Judgment :- Common Order 1. The petitioner has filed both writ petitions seeking for a writ in the nature of declaration declaring that by the contract if the parties have restricted settling of disputes between them at a particular place, any prosecution or proceedings launched by the other party away from the restricted / agreed jurisdiction even in cases of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act falling within the said contract will not be valid and binding on the petitioner. 2. The petitioner has made the Union of India and the State of Tamil Nadu as first and second respondents. Apart from that, they have included two learned Magistrates whose courts are situated in Faridabad and New Delhi. The first writ petition was admitted on 20.1.2011 and the second writ petition was admitted on 19.04.2011. In the applications for stay, only notice was ordered. 3. The contention of the petitioner was that the petitioner is the Managing Director of M/s.Galaxy Amaze Kingdom Ltd. The company had entered into contracts and agreements with the contesting respondents. Under the terms of the agreement in the first writ petition, it was agreed between the parties that any dispute arising out of the contract will be settled by the Arbitrator at New Delhi. In respect of the second writ petition, for any disputes, the courts at Chennai will have the jurisdiction. But they have breached the contracts. The counter guarantee cheques which were issued to them were misused by them. They filed criminal complaints before various courts in terms of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned Magistrates of respective courts have also issued process in respect of those complaints. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that filing complaints outside the jurisdiction of courts was only to harass the petitioner. The contractual obligation that they had with the petitioner debar them from suing the petitioner in various Magistrates' Courts in terms of Section 138 of the NI Act. Such proceedings initiated will not be binding on the petitioner in view of the subsisting of contracts. It is in that view of the matter, the petitioner has sought for declaratory relief. 5. However, this court is not inclined to entertain the writ petitions. The petitioner has made the magistrates of the Country as party respondents as if the writ petition is a quash petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 6. It is in that view of the matter, the petitioner has sought for declaratory relief. 5. However, this court is not inclined to entertain the writ petitions. The petitioner has made the magistrates of the Country as party respondents as if the writ petition is a quash petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 6. In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court which arose under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, wherein the Supreme Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 234 in paragraph 13 held as follows: "13. The learned Judge has next gone into facts and arrived at a conclusion that the cheques were issued as security and not for any debt or liability existing on the date they were issued. In so doing the learned Judge has ignored the well-settled law that the power of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised very stringently and with circumspection. It is settled law that at this stage the Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice. At this stage the Court could not have gone into merits and/or come to a conclusion that there was no existing debt or liability." 7. The Supreme Court has held that a person aggrieved can resort to proceedings in respect of dishonour of cheque before the civil court as well as before the criminal court under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and that both proceedings are maintainable vide judgment in D. Purushotama Reddy v. K. Sateesh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 505 and in paragraph 9, it was observed as follows: "9. A suit for recovery of money due from a borrower indisputably is maintainable at the instance of the creditor. It is furthermore beyond any doubt or dispute that for the same cause of action a complaint petition under terms of Section 138 of the Act would also be maintainable." 8. A suit for recovery of money due from a borrower indisputably is maintainable at the instance of the creditor. It is furthermore beyond any doubt or dispute that for the same cause of action a complaint petition under terms of Section 138 of the Act would also be maintainable." 8. In dealing with the territorial jurisdiction of the court trying the offences under Section 138 of the N.I. Act came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the light of the relevant provisions of Cr.P.C., vide its judgment in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan reported in (1999) 7 SCC 510 and in paragraphs 11 to 16, it was observed as follows: "11. We fail to comprehend as to how the trial court could have found so regarding the jurisdiction question. Under Section 177 of the Code ‘every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried in a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed’. The locality where the Bank (which dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as the sole criterion to determine the place of offence. It must be remembered that offence under Section 138 would not be completed with the dishonour of the cheque. It attains completion only with the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the cheque amount within the expiry of 15 days mentioned in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. It is normally difficult to fix up a particular locality as the place of failure to pay the amount covered by the cheque. A place, for that purpose, would depend upon a variety of factors. It can either be at the place where the drawer resides or at the place where the payee resides or at the place where either of them carries on business. Hence, the difficulty to fix up any particular locality as the place of occurrence for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. 12. Even otherwise the rule that every offence shall be tried by a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed is not an unexceptional or unchangeable principle. Section 177 itself has been framed by the legislature thoughtfully by using the precautionary word ‘ordinarily’ to indicate that the rule is not invariable in all cases. 12. Even otherwise the rule that every offence shall be tried by a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed is not an unexceptional or unchangeable principle. Section 177 itself has been framed by the legislature thoughtfully by using the precautionary word ‘ordinarily’ to indicate that the rule is not invariable in all cases. Section 178 of the Code suggests that if there is uncertainty as to where, among different localities, the offence would have been committed the trial can be had in a court having jurisdiction over any of those localities. The provision has further widened the scope by stating that in case where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another local area the court in either of the localities can exercise jurisdiction to try the case. Further again, Section 179 of the Code stretches its scope to a still wider horizon. It reads thus: “179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues. When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be enquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.” 13. The above provisions in the Code should have been borne in mind when the question regarding territorial jurisdiction of the courts to try the offence was sought to be determined. 14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. The following are the acts which are components of the said offence: (1) drawing of the cheque, (2) presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at five different localities. But a concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Code. 15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at five different localities. But a concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Code. In this context a reference to Section 178 (d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below: “178. (a)-(c)*** (d) where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act."(Emphasis added) 9. Therefore, this court cannot by a declaratory relief restrict the scope of the aggrieved party from suing the petitioner before the appropriate court. It is only when they filed civil cases against the petitioner, the petitioner can rely upon the contract between the parties to oust the civil court's jurisdiction in terms of Section 20 of C.P.C. But when it comes to criminal cases like the one under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the Act itself enables the party to sue the defaulter in any court where the jurisdiction arose and that cannot be curtailed by any private agreement. Even the law applicable to the civil cases relating to such agreement will not be extended to criminal offence. 10. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court regarding deriving the jurisdiction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act vide judgment in Harman Electronics Private Limited v. National Panasonic India Private Limited reported in (2009) 1 SCC 720 and in paragraphs 20 to 22, it was observed as follows: "20. 10. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court regarding deriving the jurisdiction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act vide judgment in Harman Electronics Private Limited v. National Panasonic India Private Limited reported in (2009) 1 SCC 720 and in paragraphs 20 to 22, it was observed as follows: "20. Indisputably all statutes deserve their strict application, but while doing so the cardinal principles there for cannot be lost sight of. A court derives a jurisdiction only when the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction. The same cannot be conferred by any act of omission or commission on the part of the accused. A distinction must also be borne in mind between the ingredient of an offence and commission of a part of the offence...... 21. We cannot, as things stand today, be oblivious of the fact that a banking institution holding several cheques signed by the same borrower can not only present the cheque for its encashment at four different places but also may serve notices from four different places so as to enable it to file four complaint cases at four different places. This only causes grave harassment to the accused. It is, therefore, necessary in a case of this nature to strike a balance between the right of the complainant and the right of an accused vis-à-vis the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that the principle that the debtor must seek the creditor should be applied in a case of this nature. We regret that such a principle cannot be applied in a criminal case. Jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is governed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and not on common law principle." 11. The observations made by the Supreme Court will not apply to the case of the petitioner as it is not the same party which has sued the petitioner in different forums. Even otherwise as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the above passages, if there are any inconvenience, it is for the petitioner to file an appropriate transfer application before the appropriate court. 12. In view of the above, both writ petitions will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.