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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 212 (HP)

Tej Kumar Sethi v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2012-04-20

RAJIV SHARMA

body2012
JUDGMENT Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Petitioner was promoted as Officer Grade-I on 16.3.2006. He was charged on 29.4.2009 vide Annexure P-7. He retired after attaining the age of superannuation on 30.4.2009 and was relieved on 30.4.2009 itself. He also filed reply to the communication dated 29.4.2009 on 14.5.2009. The Managing Director of respondent No.3 – Bank informed the General Manager of respondent No.4 to initiate appropriate action against the petitioner vide letter dated 16.6.2009. Thereafter, the General Manager of respondent No.4 - Bank, vide his office order dated 3.2.2010 forwarded a copy of the resolution of the Managing Committee passed in its meeting held on 28.1.2010 to respondent No.2 requesting him to appoint a Senior Officer of the Cooperative Department to hold inquiry against the petitioner. Respondent No.2 on the basis of request made by respondent No.4 appointed Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Dharamshala as Inquiry Officer on 17.7.20 10. Petitioner was served with a memorandum on 4.9.2010 by the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies to appear before him on 15.9.20 10. Petitioner filed a detailed representation on 15.9.2010 and also appeared before him. The Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Dharamshala completed the inquiry and submitted a report on 23.10.20 10 to the Bank. 2.Mr. Dilip Sharma has strenuously argued that there is no provision in the Service Rules for the Employees of the H.P. State Cooperative Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Limited (hereinafter referred to as the ‘service rules’ for convenience sake) notified on 18.6.1987 for continuation of disciplinary proceedings after the retirement of the petitioner. He also contended that respondent No.4 has not complied with rule 53-A in letter and spirit. He further argued that the inquiry has been conducted by the Deputy Registrar in breach of mandatory service rules. 3.Mr. Vikas Rathore, learned Deputy Advocate General has argued that the inquiry held against the petitioner is in accordance with law. He also argued that the petition against respondent No.4 is not maintainable. 4.Mr. S.C. Sharma and Mr. Ajay Sharma have argued that the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner strictly in accordance with law. They also argued that in the absence of any specific provisions in the service rules for the employees of the Bank, the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1965 are applicable. In other words, their submission is that the disciplinary proceedings could be continued against the petitioner after his retirement. They also argued that in the absence of any specific provisions in the service rules for the employees of the Bank, the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1965 are applicable. In other words, their submission is that the disciplinary proceedings could be continued against the petitioner after his retirement. They have also argued that there is no illegality in the charge-sheet issued by the General Manager. 5.I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the pleading carefully. 6.According to the reply filed by respondents No.1, 2 and 5, respondents No.3 and 4 are Cooperative Societies registered under the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968. 7. The Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh has enacted the act called “The Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Agriculture and Rural Development Banks Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for brevity sake). This Act has been enacted to supplement the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968 in order to facilitate the working of the cooperative agriculture and rural development banks in the State of Himachal Pradesh with a view to providing for the grant of long term loans to owners of land or other immovable property to carry out agricultural improvements, to acquire land for the formation of economic holdings and other like purposes to enable them to discharge their debits and thereby to promote thrift and self help among them. According to section 4, there shall be a State Bank for the State of Himachal Pradesh and as many Primary Agriculture and Rural Development Banks or branches as may be deemed necessary. According to sub-section (3) of section (4) with effect from the commencement of this Act and until such time as the names of the land mortgage Banks and societies functioning in the State at the commencement of this Act are changed into Agriculture and Rural Development Banks all acts done by them or mortgages and other documents executed by them, on in their favour, and all suits and other proceedings filed by or against them shall be deemed to have been done, executed or filed, as the case may be, by or against them as Agriculture and Rural Development Bank. It is thus evident that respondent No.3, i.e. Himachal Pradesh State Cooperative Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Limited is constituted under section 4 of the Act. It is thus evident that respondent No.3, i.e. Himachal Pradesh State Cooperative Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Limited is constituted under section 4 of the Act. 8.Similarly, respondent No.4 shall also be deemed to have been constituted as a primary agriculture and rural bank as per section 4 of the Act. Since respondents No.3 and 4 are creature of a Statute, writ would be maintainable against them. It is evident from the reading of the entire Act that the bank discharges public duties for providing long term loans to owners of land or other immovable property to carry out agricultural improvements. 9.In the instant case, action has been directed to be taken against the petitioner at the instance of respondent No.3 on 16.6.2009. In sequel thereto, request was made by the Management of respondent No.4-Bank to the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Himachal Pradesh to appoint the Inquiry Officer. The Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Dharamshala has been appointed as the Inquiry Officer on 17.7.2010. He has submitted the report on 23.10.2010. Since the Inquiry Officer was the Government functionary, writ is maintainable against the orders passed by him as well. 10.Now, the Court will advert to: whether the disciplinary proceedings could be continued against the petitioner after his retirement on 30.4.2009. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents have failed to point out any rule permitting the Managing Committee to continue the disciplinary proceedings after the retirement. There has to be express provision which authorizes the disciplinary authority to continue the disciplinary proceedings after the retirement. Mr. S.C. Sharma and Mr. Ajay Sharma have failed to point out how the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 could be adopted in the absence of specific provisions in the service rules. 11.Rule 70 talks of retirement. Petitioner in this case has retired on 30.4.2009 and was relieved on 30.4.2009 itself. It was always open to the management not to retire the petitioner and to continue the proceedings against the petitioner and if necessary by placing him under suspension. 12.Mr. Ajay Sharma, in addition, has also referred to Chaper-18. This Chapter is not applicable in the present case. It deals with repeal and savings. It was always open to the management not to retire the petitioner and to continue the proceedings against the petitioner and if necessary by placing him under suspension. 12.Mr. Ajay Sharma, in addition, has also referred to Chaper-18. This Chapter is not applicable in the present case. It deals with repeal and savings. 13.Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab versus Khemi Ram, 1969 (3) SCC 28 have held that there can be no doubt that if disciplinary action is sought to be taken against a Government servant it must be done before he retires as provided by the rule. Their Lordships have further held that if a disciplinary enquiry cannot be concluded before the date of such retirement, the course open to the Government is to pass an order of suspension and refuse to permit the concerned public servant to retire and retain him in service till such enquiry is completed and a final order is passed therein. Their Lordships have held as under: “12. There can be no doubt that if disciplinary action is sought to be taken against a Government servant it must be done before he retires as provided by the said rule. If a disciplinary enquiry cannot be concluded before the date of such retirement, the course open to the Government is to pass an order of suspension and refuse to permit the concerned public servant to retire and retain him in service till such enquiry is completed and a final order is passed therein. That such a course was adopted by the Punjab Government by passing the order of suspension on July 31, 1958, cannot be gainsaid. That fact is clearly demonstrated by the telegram, Ex.P-1, which was in fact dispatched to the respondent on July 31, 1958, by the Secretary, Co-operative Societies to the Punjab Government informing the respondent that he was placed under suspension with effect from August 2, 1958. As the telegram shows, it was sent to his home address at village Batahar, post office Haripur, as the respondent had already by that time proceeded on leave sanctioned by the Himachal Pradesh Administration. Ex.R-1 is the memorandum, also dated July 31, 1958, by which the Punjab Government passed the said order of suspension and further ordered not to permit the respondent to retire on August 4, 1958. Ex.R-1 is the memorandum, also dated July 31, 1958, by which the Punjab Government passed the said order of suspension and further ordered not to permit the respondent to retire on August 4, 1958. That exhibit shows that a copy of that memorandum was forwarded to the respondent at his said address at village Batahar, post office Haripur. Lastly, there is annexure H to the respondent’s petition which consists of an express telegram dated August 2, 1958 and a letter of the same date in confirmation thereof informing the respondent that he was placed under suspension with effect from that date. Both the telegram and the letter in confirmation were despatched at the address given by the respondent, i.e., at his village Batahar, post office Haripur. These documents, therefore, clearly demonstrate that the order of suspension was passed on July 31, 1958, i.e., before the date of his retirement and had passed from the hands of the Punjab Government as a result of their having been transmitted to the respondent. The position, therefore, was not as if the order passed by the Punjab Government suspending the respondent from service remained with the Government or that it could have, therefore, changed its mind about it or modified it. Since the respondent had been granted leave and had in fact proceeded on such leave, this was also not a case where, despite the order of suspension, he could have transacted any act or passed any order in his capacity as the Assistant Registrar.” 14.Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Jena versus Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and others (1999) 3 SCC 666 have held that the inquiry would lapse in the absence of specific provision and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits. Their Lordships have held as under: “6. It will be noticed from the abovesaid regulations that no specific provision was made for deducting any amount from the provident fund consequent to any misconduct determined in the departmental enquiry nor was any provision made for continuance of departmental enquiry after superannuation.7. In view of the absence of such provision in the abovesaid regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the retiral benefits of the appellant. In view of the absence of such provision in the abovesaid regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the retiral benefits of the appellant. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in case misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on 30-6-95, there was no authority vested in the Corporation for continuing the departmental enquiry even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement.” 15.The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Mrinal Kanti Chakraborty versus State of West Bengal and others, 1993 Lab.I.C. 1747 has held that the departmental proceeding or disciplinary proceeding cannot continue after the employee finally retired from the service. The Division Bench has further held that if the power of the employer to continue with the departmental proceeding even after the retirement is conceded that would be destructive of the concept of relationship of employer and employee which has come to an end by reason of the retirement of the employee beyond which disciplinary control cannot extend. The Division Bench has held as under: “6. If the power of the employer to continue with the departmental proceeding even after the retirement is conceded that would be destructive of the concept of relationship of employer and employee which has come to an end by reason of the retirement of the employee, beyond which disciplinary control cannot extend.7. The modern welfare state believes it to be for peoples own good that they should not be exposed to any risk of being overreached. Thus in Guardians of Salford Union v. Dewhurst (1926) AC 619 the House of Lords held that an employer could not contract out of a statutory duty to pay a pension. The reason was expressed by Pullock Mr. (P664) in somewhat quaint language.... Thus in Guardians of Salford Union v. Dewhurst (1926) AC 619 the House of Lords held that an employer could not contract out of a statutory duty to pay a pension. The reason was expressed by Pullock Mr. (P664) in somewhat quaint language.... ‘the public should be safeguarded from the melancholy susetable of seeking a man who had done work and been in a responsible position during years of his life, suffering from poverty and distress by reason of the fact that no adequate provision had been made to enable him to spend him later years in reasonable comfort.’ In Hirendra Kumar Nag v. Collector or Calcutta reported in 1979 (2) CHN 291, it was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that the disciplinary proceeding could not be continued after the retirement and the same view was also taken in another decision of this Court in Satya Ranjan Chowdhury v. Commissioner, of Police, Calcutta reported in (1983) 87 CWN 1009. This point is also concluded by another decision of this court in the case of Ram Gopal Bhattacharjee v. State of West Bengal judgment dated 14.11.1986 in C.O. No. 18299 (N) of 1984 reported in 1987 LIC 1617 and that the said judgment of the learned Single Judge has been affirmed on appeal by the Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dt. 15th December, 1992 in FMA No. 1175 of 1990. Accordingly we are of the view that the department proceeding and/or disciplinary proceeding could not be continued in the facts and circumstances of the case after the appellant petitioner finally retired from the service after serving two extensions thereof and that after retirement there cannot be any disciplinary control over an employee who had retired. Only for the purpose of denying the retiring benefit which is his property and with that he will have to maintain his last days of his life. If such hard earned benefit is allowed to be taken away in his old age days it would be also destructive to the principles of social and economic justice which the Constitution of India designed to secure to all the citizens of India.” 16. If such hard earned benefit is allowed to be taken away in his old age days it would be also destructive to the principles of social and economic justice which the Constitution of India designed to secure to all the citizens of India.” 16. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Government of T.N. versus K.N. Ramamurthy, (1997) 7 SCC 101 have held that the Tribunal or the Court can interfere only if on the charges read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any, no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out, or the charges framed are contrary to any law. In the case in hand, the charge sheet dated 29.4.2009 is contrary to rule 53 (b) (i) of the service rules. 17.The next question which falls for consideration is that whether the disciplinary proceedings instituted against the petitioner and completed on 23.10.2010 are in conformity with law or not. A detailed procedure has been provided under rule 53-A the manner in which the disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against an employee for awarding punishment under rule 52. The competent authority for imposing punishment on the employee in Grade-I and Special Grade is Board of Directors on the recommendations of the Managing Director. It is stipulated in sub-clause (b) of rule 53 that no punishment for ‘major misconduct’ shall be imposed on an employee unless he is proved guilty of major misconduct in enquiry conducted in the following manner:(i)The competent authority Managing Director/General Manager, as the case may be, shall serve on the employee a charge sheet in Form ‘A’ for major misconduct clearly setting forth the misconduct charged and the circumstances appearing against him and call for his explanation.(ii)The employee shall be given for submitting his explanation a period of at least two weeks.(iii)If the employee accepts the charge(s) the competent authority shall award suitable punishment to him. In case of denial, the competent authority shall cause an enquiry to be conducted by an officer appointed by him for the purpose.(iv)The employee shall be allowed to defend by himself or by any other employee of the Bank, if he so desires, but an outsider shall not be allowed to conduct the defence on behalf of the delinquent employee.(v)The employee shall be permitted to produce witnesses in his defence and cross-examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests.(vi)The substance of the evidence shall be recorded and read over to the concerned employee.(vii)The Officer appointed to conduct the enquiry will complete the enquiry and submit his report within such time and any extension thereof as may be allowed by the competent authority. The enquiry report shall include the statement of witnesses adduced for and against the employee and the findings of the enquiry officer based on such evidence on each charge.(viii)On receipt of the enquiry report the competent authority shall examine the findings applying his own best judgment and in awarding punishment shall not merely be led by the findings of the enquiry officer. His order shall be self speaking.(ix)The order of punishment shall be in writing and shall be issued under the signature of the competent authority or other officer authorized by him. A copy of the order passed awarding the punishment shall be given to the employee. 18.The charge sheet issued to the petitioner on 29.4.2009 is not in conformity with form ‘A’ provided in rule 53 (b) (i). Form ‘A’ permits the incumbent to file reply to the charge-sheet and also to furnish the names of witnesses and to produce the documents, which he wanted to rely in defence. It is also permissible to him to inspect the papers connected with the basis of the charges during working hours. Annexure P-7 charge sheet is not in conformity with form ‘A’. The petitioner has only been permitted to file reply within 15 days and he has not been permitted to submit the list of witnesses and documents as provided in form ‘A’. Petitioner has still filed the reply to memorandum of charge sheet dated 29.4.2009 on 14.5.2009. Annexure P-7 charge sheet is not in conformity with form ‘A’. The petitioner has only been permitted to file reply within 15 days and he has not been permitted to submit the list of witnesses and documents as provided in form ‘A’. Petitioner has still filed the reply to memorandum of charge sheet dated 29.4.2009 on 14.5.2009. It is not borne out from the record that the reply filed by the petitioner to charge sheet dated 29.4.2009 on 14.5.2009 was taken into consideration before respondent No.3 has directed respondent No.4 to take action against the petitioner vide letter dated 16.6.2009. It is also not borne out from the pleadings that before the Management had decided to approach respondent No.2 for appointment of Inquiry Officer on 3.2.2010 whether the reply filed by the petitioner on 14.5.2009 was taken into consideration or not. The Inquiry Officer was appointed on 17.7.20 10, i.e. Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Dharamshala. He has submitted reply to the memorandum on 14.5.2009. He has appeared before the Inquiry Officer on 15.9.2009. The Inquiry Officer has not held the inquiry strictly as per rule 53-A. He has not called upon the petitioner to give the list of witnesses or documents to prove his innocence. The inquiry conducted is one sided. The procedure to be followed by the Inquiry Officer is that he has to permit the parties to lead their respective oral as well as documentary evidence. In the instant case, petitioner has not at all been given opportunity to prove his innocence by citing the witnesses and proving the documents. The Inquiry Officer has abruptly come to the conclusion that the petitioner has violated the policy guidelines. The plea of the petitioner that the charge sheet could not be issued by the General Manager has not been dealt with in right perspective. 19.Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Prakash Kumar Tandon (2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 541 have held that if the disciplinary proceedings have not been conducted fairly, presumption can be drawn that this caused prejudice to the charged employee. Their Lordships have held as under: “13. From the evidence of another Assistant Engineer who had taken part in the raid, it is evident that the alleged loss caused to the Railways was negligible and mere marginal allowances are permitted for measurement of “scantlings and planks”. Their Lordships have held as under: “13. From the evidence of another Assistant Engineer who had taken part in the raid, it is evident that the alleged loss caused to the Railways was negligible and mere marginal allowances are permitted for measurement of “scantlings and planks”. 14.In the aforementioned situation, we are of the opinion that the Tiribunal as also the High Court cannot be said to have erred in holding that the Said Mr. Walia should have been examined as a witness.15.The principles of natural justice demand that an application for summoning a witness by the delinquent officer should be considered by the enquiry officer. It was obligatory on the part of the enquiry officer to pass an order in the said application. He could not refuse to consider the same. It is not for the Railway Administration to contend that it is for them to consider as to whether any witness should be examined by it or not. It was for the enquiry officer to take a decision thereupon. A disciplinary proceeding must be fairly conducted. An enquiry officer is a quasi-judicial authority. He, therefore, must perform his functions fairly and reasonable which is even otherwise the requirement of the principles of natural justice.17.If the disciplinary proceedings have not been fairly conducted, an inference can be drawn that the delinquent officer was prejudiced thereby.18.In S.L. Kapoor V. Jagmohan this Court has held that non-compliance with the principles of natural justice itself causes prejudice. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said principle has since been watered down but in a situation of this nature, we are of the opinion that the concurrent findings of the Tribunal, as also the High Court cannot be said to be unreasonable or suffering from any legal infirmity warranting interference.” 20.The disciplinary proceedings are quasi- judicial in nature and the same must be based on admissible evidence. Though the evidence Act is not applicable but the principles of natural justice and fair play are applicable. 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi versus Punjab National Bank and others (2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 570 have held that a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi versus Punjab National Bank and others (2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 570 have held that a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. Their Lordships have further held that the disciplinary authority and appellate authority must pass reasoned orders. Their Lordships have further held that the enquiry report based on conjectures and surmises, cannot be sustained. Their Lordships have also held that suspicion howsoever high cannot be a substitute for legal proof and though the Evidence Act, 1872 is not applicable, the inquiry has to be conducted according to principles of natural justice. 22. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others Versus Gyan Chand Chattar (2009) 12 Supreme Court Cases 78 have held that an enquiry has to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not subjectively. The finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory even if the delinquent does not take the defence or make a protest against that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly, in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences. 23. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G. Vallikumari versus Andhra Education Society and others, 2010 (2) SCC 497 have held that the disciplinary authority must record reasons while removing an employee, if reasons are not recorded, the order is vitiated due to violation of the statutory rules and the principles of natural justice. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus Khan Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2010) 10 Supreme Court Cases 539 have held that the enquiry is to be conducted fairly and reasonably and enquiry report must contain reasons for reaching the conclusion that charge framed against delinquent stood proved against him. It cannot be ipse dixit of enquiry officer. Their Lordships have held as under: “16. We have to proceed keeping in mind the trite law that holding disciplinary proceedings against a government employee and imposing a punishment on his being found guilty of misconduct under the statutory rules is in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings. Though the technical rules of procedure contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 do not apply in a domestic enquiry, however, the principles of natural justice require to be observed strictly. Therefore, the enquiry is to be conducted fairly and reasonably and the enquiry repost must contain reasons for reaching the conclusion that the charge framed against the delinquent stood proved against him. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the enquiry officer. Punishment for misconduct can be imposed in consonance with the statutory rules and principles of natural justice. (See Bachhittar Singh V. State of Punjab, Union of India V. H.C. Goel, Anil Kumar V. Presiding Officer, Moni Shankar V. Union of India and Union of India V. Prakash Kumar Tandon.)” 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar Versus Union of India & Anr., JT 2012 (2) SC 352 have held as under: “13.The Inquiry Officer noticed the aforesaid facts and held the appellant was unauthorisedly absent between 3rd October, 1995 and 7th November, 1995; 9th November, 1995 and 10th December, 1995; 10th December, 1995 and 2nd August, 1995. However, while coming to such contention, the authority failed to decide whether such absence amounted to misconduct. The evidence led by the appellant in support of his claim that he was prevented to sign the attendance register and to perform duty though noticed the Inquiry Officer on presumption and surmises, held the charge proved.14.Rule 3(1)(ii) and Rule 3(1)(ii) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, relates to all time maintaining integrity, devotion to duty and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant and reads as follows: “Rule 3-General. (1) Every Government servant shall at all times- (i)maintain absolute integrity; (ii) maintain devotion to duty; and (iii)do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant.” 15.In the case of appellant referring to unauthorized absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion of duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a Government servant.22.In the present case, the disciplinary authority failed to prove that the absence from duty was willful, no such finding has been given by the Inquiry Officer or the Appellate Authority. Though the appellant had taken a specific defence that he was prevented from attending duty by Shri P. Venkateswarlu, DCIO, Palampur who prevented him to sign the attendance register and also brought on record 11 defence exhibits in support of his defence that he was prevented to sign the attendance register, this includes his letter dated 3rd October, 1995 addressed to Shri K.P. Jain, J.D., SIB, Ahmedabad, receipts from STD/PCO office of Telephone calls dated 29th September, 1995, etc. but such defence and evidence were ignored and on the basos of irrelevant fact and surmises the Inquiry Officer held the appellant guilty.” 26.Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, the writ petition is allowed. Annexure P-7 dated 29.4.2009 and R-6 dated 23.10.2010 are quashed and set aside. Respondents are directed to release the due and admissible retiral/pensionary benefits to the petitioner within a period of 10 weeks after the production of certified copy of this judgment by the petitioner. No costs.