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2012 DIGILAW 209 (KAR)

Haribhau Siddapa Patil v. State of Karnataka, Rep. by its Secretary

2012-03-07

B.V.PINTO, D.V.SHYLENDRA KUMAR

body2012
Judgment :- 1. Appellants are owners of some parcels of lands notified initially u/s 3(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Act, 1966 (for short ‘the Act’) as per notification No. CI 565 SPQ 2006, Bangalore, dated 06.12.2006 (copy at Annexure-A) and published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 08.12.2006 declaring it as an industrial area for the purpose of the Act. Simultaneously, another notification of even date was issued u/s 1 (3) of the Act indicating that the provisions of Chapter 7 of this Act was made applicable and the statutory provisions provided for in this Chapter for acquisition and disposal of land so notified will be put into operation. 2. The third notification also came to be issued simultaneously on the very date u/s 28 (1) of the Act indicating that the very lands are required for the purpose of establishing industries by the 5th respondent – M/s. Parivarthana Alpasankhyatara Agricultural Cooperative Society, Belgaum, and the subject lands are required to be developed for such purpose and are therefore required to be so developed by the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (for short ‘Board’). A notification was issued by the state Government indicating such purpose for acquiring the subject lands. 3. In due course, notices under Section 28(2) of the Act were served on the owners of the subject lands and the 3rd respondent/Special Land Acquisition Officer heard the landowners personally and also considered their objections dated 11.01.2007 and passed an order on 27.01.2007 (copy at Annexure-B) rejecting all objections raised on behalf of the landowners as not tenable and recommended for putting up the proposal for issue of a declaration by the State Government in terms of sub Section 4 of Section 28 of the Act. While passing the order under sub Section 3 of Section 28 of the Act, the Special Land Acquisition Officer acting as delegate of the powers of the State Government in terms of Rule 14(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Rules, 1966 r/w Section 28 (3) of the Act indicated interalia that the subject land in all measuring 13 acres 27 guntas comprised in Sy.Nos.628, 629 and 630 of Belgaum village, are all part of area coming within the Belgaum Urban Development Authority, were required for establishing industries and therefore acquisition is in public interest and as the said establishment of industry was a very important project of the state Government, passed orders indicating that such of those objections received within the stipulated time were not tenable, that they were all meritless and therefore the objections are required to be rejected and order was passed for acquisition of the land. 4. Thereafter, the State Government issued the declaration u/s 28 (4) of the Act on 19.02.2007 followed by publishing the same in the Karnataka Gazette dated 21.02.2007 (copy at Annexure-J). The landowners were also issued with notices dated 24.02.2007 apprising them that the subject land had vested in the State Government on and after the publication of the declaration u/s 28 (4) of the Act, that it is vested in the State Government absolutely in terms of sub section 5 of Section 28 of the Act and therefore the owners were required to hand over vacant possession of the land within 30 days from the date of such notice i.e., from 24.02.2007 and in default further action will have to be taken for taking possession of the subject lands, if necessary, by use of force as enabled under sub section 7 of Section 28 of the Act. 5. 5. At this stage, the landowners approached this Court by filing W.P.No.4834/2007 on 09.10.2007 seeking the following prayer: “A. A writ order or direction in the nature of Certiorari Quashing Annexure-A i.e., the Gazette Notification dated 14.12.2006 bearing KJADB (sic) Bhuswa Be:73 9/06-07 issued by the respondents, the Annexure-B i.e., the order dated 27.01.2007 bearing no.KJADB (sic)/LAQ/BELGAUM/856-2006-07, passed by the third respondent, and Annexure-C i.e., the notice dated 24.02.2007 issued by the third respondent under section 28 (6) of the KIADB Act, 1966: B. A writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents, not to dispossess the petitioners from the said land except according to the due process of law, C. Any other writ order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court deems it fit and proper, in the facts and circumstances of the case. D. A writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the final notification i.e., Annexure J, dated 19.02.2007, bearing no. CI:02:SPQ 2007, issued by the first respondent.” 6. D. A writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the final notification i.e., Annexure J, dated 19.02.2007, bearing no. CI:02:SPQ 2007, issued by the first respondent.” 6. In support of the writ petition, it was prominently urged before the learned Single Judge of this Court, that the subject acquisition barred in law as the Special Acquisition Officer has not examined the objections filed by the landowners in a proper and objective manner; that the subject lands were agricultural lands so notified even in terms of the Comprehensive Development plan prepared and maintained by the Belgaum Urban Development Authority; that there was an attempt on the part of this very Authority to acquire the very lands in the year 1988 but when the landowners resisted the same, it came to be dropped; that the subject lands were fertile agricultural lands; that it is not suitable for development as an industrial area nor required to be done so at the cost of the agricultural operations carried out in the land: that the notification are unnecessary as more suitable lands are available elsewhere in the vicinity; that the landowners being agriculturists by occupation and the income from the lands being the sustenance for their livelihood, acquisition would cause immense loss and hardship to them by depriving their source of livelihood; that the statutory requirements of the provisions of Section 28 of the Act has not been followed; that the notification of subject land for acquisition is also in contravention of the provisions of Section 14-A of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961; that without the change of the land user which was indicated as agriculture under the Comprehensive Development Plan, the acquisition is bad in law, that the State Government has not applied its mind to all relevant aspects before embarking on acquisition of the lands for the intended purpose etc., 7. The writ petition was resisted by the State Government and the Board. The third respondent-Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB filed statement of objections. The beneficiary namely Parivarthana Alpasankhyatara Krushi Sahakara Sangha got itself impleaded and also filed objections to the writ petition. 8. The writ petition was resisted by the State Government and the Board. The third respondent-Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB filed statement of objections. The beneficiary namely Parivarthana Alpasankhyatara Krushi Sahakara Sangha got itself impleaded and also filed objections to the writ petition. 8. The learned Single Judge of this Court examined the matter and passed orders dismissing the petitions holding that the very basis for challenge being that the subject lands had been shown as Green Belt Area in the Comprehensive Development Plan and therefore the notification u/s 3(1) of the Act not having been issued and advancing such arguments placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of H.G.SHEELA v STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS (2006 (2) AIR (KARNATAKA REPORTS) 414) and further decisions in this line of argument were not tenable in the wake of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of BHAGAT SINGH V STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ( AIR 1999 SC 436 ) and also holding that when once the lands are notified under the provisions of Sections 3 (1) and 1(3) of the Act, wherein the public purpose is mentioned and declaration u/s 28 (4) of the Act concludes the same and therefore the subject lands are required for public purpose and the challenge to the acquisition cannot be sustained and on such reasoning, dismissed the writ petition. It is aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge, the lands owners are in appeal. 9. We have heard Sri. Ravikumar Gokakakar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, Sri Dinesh Rao, learned Government Advocate appearing for respondent Nos. 1,2 and 4, Sri.N.Devahdass, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri. Mahesh Wodeyar, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondent No.3 – Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board and intermittently Sri. Raviraj Patil, learned counsel who has appeared for fifth respondent. 10. Mr. Gokakakar, learned counsel for the appellants has urged that subject lands being within the area notified by Belgaum Urban Development Authority as the area for its development under the Comprehensive Development Plan notified under the provisions of the Karnataka Town & Country Planning Act, 1961, the issue of notification under section 3(1) of the Act in respect of lands covered within the limits of the Belgaum Urban Development Authority is bad in law. It is urged that even assuming for arguments, the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Act, 1966 is a special enactment, vis-à-vis, the Industrial Areas Development Act, nevertheless, the procedural compliance with section 14-A of the Karnataka Town & Country Planning Act, 1961 is very necessary and that having not been complied with, notifications are bad for this reason also. 11. It is pointed out that under the comprehensive development plan, the subject lands are agricultural lands and the intended user of the land in terms of the notification being for industrial purpose, such change of land user of the land is very essential. It is further submitted that the manner in which the power is exercised under the provisions of sections 3 of the Act, that too for the purpose of the benefit of fifth respondent is nothing short of an abuse and also arbitrary exercise of statutory power and therefore the acquisition proceedings are vitiated. 12. In this regard, Mr. Gokakakar, learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the Judgment of the division Bench of this court in the case of ‘SPECIAL LAND ACQUISTION OFFICER, KIADB, BANGALORE AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENEU BY ITS SECRETARY AND OTHERS’ reported in ILR 2007 KAR 4891 to urge that there was no public purpose involved in the present acquisition; that the acquisition for the benefit of a private co-operative society like fifth respondent cannot be construed as a public purpose. Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in BHAGAT SINGH’S case [supra] and such other cases by the learned single Judge has affected the result in the writ petitioner; that the ratio of the case in H.G.SHEELA’s case [supra] aptly applies to the present situation and this view of the learned single Judge having been affirmed by the division Bench of this court, the learned single Judge should have applied the ratio of this case than to rely upon BHAGAT SINGH’s case [supra] to dismiss the writ petitioner and therefore urges for setting aside the order and to quash the notification. 13. Mr. 13. Mr. Gokakakar, learned counsel for the appellants has also urged that there is absolutely no obligation on the part of either the State Government or even the Board for initiating the proceedings under the Act and in taking it to the stage of declaration; that the State Government had delegated its powers under the Act to the Special Land Acquisition Officer and others in the Board but they have all surrendered their decision to the request of the fifth respondent who had identified the land for its purpose of setting up a cold storage plant, wholesale vegetable auction centre and food processing pulp manufacturing unit; that no independent examination has been undertaken by the State Government or even the Board either for declaring the extent of the area covered by this survey number as an industrial area or for acquiring these lands for such purpose, but merely because the fifth respondent-society was headed by a political bigwig and a representative of the people, others have surrendered their decision and therefore the proceedings are vitiated. 14. It is also submitted that the manner in which the statutory powers are exercised by the State Government is nothing short of a colourable exercise of power; that the issue of notifications under sections 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the Act in the name of public purpose is nothing short of misuse and abuse of the power as the purpose is only a private purpose, in the sense, acquisition is for the benefit of a private society and does not serve any ‘Public Purpose’ as is understood in the true meaning of this phrase.. 15. One another point urged is that the Urban Development Authority and the competent authority had earlier declined such permission for conversion of land from agricultural to non-agricultural use in respect of neighbouring lands on the premise that such lands had been indicated as agricultural land in the comprehensive development plan notified by the Belgaum Urban Development Authority and this has been overlooked by the learned single Judge by assuming that acquisition in the present case is for public purpose and such assumption has vitiated not only the order passed by the learned single Judge, but there being no real public purpose, exercise of power in the name of public purpose for issue of notifications under sections 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the Act are all bad in law. 16. 16. By drawing our attention to the facts of BHAGAT SINGH’s case (supra), Mr. Gokakakar, learned counsel for the appellants submits that it was a very peculiar case wherein the Government had noticed an atrocious situations of vegetable market in Agra city being located in a most filthy, congested locality and being located in a most unhygienic area, called for immediate shifting of the same and it did serve a real public purpose as the acquisition of land in that case was for shifting of the vegetable market and submits that in the present case, there is no such requirement; that the requirement is only one of a private co-operative society and therefore not a public purpose and the ratio of BHAGAT SINGH’s case (supra) is clearly not applicable to the present situation. 17. He has joined issue on the aspect of the intended acquisition for the benefit of the fifth respondent-society to put up a cold storage plant being in the nature of a public purpose by submitting that there is a well established functioning APMC yard in Belgaum city with two cold storage plants at a distance of about 12 kilometers from the subject land therefore there is no imminent need in the present situation for setting up a cold storage plant that too only by the fifth respondent in the lands of the appellants. 18. Likewise, Mr. Gokakakar, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.S. DARSHAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS’ reported in AIR 1996 SC 671 is also not attracted to the present case. 19. Mr. 18. Likewise, Mr. Gokakakar, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.S. DARSHAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS’ reported in AIR 1996 SC 671 is also not attracted to the present case. 19. Mr. Gokakakar has also drawn the attention of the court of Judgment of the division Bench of this court in the case of ‘A JANARDHAN SHETTY v. SHANTAMMA AND OTHERS’ reported in ILR 2009 KAR 2159 and the questions that fell for consideration in that case as indicated in paragraph-19 to submit as in that case, in the present case also, the acquisition is not for a real public purpose, but only for the benefit of a private co-operative society and therefore submits that the present acquisition initiated on the recommendation of the single window clearance agency at the District level or the State level and without any further application of mind on the part of the statutory is bad in law and therefore submits that the writ appeals are to be allowed and the order of the learned single Judge set aside and the impugned notifications quashed. 20. Mr. Gokakakar, learned counsel for the appellants has drawn our attention to the additional documents sought to be placed in the writ appeals along with the affidavit of the appellant No.1 to submit that insofar as the marketing facilities are concerned, there are adequate facilities in Belgaum city, as provided by the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee, Belgaum etc. 21. Countering such submissions. Sri. Dinesh Rao, learned Government Advocate has put up a very spirited defence. 21. Countering such submissions. Sri. Dinesh Rao, learned Government Advocate has put up a very spirited defence. It is firstly pointed out that even the very bonafides of the petitioners – appellants is not genuine; that the appellants – land owners are virtually fence sitters, in the sense, they had themselves once earlier sought for conversion of the land user from agricultural purpose to non agricultural users and were not successful in their attempts; that many grounds not raised before the learned single Judge are all sought to be urged now in their appeals; that the only contention urged before the learned single Judge regarding change of land user and availability of more suitable lands etc.,; that the acquisition being vitiated due to Government acting at the behest of the fifth respondent and therefore acquisition proceedings getting bad as acquisition is now being characterized as hit by mala fides and non application of mind are all ground not urged before the learned single Judge and therefore not permitted to be raised in the writ appeals and it submitted that suitability is not the criteria for examining the validity of the acquisition proceedings and it is for the Government to be satified about it and the State Government having examined this aspect and particularly, the Special Land Acquisition Officer having given full opportunity to the land owners and having opined that said land alone in required for the project of the State Government, the acquisition proceedings should be continued and therefore submits that there is no merit in the appeals and are to be dismissed. 22. Mr. Dinesh Rao, learned Government Advocate also submits that it is not open to the appellants to urge that there is no public purpose involved in the present situation as when once the State Government being satisfied about the existence of such public purpose, issues a declaration, the matter gets concluded with that and it is not open for the appellants to urge that there is no public purpose in the present acquisition nor the said issue justifiable. 23. Mr. Dinesh Rao, learned Government Advocate has placed reliance on the available records of the State Government and has placed them before the Court. 24. Mr. 23. Mr. Dinesh Rao, learned Government Advocate has placed reliance on the available records of the State Government and has placed them before the Court. 24. Mr. N. Devahdass, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the third respondent – Board has submitted that the Board has taken action fully in consonance with the statutory provisions; that the role of the Board was only insofar as hearing of objections of the land owners and this aspect of examining the objections of land owners are concerned; that the land owners had been given full opportunity to put forth their views and objections and they have all been duly examined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer; that personal hearing had also been given to the land owners and their representatives and it is only after fulfilling of statutory requirements and procedures, the Special Land Acquisition Officer opined there is need for acquiring the subject land and made recommendation to the State Government to issue a declaration and therefore submits that no fault can be found with the action taken on the part of the Board either on the basis of statutory provisions or on need for adhering to procedural requirements. 25. Mr. Devahdass, learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondent-Board has also drawn our attention to provisions of sections 10 and 14 of the Karnataka Town & Country Planning Act, 1961 to submit that the bogie of not obtaining the permission for change of land user is unnecessarily raised as the change of land user assumes significance only at the time of actual establishment of the industry and it cannot come in the way of acquisition proceedings at this stage; that the Board has acted in a bonafide manner as the foundation for acquisition was laid by the clearance given by the State level single window clearance agency functioning under the provisions of the Karnataka Industries [Facilitation] Act, 2002; that the State level single window clearance committee had considered the proposal of the fifth respondent in its 27th Meeting held on 28.11.2006 and had approved the proposal in subject No.4.110 and had communicated the same to the fifth respondent-applicant as per its communication dated 28.11.2006 and the following infrastructural assistances etc. This letter as found in the records is as under: “No.KUM/SLSWCC-27/ E1/666/2006-07 28TH Nov, 2006 To, M/s. PARIVARTANA ALPASANKHYATARA KRISHI SAHAKAR SANGH NIYAMIT, BELGAUM No.898, Patil Rice Mill Building, Old P.B. Road, Belgaum Dear Sir, Sub: State Level Single Window Clearance Committee Clearance We are Pleased to inform you that, your project proposal has been considered by the State Level single Window Clearance Committee in its 27th Meeting held on 20th Nov. 2006 and the same has been approved with following infrastructural assistances. Subject No.4.110. i) PROJECT: The project proposal of M/s. Parivartana Alpasankhyatara Krishi Sahakar Sangh Niyamit Belgaum, to establish a ‘Food processing, Pulp Manufacturing Unit, Cold Storage and Wholesale Vegetable Auction Centre’, with an investment of Rs.3.10 crores, in Belgaum District, was approved. ii) LAND: The Committee resolved to recommend to KIADB to acquire and allot 13.27 acres of land at Sy.Nos.628 [excluding land proposed for NH-4], 629 & 630, in Belgaum, to the Society, for the project. iii) WATER: To be met from own borewells. Unit to minimize the use of water and shall establish structure/facility for rain water harvesting and ground water recharge, Conducting an annual ‘Water Audit’ is also recommended. iv) POWER: 500 KVA to be serviced by HESCOM. v) POLLUTION CONTROL: The promoters were advised to obtain consent for establishment from KSPCB to establish the facility and to install 500 KVA DG Set. vi) BUILDING AND MACHINERY LAYOUT PLAN APPROVAL: The promoters were advised to obtain prior approval for proposed building plan & machinery layout from factories and Boilers Dept. vii) INCENTIVES & CONCESSIONS: As per New Industrial Policy 2006 – 11. Please find enclosed ‘Combined Application From [CAF] which has to be filed for obtaining the required different Department/Authority as per the Karnataka Industries [[Facilitation]] Act, 2002. You are requested to fill up and provide two sets of CAF along with the required fees by way of Demand Draft and other enclosures securely tied, Department/Authority – wise to this office for forwarding the same to concerned department/authority for issue of respective clearances. Further, you are expected to provide employment unit as per the Government Order No.CI/228/RIS/90 dated 21/04/1995 [enclosed herewith]. We will be pleased to provide the necessary escort services for the speedy implementation of your project. We request you kindly to keep us informed of the progress made in the implementation of the project every quarter in the proforma enclosed. Further, you are expected to provide employment unit as per the Government Order No.CI/228/RIS/90 dated 21/04/1995 [enclosed herewith]. We will be pleased to provide the necessary escort services for the speedy implementation of your project. We request you kindly to keep us informed of the progress made in the implementation of the project every quarter in the proforma enclosed. Kindly send us a copy of the Industrial Entrepreneurs Memorandum acknowledgement issued by the Government of India in respect of your proposed project for our records. This approval is valid for two years. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, Sd/- [H.L.SHIVANANDA] Managing Director, KUM and Member Secretary, State Level Single Window Clearance Committee” 26. It is also pointed out that it is not as though the fifth respondent itself identified the land for acquisition; that at the request of the fifth respondent for locating the suitable lands, the Tahsildar of the area had conducted a survey of the available land and had indicated three parcels of lands in his report to the Senior Assistant Commissioner, Belgaum Sub-Division, Belgaum, sent on 22.10.2006 and had indicated that the lands in Sy.Nos.628,629 & 630 were suitable; that the total extent of 13 acres 27 guntas were available and therefore proceedings had progressed and no malafides or lack of application of mind can be attributed to the respondents in such acquisition proceedings and has drawn attention of the court to the earlier correspondence relating to the letter of the Deputy Commissioner addressed to the Executive Officer of the Board on 2.11.2006 and the communication from the Special Deputy Commissioner, Board to the Principal Secretary, Department of Communications and Industry, Government of Karnataka dated 30.11.2006 recommending acquisition of land for the benefit of the fifth respondent to set up their project shows that the Board has acted in a Proper, Statute conforming manner and therefore submits that there is no need for interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction and the learned single Judge has rightly dismissed the petitioners and urges for dismissal of the appeals. 27. It is in the wake of such contentions that we are required to examine the present appeals. 28. 27. It is in the wake of such contentions that we are required to examine the present appeals. 28. It is to be made clear at the outset that the examination by this court whether in writ petitions or in writ appeals in respect of any administrative action or statutory action on the part of any public authority answering the description of ‘state’ is always based on the touchstone of the statutory and constitutional provisions. 29. Judicial review of administrative action or exercise of statutory power is confined to the questions of the existence of the power under the relevant provisions of the law, the manner of exercise of that power; whether it is in accordance with the procedure required or envisaged by the statue and also the manner in which the power is exercised, in the sense, whether it is exercised in a bonafied manner for a proper purpose, on relevant consideration and for which the power is conferred on the statutory functionary and as is proclaimed. 30. Thoughseveral shades of arguments have been addressed in the present appeals raising many legal contentions and assuming many hues and shades, the examination is confined to the aspects of the existence of power and the manner of its exercise. In the present situation, there is not much dispute that the entire acquisition proceedings were initiated at the behest of the fifth respondent-society as it appears that the fifth respondent-society wanted to set up the cold storage plant, wholesale vegetable auction centre and food processing pulp manufacturing unit. 31. Sri. Mahesh Wodeyar, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the Board has drawn attention of the court to the communication/request of the fifth respondent-society addressed to the Managing Director, Karnataka Udyog Mitra in terms of the request letter dated 15.11.2006 requesting for acquiring the very subject lands comprised in Sy.No.628 to the extent of 3 acres 20 guntas, in Sy.No.629 to the extent of 3 acres 37 guntas, in Sy.No.630 to the extent of 6 acres 10 guntas, in all totaling 13 acres 27 guntas. The file containing this application at page 70 of the records is placed before the court. At pages 59 to 63 is the application. The application itself is undated though the request letter is dated 15.11.2006. When the fifth respondent has made its application to the single window agency, the fifth respondent has already identified the land. The file containing this application at page 70 of the records is placed before the court. At pages 59 to 63 is the application. The application itself is undated though the request letter is dated 15.11.2006. When the fifth respondent has made its application to the single window agency, the fifth respondent has already identified the land. It is therefore obvious that the identification of the land is only by the fifth respondent and not by any public authority, such as single window agency or the Board or the State Government. Though certain records are placed before the court to indicate that local Tahsildar had certified the area to be a suitable land after conducting a survey in this regard etc., it was a request by the fifth respondent to the Tahsildar and cannot form part of the proceedings before the single window agency which according to the learned Government Advocate has statutory recognition in terms of the provision of section 6 of the Karnataka Industries [Facilitation] Act, 2002. 32. It is not in dispute that the fifth respondent is a private co-operative society said to be formed by farmers for their benefit and registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959. Assuming that a private society like the fifth respondent has a very commendable and workable project to be started or implemented as in the instant case, establishment of a project of this nature by such private society can never partake the character of a public purpose. It may be true that the working of the project and its establishment by the fifth respondent may enure to the farmers class, but it still remains in the domain of the private enterprise. The concept of ‘public purpose’ whether as understood under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or under the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Act, 1966, is not the same as a private project and for the benefit of a private society. It is obvious from a perusal of the manner in which developments have taken place that the entire State machinery including the so called single window agency and the Board have all been activated and have been made to work with great speed to please the fifth respondent-society, that too for acquiring the private lands in the name of public purpose. 33. 33. Powers under section 3(1), 1(3) and 28 of the Act are to be exercised by the State Government as a statutory functionary and on relevant considerations. In the present situation, though the motions of issuing such notifications and publishing the same in the gazette have all been gone through, it is obvious that the decision making process is only guided by the fifth respondent whose requirement has assumed importance before all authorities. 34. It is rather ironic that a combination of the statutory provisions under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, Karnataka Industries [Facilitation] Act, 2002 and the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Act, 1966, are all pressed into service for the purpose of acquiring a small extent of 13 acres 27 guntas of land in a private holding. 35. The so called power of eminent domain is pressed into service for compulsory acquisition of these lands only for the benefit of the fifth respondent. The concept of ‘public purpose’ and public interest is not the same as providing or extending the facility for establishing a project of a private co-operative society by utilizing the powers of the State for compulsory acquisition of private lands and in the name of a public purpose. 36. It is also to be emphasized that while Karnataka Industries [Facilitation] Act, 2002 may have a good and laudable object and purpose to facilitate and to speed up the clearances to be obtained at the Government level by intending entrepreneurs, it does not at the same time mean that law and procedures can be given a go by. It is rather surprising to see that the statutory functionaries in the name of recommendation by either State High Level Clearance Committee or the State Level Single Window Clearance Committee have systematically given a go by to all requirements of law and procedure and have surrendered their judgment to the dictates of this Committee. 37. Whether a State High Level Committee has cleared a project or as in the present case, the State Level Single Window Clearance Committee has approved the project, neither the statutory provisions can be changed by such approval nor the procedural requirements and exercise of power on relevant considerations can be given up. 37. Whether a State High Level Committee has cleared a project or as in the present case, the State Level Single Window Clearance Committee has approved the project, neither the statutory provisions can be changed by such approval nor the procedural requirements and exercise of power on relevant considerations can be given up. No statutory authority whether functioning under the present Act or under any other enactment can abdicate its duties and responsibilities in favour of the decisions/clearance/approval of the so called State Level Single Window Clearance Committee or the State High Level Clearance Committee, however strong and potent the composition of these committee may be, including a good number of Secretaries/ Principal to the Government and may include many a Cabinet Ministers and even the Chief Minister. Any decision of such committee is always subject to securing compliances with the relevant statutory provisions. In fact, even in the present case, as one can notice, the very single window clearance committee has apprised the fifth respondents that the fifth respondent has to comply with other requisite statutory provisions and clearance. It is afortiori so on the part to statutory authorities exercising statutory power to comply with the requirements of law. 38. We find that the statutory power for notifying an area as an ‘industrial area’ need for applying the provisions of chapter-IV in respect of the area for the purpose of acquiring the land and the issue of a preliminary notification under section 28[1] of the Act which are all statutory functions of considerable importance and significance and requiring application of mind have all been simply abdicated to the recommendation of the single window clearance committee in favour of the fifth respondents. It is the fifth respondent who has identified the subject lands and not through a process envisaged in law for public purpose. It is precisely because of this reason that learned counsel for the appellants has urged that the learned single judge was clearly in error proceeding to dismiss the writ petitions on the premise that it was for a public purpose and ratio of BHAGAT SINGH’S case (supra) applied to the present situation. 39. On the other hand, we find statutory is not exercised in a manner envisaged in law. Relevant aspects are not taken into consideration and the exercise of power is made subservient to the dictates of an agency like the single window agency. 40. 39. On the other hand, we find statutory is not exercised in a manner envisaged in law. Relevant aspects are not taken into consideration and the exercise of power is made subservient to the dictates of an agency like the single window agency. 40. It is of significance to notice that even when the fifth respondent is applying to the single window agency it has already identified the land, may be with the assistance of the local Tahsildar earlier, but nevertheless, identification is by the applicant and not by a public authority. All further proceedings are just gone through to sub serve this request of the fifth respondent. It is a clear case of non application of mind, abdication of statutory responsibilities and an instance of colorable exercise of power by giving a picture of public interest being involved in a situation where pure private purpose is sought to be served. 41. The powers under the Act is not used for sub-serving the purpose and object of the Act but surrendered in favour of outside dictates. 42. It is also high time that the Sate Government to introspect as to whether all its private and purpose can be fulfilled in the name or in the guise of extending facilities to entrepreneurs under the provisions of the Karnataka Industries [facilitation] Act, 2002. While acquisition in favour of a private society is not totally frowned under the provisions of the acquisition act, it should be spelt out so and not to lend a colour of public purpose is to be used, particularly, as it is presumed in situations of issue of the notifications under sections 3[1], 1[3] and 28[1] of the Act, it should be really so and not a pretence. An acquisition of a small extent of 13 acres 27 guntas of land for the benefit of a private party can never partake the character of ‘public purpose’ however laudable the intentions and objects of the may be and however good and efficient the project that is likely to be set up by the private society may be. 43. Though no personal malafides are attributed to any person by impleading any person by name, but nevertheless, arguments are advanced suggesting such malafides as the heads of the fifth respondent was a Member of the Legislative Assembly etc., and therefore arguments cannot be accepted. 43. Though no personal malafides are attributed to any person by impleading any person by name, but nevertheless, arguments are advanced suggesting such malafides as the heads of the fifth respondent was a Member of the Legislative Assembly etc., and therefore arguments cannot be accepted. But, legal malafides are writ large on the face of the record on the part of not only the State Government but also the Board as statutory authorities have exercised statutory powers and functions only for the benefit of the fifth respondent. Such exercise of statutory power does not stand the scrutiny of judicial review of administrative action put in place by the respondent in the name of exercise of statutory powers. 44. Before concluding, we would like to refer to the interim order passed in these appeals earlier on 30.1.2009 as under: “VGGJ & LNSJ: 30.01.2009 ORDER ON I.A. NO. 4/2007 These matters are listed today to consider I.A No.4/2007 the application for stay filed by the appellants. It is their case that after declaration of final notification under Section 28(4) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, (hereinafter called as ‘the KIAD Act’ in short), notice under Section 28(6) was served calling upon the appellant owners to deliver the possession of the lands to the authorized officer of State Government under the provisions of KIAD Act within 30 days from the date of serving of the notices. If there is failure to deliver possession within 30 days, the state Government’s Authorized Officer can take possession by using force. 2. In the instance cases, it is the case of the owners that possession of their lands has not been taken from them, as provided under Section 28(6) or 28(7) of the KIAD Act. To evident this fact, they have filed their affidavit and the affidavits of the neighbors namely Shri Ramachandra Narayanan Gunddanche, Shri Jayavant Balu Konduskar, Shri Mahadev Ramachandra Godase, Shri Ishwar Gundoji Muchandi, Shri Pandurang Ananada Chogule, Shri Ajas Y. Hakim, Shri Pandurang Anant Mendake, along with the photographs showing that possession of the acquired lands are in their possession and they have been cultivating the same. It is their complaint that the 3rd respondent-KIADB and 5th respondent beneficiary are tring to interfere with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the properties. It is their complaint that the 3rd respondent-KIADB and 5th respondent beneficiary are tring to interfere with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the properties. Therefore they have requested this Court to grant interim order staying the further proceedings of taking possession of the lands in question. 3. It is contended that the acquisition of the property is totally impermissible in view of the Comprehensive Development plan (CDP) as the lands in question are earmarked for agricultural purpose. In respect of such lands, under section 3(1) of the KIAD Act, the acquisition is totally impermissible. In support of the statement they have filed the affidavits of the neighboring owners and produced photographs. Copies of the same are served upon the learned AGA, consul for KIADB and learned counsel for the 5th respondent-beneficiary. 4. This application is opposed by the KIADB and the 5th respondent-beneficiary placing strong reliance upon the original records maintained by the KIADB to substantiate their case that, after declaration of the final notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act, the acquired lands are statutorily vested with the state Government. The same is followed by issuing of notice under Section 28(6) of the KIAD Act, to the land owners by the Special Land Acquisition Officer attached to KIADB and they have been served. Time was stipulated for them to deliver the possession on or before 28.03.2007. Since they did not deliver the possession of the lands before the date specified in the notice, the special Lands Acquisition Officer authorized the Revenue Inspector of the concerned village to take possession by using force. According to the Spl. L.A.O possession of the lands has been taken on 01.10.2007. To substantiate this, panchanama is drawn by the Revenue Inspector attached to KIADB. Thereafter the lands have been transferred to the KIADB on 03.10.2007 and in turn given to 5th respondent-beneficiary on 13.11.2007. 5. The 5th respondent-beneficiary has also taken the same stand by producing the documents and opposing the prayer for grant of stay of further proceedings pursuant to the notice under Section 28(6) of the KIADB Act placing strong reliance upon the lease-cum-sale agreement dated 20.11.2007 to evidence the that the acquired lands have been leased in its favour with certain terms and conditions. Copy of the same has been produced as Annexure-R1, the lands mentioned is 13 acres 27 guntas as disclosed in Annexure-1 to the lease deed and the same is registered before the Sub-Registrar, Begaum on the same date. Pursuant to the said lease-cum-sale deed, possession certificate Annexure-R2 is issued in favour of the 5the respondent-beneficiary. The name of the 5th respondent is mutated vide MR No. 547/2007-08 dated 02.04.2008. To evidence this fact Annexure-3A2 and 3B are produced. Annexure-R4 is the letter written by the Commissioner of Belgaum Urban Development Authority (Hereinafter called as ‘BUDA’ for short ) to the 5th respondent – beneficiary intimating to pay the conversion charges of Rs. 6,07,420/. Within 90 days to the Belgaum Urban Development Authority. On 04.06.2008, the demanded notice as per Annexure-R5 to pay amount is produced. It is stated that the amount has been paid by the 5th respondent –beneficiary to the BUDA. 6. Learned senior counsel Shri Nanjundareddy submits that the lands covered in these appeals are in possession of the 5th respondent and they have fenced it. Further submission is made that the function for laying foundation stone was held. Therefore he submits that is not a fit case grant of interim stay as prayed in the application. 7. This appeal was admitted on 23.01.2009 and after hearing for some time on the interim stay application, we directed the KIADB to produce the original records in relation to these cases. Accordingly, the records are made available to us on 29.01.2009 for our perusal. With reference to the pleadings and the rival submissions on the interim stay application we have carefully examined to find out: I) Whether the appellants are entitled for order of staying further proceedings? II) Whether the Special Land Acquisition Officer attached to KIADB took possession of the lands and handed over to the KIADB and thereafter transferred to the 5th respondent? III) What Order? 8. The aforesaid points are required to be answered in favour of the appellants for the following reasons: (I). It is an undisputed fact that final notification dated 28.05.2006 was published on 08.12.2006. After the final notification, the special land Acquisition Officer issued notices to the appellants and other landowners on 24.02.2007. On the overleaf of the notice available in the original record, it is seen that some of the appellants are served. It is an undisputed fact that final notification dated 28.05.2006 was published on 08.12.2006. After the final notification, the special land Acquisition Officer issued notices to the appellants and other landowners on 24.02.2007. On the overleaf of the notice available in the original record, it is seen that some of the appellants are served. In the said notices there is direction calling upon the owners, who are in possession of the lands to deliver the same on or before 28.03.2007. (II). It is an undisputed fact that the owners have not delivered possession voluntarily as directed in the notice issued under Section 28(6) of the Act. The next action that was required to be taken was either by the state Government or any officer duly authorized by it to take possession of the acquired lands covered in these Appeals by using such force as may be necessary. As could be seen from the original records, there is no order passed by Spl. L.A.O under Section 28(6) of the KIADB Act who is the authorized officer of the Sate Government under Rule 14 of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Rules, 1996. (hereinafter called as the Rules for short), the State Government has not delegated its power to the Revenue Inspector attached to KIADB to take possession of the acquired lands of the appellants. (III). The authorization in favour of the Spl. L.A.O under Rule 14 of the Rules is permissible under Section 31 of the Act. It is the case of the KIADB that by using force, possession has not been taken from the appellants as there is no order as required under Section 28(6) of the Act passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer who is specially authorized by the State Government under Rule 14 of the Rules calling upon the appellants to surrender or deliver possession of acquired land to him. (Iv). AS could be seen from the original records of the KIADB, possession of the lands was taken by the Revenue Inspector of the concerned village of the lands on 01.10.2007. To this effect, there is panchanama drawn. But, it is to be noted that under Sub-section(7) of section 28 of the Act it is the State Government or any officer authorized by it should take possession and not by any other person. To this effect, there is panchanama drawn. But, it is to be noted that under Sub-section(7) of section 28 of the Act it is the State Government or any officer authorized by it should take possession and not by any other person. In the instant case, the Revenue Inspector who has taken possession as per the Kiadb, is not authorised or empowered to take possession of lands taken by him is not valid in the eye of law as lawful possession is not at all taken by the Spl.L.A.O attached to the KIADB. 9. Thus it is clear that the Special Land Acquisition Officer, who is specially authorized under Rule 14 of the Rules, has not taken possession forcibly from the Appellant/ owners as provided under sub- section.(7) of section 28 of KIAD Act. Therefore the case pleaded by the owners that possession has not been taken in accordance with Section 28(6) and (7) of the KIADB Act is prima facie established by the appellants. The Affidavits sworn to by the appellants along with 7 neighboring owners and the photograph clearly establishes the fact that the appellants have been in possession and cultivating the lands. No doubts, the learned senior counsel Mr. S.Vijayashankar and D.N. Nanjunda Reddy on behalf of KIADB and 5 th respondent-beneficiary have disputed the correctness of the same. Whether the notices under Section 28(5) of the KIADB Act issued were served upon the appellants or not , even assuming that notices have been served, the possession of the lands have not been voluntarily delivered by the appellants to the Spl.L.A.O, is an undisputed fact. 10. The further contention that Special Land Acquisition Officer, who is specially authorised under rule 14 of the Rules on behalf of the State Government to take possession of the acquired lands in favour of KIADB, has delegated the said power to the Revenue Inspector is wholly untenable in law. Such delegation of power is totally impermissible in view of Section 28(6) and (7) read with Rule 14 of the Rules. 11. Prima-facie possession of the lands is not taken by the KIADB. Consequently possession could not be transfers in favour of 5th respondent – beneficiary as per Annexure R1 and other documents. Therefore 5th respondent cannot claim or say that it was put in possession and is in possession of the lands. 11. Prima-facie possession of the lands is not taken by the KIADB. Consequently possession could not be transfers in favour of 5th respondent – beneficiary as per Annexure R1 and other documents. Therefore 5th respondent cannot claim or say that it was put in possession and is in possession of the lands. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of BALWANT NARAYAN BHAGDE V. M.D. BHAGWAT AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1975 PAGE 1767 regarding taking over possession of the lands, at paragraph 25 and 26 held thus: 25. It would be thus seen that a symbolical or formal delivery of possession as understood in law has the effect of disposing the judgment- debtor from his right, title or interest in the property. It does not dispossess the person in actual possession in his own right not liable to be evicted under the decree or in pursuance of the auction sale. A symbolical or formal delivery of possession against the judgment-debtor is giving of actual possession of the property in the eye of law and has the effect of disposing him although as a mater of fact he may have succeeded in resuming back possession as before shortly after dispossession. 26. In a proceeding under the Act for acquisition of land all interests are wiped out. Actual possession of the land becomes necessary for its use for the public purpose for which it has been acquired. Therefore, the taking of possession under the Act cannot be “symbolical” in the sense as generally understood in civil Law. Surely it cannot be a possession merely on paper. What is required under the Act is the taking of actual possession on the spot. In the eye of law the taking of possession will have the effect of transferring possession from the owner or the occupant of the land to the Government. 12. Surely it cannot be a possession merely on paper. What is required under the Act is the taking of actual possession on the spot. In the eye of law the taking of possession will have the effect of transferring possession from the owner or the occupant of the land to the Government. 12. The above observations of the Apex Court in the above referred case is with all fours prima facie is applicable to the fact situation for the reason that on 20.08.2006 notices issued to some of the appellants was not served, thereafter Special Lands Acquisition Officer being authorised officer of the State Government as provide under Rule 14 of the Rules, as not passed order under Section 28(6) of the Act to take possession of the lands have been taken by the Revenue Inspector of the concerned village who is not empowered to take possession of the lands in law. Therefore we have prima facie found that possession has not been taken as provided in sub-section (7) of section 28 of the Act. Therefore we have to accept the case of the appellants that they have been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property. In this view of the matter, the various documents produced by 5th respondent-beneficiary do not support the case of taking actual possession by the special Land Acquisition Officer and in turn given to 5th respondent. 13. It is also to be noted that the appellants in this case have produced additional documents along with the application particularly the CDP to evidence the fact that the lands in question are earmarked for agricultural purpose. Therefore Prima- facie the acquisition of the lands for non-agricultural purpose is contrary to CDP. 14. For the reasons stated above, we allow the application I.A. No.4/2007 and grant stay of further proceedings in pursuant to the notices issued under Section 28(5) of the KIADB Act. The Possession of the appellants lands shall not be disturbed until disposal of all these appeals. This interim order will be applicable to the lands of the appellants only. 45. Our present further examination has only confirmed the apprehensions expressed, even while passing this interim order and we have found the statutory power being virtually misused and abused for private purpose. 46. In the result, these writ appeals are allowed. This interim order will be applicable to the lands of the appellants only. 45. Our present further examination has only confirmed the apprehensions expressed, even while passing this interim order and we have found the statutory power being virtually misused and abused for private purpose. 46. In the result, these writ appeals are allowed. The impugned notifications issued under sections 3[1], 1[3] and 28 of the Act and all proceeding in pursuance thereof are all quashed by issue of a writ certiorari. Rule issued and made absolute. Parties to bear their respective costs. 47. All the pending applications in these appeals for production of additional documents are allowed and all pending applications for impeding are dismissed as unnecessary.