Judgment :- S.J. Vazifdar, J. 1. The petitioner alleges that he is the tenant of the land sought to be acquired. The landlord, the Comunidade of Mapusa and another party who also alleges to be the tenant of the land, have not challenged the acquisition. 2. Respondent Nos.2 and 3 are the Under Secretary (Revenue), Government of Goa and The Bardez Bazar Consumer Cooperative Society (hereinafter, referred to as “the Society”), respectively. 3. The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to quash notifications dated 7th April, 1999 and 7th February, 2000 issued under the Land Acquisition Act and an Award dated 12th January, 2001. The petitioner has also sought restoration of possession in the event of it being found that the possession was in fact taken. 4. The respondents raised two preliminary objections. Although we heard the matter on two other issues as well, we are of the opinion that one of the preliminary objections is well founded and the petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. We, therefore, restrict this judgment to the preliminary objections. 5. It was contended that the petitioner has no locus standi, as he has not established his rights as a tenant in respect of the land that is sought to be acquired. The second preliminary objection, which we have upheld, is that the petition suffers from gross delay and laches. The petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to challenge the acquisition proceedings, inter-alia, in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court. Even if it does not constitute a preliminary objection in the strict sense, if it is well founded, it would entail a dismissal of the petition irrespective of our findings on the other issues. 6. The objection on the ground of delay is this. This petition is the first step the petitioner has taken to challenge the acquisition proceedings. Over a year before that, the entire proceedings for acquisition, including the taking over of possession and the handing over of the same to the acquiring body-respondent No.3, stood concluded. On facts, we find that the petitioner in all probability, was aware of the proceedings. In any event, the petitioner has not satisfactorily explained the delay in filing this petition after the award was made and possession was taken. In view of the consistent views in such cases, especially of the Supreme Court, the petition is liable to be dismissed. On facts, we find that the petitioner in all probability, was aware of the proceedings. In any event, the petitioner has not satisfactorily explained the delay in filing this petition after the award was made and possession was taken. In view of the consistent views in such cases, especially of the Supreme Court, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. Mr. Sonak, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner placed strong reliance upon the fact that even prior to the present acquisition proceedings, the said land was sought to be acquired. A notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 12th November, 1996. It is stated that the land was likely to be needed for the public purpose of construction for the Society. The petitioner and the landlord filed objections to the same. The petitioner filed his objections by a letter dated 23rd December, 1996. No notification under Section 6 was issued and the proceedings accordingly lapsed. 8(A). Thereafter, the present proceedings commenced by issuance of a notification under Section 4 dated 7th April, 1999. This notification also states that the land was likely to be needed for the public purpose for construction of a market for the Society. (B). A notification under Section 6 was, thereafter, issued on 7th April, 2000. The petitioner did not raise any objection even at this stage. 9. The petitioner contends that he did not raise an objection to the proposed acquisition as he was unaware of the same. He in fact claims to have been unaware of the entire acquisition proceedings. We will deal with this important issue of fact later. Suffice it note at this stage that the petitioner has placed strong reliance upon the fact that his name was not mentioned in either of the notifications, despite the fact that he had objected to the previous proceedings for the acquisition of the said property. 10. The award was made on 12th January, 2001. The contents of the award are of considerable importance in testing the petitioner's case that he was unaware of the entire acquisition proceedings. The award states the following facts. The Section 4 notification was published in the Official Gazette dated 13/5/99 and in two local newspapers on 18th April, 1999 and 24th April, 1999. The contents of the award are of considerable importance in testing the petitioner's case that he was unaware of the entire acquisition proceedings. The award states the following facts. The Section 4 notification was published in the Official Gazette dated 13/5/99 and in two local newspapers on 18th April, 1999 and 24th April, 1999. The requisite public notices under Section 4(1) were issued at the concerned places through the Mamlatdar of Bardez on 3rd August, 1999. Thereafter, a site inspection was carried out along with the representatives of the acquiring department. The objections raised during the proceedings were heard. The comments of the acquiring department were also noted and a report under Section 5-A was submitted to the Government, along with a draft declaration under Section 6 with a revised survey report and plan and a letter dated 30th November, 1999. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made in the Government notification dated 7th February, 2000 and published in the Official Gazette dated 10th February, 2000 and in two local newspapers on 13th February, 2000 and 15th February, 2000. A corrigendum containing minor corrections in the name of the Society was also published in the Official Gazette on 24th February, 2000. The land was properly surveyed and demarcated with boundary stones and the plans and the survey reports were published. The plans were also kept for public inspection along with the survey reports. The public notices under Sections 9 and 10 were issued and published at the appropriate places on 27th March, 2000 through the Mamlatdar of Bardez. Individual notices were served on the persons mentioned in the Section 6 notification, as also on those found to be interested in the land during the course of proceedings. Thereafter, a site inspection was carried out to ascertain the area to be acquired in the presence of the representatives of the acquiring department. No one objected to the measurements of the land. The facts stated in the award are important in testing the petitioner's allegation that he was unaware of the proceedings, especially when it is his case that he was in possession of the land as the tenant thereof. 11. The award is dated 12th January, 2001. No one objected to the measurements of the land. The facts stated in the award are important in testing the petitioner's allegation that he was unaware of the proceedings, especially when it is his case that he was in possession of the land as the tenant thereof. 11. The award is dated 12th January, 2001. 12(A) A certificate dated 17th April, 2001 was issued, certifying that the possession of the land, trees and structures had been taken over on 17th April, 2001 at 10.30 a.m. under Section 16 of the Act and that the same vested absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. The certificate stated that the possession had been taken over on behalf of the acquiring department, viz. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies from the Additional Deputy Collector on the same day. (B) A further certificate dated 30th April, 2001 was issued by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, stating that the possession of the land had been handed over on that day, viz. 30th April, 2001 to the Society for the purpose of constructing a building for the Society. The Chairman of the Society endorsed his confirmation upon the certificate. 13. The present acquisition proceedings, therefore, commenced on 17th April, 1999 with the issuance of the notification under Section 4. The proceedings concluded with the making of the award on 12th January, 2001 and the possession of the said land being taken over on 17th April, 2001. Thereafter, the possession was handed over to the acquiring body on 17th April, 2001 and to the Society on 30th April, 2001. 14. The petition was filed on 3rd May, 2002 i.e. over a year after the entire proceedings had concluded and the land stood vested in the Government. On 25th November, 2002, Rule was issued and an ad interim order in terms of prayer (b) was granted, restraining the Society from, in any way, carrying out the construction on the said plot, pending the hearing and final disposal of this petition. 15. Mr. Dessai, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3 contended that the petitioner is disentitled to reliefs in view of the gross delay and laches. Mr. Lawande, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2 went a step further. 15. Mr. Dessai, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3 contended that the petitioner is disentitled to reliefs in view of the gross delay and laches. Mr. Lawande, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2 went a step further. He contended that the petition is not maintainable as it was filed after the award was made and the possession of the land was taken. 16. It is convenient to refer to the authorities cited before dealing with Mr. Sonak's submissions endeavouring to explain the delay. 17. Mr. Dessai relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Aflatoon and others vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, (1975) 4 SCC 285 , where it was held: “11. Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the validity of the notification even after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 in 1966. Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one of the appellants. There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the public purpose were not specified. A valid notification under Section 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners (see Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi (1969) 2 SCR 824 and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 84 ).” The judgment turned on its own facts. This judgment does not support either the petitioner or the respondents in respect of their respective extreme propositions. This judgment does not support either the petitioner or the respondents in respect of their respective extreme propositions. It, however, certainly supports the respondents to the extent that a petitioner who is found to have sat on the fence and allowed the government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notifications were valid, is disentitled to reliefs. 18. Mr. Dessai relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501 ): “23. The next question is whether the High Court was right in issuing the writ after a long lapse of time? The respondents, admittedly, approached the High Court after a delay of 4 years; that too after award was made and possession was taken from the owner. It is seen that the declaration was published as long back as on 3-5-1979. Earlier to that after the draft plan was published, notice was given to all the parties. The respondents, who claim to be the tenants, had not raised the little finger in making any objection to the proposed scheme or the revised plan. The award was made on 24-2-1983; possession was taken on 4-3-1983, and on the same day it stood transferred to the BMC. The writ petition came to be filed thereafter on 4-7-1983. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches. 29. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.” Firstly, it is important to note that the delay of four years was from the date of the notices and not from the date of possession having been taken. The possession was taken on 4th March, 1983 and the writ petition was filed on 4th July, 1983 i.e. within four months. Assuming that a writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition proceedings even if the award is made and possession is taken, it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case to decide whether the petitioner ought to be permitted to challenge the acquisition proceedings despite the delay and laches. Paragraph 29 and especially the observations therein that the Court should be loath to quash the notifications when a petition is filed after all the steps taken for the acquisition proceedings have become final, have been interpreted by the judgments referred to shortly. It is necessary, however to note that it was held that the fact that no third party rights were created, is hardly a ground for interference. This answers Mr. Sonak's submission that the construction has not been put up and units therein had not been sold. This fact, therefore, by itself is not a ground in the event of the Court coming to the conclusion that the petition ought to be dismissed in view of the delay and laches. 19. Mr. Lawande relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 = AIR 2000 SC 671 . In paragraph 17, the Supreme Court held : “17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. In paragraph 17, the Supreme Court held : “17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N., reported in (1997) 2 SCC 627 . This Court observed as below: (SCC p. 628, para 4) 18. Similar is the view in an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (1996) 11 SCC 501 .......” The Supreme Court quoted paragraph 29 of the judgment which we set out earlier. Mr. Lawande strongly contended that the Supreme Court has laid down as an absolute rule that after the award is passed, no writ petition can be filed, challenging the acquisition notice or any proceedings thereunder. He submitted, therefore, that it is not open to this Court to consider whether there is a valid explanation for any delay that is caused after the award is passed. He also submitted that in this case, the Supreme Court construed the earlier judgments to be to the same effect, viz., that after an award is passed no writ petition can be filed, challenging the acquisition notice or any proceedings thereunder. This, he submitted, is evident from paragraph 18. 20. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh and others, (2003) 1 SCC 335 relied upon by Mr. Dessai follows the judgment in Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (supra). 21. Mr. Sonak relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Charles F. Pais Vs. State of Goa, through its Chief Secretary, Secretariat, Panaji, Goa & ors. (2004) Goa L. R. 389. A preliminary objection had been raised contending that the petition should be dismissed in limine as it was filed after passing of the award and after the possession of the acquired land had been taken. The Division Bench held as follows: “5. State of Goa, through its Chief Secretary, Secretariat, Panaji, Goa & ors. (2004) Goa L. R. 389. A preliminary objection had been raised contending that the petition should be dismissed in limine as it was filed after passing of the award and after the possession of the acquired land had been taken. The Division Bench held as follows: “5. With the above, we shall deal with the first contention as raised on behalf of the Respondents that the Petition should be dismissed on the ground that as the declaration under Section 6 has been issued, award has been made and possession has been taken the Petition ought to be dismissed. Reliance has been placed on various authorities for that purpose. In Municipal Corporation Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others (1996) 11 SCC 501 the Apex Court, has observed that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the Notifications. In other words, it is not an absolute rule that the Court cannot interfere but it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Normally if there was inordinate delay the Court shall not interfere. ........ ” Mr. Sonak submitted that this Court, therefore, has construed the judgment of the Supreme Court as not constituting an absolute inflexible rule that the Court must dismiss a petition challenging an acquisition where an award has been made and possession has been taken. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (supra) was not noticed by the Division Bench. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bangalore City Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 3 SCC 727 , to which we will refer last, it is not necessary to consider whether the interpretation of this Court of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (supra) is opposed to the interpretation of that judgment by the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (supra) where it was held that after the award is passed, no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or any proceedings thereunder. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (supra) is opposed to the interpretation of that judgment by the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (supra) where it was held that after the award is passed, no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or any proceedings thereunder. We have come to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 is not barred merely because the petition is filed after the award is made and possession is taken. 22. Mr. Lawande then relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 4 SCC 695 . The Supreme Court once again referred to its earlier judgment in Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (supra). It is important to note that the Supreme Court also referred to its earlier judgment in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (supra) and held as under: “16. This Court has repeatedly held that a writ petition challenging the notification for acquisition of land, if filed after the possession having been taken, is not maintainable. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. where K. Ramaswamy, J. speaking for a Bench consisting of His Lordship and S.B. Majmudar, J. held: (SCC p. 520, para 29) 18. To the similar effect is the judgment of this Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (2000) 2 SCC 48 wherein this Court, following the decision of this Court in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. held: (Shah Hyder case, (2000) 2 SCC 48 , SCC p. 55, para 17) “17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. (1997) 2 SCC 627 ) ….” 19. In the present case also, the writ petition having been filed after taking over the possession and the award having become final, the same deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. (1997) 2 SCC 627 ) ….” 19. In the present case also, the writ petition having been filed after taking over the possession and the award having become final, the same deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Accordingly, the orders of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench are affirmed to the extent of dismissal of the writ petition and the special appeal without going into the merits thereof. This appeal also deserves to be dismissed without going into the merits of the case and is dismissed as such. No costs.” 23. Thus, upto this stage, it is clear that the legal position is as stated in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (supra) and paragraphs 16 to 19 of Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (supra). 24. This brings us to the last judgment relied upon by the parties on this issue. Mr. Sonak relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Bangalore City Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. State of Karnataka, (supra). Before referring to the observations, it is important to state that the Supreme Court noted its earlier judgment referred to above in the case of Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (supra) which judgment, in turn, referred to the judgment in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (supra). Relying upon the earlier judgments, it was submitted before the Supreme Court that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge by not entertaining her challenge to the acquisition of land on the ground of delay of more than two and half years. The Supreme Court, having noted these judgments, held as under: “45. We have considered the respective arguments. The Framers of the Constitution have not prescribed any period of limitation for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and it is only one of the several rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by the superior courts that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is essentially an equity jurisdiction, should not be exercised in favour of a person who approaches the Court after a long lapse of time and no cogent explanation is given for the delay. 46. 46. In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi (1969) 1 SCC 110 , the Constitution Bench considered the question whether the writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for refund of the amount forfeited by the Sales Tax Officer under Section 21 (4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, which, according to the petitioner, was ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature should be entertained ignoring the delay of almost nine years. Sikri and Hedge, JJ. were of the view that even though the petitioner had approached the Court with considerable delay, the writ petition filed by it should be allowed because Section 12-A(4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 was declared unconstitutional by the Division Bench of the High Court (sic Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court)***. Bachawat and Mitter, JJ. opined that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay. 47. Hidayatullah, C.J. who agreed with Bachawat and Mitter, JJ. in Tilokchand case noted that no period of limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe: (SCC p. 116, para 11) “11. Therefore, the question is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit. A case may be brought within the Limitation Act by reason of some article but this Court need not necessarily give the total time to the litigant to move this Court under Article 32. Similarly in a suitable case this Court may entertain such a petition even after a lapse of time. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are when and how the delay arose.” 48. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is that even though there is no period of limitation for filing petitions under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner should approach the Court without loss of time and if there is delay, then cogent explanation should be offered for the same. However, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down or a straitjacket formula can be adopted for deciding whether or not this Court or the High Court should entertain a belated petition filed under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution and each case must be decided on its own facts.” 25. However, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down or a straitjacket formula can be adopted for deciding whether or not this Court or the High Court should entertain a belated petition filed under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution and each case must be decided on its own facts.” 25. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Bangalore City Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. State of Karnataka, (supra) noted the earlier judgments in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (supra) and Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (supra) and interpreted them in paragraphs 45 to 48. Based on these judgments, it must be held that mere delay and laches does not bar a challenge to the acquisition proceedings by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution. Delay and laches are factors to be considered in the exercise of discretion to entertain a writ petition, challenging the acquisition proceedings filed after the award is made and the possession has been taken. The High Court has discretion to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case even if an award is made and possession is taken. 26. Mr. Sonak next submitted that if the proceedings are void for any reason, the question of delay and laches loses any significance. In other words, according to him, if it is found that the material steps in the process of acquisition are void, the acquisition is liable to be set aside on that ground, even if the petitioner challenges the process after it was complete in all respects, including where an award has been made and possession has been taken. He submitted that in the present case, the petitioner had challenged the very jurisdiction of the authorities in view of the alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. He further contended that the proceedings are void as the acquisition was not for a public purpose, but for the private benefit of respondent No.3 which is a private Society. 27. The submission is not well founded. The judgments of the Supreme Court referred to so far do not qualify the ratio therein in this manner. It is not open to us to ignore the judgments of the Supreme Court on this ground. 28. 27. The submission is not well founded. The judgments of the Supreme Court referred to so far do not qualify the ratio therein in this manner. It is not open to us to ignore the judgments of the Supreme Court on this ground. 28. A Bench of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi, (1996) 6 SCC 445 , held as under: “7. The question is whether the absence of the publication of the substance of the notification in the locality renders the entire proceedings void? We need not dilate upon the question whether local publication of substance of Section 4(1) notification is mandatory or directory. Since this Court has consistently taken the view that compliance of the requirement of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) in the Gazette as well as publication of the substance of the notification in the locality now under the Amended Act in the newspaper, is mandatory requirement. As the facts are not in controversy, as mentioned in the judgment of the High Court, the substance of the notification was not published in the locality; we proceed on the premise that second step, namely, publication of the substance of the notification in the locality, was not taken. The question then is whether Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration are required to be quashed? In this regard, we have to consider the conduct of the parties and the effect thereof. Under the scheme of the Act, after the possession of the land was taken either under Section 17(2) or Section 16, the land stands vested in the State free from all encumbrances. Thereafter, there is no provision under the Act to divest the title which was validly vested in the State. Under Section 48(1) before possession is taken, the State Government is empowered to withdraw from the acquisition by its publication in the Gazette. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has considered the question in Senjeevanagar Medical & Health Employees' Coop. Society v. Mohd. Abdul Wahab (1996) 3 SCC 600 and held in para 12 thus: (SCC p. 607) “That apart, as facts disclose, the award was made on 24-11-1980 and the writ petition was filed on 9-8-1982. It is not in dispute that compensation was deposited in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. Society v. Mohd. Abdul Wahab (1996) 3 SCC 600 and held in para 12 thus: (SCC p. 607) “That apart, as facts disclose, the award was made on 24-11-1980 and the writ petition was filed on 9-8-1982. It is not in dispute that compensation was deposited in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. It is asserted by the appellant Society that possession of the land was delivered to it and the land had been divided and allotted to its members for construction of houses and that construction of some houses had been commenced by the date the writ petition was filed. It would be obvious that the question of division of the properties among its members and allotment of the respective plots to them would arise only after the Land Acquisition Officer had taken possession of the acquired land and handed it over to the appellant Society. By operation of Section 16 the land stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. (1993) 4 SCC 369 , the question arose: whether notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 get lapsed if the award is not made within two years as envisaged under Section 11-A? A Bench of three Judges had held that once possession was taken and the land vested in the Government, title to the land so vested in the State is subject only to determination of compensation and to pay the same to the owner. Divesting the title to the land statutorily vested in the Government and reverting the same to the owner is not contemplated under the Act. Only Section 48(1) gives power to withdraw from acquisition that too before possession is taken. That question did not arise in this case. The property under acquisition having been vested in the appellants, in the absence of any power under the Act to have the title of the appellants divested except by exercise of the power under Section 48(1), valid title cannot be defeated. The exercise of the power to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 would lead to incongruity. Therefore, the High Court under those circumstances should not have interfered with the acquisition and quashed the notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 respectively. The exercise of the power to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 would lead to incongruity. Therefore, the High Court under those circumstances should not have interfered with the acquisition and quashed the notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 respectively. Considered from either perspective, we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in allowing the writ petition.” 8. In Satendra Prasad Jain case (1993) 4 SCC 369 , another Bench of three Judges had held that though award under Section 11-A was not made within two years after the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 came into force, the title having been vested in the State, the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 do not get lapsed and non-compliance of statutory provisions does not have the effect of divesting the title of the land vested in the Government free from all encumbrances. 9. Recently, another Bench of this Court in Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development & Investment Co. (P) Ltd. CA No.286 of 1989, decided on 6.9.1996 re-examined the entire case law and had held that once the land was vested in the State, the Court was not justified in interfering with the notification published under appropriate provisions of the Act. Delay in challenging the notification was fatal and writ petition entails with dismissal on grounds of laches. It is thus, well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loathe to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. Reliance was placed by Shri Sachar on M.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi (1992) 2 SCC 168 in particular para 8, wherein it was held that compliance of the requirements is mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders all subsequent proceedings connected therewith unexceptionably illegal; but the question is what will be its effect. That was not the question in that case, since no award had come to be passed. In Nutakki Sesharatanam v. Sub-Collector, Land Acquisition (1992) 1 SCC 114 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court had held that if the requirements of Section 4 are not complied with, all proceedings had become invalid and possession was directed to be redelivered to the appellant. We are of the view that the ratio therein is not correctly laid down. The question whether violation of the mandatory provisions renders the result of the action as void or voidable has been succinctly considered in Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade (7th Edn.) at pp. 342-43 thus: “The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case the ‘void’ order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another. A common case where an order, however void, becomes valid is where a statutory time-limit expires after which its validity cannot be questioned. The statute does not say that the void order shall be valid; but by cutting off legal remedies it produces that result.” 10. The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. The statute does not say that the void order shall be valid; but by cutting off legal remedies it produces that result.” 10. The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances. It is seen that the acquisition has become final and not only possession had already been taken but reference was also sought for; the award of the Court under Section 26 enhancing the compensation was also accepted. The order of the appellate court had also become final. Under those circumstances, the acquisition proceedings having become final and the compensation determined also having become final, the High Court was highly unjustified in interfering with and in quashing the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. 11. It is true that the respondent had offered to accept the compensation by shifting the date of the notification by 4 to 5 years from the date of the notification under Section 4 (1). For this view, reliance was placed by Shri Sachar on the judgment of this Court in Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri (1992) 1 SCC 328 , where this Court had allowed the shifting of the date for the determination of the compensation. In that case since the award had not been passed, this Court had given the direction but in this case award determining the compensation has attained finality. It is not a case to shift the date for the determination of the compensation. Thus considered, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the notification and declaration under Sections 4(1) and 6.” This judgment answers Mr. It is not a case to shift the date for the determination of the compensation. Thus considered, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the notification and declaration under Sections 4(1) and 6.” This judgment answers Mr. Sonak's submission that the question of delay and laches becomes irrelevant if any of the acts performed in the course of acquisition proceedings are held to be void. 29. In this regard, it is also necessary to note Mr. Sonak's submission that the proceedings are void for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. He relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Harakchand Misirimal Solanki vs. Collector and others, 2009(Supp) Bom.C.R. 979. We will presume that the judgment applies in this case although we hasten to add that Mr. Dessai and Mr. Lawande submitted that the judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case. Mr. Lawande invited our attention to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 14.7.2010 in Barnabas P. George vs. State of Goa by the Secretary (Revenue) and 4 others in Writ Petition No.371 of 2010. The same contention based on Section 7 of the Act and on the said judgment of this Court was raised. The Division Bench, despite the same dismissed the petition on the ground of delay and laches. 30. Having stated that, we are entirely in agreement with Mr. Dessai's submission that once the delay and especially inordinate delay is established, it is for the petitioner to make out a strong case to persuade a writ Court to entertain a challenge nevertheless. In other words, he submitted that where an award is made and possession has been taken, a challenge to the acquisition proceedings by any party, including a party interested in the land sought to be acquired, ought not to be entertained. In such cases, normally where an award is made and possession had been taken, a Court may entertain a challenge to the acquisition proceedings only if the petitioner furnishes a cogent explanation for the delay. Every judgment on this point supports Mr. Dessai's submission. There is not a single judgment that indicates that a Court may entertain a petition after the award is made and possession has been taken, even if there is no cogent explanation for the delay. Every judgment on this point supports Mr. Dessai's submission. There is not a single judgment that indicates that a Court may entertain a petition after the award is made and possession has been taken, even if there is no cogent explanation for the delay. Indeed the judgments are to the contrary. It is only in exceptional cases that the Courts have interfered after an award is made, possession is taken and the entire process is complete. 31. The question then is whether the petitioner has established cogent reasons for the delay. The petitioner's only explanation for the delay is that he was unaware of the entire proceedings. The petitioner states that he cannot be blamed for the same as he was led to believe that the land would never be acquired in view of the earlier proceedings for acquisition of the land for the same public purpose having lapsed. 32. It is difficult to accept the petitioner's allegation that he was unaware of the acquisition proceedings. The facts indicate the contrary. The contrary is indicated not merely, but the fact that the notices under Sections 4 and 6 were issued on 7th April, 1999 and 7th February, 2000. The entire procedure had been followed. The nature of this procedure is of vital importance in view of the petitioner's allegation that he is a tenant of the property and that he has been in possession thereof. There is a dispute between the petitioner and one Mulgaonkar who also claims to be the tenant. Proceedings are pending in this regard before the Mamlatdar. What is, however, important is that the petitioner's case is that he was always in possession and continues to be in possession. It is, in fact, contended even in this petition that the possession has not been handed over despite the said certificate of possession which is referred to earlier. 33. The petitioner has not established that the contents of the award and the said certificate are false. There is nothing on record that persuades, leave alone, entitles us to disbelieve the same. We must, therefore, proceed on the basis that the contents are true-that the procedure involved, inter alia, about the activities, was followed. 34. 33. The petitioner has not established that the contents of the award and the said certificate are false. There is nothing on record that persuades, leave alone, entitles us to disbelieve the same. We must, therefore, proceed on the basis that the contents are true-that the procedure involved, inter alia, about the activities, was followed. 34. If the petitioner was in possession, at least at the material time, it is impossible that he would not be aware of the acquisition proceedings which involved visiting the site and physically dealing with the property. For instance, and as stated in the award, the land had been surveyed and demarcated with boundary stones; after the requisite notices under Sections 9 and 10 were issued and questionnaires were supplied, a site inspection was carried out in order to ascertain the area to be acquired and the site inspection was carried out in presence of the representatives of the acquiring department. As evidenced by the certificate of possession, possession of the land, trees and the structure was taken over on 17th April, 2001 at 10.30 a.m. Subsequently, possession of the land, trees and the structure had been taken over by the acquiring department, viz. Registrar of Cooperative Societies from the Additional Deputy Collector (LAO). Thereafter, on 30th April, 2001, possession was handed over by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies to the Chairman of the Society as evidenced by the Certificate dated 30th April, 2001. It is impossible to believe that the petitioner who claims to have been in possession throughout, would not have noticed all these activities and would have been unaware of the same. The activities, unlike the issuance/publication of notices, are carried out physically at site. 35. In the circumstances, the petitioner has been unable to establish any cogent reasons for the delay in filing this writ petition after the award was made and possession was taken and the entire proceedings stood concluded, including handing over possession of the property to the Society-respondent No.3. 36. On this count alone, the petition is liable to be dismissed. In that view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider the other submissions, for even if the same were established, it would not alter the result of this petition. The same would, therefore, be a mere academic exercise. 37. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. 36. On this count alone, the petition is liable to be dismissed. In that view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider the other submissions, for even if the same were established, it would not alter the result of this petition. The same would, therefore, be a mere academic exercise. 37. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. The interim order dated 25th November, 2002 shall continue upto and including 15th January, 2013.