Hon'ble Dr. KOTHARI, J.—"Fraud unravels everything" and any property right claimed by the person which is based on a fraud cannot confer even a semblance of such right and the present case is a glaring example of defendants-appellants insisting on such right upto this Court in the present second appeal having lost before the two Courts below who by the detailed judgments granted concurrently the decree of possession in favour of plaintiff Jethmal Sharma, the true owner of the plot of land No. 202, situated at LIGH Scheme, Akhliya Chauraha, Jodhpur. 2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court recently in the case of Maria Margardia Sequeira Fernandes and Ors. vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria- (2012) 5 SCC 370 emphasized the need to see "Truth" as the North Star or guiding star, as the foundation of justice in very touching language. The relevant portion is quoted below.: "Truth as guiding star in judicial process 32. In this unfortunate litigation, the Court's serious endeavour has to be to find out where in fact the truth lies. 33. The truth should be the guiding star in the entire judicial process. Truth alone has to be the foundation of justice. The entire judicial system has been created only to discern and find out the real truth. Judges at all levels have to seriously engage themselves in the journey of discovering the truth. That is their mandate, obligation and bounden duty-Justice system will acquire credibility only when people will be convinced that justice is based on the foundation of the truth. 34. In Mohanlal Shamji Soni vs. Union of India 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271, this Court observed that in such a situation a question that arises for consideration is whether the presiding officer of a Court should simply sit as a mere umpire at a contest between two parties and declare at the end of the combat who has won and who has lost or is there not any legal duty of his own, independent of the parties, to take an active role in the proceedings in finding the truth and administering justice? It is a well accepted and settled principle that a Court must discharge its statutory functions-whether discretionary or obligatory-according to law in dispensing justice because it is the duty of a Court not only to do justice but also to ensure that justice is being done. 35. It is a well accepted and settled principle that a Court must discharge its statutory functions-whether discretionary or obligatory-according to law in dispensing justice because it is the duty of a Court not only to do justice but also to ensure that justice is being done. 35. What people expect is that the Court should discharge its obligation to find out where in fact the truth lies. Right from inception of the judicial system it has been accepted that discovery, vindication and establishment of truth are the main purposes underlying the existence of the courts of justice. 36. In Ritesh Tewari and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others (2010) 10 SCC 677 this Court reproduced often quoted quotation which reads as under: "...Every trial is voyage of discovery in which truth is the quest." ...The quest of truth continues..., also in this case. 3. These two second appeals of defendants Mohd. Ramjan S/o Abdul Gafoor (CSA No. 49/2012) and LRs. of Mehboob Khan (CSA No. 50/2012) are filed against the plaintiff-respondent Jethmal S/o Girdhar Lal Brahmin (Shrama) against the judgment and decree dtd. 23.1.2012 passed by the learned Additional Dist. Judge No. 1, Jodhpur Metropolitan in Civil Appeal No. 17/2006- Mohd. Ramjan vs. Jethmal and Ors. by which the learned lower first appellate Court dismissing the defendant's appeals and upheld the judgment and possession decree dtd. 24.3.2006 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 3, Jodhpur in Civil Original Suit No. 113/2003- Jethmal vs. Mohd Ramjan and Ors. whereby the learned trial Court decreed the suit for possession in respect of suit premises, a plot of land situated at 2012, LIGH Scheme near Akhliya Choraha Jodhpur, whose market value phenomenally increased over the period. 4. The brief facts giving rise to the present second appeals are that the plaintiff Jethmal Sharma filed the present suit on 31.5.1985 by setting up a case that the said plot of land No. 202 was allotted to him in the year 1956 by the Development Authority, Jodhpur for Rs. 4. The brief facts giving rise to the present second appeals are that the plaintiff Jethmal Sharma filed the present suit on 31.5.1985 by setting up a case that the said plot of land No. 202 was allotted to him in the year 1956 by the Development Authority, Jodhpur for Rs. 843/- and regular "Patta" was not issued at that relevant point of time and process of that was going on by correspondence between the Development Authority and the Government, which "patta" was finally issued by the Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur which was created in the year 1960 only, on 12.2.1981 after 24 years, but in the meanwhile in the year 1979 when he started raising construction on this plot of land allotted to him way back in the year 1956, the defendant-appellant, Mohd. Ramjan restricted and restrained him from doing so and claimed that he, Mohd. Ramjan, had purchased this plot of land under a registered sale-deed on 25.7.1978. This sale-deed dtd. 25.7.1978 which was registered on 26.9.1978 was purportedly executed by one Jethmal in favour of appellant Mohd. Ramjan, which was held to be result of fraud played by accused Manohar Lal and Ashok Joshi, clerk in the UIT, Jodhpur, who impersonating as Jethmal Sharma (the plaintiff) executed the said impugned sale-deed in favour of defendant Mohd. Ramjan and these accused persons were convicted by the competent Court as aforesaid and said Mohd. Ramjan in turn created tenancy in favour of two persons over the plot of land in question, one Panna Lal S/o Basti Mal, who died during the litigation and is represented by his LRs. and another Mehboob Khan S/o Nakshu Khan the appellant in CSA No. 50/2012, who also died during the pendency of first appeal and the present second appeal has been filed by his LRs. Munawar Khan and two others. 5. The accused person Manohar Lal who played the said fraud was convicted by the competent Court of jurisdiction under Section 120B, 419, 467 and 471 IPC and another accused Ashok Joshi was convicted for offences under Sections 120B, 477, 418, 467 and 468 IPC in Criminal Case No. 532/1983 - State vs. Manohar Lal and another by judgment dtd. 5. The accused person Manohar Lal who played the said fraud was convicted by the competent Court of jurisdiction under Section 120B, 419, 467 and 471 IPC and another accused Ashok Joshi was convicted for offences under Sections 120B, 477, 418, 467 and 468 IPC in Criminal Case No. 532/1983 - State vs. Manohar Lal and another by judgment dtd. 31.1.2004 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 2 Jodhpur, against which both the accused persons preferred separate appeals being appeal No. 52/2008 - Manohar Lal vs. State and 51/2008 - Ashok Joshi vs. State. The appeal filed by Ashok Joshi came to be allowed and Ashok Joshi was acquitted, whereas the appeal filed by Manohar Lal came to be dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 2, Jodhpur by judgment dtd. 20.9.2011 and the said accused Manohar Lal was sentenced for 2 years S.I. and a fine of Rs. 200/- and that appellate decision holds the field not having been further challenged. The aforesaid criminal case relates to the forgery committed by Manohar Lal by executing the forged sale-deed impersonating himself as true owner Jethmal in respect of the same plot of land in question viz. Plot No. 202, LIGH Scheme, Akhliya Choraha, Jodhpur in favour of defendant Mohd. Ramjan, the suit land involved in the present case only. 6. The aforesaid criminal case relates to the forgery committed by Manohar Lal by executing the forged sale-deed impersonating himself as true owner Jethmal in respect of the same plot of land in question viz. Plot No. 202, LIGH Scheme, Akhliya Choraha, Jodhpur in favour of defendant Mohd. Ramjan, the suit land involved in the present case only. 6. In the appeal No. 51/2008 filed by Ashok Joshi, the appellate court observed as under: ^^loZizFke ge bl izdj.k esa izLrqr fd;s x;s lk{; dk la{ksi esa mYys[k djuk pkgsaxsA bl izdj.k esa ifjoknh tsBey vfHk;kstu lk{kh Øekad 1 gSA mlus lk{; fn;k gS fd mls fnukad 10-2-56 dks MoyiesUV foHkkx tks/kiqj }kjk IyksV la[;k 202 vk[kfy;k pkSikluh jksM ij vkoafVr gqvk FkkA vkoaVu vkns'k izn'kZ ih-1 gSA IykaV dh jde dh fd'r tek djokus gsrq mls uksfVl izn'kZ ih- 2 fn;k x;k Fkk vkSj mlus izn'kZ 3 o 4 jlhnksa }kjk nks fdLrksa esa iwjs IyksV dh jkf'k tek djok nh FkhA o"kZ 1956 esa vksojlh;j us mls IyksV dk dCtk ns fn;k FkkA MoyiesUV foHkkx us IyksV dk foØ; i= ifjoknh ds i{k esa fu"ikfnr ugha djok;k vkSj mlls ;g dgk fd foØ; i= ds izk:i dh izfr vuqeksnu gsrq t;iqj Hksth xbZ gS vkSj vuqeksfnr gks dj vkus ds i'pkr foØ; i= fu"ikfnr dj fn;k tk;sxkA bl lEcU/k esa ifjoknh vkB nl ckj x;k vkSj gj ckj ;gh mRrj feykA o"kZ 1960 esa MoyiesUV foHkkx VwV dj uxj lq/kkj U;kl esa cny x;k rc ifjoknh U;kl esa Hkh IykV ds iV~Vs gsrq x;k vkSj U;kl us Hkh mls ;gh mRrj fn;k fd t;iqj ls izk:i vuqeksfnr gksdj vkus ds i'pkr~ foØ; i= iV~Vs dj fu"iknu dj fn;k tk;sxkA** ^^vr% vihy vihykFkhZ@vfHk;qDr v'kksd dqekj tks'kh fo:) jktLFkku jkT; ,rn}kjk Lohdkj dh tkrh gS vkSj vfHk;qDr v'kksd dqekj iq= ijljke tkfr czkg~e.k fuoklh ekulkxj] egkeafnj] tks/kiqj dks Hkk-n-ala- dh /kkjk 120-ch] 477] 418] 467] 468 ds v/khu n.Muh; vijk/kksa ds vkjksi ls lUnsg ds vk/kkj ij nks"k eqDr fd;k tkrk gS ,oa fo}ku fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk vfHk;qDr v'kksd dqekj ds lEcU/k esa ikfjr nks"kflf) vkSj n.Mkns'k fnukafdr 31-1-04 vikLr fd;k tkrk gSAvihykFkhZ vfHk;qDr v'kksd dqekj }kjk gktjh ckcr izLrqr tekur eqpyds mUeksfpr fd;s tkrs gSaA fopkj.k U;k;ky; dk vfHkys[k fu.kZ; izfr lfgr rqjUr fHktok;k tk;sA ,l-Mh- 20-9-2011 ¼ohjsUnz dqekj ikBd½ vij ls'ku U;k;k/kh'k ¼Rofjr la[;k 2½ tks/kiqj egkuxj** 7. In the appeal No. 52/2008 filed by Manohar Lal, the appellate court observed as under: ^^la{ksi esa rF;] ftuls ;g vihy O;qRiUu gqbZ] bl izdkj gSa fd fnukad 4-2-79 dks ifjoknh tsBey 'kekZ us ,d vafdr fjiksVZ izn'kZ ih-23 Fkkukf/kdkjh] iqfyl Fkkuk] ljnkjiqjk] tks/kiqj ds le{k bl vk'k; dh is'k dh fd izkFkhZ dks MoyieesUV vkfQl tks/kiqj }kjk ,d IyksV la[;k 202 okds vk[kfy;k pkSikluh jksM] tks/kiqj esa rkjh[k 10-2-56 dks ,yksV gqvk Fkk] ftldh izFke fd'r fnukad 14-2-56 dks 173-75 #i;s o nwljh fd'r fnukad 17-12-57 dks 675@- #i;s izkFkhZ }kjk tek djok;s x;sA lEcfU/kr vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk izkFkhZ dks ;g dgk x;k fd izkFkhZ dks ,yksV fd;s x;s IykaV ds lEcU/k esa foØ; foys[k iV~Vs ¼lsyMhMiV~Vk½ dk MªkV t;iqj ls ,izwOM gks dj vkus ij izkFkhZ dks mlds gd esa iV~Vs dh cdk;nk jftLVªh djds ns nh tk;sxhA izkFkhZ igys MoyiesUV vkWfQl o mlds etZ gksus ds ckn uxj lq/kkj U;kl] tks/kiqj esa le; le; ij tkrk jgk o iwNrkN djrk jgk] ijUrq izkFkhZ dks ;gh dgk x;k fd vc rd MªkV ,izwOM gksdj ugha vk;k gS vkrs gh izkFkhZ dks lwfpr dj fn;k tk;sxkA fnukad 14-1-79 dks tc izkFkhZ us mDr ,yksVlqnk IyksV ij iwlkjke ekyh Bsdsnkj ds ekQZr ifV~V;ka Myok;ha rks ogka eks- jetku iq= vCnqy xQwj us ifV~V;ka Mkyus ls badkj fd;k o ;g tkfgj fd;k fd og IyksV mldk [kjhnlqnk gS] ftls mlus egsUnzk esdsfudy oDlZ] pkSikluh jksM] tks/kiqj ds ekQZr c,ot 20]000@- #i;s esa [kjhn fd;k gSA bl ij tc izkFkhZ us uxj lq/kkj U;kl] tks/kiqj esa tk dj irk yxk;k rks izkFhkZ dks bl ckr dk bYe gqvk fd dksbZ vU; 'k[l izkFkhZ ds LFkku ij cu dj vFkkZr tsBey iq= fxj/kjyky cudj uxj lq/kkj U;kl] tks/kiqj ls mDr IyksV dk foØ; foys[k iV~Vk rgjhj rdehy djok dj vius gd esa jftLVªh djokdj gkfly dj fy;k gSA foØ; foys[k iV~Vk ¼lsyMhM iV~Vk½ esa tks tsBey ds nLr[kr o vaxwBs dk fu'kku gS og njvly izkFkhZ ds nLr[kr o vaxwBs ds fu'kku ugha gS vfirq fdlh vU; 'k[l dk gS] ftls cjoDr jftLVªh lTtuey esMfr;k LVkEi os.Mj o VkbfiLV uxj lq/kkj U;kl] tks/kiqj us igpkuus ds vius gLrk{kj o vaxq"B fu'kku igpkudrkZ ds LFkku ij fd;s gSA izkFkhZ us bl IyksV ls lEcfU/kr viuh Qkby tks fd v'kksd tks'kh fyfid fjdojh 'kk[kk uxj lq/kkj U;kl ds dCts esa Fkh dks ns[kk rks ;g ik;k fd izkFkhZ us le; le; ij bl IyksV ckcr uxj lq/kkj U;kl esa tks nj[okLrs is'k dh Fkh os lHkh Qkby ls xk;c FkhaA izkFkhZ dks ;g Kkr gqvk fd ml 'k[l us ftlus cn;kfUriwoZd o nxs dh uh;r ls tsBey iq= fxj/kjyky cu dj izkFkhZ dks ,yksVsM mDr IyksV dk foØ; foys[k iV~Vk vius gd esa uxj lq/kkj U;kl] tks/kiqj ls rgjhj o rdehy djok dj gkfly dj fy;k Fkk] ftlus vkxs ;g IykV egsUnz esdsfudy oDlZ] tks/kiqj ds ekQZr c,sot 20]000@- #i;s esa eksgEen jetku iq= vCnqy xQwj dks cspku dj jftLVªh mlds gd esa dj nh gS o ,;dls dCtk IyksV ns fn;k gSA bl jftLVªh esa tks Hkh nLr[kr o vaxq"B fu'kku tsBey dk gS og njvly izkFkhZ ds gLrk{kj o vaxq"B fu'kku ugha gSA bl jftLVªh esa tsBey dks igpkuus okyk o igpkudrkZ ds LFkku ij gLrk{kj djus okyk Jh jkts'k pUnz fnokdj ,MoksdsV gSA izkFkhZ dks ;g Hkh Kkr gqvk fd foØ; foys[k iV~Vk dks iath;u gsrq is'k djus ls iwoZ mldh vof/k c<+kus gsrq tks izkFkZuk i= izLrqr fd;k x;k gS og mDr fyfid v'kksd tks'kh }kjk izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA mDr IyksV ds cspku ds le; eks- jetku }kjk nh xbZ lkbZ dh jde #i;s 1000@- dk pSd egsUnz esdsfudy oDlZ] tks/kiqj ds izksijkbVj egsUnz us v'kksd tks'kh dks fn;k] ftlus cSad dh jde lcafU/kr cSad ls gkfly dhA bu lc gkykr esa izkFkhZ dks lansg gS fd mDr lHkh 'k[lksa us feydj cn;kfUriwoZd izkFkhZ o uxj lq/kkj U;kl ds lkFk nxk dj fdlh vU; 'k[l ds tfj;s izkFkhZ ds LFkku ij tsBey iq= fxj/kjyky cukdj mDr IyksV dks gM+ius o mls cMh Hkkjh jde gkfly djus dh uh;r ls ;g vijk/k fd;k gSA bl fyf[kr fjiksVZ ds vk/kkj ij izdj.k iathc) dj vUos"k.k izkjEHk fd;k x;k o vUos"k.kksijkUr vfHk;qDrx.k euksgjyky] v'kksd dqekj] lTtujkt ,oa jkts'k pUnz ds fo:) vkjksi i= is'k fd;k x;kA** ^^vihykFkhZ vfHk;qDr euksgjyky iq= nqxkZ'kadj tkfr Jhekyh fuoklh ekulkxj] egkeafnj] tks/kiqj dks Hkk-na-la- dh /kkjk 419 ds v/khu n.Muh; vijk/k ds fy, nks o"kZ ds lk/kkj.k dkjkokl vkSj 200@- #i;s ds tqekZus ls nf.Mr fd;k tkrk gS] tqekZuk nsus esa O;fDrØe gksus dh n'kk esa vfHklaf'kr euksgjyky ,d ekl dk lk/kkj.k dkjkokl Hkqxrsxk] Hkk-n-la- dh /kkjk 467 ds v/khu n.Muh; vijk/k ds fy, ,d o"kZ ds lk/kkj.k dkjkokl vkSj 200@- #i;s ds tqekZus ls nf.Mr fd;k tkrk gS] tqekZuk nsus esa O;fDrØe gksus dh n'kk esa vfHklaf'kr euksgjyky ,d ekl dk lk/kkj.k dkjkokl Hkqxrsxk rFkk Hkk-n-la- dh /kkjk 471 ds v/khu n.Muh; vijk/k ds fy, ,d o"kZ ds lk/kkj.k dkjkokl vkSj 200@- #i;s ds tqekZus ls nf.Mr fd;k tkrk gS] tqekZuk nsus esa O;frØe gksus dh n'kk esa vfHklaf'kr euksgjyky ,d ekl dk lk/kkj.k dkjkokl HkqxrsxkA rnuqlkj fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; o n.Mkns'k fnukafdr 31-1-04 ifjofrZr fd;k tkrk gSA rnuqlkj lqiqnZxh dk okjaV cuk;k tk;sA fopkj.k U;k;ky; dk vfHkys[k fu.kZ; izfr lfgr rqjUr fHktok;k tk;sA ,l-Mh- 20-9-11 ¼ohjsUnz dqekj ikBd½ vij ls'ku U;k;k/kh'k ¼Rofjr½ la[;k 2 tks/kiqj egkuxj 8. The plaintiff-real owner Jethmal Sharma S/o Sh. Girdharlal filed the present suit No. 113/2003- Jethmal vs. LRs. of Mohd. Ramjan and Ors. for possession in the year 1984 on 31.5.1984 and the same was decreed by both the courts below as aforesaid and being aggrieved by the same, two defendants Mohd. Ramjan (the beneficiary of fraud) and LRs. of Mehboob Khan (the tenant claiming through Mohd. Ramjan) have preferred these present second appeals under Section 100 C.P.C. 9. In Civil Second Appeal No. 49/2012 - Mohd. Ramjan vs. Jethmal Sharma and Ors. after hearing both the parties, a coordinate bench of this Court recently framed the following two substantial questions of law on 16.4.2012 which are reproduced below for ready reference: "(i) Whether since the possession has been claimed jointly from defendants No. 1 to 3 by the plaintiff-respondent and the legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 3 - Mehboob Khan were not brought on record, the suit filed by the plaintiff- respondent has abated as a whole and as a relief of possession was jointly prayed and the decree of possession being passed jointly cannot be executed against the dead person? (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, finding recorded by the first appellate court that limitation of suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act and nor by Article 59 or 56 can be sustained." In the said order dtd. 16.4.2012 of Coordinate Bench, no reference to aforesaid fraud and conviction of accused persons is mentioned. Apparently, therefore, this fact was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge on that date. 10. On 1.10.2012, when the connected second appeal by tenant bearing No. 50/2012 - LRs. of Mehboob Khan vs. Jethmal Sharma and Ors. came up before this Court, after hearing Mr. Girish Joshi and Mr. R.R. Nagori Sr. Advocate, this fact of fraud was revealed and attention of the Court was drawn towards the second appeal filed by Mohd. Ramjan and therefore the said appeal No. 49/2012 - Mohd. Ramjan vs. Jethmal and Ors. was directed to be listed along with Second Appeal No. 50/2012- LRs. of Mehboob Khan vs. Jethmal and Ors. on 4.10.2012. 11. Today on 4.10.2012, Mr. O.P. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant Mohd. Ramjan and therefore the said appeal No. 49/2012 - Mohd. Ramjan vs. Jethmal and Ors. was directed to be listed along with Second Appeal No. 50/2012- LRs. of Mehboob Khan vs. Jethmal and Ors. on 4.10.2012. 11. Today on 4.10.2012, Mr. O.P. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant Mohd. Ramjan in CSA No. 49/2012 initially resisted to open the arguments for final disposal of the matter, but upon refusal of request for adjournment by the Court in view of aforesaid fraud played in the matter, the learned counsel agreed and accordingly the case was argued by both the learned counsels for the defendants-appellants and learned counsel for the plaintiff -respondent Mr. R.R. Nagori, Sr. Advocate for final disposal and accordingly, both these appeals are being disposed of by this common order. 12. Mr. O.P. Mehta and Mr. Girish Jodhi, learned counsel appearing for the appellants- defendants raised the following contentions: (i) Mohd. Ramjan- defendant- appellant is a bonafide purchaser of the plot of land No. 202, in question, unaware of any fraud and he is a purchaser for consideration, therefore, the appellant Mohd. Ramjan and tenants claiming through him cannot be dispossessed from the suit property. (ii) The suit filed by the actual owner Jethmal Sharma - the plaintiff in the year 1984 was barred by limitation and the courts below have erred in deciding that issue against the defendants. (iii) The valuation of suit property being much more than Rs. 30,000/- at the time of filing of suit, in view of adequate court fee having not paid, the suit was not maintainable nor the trial Court had pecuniary jurisdiction to try that suit with higher market value. (iv) The plaintiff Jethmal Sharma had not filed suit for cancellation of sale-deed dtd. 25.7.1978 in favour of defendant Mohd. Ramjan and therefore, he could not claim possession and if any such suit was to be filed, limitation for that was only 3 years. He relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Rahim vs. S.K. Abdul Zabar reported in AIR 2010 SC211. (v) Since Mehboob Khan- one of the two tenants had expired during the pendency of first appeal and the plaintiff Jethmal failed to bring his LRs. He relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Rahim vs. S.K. Abdul Zabar reported in AIR 2010 SC211. (v) Since Mehboob Khan- one of the two tenants had expired during the pendency of first appeal and the plaintiff Jethmal failed to bring his LRs. on record, the learned appellate Court could not take them on record later on by allowing his application under Order 22 Rule 9 CPC and appeal having abated as a whole, no decree could be passed by the appellate Court against the LRs. of defendant Mehboob Khan. Mr. O.P. Mehta and Mr. Girish Joshi therefore, submitted that both the present second appeals deserve to be allowed. 13. On the other hand, Mr. R.R. Nagori, Sr.Advocate assisted by Mr. Alkesh Agarwal vehemently opposed all these contentions and submitted that the defendants do not have any title over the suit land in question and since the fraud was played upon the plaintiff Jethmal Sharma, the true owner by certain accused persons and present defendants Mohd. Ramjan and Mehboob Khan are only the beneficiaries of said fraud, the concurrent decree of possession by two courts below in favour of plaintiff Jethmal Sharma does not give rise to any substantial question of law and the appellant Mohd. Ramjan cannot be said to be a bonafide purchaser of the suit property and even if it is so assumed for argument's sake, that he is the bonafide purchaser, he has no better title than the plaintiff Jethmal Sharma, who is the true and real owner of the suit property and questions of limitation and jurisdiction raised by the defendants in the present appeal cannot undo the right of the plaintiff to secure the possession of his own property which was sought to be deprived from him based on a fraud for which responsible persons have been convicted by the competent Courts. 14. On the abatement of appeal before the first appellate Courts, Mr. R.R. Nagori urged that LRs. of Mehboob Khan could not be brought on record within the prescribed time on account of failure of the defendant himself to inform the Court under O. 22 R. 10A CPC about the death of said Mehboob Khan and the LRs. 14. On the abatement of appeal before the first appellate Courts, Mr. R.R. Nagori urged that LRs. of Mehboob Khan could not be brought on record within the prescribed time on account of failure of the defendant himself to inform the Court under O. 22 R. 10A CPC about the death of said Mehboob Khan and the LRs. of Mehboob Khan were taken on record, when such information was later on furnished to the appellate court and abatement under O. 22 R. 9 CPC was set aside by the Court and there is nothing wrong in that. No appeal under O. 43 R. 1 CPC as a misc. appeal has been filed by Mehboob Khan's LRs. against that order. As far as question of jurisdiction is concerned, the learned counsels for the respondent-plaintiff Mr. Nagori relying upon certain authorities also submitted that suit had to be filed as per the disclosed market value in the sale-deed on the basis of which the competent Trial Court had pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction and the alleged higher market value could not divest the said trial Court of its jurisdiction and since no prejudice has been caused to the defendants on this account, the two courts below have rightly and concurrently decreed the suit for possession in favour of the plaintiff Jethmal Sharma and the present second appeals of the defendants deserve to be dismissed with exemplary costs. 15. Having heard the learned counsels at length, this Court is satisfied that both the present appeals of the defendants deserve to be dismissed and substantial questions of law framed in one of the appeals as quoted above deserve to be answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 16. In the present case, it is undisputed that so called registered sale-deed in favour of defendant Mohd. Ramjan was a result of impersonation by accused Manohar Lal who posed himself to be the true owner Jethmal Sharma and executed the said sale-deed dtd. 25.7.1978. Merely because the reputed brokers were the witnesses of registration of said sale-deed as the learned counsel for the defendants, Mr. O.P. Mehta contended, it hardly confers any title to the defendant Mohd. Ramjan. In view of conviction of persons impersonating, Manohar Lal and Ashok Joshi, the clerk in UIT, Jodhpur, the beneficiaries of title under the forged sale-deed, the defendant Mohd. O.P. Mehta contended, it hardly confers any title to the defendant Mohd. Ramjan. In view of conviction of persons impersonating, Manohar Lal and Ashok Joshi, the clerk in UIT, Jodhpur, the beneficiaries of title under the forged sale-deed, the defendant Mohd. Ramjan, cannot obtain any title over the suit property. He is neither bonafide purchaser nor payment of consideration, if any, to seller is of any significance. He may be a person who had been duped and defrauded, but that is hardly a thing which could give him title over the suit property. It is well settled legal principle that fraud unravels everything. The defendant's remedy may be to claim damages from the persons who cheated him, but he cannot claim any right on the strength of so called registered sale-deed in his favour against the true and real owner-plaintiff Jethmal. The said sale-deed in his favour is a waste paper. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a very detailed and researching judgment in the case of Maria Margardia Sequira Fernandes & Ors. vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (2012) 5 SCC 370 detailing the four types of possession under property law; Easements Act, 1882, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Specific Relief Act, 1963, dealing with a case of a well known and respected Christian family of Goa where the permissive & free of cost possession of suit premises was given by a sister to her brother as a caretaker, while the sister with her husband was out of Goa in relation to his service in Navy and which brother illegally denied her possession of her own house with title undisputed for 20 longs years. The Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the sister's appeal with costs of Rs.50,000/- and mesne profits of Rs.1 lac per month for the residential house. 18. Deprecating false claims and defences, which are considered really serious problems with real estate litigation, predominantly because of ever escalating prices of the real estate, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment of Maria Margardia Sequeira Fernandes (supra) in para 81 and 82 observed as under:- "False claims and defences are really serious problems with real estate litigation, predominantly because of ever-escalating prices of the real estate. Litigation pertaining to valuable real estate properties is dragged on by unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will tire out and ultimately would settle with them by paying a huge amount. This happens because of the enormous delay in adjudication of cases in the Courts. The Supreme Court in Ramrameshwari Devi case, (2011) 8 SCC 249 aptly observed that unless wrongdoers are denied profit from frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to prevent it. In order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. This problem can be solved or at least can be minimised if exemplary costs is imposed for instituting frivolous litigation. Imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and/or ordering prosecution in appropriate case would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases, the courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings." 19. And then finally, allowing the sister's appeal as aforesaid and laying down the principles of law in para 97 to 101, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "97. Principles of law which emerge in this case are crystallized as under:- 1. No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. 2. Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. The caretaker or servant has to give possession forthwith on demand. 3. The Courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a care-taker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant. 4. The protection of the Court can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his favour. 5. The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. 4. The protection of the Court can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his favour. 5. The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession. 98. In this view of the matter, the impugned judgment of the High Court as also of the Trial Court deserve to be set aside and we accordingly do so. Consequently, this Court directs that the possession of the suit premises be handed over to the appellant, who is admittedly the owner of the suit property. 99. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the legal representatives of the respondent are granted three months time to vacate the suit premises. They are further directed that after the expiry of the three months period, the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property be handed over to the appellant. The usual undertaking to this effect be filed by the legal representatives of the respondent in this Court within two weeks. 100. The legal representatives of the respondent are also directed to pay Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one Lakh) per month towards the use and occupation of the premises for a period of three months. The said amount for use and occupation be given to the appellant on or before the 10th of every month. In case the legal representatives of the respondent are not willing to pay the amount for use and occupation as directed by this Court, they must hand over the possession of the premises within two weeks from the date of this judgment. Thereafter, if the legal representatives of the respondent do not hand over peaceful possession of the suit property, in that event, the appellant would be at liberty to get the possession of the premises by taking police help. 101. As a result, the appeal of the appellant is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents are directed to pay a cost of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant within four weeks. (We have imposed the moderate cost in view of the fact that the original respondent has expired). Ordered accordingly." 20. 101. As a result, the appeal of the appellant is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents are directed to pay a cost of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant within four weeks. (We have imposed the moderate cost in view of the fact that the original respondent has expired). Ordered accordingly." 20. Thus, strongly deprecating the holding over of possession by the persons like care-takers and persons with permissive possession, Chowkidar etc., the Hon'ble Apex Court allowed the plaintiffs appeal in that case with exemplary cost of Rs. 50,000/- and mesne profit of Rs. 1,00,000/- in respect of a residential house situated at Goa. 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gayatri Devi and Ors. vs. Shashi Pal Singh reported in (2005) 5 SCC 527 dealing with a cantankerous litigant- tenant in a Rent Control and Eviction matter, allowing the plaintiff- landlord's appeal with exemplary costs of Rs. 20,000/- negatived the contentions of the tenant over the landlord's title over the suit property and referring to the previous decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court held that fraud unravels everything and where a fraud is played upon the Court, the Court must deny the relief to the party claiming the benefit of fraud. However, the factum of fraud must be necessarily pleaded and proved. The relevant para 15 and 16 of the said judgments are quoted below: "15. In Ravinder Kaur vs. Ashok Kumar and another a two Judge Bench of this Court observed: (SCC p. 295, para 22) "Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diaboli-cal plans of the judgment-debtors to deny the decree-holders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. These type of errors on the part of the judicial forums only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing law's delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system." 16. In our view these observations aptly apply to the case before us. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rajendra Singh and Others to contend that there was a fraud played upon the court and the fraud unravels everything. As a general proposition, the proposition is right. But fraud must necessarily be pleaded and proved. In the entire history of litigation nothing was pleaded, much less proved, as fraud. Ltd. vs. Rajendra Singh and Others to contend that there was a fraud played upon the court and the fraud unravels everything. As a general proposition, the proposition is right. But fraud must necessarily be pleaded and proved. In the entire history of litigation nothing was pleaded, much less proved, as fraud. We cannot countenance the plea of fraud without any basis." 22. In the case of Jaipur Development Authority vs. Mahavir Housing Cooperative Society, Jaipur reported in (1996) 11 SCC 229 , 3 Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the principle of illegality in the award in the Land Acquisition matters does not apply, since fraud unravels the entire procedure and makes the award a nullity. In para 9 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "It is true that in a case where the proceedings were properly conduc-ted and the order was allowed to become final, the matter may be constructed to be an order of illegality. When it is one of jurisdiction, this Court has repeatedly, in plethora of precedents, had held that the courts have no jurisdiction to award additional amount under Section 23 (1-A) since the Collector had already passed the award under Section 11 and the benefit of additional amount would be confined to the period between the date of the notification under Section 4(1) and the award under Section 11 when the proceedings were pending before him. In this case, since we have already recorded the finding that the award became final due to collusion by the officers and the claimants, the principle of illegality in the award does not apply since fraud unravels the entire procedure and makes the award a nullity." 23. In the case of Ravinder Kaur vs. Ashok Kumar and Anr. reported in (2003) 8 SCC 289 , again in a matter under the Rent Control law deprecating the vexatious litigation by the tenant, the Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 22 that raising a dispute in regard to the description or identity of the suit schedule property or a dispute in regard to the boundary of the suit schedule property is only a bogey to delay the eviction by the abuse of the process of Court. Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment-debtors to deny the decree holder the fruits of the decree obtained by them. The relevant para is quoted below for ready reference: "Therefore, raising a dispute in regard to the description or identity of the suit schedule property or a dispute in regard to the boundary of the suit schedule property is only a bogey to delay the eviction by the abuse of the process of Court. Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment-debtors to deny the decree holder the fruits of the decree obtained by them. These type of errors on the part of the judicial forums only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing law's delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system." The Editorial Note in the said judgment also refers to Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1949 enacted by the A.P. State Legislature and a suggestion has been made to the Legislatures of other State also to enact similar statutes to prevent vexatious litigation. 24. In the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rajendra Singh and Ors. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 581 . the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with a motor accident claim and setting aside the award obtained by the claimants by practicing a fraud, the Hon'ble Apex Court set aside the judgment of the Tribunal and the High Court by observing as under: "It is unrealistic to expect the appellant Company to resist a claim at the first instance on the basis of the fraud because the appellant Company had at that stage no knowledge about the fraud allegedly played by the claimants. If the Insurance Company comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with the sinister object of extracting a claim for compensation, and if by that time the award was already passed, it would not be possible for the Company to file a statutory appeal against the award. Not only because of the bar of limitation to file the appeal but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the pleadings made till then. Not only because of the bar of limitation to file the appeal but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the pleadings made till then. Therefore, the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly-discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim. The allegation made by the appellant Insurance Company, that the claimants were not involved in the accident which they described in the claim petitions cannot be brushed aside without further probe into the matter, for the said allegation has not been specifically denied by the claimants when they were called upon to file objections to the applications for recalling of the awards. The claimants then confined their resistance to the plea that the application for recall is not legally maintainable. Therefore, the claim must be allowed to be resisted, on the ground of fraud now alleged by the Insurance Company. If the Insurance Company is not afforded an opportunity to substantiate their contentions, it might certainly lead to a serious miscarriage of justice." 25. In the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Apex Court setting aside the judgment of Madras High Court in a suit for partition whereby the High Court took a view that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence" and set aside the order of the trial Court. Allowing the appeal of the appellant, it was revealed that it was only at the time of hearing of application for final decree in partition suit, that the appellants came to know about the release-deed by the respondent and consequently the want of locus standi of the respondent in the partition suit and therefore, the appellant challenged the application for final decree on the ground of non-disclosure of the vital document by the respondent which vitiated the proceedings and as such the preliminary decree was obtained by playing fraud on Court and the same was nullity. The Hon'ble Supreme Court allowing the appeal held as under: "The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. A person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. A judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree-by the first court or by highest court - has to be treated as nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side, then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party. In this case the respondent, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed in favour of C. He knew that the appellant had paid the total decretal amount to his master C. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of C. Non-production and non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the Court. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The appellant shall be entitled to costs quantified at Rs. 11,0000/-." 26. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The appellant shall be entitled to costs quantified at Rs. 11,0000/-." 26. Thus, wherever a fraud is detected and is found to be at the bottom and root of any right claimed by a party in any property, everything based upon that has to fall to the ground and that is the principle in the realm of public policy that "fraud unravels everything." Even by mere passage of time, if such foundation of fraud was to be allowed to lie down dormant, there would be a serious miscarriage of justice and beneficiaries of the fraud would be able to have the last laugh at the true owners of the property, as in the present case. In the present case, in view of conviction of person who impersonated and sold the property of the true owner, the present defendants-appellants Mohd. Ramjan and his tenant Mehboob Khan etc. have no equity in their favour and they cannot be allowed to retain the possession of the said plot of land and his claim of being bonafide purchaser is hardly a defence which can be validly set up against the true owner Jethmal Sharma, the plaintiff. This is how the truth in the present case has revealed and being the guiding star for the ends of justice, leads this Court to dismiss the present appeals of both the defendants with exemplary costs and mesne profits. 27. The question of pecuniary jurisdiction raised in this context pales into insignificance and since the Courts below have decided even these issues in favour of the plaintiff, no substantial question of law has been framed as such, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the defendants in this regard are liable to be rejected and the same are accordingly rejected and so also the question of limitation, since the plaintiff had a continuous cause of action in the matter. 28. The questions which have been framed with regard to failure of the plaintiff to bring on record the L.Rs. of deceased Mehboob Khan is also liable to be answered against the defendants because such failure is result of the failure of defendant LRs. of Mehboob Khan to inform the court which was their legal obligation under Order 22 Rule 10A C.P.C. upon death of Mehboob Khan. of deceased Mehboob Khan is also liable to be answered against the defendants because such failure is result of the failure of defendant LRs. of Mehboob Khan to inform the court which was their legal obligation under Order 22 Rule 10A C.P.C. upon death of Mehboob Khan. No such information of such death of Mehboob Khan can be attributed to the plaintiff Jethmal Sharma. In view of undisputed fact that the person Manohar Lal alongwith Ashok Joshi, concerned clerk of UIT, Jodhpur were convicted by the learned trial Court, but on appeal, the convict Ashok Joshi was acquitted by the appellate Court, but conviction against Manohar Lal was maintained on 20.9.2011 who impersonated as plaintiff Jethmal Sharma to execute the sale-deed in favour of defendant Mohd. Ramjan, this Court does not consider it necessary to go any further in the matter and that conviction having become final, any right or interest claimed by the defendants in the said property is liable to fall to the ground and is bound to be brushed aside. 29. Accordingly, the aforesaid both the second appeals of the defendants are dismissed with costs of 10000/- in each appeal to be paid to the plaintiff Jethmal Sharma. 30. The appellants-defendants in both the appeals shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of plot No. 202, LIGH Scheme, Akhliya Choraha, Jodhpur to the respondent- plaintiff within a period of one month from today i.e on or before 4th November, 2012 and shall also pay mesne profit to the plaintiff Jethmal Sharma @ Rs. 5000/- per month from the date of decree of appellate Court below i.e. 23.1.2012 from January, 2012 onwards till the date of handing over of vacant and peaceful possession for use and occupation by them. The Executing Court is directed to handover the possession to the plaintiff through police aid, if necessary, within 15 days of expiry of said period of one month. The respondent-plaintiff Jethmal Sharma shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court, if necessary. A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned courts below and all the concerned parties forthwith.