JUDGMENT 1. - The appellant-defendant, Hasam Ali S/o Mubarak Ali has approached this Court by way of present two second appeal(s) under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, being aggrieved by the concurrent judgment and decree of the courts below dated 07.05.1998 passed by learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Bikaner in Civil Appeal No. 10/98- Hasam Ali v. Anwar Ali. and in Civil Appeal No. 14/98- Hasam Ali v. Anwar Ali. by which the appeals filed by the appellant-defendant were dismissed while affirming the judgment and eviction decree of learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Bikaner in Civil Suit No.509/86 and 508/86- Anwar Ali v. Hasam Ali. granting eviction decree to respondent-plaintiff, Anwar Ali (Secretary), who represented the "Madrasa Rahmania Talimul Quran, Naya Kua, Bikaner" a body corporate exempted from the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short, hereinafter referred to as `Act of 1950') under the Notification No. F.20(14) Rev.I/75. dated 20.8.1976 S.O. No. 244 dated 23.09.1976, which is reproduced herein below:- "Notification [No. F.20(14) Rev.I/75. Dated 20.8.1976] S.O. No. 244- In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1950) (Rajasthan Act 17 of 1950), the State Government being satisfied that is necessary so to do in public interest, exempts all the premises owned by Wakfs registered under the Wakf Act from the operation of all the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950. [Pub. in Raj. Gaz, Part IV-C, dated 23.9.1976, p.96]" 2. The substantial question of law framed in both the present second appeals by a coordinate bench of this Court vide order dated 12.08.1998 is reproduced herein below for ready reference:- "WHETHER the tenancy in question has not been terminated by a valid notice terminating tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the suit was, therefore, not maintainable?" 3. The suit shop and godown for which two separate eviction suits being Civil Suits No. 508/86 and 509/86 were filed by the plaintiff-respondent-landlord, therefore, these two second appeals by the defendant-tenant arise out of same judgments and decrees and are being decided by this common judgment. 4. The suit shop and godown, situated in the same building, were let out to the the defendant, Hasam Ali at a monthly rent ofRs. 50/- (for Godown) andRs. 4. The suit shop and godown, situated in the same building, were let out to the the defendant, Hasam Ali at a monthly rent ofRs. 50/- (for Godown) andRs. 150/- (for room-cum-shop). Due to increase of students in the said "Madrasa", the plaintiff, Anwar Ali, being the Secretary of "Madrasa Rahmania Talimul Quran, Naya Kua, Bikaner" filed the present suits seeking eviction of the defendant-tenant, Hasam Ali from the suit premises on the ground of bonafide need for providing more accommodation to the students in the said "Madrasa/school" run by them, as the space already available in the suit premises had fallen short. It was further averred in the plaint that since the plaintiff was exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act of 1950, it terminated the lease/tenancy by serving notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, Ex.2 dated 31.07.1986 and again notice dated 11.08.1986. 5. Mr. Sajjan Singh, learned counsel for the appellant defendant-tenant, Hasam Ali, submits that firstly the bonafide need for the accommodation to be provided to students and for constructing water tank in the underground of the building, which was in the tenancy of the defendant, no longer existed because of I.G.N.P. Canal water was now supplied to Bikaner district and, therefore, there was no shortage of water and as such there was no bona fide need of the suit shop and godown to construct such water tank. Secondly, he urged that the plaintiff, Anwar Ali could not file such suit in his personal capacity as the suit property was belonging to Wakf covered under the provisions of Wakf Act, 1955 and the plaintiff, Anwar Ali, ought to have approached the Wakf Tribunal in view of provisions of Section 85 of the said Act and could not approach the civil courts for eviction. He also submitted that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the lease/tenancy could not be directly served by affixutre on the suit premises and the second notice dated 11.08.1986 amounted to waiver of first notice dated 31.07.1986 (Ex.2) and, therefore, the lease/tenancy was not validly terminated by the plaintiff. He, therefore, submitted that the present second appeals filed by the appellant- defendant deserves to be allowed answering the substantial question of law in favour of appellant-defendant. He, therefore, submitted that the present second appeals filed by the appellant- defendant deserves to be allowed answering the substantial question of law in favour of appellant-defendant. He also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC alleging therein that another shop in the same building, which was in the tenancy of other tenant, had become available to the plaintiff during the pendency of this litigation and, therefore, the bonafide need of the landlord can be satisfied by that shop/premises. 6. On the other hand, Mr. M.S. Purohit, learned counsel for the respondent- plaintiff-landlord "Madrasa" vehemently submitted that all other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant except touching the validity of Section 106 notice, cannot be raised since the substantial question of law has been framed only with regard to validity of notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Secondly, he urged that question of validity of notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act also cannot be raised in view of Section 106 (3) of the Act of 1950 since the suit in the present case was filed on 10.09.1986 after expiry of fifteen days period of giving of the notice. He also justified the notice under Section 106 being served, initially by registered AD post, which was returned back by the defendant-tenant with the postal remarks "refused to accept" and subsequent notice dated 11.08.1986 being served through affixture as held in para 33 of the appellate court's judgment, which findings of fact are binding on this Court. He also submitted that this Court in the case of Om Prakash v. LR's of Dev Raj (SBCSA No.857/2011, decided on 14.08.2012). has held that these four modes provided u/s 106 (1) of the T.P. Act, are independent and mutually exclusive modes and, therefore, the service in either of the ways was sufficient and thus the eviction decree has rightly been passed against the defendant-appellant, Hasam Ali. 7. Having heard learned counsels for the parties, and upon careful perusal of impugned judgments and decrees of the courts below, this Court is of the opinion that these second appeals of the appellant-defendant have no force and the same are liable to be dismissed. 8. The substantial question of law framed by this Court is only with regard to validity of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act served on the defendant-tenant. 8. The substantial question of law framed by this Court is only with regard to validity of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act served on the defendant-tenant. In view of this, the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant, Mr. Sajjan Singh, about the alleged bonafide need having been extinguished or the jurisdiction of the civil court, cannot be entertained at this stage and they are liable to be rejected and the same are accordingly rejected. With respect to validity of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, there is no force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant defendant because the four modes provided in Section 106 (1) of the Act are independent modes of service and service through anyone mode is sufficient to terminate the tenancy/lease. This Court in the case of Om Prakash v. LR's of Dev Raj. (supra) has already held to this effect that there is no occasion to take a different view in the present matter. The relevant extract of that judgment is quoted herein below for ready reference:- "6. Sub-section (4) of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act envisages four modes of service terminating the lease under sub-clause (1) (i) notice must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it, or (ii) notice must be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or (iii) it should be offered to any member of his family or servants at his residence, or (iv)- if such tender or delivery is not practicable, notice may be affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. 7. The word `or' in these four different parts of sub-Section (4) of Section 106 of the T.P. Act makes these modes of service mutually exclusive and not dependent or connected with each other. 7. The word `or' in these four different parts of sub-Section (4) of Section 106 of the T.P. Act makes these modes of service mutually exclusive and not dependent or connected with each other. In the present case, since the envelope of registered post containing such notice (Ex.3) was admittedly tendered by the postman at the correctly given address, which address, the defendant himself during the course of evidence, has admitted that given address on Ex.3 notice was the correct address and he usually received his posts/"Dak" at this address, the courts below, therefore, cannot be said to be at fault in drawing the presumption of service/receipt of the notice by the defendant-tenant in view of aforesaid postal remark. The Hon'ble Apex Court clearly held in para 6, quoted above, that the postman is not expected to act as a process server and is not expected to do what process server does under Order 5 of CPC, and go to the extent of affixture of the notice or, either to find out the whereabouts of the addressee, or wait for his return, if not found available at that time when such post is tendered for service. The burden of proving the Issue No.2 in this regard was laid on the defendant-tenant, and upon the perusal of his statements, it does not even indicate that either he was permanently out from the said address or none of his family members or servants were available at the address given at that time. The provision of sub-Section (4) of Section 106 of the T.P. Act, speaks about service even on family members or servant at his residence. As per own showing of the defendant-tenant, he was running some ice factory at the given address and, therefore, it cannot be said that nobody was present at that time to take the notice. The defendant-tenant can hardly take advantage of the aforesaid postal remark written on the envelope that he was not found available at the given moment. Mere tender of notice at his given address was thus sufficient to presume the "receipt" of the same or service of the same on the defendant- tenant." 9. Once the valid notice is served and the suit was filed after expiry of the prescribed period, question of validity cannot be raised on ground of shortage of period of the notice. Mere tender of notice at his given address was thus sufficient to presume the "receipt" of the same or service of the same on the defendant- tenant." 9. Once the valid notice is served and the suit was filed after expiry of the prescribed period, question of validity cannot be raised on ground of shortage of period of the notice. Consequently, the controversy involved in the present case, is no longer res integra and is covered by the aforesaid decision of this Court. 10. In the result, both the present second appeals filed by the appellant- defendant being devoid of any merit and force are liable to be dismissed and the same are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. The substantial question of law, framed above, is accordingly answered in favour of plaintiff-respondent-landlord and against the defendant-appellant-tenant, Hasam Ali. 11. The appellant-defendant-tenant Hasam Ali S/o Mubarak Ali shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit room-cum-shop and godown to the respondent-plaintiff within a period of nine months from today and shall pay mesne profit @Rs. 1,000/- per month commencing from October, 2012 and will further continue to pay the mesne profits each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the respondent-plaintiff till the vacant possession is handed over to the plaintiff-respondent and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit, the period of nine months for eviction shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction would become executable forthwith. The appellant-defendant shall also clear all the arrears of the rent or mesne profit within three months from today, otherwise the amount shall bear interest @ 9% p.a. and executing Court may quantify such amount and recover the same as a money decree. The defendant appellant shall also not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit premises or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and if so created the same would be treated as void. The appellant-defendant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. The appellant-defendant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises is not handed over or rent or mesne profits are not paid to the respondent-plaintiff within a period of nine months from today, besides expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the respondents-plaintiffs shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. Copy of this judgment be sent to the courts below and parties concerned forthwith.Appeal dismissed. *******