Judgment :- Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. It has been stated that the petitioner company is engaged in the business of manufacturing and distribution of personal care and cosmetic products. The petitioner company had filed its return of income, before the second respondent, for the assessment years 2002-2003 to 2009-2010. The petitioner company had been regularly assessed by the second respondent, under Pan No.AAACB3754B. The petitioner company had filed its original return of wealth, for the assessment year 2002-2003, on 7.5.2003, admitting the taxable wealth of Rs.61,14,500/-. 3. The said return, for the assessment year 2002-2003, had been assessed, under Section 16(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') and it had been accepted by the assessing officer. Subsequently, a notice for the re-opening of the assessment had been issued and a fresh re-assessment had been completed, under Section 16(3), read with Section 17 of the Act. The said reassessment had been completed by an order, dated 31.12.2009. 4. In respect of the other assessment years, from 2003-2004 to 2009-2010, the returned wealth had been accepted. While so, the petitioner company had received a notice, dated 25.6.2009, issued under Section 16(A)(2) of the Act, read with Section 53(CC) of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961. By the said notice the petitioner company had been requested to furnish certain details, as specified therein. 5. In response to the said notice, issued by the first respondent, the petitioner company had issued a letter, dated 10.2.2010, informing the first respondent that he does not have any jurisdiction to issue such a notice, as he had become functus officio and therefore, the proceedings initiated by the first respondent ought to be dropped. However, the first respondent had issued the impugned notice, dated 8.7.2011, asking the petitioner company to furnish certain details, in respect of the assessment years 2002-2003 to 2009-2010, within two weeks from the date of the receipt of the said notice. 6. Pursuant to the said notice, dated 8.7.2011, a letter, dated 29.7.2011, had been issued on behalf of the petitioner, requesting the first respondent to drop the proceedings. However, the first respondent had issued another letter, dated 17.8.2011, stating that the exercise of valuation does not get time barred on the conclusion of the assessment proceedings. 6. Pursuant to the said notice, dated 8.7.2011, a letter, dated 29.7.2011, had been issued on behalf of the petitioner, requesting the first respondent to drop the proceedings. However, the first respondent had issued another letter, dated 17.8.2011, stating that the exercise of valuation does not get time barred on the conclusion of the assessment proceedings. The value provided by the valuation cell can be adopted, subsequently, in accordance with the procedure envisaged under Section 35 of the Act. The petitioner had been requested to take up the matter directly before the assessing officer, by making the necessary claims. 7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted that the impugned letter, dated 8.7.2011, issued by the first respondent, calling for certain details, is without jurisdiction and it is in violation of the settled principles of law. It had also been stated that the impugned letter issued by the first respondent is barred by limitation and therefore, the first respondent does not have any jurisdiction to issue such a letter, under Section 16A of the Act. 8. It had been further stated that a reference to the valuation officer could be made only for the purpose of assessment. However, in the present case the assessment, including the reassessment for the year 2002-2003, had already been completed. Hence, such a reference to a valuation officer would be arbitrary and illegal. In fact, the assessing officer would become functus officio, once the assessment is completed, as per law. Further, the impugned letter does not disclose any reason for making the reference to the valuation officer. As such, no request could be made to the petitioner to furnish the necessary details. 9. It had been further stated that, in respect of the assessment years 2002-2003 and 2003-2004, the time for completing the assessment is over. Therefore, the provisions of Section 16A of the Act cannot be invoked, at this stage. In respect of the other assessment years, the return filed by the petitioner company had been accepted. Thereafter, no further proceedings had been initiated, by the respondent Department, till date. 10. As such, the first respondent does not have the jurisdiction to issue the impugned letter, dated 8.7.2011. In respect of the other assessment years, the return filed by the petitioner company had been accepted. Thereafter, no further proceedings had been initiated, by the respondent Department, till date. 10. As such, the first respondent does not have the jurisdiction to issue the impugned letter, dated 8.7.2011. Since, the first respondent does not have the jurisdiction to issue the impugned letter, dated 8.7.2011, and as there is no provision under the statute to question such a letter, issued by the first respondent, making a reference to the valuation officer, the petitioner has been constrained to file the present writ petition before this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had relied on the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Dhariya Construction Co. [2011(197) TAXMAN 202 (SC)], wherein it had been held as follows: "Having examined the record, we find that in this case, the Department sought reopening of the assessment based on the opinion given by the District Valuation Officer (DVO). The Opinion of the DVO per se is not an information for the purposes of reopening assessment under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer has to apply his mind to the information, if any, collected and must form a belief thereon. In the circumstances, there is no merit in the civil appeal. The Department was not entitled to reopen the assessment." 12. He had also relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court, made in Tax Case (Appeal) NO.550 of 2004, dated 6.7.2011, to state that the first respondent does not have the jurisdiction to issue the impugned letter, dated 8.7.2011. 13. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents it has been stated that, for the assessment year 2002-2003, the petitioner company had filed its return of wealth, belatedly, on 7.5.2005. A notice, under Section 17 of the Act, had been issued to the petitioner company, on 23.3.2009, after obtaining the approval from the Additional Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Company Range-I, Chennai. 14. In response to the said notice the petitioner had sent a letter, dated 6.5.2009, to treat the return, which had been originally filed, on 7.5.2003, as the return filed in response to the notice issued under Section 17 of the Act. 14. In response to the said notice the petitioner had sent a letter, dated 6.5.2009, to treat the return, which had been originally filed, on 7.5.2003, as the return filed in response to the notice issued under Section 17 of the Act. Thereafter, a notice under Section 16(2) of the Act had been issued, on 12.5.2009, to take up the return of wealth for scrutiny assessment. The petitioner had provided a tabulation containing the details of assets, including the vacant land in its possession, along with its value. In arriving at the total wealth the petitioner company had adopted the acquisition cost of the vacant land and had not adopted the fair market value of the asset. 15. The taxation of wealth is pivoted to the fair market value of the property on the valuation date, which in the present case, is 31.3.2002. In order to ascertain the same, a commission for local investigation was ordered and a reference was made, under Section 16A of the Act, to the District Valuation Officer, the first respondent herein, on 21.12.2009. Since, the valuation report was not available, as on 31.12.2009, and as the re-assessment was getting time barred, the value, as returned by the assessee, in respect of the land under consideration, was adopted and the order of assessment, under Section 16(3) of the Act, read with Section 17 of the Act, was passed on 31.12.2009. The re-assessment had resulted in determining the net taxable wealth as 1,32,97,914/- and the wealth tax demand of Rs.1,46,269/-, as against the returned net taxable wealth of Rs.61,14,500/-and the wealth tax paid by the petitioner was Rs.48,452/-. 16. It had been further stated that it had been held, in CWT Vs. Shriniwas Sharma [1994 (73) Taxman 102 (Raj)], that a reference to a valuation officer can be made only during the pendency of the assessment proceedings. The reference by the second respondent was made on 21.12.2009, and the reassessment was completed on 31.12.2009. Therefore, the reference made to the valuation officer, under Section 16A of the Act, is legal and valid in the eye of law, as it does not suffer any infirmity. 17. The reference by the second respondent was made on 21.12.2009, and the reassessment was completed on 31.12.2009. Therefore, the reference made to the valuation officer, under Section 16A of the Act, is legal and valid in the eye of law, as it does not suffer any infirmity. 17. If the valuation cell submits a report containing adverse findings the Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Chennai-I, Chennai, is empowered to assume revisionary jurisdiction, under Section 25 of the Act and he could direct the second respondent to enhance the taxable wealth tax, by incorporating the value determined by the first respondent. Such a procedure had been upheld by the Apex Court, in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Shree Manjunatheasware Packing Products & Camphor Works [1998 (96) Taxman 1 (SC)] 18. Further, in CWT Vs. Poolchand [272 ITR 239], the High Court of Allahabad had held that, while exercising his powers, under Section 25 or under Section 263 of the Act, he could take into account the materials available on record, while considering the revision. Further, the Commissioner of Income Tax could set aside the assessment order on the basis of the valuation report received after the date of the assessment order. As such, the writ petition is devoid of merits and therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. On dismissal of the writ petition, the petitioner may be directed to co-operate with the first respondent to arrive at the fair market value of the asset, as on 31.3.2002. 19. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents had relied on the decision of the High Court of Delhi, reported in Karni Singh Vs. Deputy C.I.T. (Delhi) (237 ITR 505), wherein it had been held that the Assessing Officer had sought the report of the Valuation Officer, in respect of the properties in question, before finalizing the assessment. On the basis of the valuation report the notices for reassessment had been issued, under Section 17 of the Act. Though the report had been received after the completion of the assessment it would be a sufficient ground to re-open the assessment and therefore, the notice of reassessment, issued under Section 17 of the Act, was valid. 20. In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Though the report had been received after the completion of the assessment it would be a sufficient ground to re-open the assessment and therefore, the notice of reassessment, issued under Section 17 of the Act, was valid. 20. In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Shree Manjunatheasware Packing Products & Camphor Works [1998 (96) Taxman 1 (SC)], it had been held that materials which had come on record subsequent to the making of the assessment could also be taken into account, by the Commissioner. The Commissioner, was justified in invoking Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on the basis of the valuation report submitted by the District Valuation Officer subsequent to the assessment order. It had been held that merely because the order of the valuation officer reached the wealth tax officer after the completion of the assessment proceedings it did not lose the character of the information, envisaged under Section 17(1)(b) of the Act. There would be no hurdle in using such information for re-assessment. 21. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioner, as well as the respondents, and on a perusal of the records available, and on considering the decisions cited supra, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned communication, dated 8.7.2011, issued by the first respondent is without jurisdiction and therefore, it is unsustainable in the eye of law. In the said communication, dated 8.7.2011, the first respondent has asked the petitioner to furnish certain details, with regard to the valuation of the immovable properties in question, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the said communication. It has also been stated that, on the failure of the petitioner to furnish the necessary details, the first respondent would inspect the properties, belonging to the petitioner, suo motu, by invoking the powers said to be vested in him, as per the relevant provisions of law. 22. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had filed its regular return of wealth, for the assessment years concerned. In fact, the return, for the assessment year 2002-2003, had been assessed, under Section 16(1) of the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957, and the return of wealth had been accepted by the assessing officer. 22. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had filed its regular return of wealth, for the assessment years concerned. In fact, the return, for the assessment year 2002-2003, had been assessed, under Section 16(1) of the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957, and the return of wealth had been accepted by the assessing officer. Thereafter, a notice for the reopening of the assessment had been issued and a fresh re-assessment had also been completed, under Section 16(3), read with Section 17 of the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957. The process of re-assessment had been completed by an order, dated 31.12.2009. It is also noted, from the records available, that the assessments, in respect of the assessment years 2003-04 to 2009-10, the returned wealth had been accepted. While so, a notice, dated 25.6.2009, had been issued to the petitioner, by the first respondent, under Section 16(A)(2), read with Section 53(CC) of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 23. The petitioner had sent a reply, dated 10.2.2010, stating that the first respondent does not have the jurisdiction to issue such a notice asking the petitioner to furnish certain details, with regard to the immovable properties belonging to the petitioner. It had been pointed out, in the reply sent on behalf of the petitioner, that the first respondent had become functus officio and therefore, the proceedings initiated against the petitioner, by the first respondent, ought to be dropped. However, the first respondent had issued the impugned communication, dated 8.7.2011, asking the petitioner to furnish further details, relating to the immovable properties owned by the petitioner. 24. However, the first respondent had issued the impugned communication, dated 8.7.2011, asking the petitioner to furnish further details, relating to the immovable properties owned by the petitioner. 24. From a reading of Section 16A of the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957, it is clear that the assessing officer may refer the valuation of any asset to a valuation officer in a case where the value of the asset, as returned, is in accordance with the estimate made by a registered valuer, and if the assessing officer is of opinion that the value so returned is less than its fair market value, or in any other case, if the assessing officer is of the opinion that the fair market value of the asset exceeds the value of the asset as returned, by more than such percentage of the value of the asset as returned or by more than such amount as may be prescribed or if it is found necessary so to do, having regard to the nature of the asset and other relevant circumstances. However, it is not in dispute in the present case that the original assessment, as well as the reassessment had been done, under the relevant provisions of the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957, in respect of the assessment year 2002-2003. 25. It is noted that, in respect of the assessment years 2003-2004 to 2009-2010, the returned wealth had been accepted by the authority concerned. Further, no issue had been raised by the assessing officer stating that he has reason to believe that the net wealth of the petitioner, chargeable to tax, had escaped assessment, in respect of a particular assessment year. If so, necessary proceedings could have been initiated, under Section 17 of the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957, by the authority concerned. However, no such proceedings had been initiated against the assessee, under Section 17 of the said Act. Instead, the impugned notice had been issued by the first respondent, for the purpose of revaluation of the properties in question, without having the jurisdiction to do so. While, a reference to a valuation officer can be made only during the pendency of the assessment proceedings, the first respondent has embarked upon the process of revaluation of the properties in question, after the assessment proceedings had been completed, in respect of the assessment years concerned. 26. While, a reference to a valuation officer can be made only during the pendency of the assessment proceedings, the first respondent has embarked upon the process of revaluation of the properties in question, after the assessment proceedings had been completed, in respect of the assessment years concerned. 26. Further, the information, if any, that may be made available by the District Valuation Officer cannot be the basis for the re-opening of the assessments already made, in respect of the assessment years concerned. In such circumstances, it is clear that the first respondent would not have the authority or the jurisdiction to issue the impugned communication, dated 8.7.2011, as contended on behalf of the petitioner. However, the Commissioner concerned may invoke the power vested in him, under Section 25 of the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957, to revise the orders already passed, in respect of the assessment years concerned, within the prescribed period of limitation. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.