Lab (I) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Meerut and Others) in para 11 held thus, “11.....Therefore, keeping in view the larger objective sought to be achieved by prescribing conditions of employment in certified standing orders, the only construction one can put on Cl.10 is that the various acts of misconduct therein set out would be misconduct for the purpose of S.O.22 punishable under S.O.23, if committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof. What constitutes establishment or its vicinity would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” Again in para 20, the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows, “20..... What constitutes establishment or its vicinity would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” Again in para 20, the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows, “20..... It is therefore, obligatory upon the employer to draw up with precision those acts of omission and commission which in his industrial establishment would constitute misconduct. Penalty is imposed for misconduct. The workmen must therefore, know in advance which act or omission would constitute misconduct as to be visited with penalty. The statutory obligation is to prescribe with precision in the standing order all those acts of omission or commission which would constitute misconduct. In the face of the statutory provision it would be difficult to entertain the submission that some other act or omission which may be misconduct though not provided for in the standing order would be punishable under standing order 23. Upon a harmonious construction, the expression 'misconduct' in S.O.23 must refer to those acts of omission or commission which constitute misconduct as enumerated in standing order 22 and none else. ... “ (b) The said position is followed in the decision of this Court reported in 2001 (1) LLN 1547 (Jeeva Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Labour Court, Salem and another), wherein in paragraphs 6 and 7 it is held thus, “6. In such circumstances the question remained as to whether the punishment imposed by the petitioner can be held to be validly made. In this context, a Division Bench judgment of our High Court J. Dhanaraj v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and others reported in 1995-I-LLJ-931 (Mad-DB) can be usefully referred to wherein the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1984(1) LLN was relied upon. The relevant passage of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to read as under at p.934 of LLJ: “5 ......... In short, it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. In short, it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. Accordingly, the contention of Sri Shanti Bhushan that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in Standing Order 22 can be punished under Standing Order 23 must be rejected.” 7. Applying the above stated principles, the Division Bench was pleased to quash the very charge-memo issued to the petitioner in that case. In the case on hand, the charge levelled against the second respondent was under Clause 15(c) of the Model Standing Orders. A reading of the said clause discloses that the same would not fit into the allegations levelled against the second respondent. Even assuming that the conduct of the second respondent could be brought within the fold of Clause 15(x), having regard to the Criminal Court verdict under Exhibit W-3, there is no scope for sustaining the action of the petitioner against the second respondent herein. As the very basis for initiation of the disciplinary action against the second respondent has no nexus to stand, there is no scope for interfering with the award impugned in this writ petition..” 17. The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Limited v. Labour Court, Meerut and Others reported in 1984-I-L.L.J 16, as followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in other decisions and relied by the Division Benches of this Court in the decisions cited supra are squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case, as in this case also, the provisions of Sections 23(1) and 23(3)(v) of the Standing Orders for Workmen employed at Madras Harbour of FCI restricts the misconduct committed by the workmen within the Port premises and as such, the misconduct alleged to have been committed by the petitioner outside the Port premises would not come within the purview of Section 23(1) and 23(3)(v) of the Standing Orders for Workmen employed at Madras Harbour of FCI. 18. 18. The learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 took enormous pain to contend that a learned Single Judge of this Court has held in respect of the very same Thrift Society of the FCI that the misconduct committed by the workmen of the FCI would come within the purview of the misconduct contemplated under the Standing Orders for Workmen employed at Madras Harbour of FCI, in an unreported decision dated 09.02.2010 in W.P.No.2319/2010 [M. Sakthivel v. The General Manager, Regional Office of the FCI, Chennai]. In the said decision, the learned Judge has held as hereunder: “24. The allegation that the petitioner's activities in his capacity of the President of the society cannot be questioned by the FCI also do not stand to reason. Even activities outside the employment can also clothe the employer with power to take action in certain circumstances. In Lalla Ram v. D.C.M. Chemical Works Ltd. reported in (1978) 3 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court in paragraph 9 observed as follows: “9. Though it is true that private quarrel between an employee and a stranger with which the employer is not concerned as in Agnani case falls outside the categories of misconduct, it cannot be reasonably disputed that acts which are subversive of discipline amongst employees of misconduct or mis-behaviour by an employee which is directed against another employee of the concern may in certain circumstances constitute misconduct so as to form the basis of an order of dismissal or discharge...” 25. The other contention that in respect of misconduct or irregularity committed in the Co-operative Society run by the employee, no action can be taken also cannot be accepted. First of all, it is the society run by the employees of the same Corporation. Only by virtue of their being employees of FCI, they are eligible for membership in the said society. Many times, it is noticed that employees, who are holding office and are Board of Directors of such societies, are given duty relief by the employer to attend to the Society's work. Even otherwise, since CBI has registered a criminal case under the Prevention of Corruption Act, which charge came to bed only because the petitioner is a public servant and was allegedly in possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income. Even otherwise, since CBI has registered a criminal case under the Prevention of Corruption Act, which charge came to bed only because the petitioner is a public servant and was allegedly in possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income. Hence that contention also must fall.” The appeal preferred by the workman against the above said order was also dismissed by the Division Bench by the order dated 30.06.2010 in W.A.No.899/2010. The learned Single Judge took a similar view in a batch of writ petitions in respect of similar matters in an unreported decision dated 25.03.2010 in W.P.Nos.25915/2009 etc., batch. 19. With great respect, I am unable to subscribe to the views of the learned Single Judge in the decisions cited supra. It is pertinent to note that the specific provisions, namely, the provisions under Sections 23(1) and 23(3)(v) of the Standing Orders for Workmen employed at Madras Harbour of FCI were not at all referred in the above said unreported decisions of the learned Single Judge. Apart from the said factor, the Hon'ble Apex Court's decision in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Limited v. Labour Court, Meerut and Others reported in 1984-I-L.L.J 16, wasalso not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge as well as before the Division Bench of this Court. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of this Court have specificaly observed that in respect of the petitioners in the said matters, the investigation in the criminal case by the Central Bureau of Investigation was pending against the said workmen. But as far as the petitioner in the instant case is concerned, it is relevant to mention at this stage that he has been acquitted in the criminal case in respect of the same, similar and identical charge framed against him. At the risk of repetition, it is to be reiterated that the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the land mark case in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Limited v. Labour Court, Meerut and Others reported in 1984-I-L.L.J 16 was followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the later decision and also relied by the Division Bench of this Court in number of decisions as cited supra. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the alleged misconduct said to have been committed by the petitioner outside the port premises would not attract the provision under Sections 23(1) and 23(3)(v) of the Standing Orders for Workmen employed at Madras Harbour of FCI and as such, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. (II) TERMINATION ORDER WAS PASSED WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANY ENQUIRY IN THE MANNER KNOWN TO LAW 20. At the outset, it is to be stated that this is a classic case of an employee who has been thrown out from the employment by passing the order of termination without conducting any enquiry in the manner known to law. The undisputed fact remains that the petitioner was neither served with any show cause notice nor with the charge memo before conducting enquiry by the respondents 2 and 3. It is pertinent to note that as early as in the year 1987, suspension order was passed against the petitioner on the basis of his implication in a criminal case on the allegation of criminal breach of trust, forgery, falsification of accounts and misappropriation of Rs.2,28,814.22 from the funds of the FCI Employees' Cooperative Thrift and Credit Society. It is pertinent to note that the materials placed before this Court discloses that the respondents 2 and 3 have not conducted any enquiry in the manner known to law by serving any notice or by issuing any charge memo and by examining any witness and by producing any documents and not even the enquiry report was submitted before the authorities concerned before passing the order of termination dated 12.01.1998. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner has not been afforded any opportunity to put forward his contentions and as such, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the respondents have not followed the established and fair procedure before passing the order of termination. 21. At this juncture, it is also relevant to refer the provision under Section 23(4) of the Standing Orders for Workmen employed at Madras Harbour of Food Corporation of India which reads hereunder: "23(4). 21. At this juncture, it is also relevant to refer the provision under Section 23(4) of the Standing Orders for Workmen employed at Madras Harbour of Food Corporation of India which reads hereunder: "23(4). No order of termination of employment by way of punishment for misconduct shall be made, unless the workman is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct, and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him and an inquiry is held in consonance with the principles of Natural Justice, and is permitted to be assisted at the inquiry by a co-worker of his choice if he so desires. The approval of the Chief Worker of the Department in charge of Port Operations at Madras will be required for this order." A reading of the above said provision makes it abundantly clear that before passing the order of termination, the workman should be given reasonable opportunity and he is also entitled to have the assistance of a co-worker of his choice, if he so desires. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions has held that an order of termination involves civil consequences and consequently amounts to stigma and the same cannot be passed without there being a charge memo, enquiry and the findings as to those charges. As far as the case on hand is concerned, it is already pointed out that respondents have not followed the established fair procedure in conducting the enquiry by affording opportunity to the petitioner and thereafter to pass orders of termination and as such, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the termination order was passed not only in violation of the specific provision of the Standing Order for Workmen employed at Madras Harbour of FCI, namely, Section 23(4), but also in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. The impugned order is liable to be quashed on this sole ground. (III) INORDINATE AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN INITIATING AND COMPLETING THE DISCIPLINARY ACTON: 22. The impugned order is liable to be quashed on this sole ground. (III) INORDINATE AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN INITIATING AND COMPLETING THE DISCIPLINARY ACTON: 22. The fact remains that the suspension order was passed against the petitioner as early as on 17.08.1987 and the said suspension order was not followed by issuance of any charge memo, but the respondents claimed to have conducted an enquiry and passed the order of termination only on 12.01.1998 and there is absolutely no explanation whatsoever forthcoming from the respondents for the inordinate delay of more than 10 years in completing the disciplinary proceedings and passing the order of termination. The respondents 2 and 3 have not filed any counter before this Court explaining the inordinate delay in completing the disciplinary proceedings. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in P.V. Mahadevan V. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005 (4) CTC 403, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the inordinate and unexplained delay in conducting the departmental proceedings pursuant to the issue of charge memo would vitiate the departmental proceedings and the relevant portions of the said decision are better to be incorporated as here under : "4. In the first case State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and another, 1990 Supp. SCC 738, an O.A. was filed by the officer concerned against initiation of departmental enquiry proceedings and issue of charge sheet on April 22, 1987 in respect of certain incidents that happened in 1975-76 when the said officer was posted as Commandant 14th Battalion, SAF Gwalior. The Tribunal quashed the charge memo and the departmental enquiry on the ground of inordinate delay of over 12 years in the initiation of the departmental proceedings with reference to an incident that took place in 1975-76. The Appeal against the said order was filed in this Court on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. 5. This Court rejected the contention of the learned counsel. While dismissing the appeal this Court observed as follows : "The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. 5. This Court rejected the contention of the learned counsel. While dismissing the appeal this Court observed as follows : "The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal." 6. In the second case State of A. P. v. N. Radhakishnan, 1998 (4) SCC 154 , the respondent was appointed as Assistant Director of Town Planning in the year 1976. A report dated 7.11.1987 was sent by the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad to the Secretary to the Government, Housing, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, about the irregularities in deviations and unauthorised constructions in multi storied complexes in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad in collusion with municipal authorities. On the basis of the report, the State issued two memos both dated 12.12.1987 in respect of three officials including the respondent Radhakishnan, the then Assistant City Planner. In this case, till 31.07.1995, the articles of charges had not been served on the respondent. 7. The Tribunal, however, held that the memo dated 31.7.1995 related to incidents that happened ten years or more prior to the date of the memo and that there was absolutely no explanation by the Government for this inordinate delay in framing the charges and conducting the enquiry against the respondent and that there was no justification on the part of the State now conducting the enquiry against the respondent in respect of the incidents at this late stage. This Court, in para 19 has observed as follows: "It is not possible to lay down and predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings, the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is not blamed for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations. 8. This Court held that there was hardly any explanation worth consideration as to why the delay occurred. In the circumstances, this Court held that the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated 31.7.1995 and directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated 27.10.1995 and 1.6.1996. 8. This Court held that there was hardly any explanation worth consideration as to why the delay occurred. In the circumstances, this Court held that the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated 31.7.1995 and directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated 27.10.1995 and 1.6.1996. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh was dismissed." The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision further observed at paragraph 10 as follows : "10. The very same ground has been specifically raised in this appeal before this Court wherein it is stated that the delay of more than 10 years in initiating the disciplinary proceedings by issuance of charge memo would render the departmental proceedings vitiated and that in the absence of any explanation for the inordinate delay in initiating such proceedings of issuance of charge memo would justify the prayer for quashing the proceedings as made in the writ petition." The Hon'ble Apex Court ultimately held in the decision cited supra as here under: (para 15) "15. We, therefore, have no hesitation to quash the charge memo issued against the appellant. The appeal is allowed. The appellant will be entitled to all the retiral benefits in accordance with law. The retiral benefits shall be disbursed within three months from this date. No costs." 23. The Division Bench of this Court also quashed the charge memo on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay of issuing charge memo in A. Obaidhullah Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Secretary to Government, Home Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9 and another ( 2005 (5) CTC 380 ) by following the Apex Court’s decision (Mahadevan’s case). Another Division Bench of this Court in D. Amaladoss Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Secretary to Government, Home Department (Courts I.A.), Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009 and another ( 2006 (5) CTC 141 ), quashed the charge memo on the ground of delay as well as conduct of parties. In yet another Division Bench decision of this Court in Union of India represented by the Secretary to Government of Pondicherry, Revenue Department, Pondicherry and another, etc., ( 2005(1) CTC 566 ) the charge memo was set aside on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in issuing the charge memo. 24. In yet another Division Bench decision of this Court in Union of India represented by the Secretary to Government of Pondicherry, Revenue Department, Pondicherry and another, etc., ( 2005(1) CTC 566 ) the charge memo was set aside on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in issuing the charge memo. 24. The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court in the decisions cited supra, are squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as in this case also, there is a total delay of 10 years in initiating and completing the disciplinary proceedings. 25. Lastly it is to be noted that during the pendency of this writ petition, the criminal case initiated against the petitioner on the same, similar and identical charges ultimately ended in acquittal as per the judgment of the learned 16th Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai dated 29.06.2007 in C.C.No.5691/1987. 26. In view of the aforesaid reasons, this Court has come to the irresistible conclusion that the impunged award is unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned award passed by the first respondent herein, namely, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court, Chennai, dated 30.01.2002 passed in I.D.No.137/2001, confirming the order of termination dated 12.01.1998 passed by the third respondent herein, is hereby set aside. It is brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner, after attaining the age of superannuation, has already retired from service. In view of the said circumstance, the respondents 2 and 3 are hereby directed to pay all retiral, attendant and monetary benefits including backwages to the petitioner from the date of his suspension i.e., 19.08.1987 till the date of retirement. It is made clear that the above said exercise shall be completed within a period of twelve (12) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.