Judgment :- 1. In all these cases, the petitioners have challenged the order at Annexure ‘L’ dated 30.4.2011 whereby the health officer of Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (‘BBMP’ for short) has cancelled their trade licence for carrying on the business at different places of the City of Bangalore. 2. The petitioners are the owners of restaurant/cafes situated at different parts of the City of Bangalore. It is contended that as a pat of their service for a long period of time, they offer to their customers ‘hookah’, an eastern smoking pipe designed with a long tube passing through an urn of water that cools the smoke as it is drawn through. The officials of the BBMP raided the premises of the petitioners serving hookah and seized hookah paraphernalia therefrom. The petitioners made a request to the respondents for the return of the seized hookah equipment. However, no favourable response from the respondents was received. Therefore, they filed writ petitions before this Court in W.P.Nos.15435 to 15445/2011 for a direction to the BBMP and its Officers refraining from interfering with their business except in accordance with law. On 21.4.2011, this Court passed an order permitting the petitioners to make a representation to the respondents for return of the seized hookah apparatus. The petitioners have accordingly filed a representation as per Annexure ‘J’ dated 23.4.2011 to the Commissioner of BBMP requesting him to direct return of hookah apparatus seized from their respective premises and to direct the officials of the BBMP to refrain from interfering with their right to serve hookah. After considering the said representation, the second responded has passed an order at Annexure ‘L’ dated 30.4.2011 cancelling the trade licenses issued by the BBMP earlier. He has further directed the return of the hookah apparatus subject to the petitioners filing an undertaking that they will not put to use the said apparatus within the limits of BBMP in any manner. 3. The respondents have filed their objections asserting that the BBMP has jurisdiction to prohibit/regulate the business in hookah and that the petitioners cannot do the said business without obtaining specific licence as provided under the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (‘Act for short). The second respondent has passed a detailed order assigning the reasons for cancelling the trade licenses. 4. The second respondent has passed a detailed order assigning the reasons for cancelling the trade licenses. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the order of cancellation of licenses as per Annexure ‘L’ is a quasi-judicial order. The second respondent has not jurisdiction whatsoever to pass the said order. Section 66 of the Act does not authorize the Commissioner to delegate his quasi judicial power to any of his sub-ordinate officers either expressly or by clear implication. 5. Alternatively, it is submitted that the petitioners are running restaurants and cafes offering inter alia hookah services which contains tobacco. The Regulation of hookah services comes within the provisions of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of trade and Commerce. Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 (‘Tobacco Act, 2003’ for short). The respondents have no jurisdiction or authority to take action in so far as hookah service is concerned as the same is covered under the Tobacco Act, 2003. 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the Commissioner has delegated his power to grant licence to hotels, restaurants, etc, as per the order dated 10.11.1998 under Section 66 of the Act. That is how the second respondents has issued trade licences to the petitioners. When the second respondent has issued trade licence, it is implied that he has power to cancel the said licenses having regard to Section 21 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899. It is further contended that the second respondent on a detailed consideration of the facts and circumstances, has passed the impugned order cancelling the trade licenses, which does not call for interference. 7. Before dealing with the contentions urged, it is necessary to note the relevant statutory provisions in the light of which the present controversy has to be resolved. Admittedly, the trade licences have been issued by the second respondent in favour of the petitioners. Sub-section (2) of Section 343 provides for cancellation or suspension of any licence issued under sub-section (1) of Section 342. The said provisions are as under: “Section 343. Admittedly, the trade licences have been issued by the second respondent in favour of the petitioners. Sub-section (2) of Section 343 provides for cancellation or suspension of any licence issued under sub-section (1) of Section 342. The said provisions are as under: “Section 343. Prohibition in respect of lodging houses: (1) No person shall, without or otherwise than in conformity with the terms of a licence granted by the Commissioner in this behalf, keep any lodging house, eating-house, tea-shop, coffee-house, café, restaurant, refreshment room, or any place, where the public are admitted for repose or for the consumption of any food or drink or any place where food is sold or prepared for sale. Explanation: xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx (2) The Commissioner may at any time cancel or suspend any licence granted under sub-section (1) if he is of opinion that the premises covered thereby are not kept in conformity with the conditions of such licence or with the provisions of any bye-law made under Section 423 relating to such premises whether or not the licensee is prosecuted under this Act.” 8. Sub-section (3) of Section 443 states that every order of the Commissioner or other municipal authority refusing, suspending, cancelling or modifying a licence or permission shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it proceeds. Sub-section (4) of Section 443 states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, any licence or permission granted under the Act or any Rule or bye-law made under it, may at any time be suspended or revoked by the Commissioner, if any of its restrictions or conditions is evaded or infringed by the grantee or if the grantee is convicted of a breach of any of the provisions of the Act or any Rule, bye-law or Regulation made under it, in any matter to which such licence or permission relates, or if the grantee has obtained the same by misrepresentation or fraud. 9. Section 66 of the Act provides for delegation of Commissioner’s ordinary power, which is as under: “Subject to the rules made by the State Government, the Commissioner may delegate to any officer of the Corporation subordinate to him, any of his ordinary powers, duties and functions including the powers specified in Schedule III.” 10. 9. Section 66 of the Act provides for delegation of Commissioner’s ordinary power, which is as under: “Subject to the rules made by the State Government, the Commissioner may delegate to any officer of the Corporation subordinate to him, any of his ordinary powers, duties and functions including the powers specified in Schedule III.” 10. Section 67 of the Act authorizes the Commissioner to delegate his extraordinary powers, which is as under: “The Commissioner may on his own responsibility and by order in writing authorize the Health Officer, the Engineer, the Revenue officer or any other officer who is the head of a department working under the Commissioner or any person in temporary charge of the duties of any of the officers aforesaid to exercise the extra ordinary powers conferred on his by clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 64.” The above provision authorizes the Commissioner to authorize his subordinates to exercise extraordinary powers conferred on his by clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 64 in any emergency. Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 64 reads as under: “64. Functions of the Commissioner: (1) Subject, whenever it is in this Act expressly so directed, to the approval or sanction of the Corporation or the Standing Committee concerned and subject also to all other restrictions, limitations and conditions imposed by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, the executive power for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act and of any other law for the time being in force which imposes any duty or confers any power on the corporation shall vest in the Commissioner, shall also:- a. Xxxx xxxx xxxx b. In any emergency take such immediate action for the service or safety of the public or the protection of the property of the Corporation as the emergency require, notwithstanding that such action cannot be taken under this Act without the sanction, approval or authority of some other Municipal Authority or of the Government. Provided that the Commissioner shall report forthwith to the Standing Committee concerned and to the Corporation the action he has taken and the reasons for taking the same and the amount of cost, if any incurred or likely to be incurred in consequence of such action which is not covered by a current budget grant under the provisions of the Act.” 11. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that the power vested in the Commissioner under Sections 343 and 443 has been delegated by him in favour of the second respondent. In support of his contention, he has produced a copy of the order dated 10.11.1998. The relevant portion of the said order is as under: OTHER LANGUAGE 12. As noticed above, sub-section (2) of Section 343 authorises the Commissioner at any time cancel or suspend any licence granted under sub-section (1) if he is of the opinion that the premises covered thereby are not kept in conformity with the conditions of the licence or with the provisions of any bye-law made under Section 423 relating to such premises whether or not the licensee is prosecuted under the Act. The petitioners have obtained the licence under sub-section (1) of Section 343 of the Act. If does not authorize any other Officers of the BBMP to revoke the licence. The order of cancellation of the licence was made by the Health Officer of the BBMP. 13. The contention of the respondents is that having regard to Section 66 of the Act, the Commissioner has delegated his power to the Health Officer under the notification dated 10.11.1998. Alternatively, it is contended that the power to grant the licence implies power to withdraw as provided under Section 21 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act 1899. Therefore, two questions arise for consideration. Firstly, whether the Commissioner is authorized to delegate the power to cancel the licence when he alone is vested with the said power under the Act? Secondly, whether the second respondent has authority to cancel the licence as he had issued the licence having regard to Section 21 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899? 14. Before answering the above questions, we have to examine as to whether the order of cancellation of licence passed by the second respondent is quasi judicial in nature. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘quasi’ is ‘not exactly’ and it is just in between a judicial and an administrative function. The definition of ‘quasi judicial’ clearly suggests that there must be two or more contending parties and an outside authority to decide those dispute. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘quasi’ is ‘not exactly’ and it is just in between a judicial and an administrative function. The definition of ‘quasi judicial’ clearly suggests that there must be two or more contending parties and an outside authority to decide those dispute. Where there are two or more parties contesting each other’s claim and the statutory authority is required to adjudicate the rival claims between the parties, such a statutory authority was held to be quasi judicial and decision rendered by it is a quasi judicial order. It is equally well settled that where a statutory authority is empowered under a statute to do any act which prejudicially affects the subject although there is not lis between the two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and the subject and the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi judicial. 15. In PROVINCE OF BOMBAY VS. KHUSHALDAS S. ADVANI – AIR 1950 SC 22, the Apex Court has held thus: “(1) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other there is a lis and prima facie, and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary, if is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act, and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. In other words, while the presence of two parties besides the deciding authority will prima facie and in the absence of any other factor impose upon the authority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking the act of the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if the authority is nevertheless required by the statute to act judicially.” 16. In STATE OF H.P. VS. RAJA MAHENDRA PAL AND OTHERS – 1999 (4) SCC 43 , the Apex Court has held that a quasi judicial function has been termed to be one which stands midway a judicial and an administrative function. The primary test is as to whether the authority alleged to be a quasi judicial one has any express statutory duty to act judicially in arriving at the decision in question. If the reply is in the affirmative, the authority would be deemed to be quasi judicial, and if the reply is in the negative, it would not be. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘quasi’ is ‘not exactly’. Thus, an authority is described as quasi judicial when it has some of the attributes or trappings of judicial functions, but not all. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (1) VS. INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL WELGARE AND OTEHRS – AIR 2002 SC 2158 , has held that where a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do any act which would prejudicially affect the subject, although there is no lis between the two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and the subject and the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi judicial it is held thus: “That the presence of a lis or contest between the contending parties before the statutory authority, in the absence of any other attributes of a quasi-judicial authority is sufficient to hold that such a statutory authority is quasi-judicial authority. However, in the absence of a lis before a statutory authority, the authority would be quasi-judicial authority if it is required to act judicially. However, in the absence of a lis before a statutory authority, the authority would be quasi-judicial authority if it is required to act judicially. Where a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do any act which would prejudicially affect the subject although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and the subject and the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decisions of the said authority is quasi judicial.” 18. In JAMAL UDDIN AHMAD VS. ABU SALEH NAJMUDDIN AND ANOTHER – 2003 (4) SCC 257 , the Apex Court has held that judicial function entrusted to a Judge is inalienable and differs from an administrative or ministerial function which can be delegated or performance whereof may be secured through authorization. The judicial function is exercised under legal authority to decide on the disputes, after hearing the parties, may be after making an enquiry, and the decision affects the rights and obligations of the parties. There is a duty to act judicially. The Judge may construe the law and apply it to a particular state of facts presented for the determination of the controversy. A ministerial act, on the other hand, may be defined to be one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done. In ministerial duty nothing is left to discretion, it is a simple, definite duty. 19. In AUTOMOTIVE TYRE MANFUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION VS. DESIGNATED AUTHORITY AND OTHERS – 2011 (2) SCC 258 , the Apex Court has pointed out the line demarcating an administrative decision from a quasi judicial decision, which is as under: “More Often than not, it is not easy to draw a line demarcating an administrative decision from a quasi judicial decision. Nevertheless, the aim of both a quasi judicial function a well as an administrative function is to arrive at a just decision. The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. Nevertheless, the aim of both a quasi judicial function a well as an administrative function is to arrive at a just decision. The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi judicial power, regard must be had to” (i) the nature of the power conferred; (ii) the person or persons on whom it is conferred; (iii) the framework of the law conferring that power; (iv) the consequence ensuring from the exercise of that power, and (v) the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised.” 20. Perusal of Section 343 and 443 would clearly indicate that no person shall run a restaurant without a licence being granted by the Commissioner and the Commissioner at any time cancel or suspend the licence granted where the premises covered in his opinion is not kept in conformity with the conditions of licence and if any of its conditions is evaded or infringed by the licensee or if the licensee is convicted of a breach of any of the provisions of the Act or any Rule, bye-law or Regulation, or if the licensee has obtained the same by misrepresentation or fraud, the Commissioner may also suspend or completely revoke the licence granted under the bye-law in respect of any ground of public health or safety or for non-observance of the conditions of any of the bye-laws. The suspension or revocation of such licence shall be made only after holding an enquiry. Opportunity ha to be given to the licensee to show cause in the matter. It is clear that the Commissioner cannot revoke the licence unilaterally as it prejudicially affects the licences. Thus, the power exercised by the Commissioner is essentially quasi judicial in nature. 21. Having said that, the question for consideration is whether the Commissioner can delegate his power to the Health Officer under Section 66 of that Act? As stated above, the power to cancel the licence under Sections 343 and 443 of the Act is a quasi judicial power which has to be exercised by the Commissioner. Section 66 of the Act does not authorize the Commissioner to delegate his quasi judicial power to any of his Officers except the one specified in Schedule III. As stated above, the power to cancel the licence under Sections 343 and 443 of the Act is a quasi judicial power which has to be exercised by the Commissioner. Section 66 of the Act does not authorize the Commissioner to delegate his quasi judicial power to any of his Officers except the one specified in Schedule III. Section 67 authorises the Commissioner to delegate the executive powers vested on his under Clause (b) of Sub Section (1) of Section 64 of the Act in any emergency. He has to report forthwith to the Standing Committee concerned and to the Corporation the action he has taken and the reasons for taking the same and the amount of cost, if any incurred or likely to be incurred in consequence of such action which is not covered by a current budget grant under the provisions of the Act. The Commissioner cannot delegate his power for cancellation of licence under Section 67 of the Act. It is well settled that a judicial power cannot ordinarily be delegated unless the law expressly or by clear implication permits it (see BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION VS. DHONDU NARAYAN CHOWDHARY – AIR 1965 SC 1486 ). 22. This Court in M/S PEPSICO RESTAURANTS INTERNATIONAL (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANOTHER VS. CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALORE, HUDSON CIRCLE, BANGALORE AND OTHERS – 1995 (6) KLJ 243 (SUPP) was considering a similar question. In the said case, it is held that Section 66 does not empower any other Corporation authority to revoke the licence granted. The Commissioner alone is competent to suspend or cancel or revoke the licence and the revocation or suspension shall be made only after an opportunity is given to the petitioner to show cause in the matter. In the administration of a local body like the Corporation or City of Bangalore, it may not be possible for the Commissioner to perform all his functions and exercise all his powers conferred by the provisions of the Act and therefore, Sections 66 and 67 of the Act empower the Commissioner to delegate his ordinary and extraordinary powers to any of his Officers. It has been further held as under: “The impugned order or memo of revocation of licence dated September, 12, 1995 was passed by the Health officer. It has been further held as under: “The impugned order or memo of revocation of licence dated September, 12, 1995 was passed by the Health officer. From the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the bye-laws to which I have referred to above, it is clear that the Health Officer is not c0nferred with any power to revoke the licence of a restaurant. Such power is exclusively vested in the Commissioner and, Section 66 of the Act empowers the Commissioner to delegate any of his ordinary powers including the one specified in Schedule III. Section 66 of the Act does not empower the Commissioner to delegate his quasi judicial powers to any of his officers except the one specified in Schedule III.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 23. It appears that in order to cure the defect pointed out by this Court in PEPSICO’s case, the notification dated 10.11.1998 has been issued by the Commissioner in exercise of the power vested on him under Section 66 of the Act delegating the power of revocation of licence without noticing the observations of the Court that Section 66 of the Act does not empower him to delegate his quasi judicial powers to any of his officers except the one specified in Schedule III. Therefore, delegation of the said power by the Commissioner is bad in law. 24. At this stage, learned Counsel for the BBMP submits that after considering PEPSICO’s decision, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. AKTHARUNNISSA AND OTHERS VS. THE CORPORATION OF CITY OF BANGALORE AND OTHERS – ILR 1997 KAR 2303 has held that power under sub-section (1) of Section 321 of the Act can be delegated by the Commissioner under Section 66 of the Act and that the said decision has been upheld by the Division bench of this Court in W.A.Nos.4632/1997 disposed of on 28.10.1997 (between SMT.AKTHAR UNNISSA & OTHERS VS. THE CORPORATION OF CITY OF BANGALORE AND OTHERS). 1 have perused the decision in AKTHAR UNNISSA’s case, which has been confirmed by the Division bench in W.A.Nos.4632/1997 disposed of on 28.10.1997. In AKTHAR UNNISSA’s case, the Court was dealing with the power vested in the Commissioner under Section 321 of the Act. THE CORPORATION OF CITY OF BANGALORE AND OTHERS). 1 have perused the decision in AKTHAR UNNISSA’s case, which has been confirmed by the Division bench in W.A.Nos.4632/1997 disposed of on 28.10.1997. In AKTHAR UNNISSA’s case, the Court was dealing with the power vested in the Commissioner under Section 321 of the Act. In paragraph 24 of the order, the Court has categorically held that the said power is an ordinary power of the Commissioner and it is not one of the emergency powers under Section 64(1)(b) of the Act. Thus, in the said decision, this Court has distinguished the decision in PEPSICO’s case. Therefore, AKTHAR UNNISSA’s case is not applicable to the facts of this case. 25. That brings me to the second contention of the learned Counsel for the BBMP that since the licence was issued by the Health Officer of the BBMP, he is authorised to amend or vary or rescind the said licence having regard to Section 21 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899. Section 21 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899, is as under: “Section 21. Power to make to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws – Where, by any enactment, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject in the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued.” 26. It is well settled that this Section embodies a rule of construction and the question whether or not it applies to the provisions of a particular statute would depend upon the subject matter, context and the effect of relevant provisions of the said statute. The principle underlying Section 21 is that the power to create includes the power to destroy and also the power to alter what is created. Section 21 does not apply to a decision as to the rights of the parties made by a particular judicial or quasi judicial or administrative authority. The principle underlying Section 21 is that the power to create includes the power to destroy and also the power to alter what is created. Section 21 does not apply to a decision as to the rights of the parties made by a particular judicial or quasi judicial or administrative authority. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State and on consideration of the policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution, but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures to transfer a part of the judicial powers and functions to the Tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between the parties. The basic and the fundamental feature, which is common to both the Courts and Tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a soverign State (See ASSOCITED CEMENTS COMPANIES LTD. VS. B.N.SHARMA & ANOTHER – AIR 1965 SC 1595 ). The said power cannot be inferred under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act unless it is specifically conferred by a statute or delegated in accordance with law. I have already held that the law does not permit the delegation of the quasi judicial power vested on the Commissioner to cancel the licence to the Health Officer. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents, the Health Officer has the power to cancel the licence is without any merit. 27. Having regard to the conclusion arrived at by me as above, it is unnecessary to decide the other contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners with regard to the jurisdiction or authority of the Corporation to take action in so far as hookah service is concerned, having regard to the different provisions of the Tobacco Act, 2003. This question is kept open. 28. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed and the order passed by the Health Officer of the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike at Annexure ‘L’ dated 30.4.2011 is hereby quashed. However, liberty is reserved to the Commissioner, Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike to take appropriate action against the petitioners in accordance with law. No costs.