JUDGMENT A.s.oka, j.: 1. We have heard the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. We have also heard learned agp appearing for respondent nos. 1 to 5. By this petition under article 227 of the constitution of india, the challenge is to the proceedings of acquisition of lands of the petitioner under the provisions of the maharashtra housing and area development act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the “mhada act”). 2. With a view to appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, it will be necessary to make a brief reference to the facts of the case. The predecessors of the petitioner claim to be holder of lands bearing survey no. 113/3 and 115/6(part) at solapur. An order under section 8 (4) of the urban land (ceiling and regulation) act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the said act of 1976) was passed by the competent authority of the solapur urban agglomeration on 2 nd december, 1981. Subsequently, notification under 10(1) of the said act of 1976 was issued by the competent authority of solapur urban agglomeration. By the said notification, it was declared that land admeasuring 23,500 sq. Mtrs, out of survey no. 115/6 and land admeasuring 20,300 sq. Mtrs bearing survey no. 113/3 was proposed to be acquired under the provisions of the said act of 1976. Admitted position is that notification under 10(3) of the said act of 1976 was never issued on the basis of aforesaid notification under 10(1). 3. By a gazette notification dated 18 th july, 1986 issued in exercise of powers under the proviso to section 41(1) of the mhada act, the land bearing survey no. 113/3 admeasuring 20,300 sq. Mtrs was acquired by the state government. 4. In the petition as originally filed, there was a challenge to the order under section 8(4) of the said act of 1976 and the notification under 10(1) of the said act of 1976. Later on the petition was amended and the challenge to the said order and the said notification was deleted by the amendment. A specific challenge was incorporated to notification dated 18 th july, 1986 under the mhada act. A prayer was also added for restoration of the possession of the said land bearing survey no. 113/3. Later on the petition was amended and the challenge to the said order and the said notification was deleted by the amendment. A specific challenge was incorporated to notification dated 18 th july, 1986 under the mhada act. A prayer was also added for restoration of the possession of the said land bearing survey no. 113/3. Perhaps the challenge to the order under the said act of 1976 was deleted in view of the decision of the division bench of this court in the case of udhav tatya bhople v/s state of maharashtra and ors. (1992) m.l.j., 1432.. The competent authority of solapur urban agglomeration had come to the conclusion that the zonal plan was a master plan within the meaning of the said act of 1976. The division bench in the said decision held that the zonal plan cannot be termed as a master plan and therefore the order under section 8(4) of the said act of 1976 of a land falling within the limits of solapur urban agglomeration which was shown reserved for residential use in the zonal plan was quashed and set aside. The said decision of the division bench of this court was confirmed by the apex court by judgment and order dated 7 th november, 1996. Acting upon the aforesaid decision of the apex court, the state government issued a government resolution dated 1 st october, 1997. The state government issued a notification excluding the lands from the purview of provisions of the said act of 1976 which were covered by the decision of this court in the case of udhav tatya bhople (supra). That is the reason why the notification under 10(3) of the said act of 1976 was not issued in respect of aforesaid lands held by the original petitioner. Perhaps that is why the challenge to the orders passed under the said act of 1976 was not pressed by the petitioner. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner pointed out that the notification under 10(1) of the said act of 1976 was issued on 2 nd december, 1981 and subsequent thereto the notification dated 18 th july, 1986 under mhada act was issued by which the land bearing survey no. 113/3 was sought to be acquired. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner pointed out that the notification under 10(1) of the said act of 1976 was issued on 2 nd december, 1981 and subsequent thereto the notification dated 18 th july, 1986 under mhada act was issued by which the land bearing survey no. 113/3 was sought to be acquired. His submission is that in view of 10(4) of the said act of 1976, there was total prohibition on any kind of transfer of vacant lands after 2 nd december, 1981. rElying upon section 26 and 27 of the said act of 1976, he submitted that in any case there was prohibition on transfer without giving notice to the competent authority. He, therefore, submitted that the notification dated 18 th july, 1986 was void as the same amounts to a transfer which is in contravention of section 10(4) of the said act of 1976. He submitted that under the definition of ‘person’ under section 2(i) of the said act of 1976, the state government and central government will be included being the bodies of individuals. He submitted that the provisions of the said act of 1976 have overriding effect over all laws including mhada act in view of section 42 of the said act of 1976. He relied upon a decision of division bench of this court in the case of ganesh rangnath dhadphale v/s special land acquisition officer (1979) mh.l.j 786. . he also relied upon a decision of allahabad high court in the case of manne khan v/s state of uttar pradesh and others, air 1988, allahabad 289. . he relied upon article 254 of the constitution of india and in support he pressed reliance on the decision of the apex court in the case of t. Barai v/s henry ah hoe and anr, air 1983, supreme court 150.. He conceded that the predecessors of the petitioners had accepted the compensation payable on account of the impugned acquisition of lands under mhada act. He submitted that under section 23 of the indian contract act, 1872, payment which is forbidden by law is void. He submitted that in view of acceptance of the decision of this court in the case of udhav tatya bhople (supra) by the state government, this court is required to pass an order of restoration of possession of lands which were covered by the said decision. He submitted that in view of acceptance of the decision of this court in the case of udhav tatya bhople (supra) by the state government, this court is required to pass an order of restoration of possession of lands which were covered by the said decision. Coming back to the definition of the word ‘person’ under the said act of 1976, he submitted that the word person includes government. On this aspect he relied upon a decision of allahabad high court in the case of state of uttar pradesh and ors v/s kanhaiya lal makund lal sarraf, air 1956, allahabad, 383.. He also relied upon a decision of madhya pradesh high court in the case of surajmal arjunda vaidya v./s state of madhya pradesh and ors, air 1958, madhya pradesh page 103.. He submitted that a transfer within the meaning of transfer of property act, 1882 will also include transfer effected by operation of law. As far as the delay in filing the petition is concerned, he submitted that as the acquisition under the mhada act is void, the technical plea of latches should not be allowed to be raised. He relied upon the decision of this court in the case of harishankar ramaswarup jaiswal v/s commissioner of prohibition and excise maharashtra state, bombay and ors., air 1997(1) AllMR 135.. He also relied upon the averments made in the amended petition for explaining the delay. The learned agp submitted that there is no illegality. He urged that there is a gross and unexplained delay in filing the petition. 6. We have considered the submissions. The main contention of the petitioner is that once a notification under 10(1) of the said act of 1976 is issued, under section 10(4), there is a complete and comprehensive ban on transfer of the land subject matter of the notification. His submission is that the prohibition imposed by section 10(4) will be applicable even in case of state government and therefore, the subsequent acquisition under mhada act was in breach of provisions of section 10(4). 7. It will be necessary to make a reference to section 10 of the said act of 1976. His submission is that the prohibition imposed by section 10(4) will be applicable even in case of state government and therefore, the subsequent acquisition under mhada act was in breach of provisions of section 10(4). 7. It will be necessary to make a reference to section 10 of the said act of 1976. Sub-section 1 to 4 read thus :- “ section 10 : acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit, - (1) as soon as may be after the service of the statement under section 9 on the person concerned, the competent authority shall cause a notification giving the particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit and stating that - (i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned state government; and (ii) the claims of all persons interested in such vacant land may be made by them personally or by their agents giving particulars of the nature of their interests in such land, (iii) to be published for the information of the general public in the official gazette of the state concerned and in such other manner as may be prescribed. (2) after considering the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land, made to the competent authority in pursuance of the notification published under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit. (3) at any time after the publication of the notification under sub-section (1), the competent authority may, by notification published in the official gazette of the state concerned, declare that the excess vacant land referred to in the notification published under sub-section (1) shall, with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the state government and upon the publication of such declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the state government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified. nSc. nSc. 8/13 wp.4198/1997 4) during the period commencing on the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3), - (i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void; and (ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land”. Sub-section 1 contemplates a notification to be issued by the competent authority declaring that the vacant land held by a person in excess of ceiling limit is to be acquired by the concerned state government. Sub-section 2 contemplates consideration of the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land. The vesting in the state government of the lands proposed to be acquired takes place under sub-section 3 by a declaration contemplated by subsection 3. The said declaration is to be made in official gazette specifying the date from which the land shall be deemed to have been acquired by the state government. Only on publication of such declaration that there is a vesting in the state government. In the present case, admittedly there was no declaration made under 10(3) of the said act of 1976 and therefore, the land of the original petitioner never vested in the state government under the provisions of the said act of 1976. 8. Section 42 of the said act of 1976 gives overriding effect to the provisions of said act of 1976. However, there is no prohibition under the said act of 1976 which prevents any government from initiating proceedings for acquisition under any other enactments. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the division bench in the case of ganesh rangnath dhadphale (supra). This was a case where before coming into the force of the said act of 1976, the process of acquisition under the land acquisition act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the said act of 1894) was already commenced by issuing the notifications under section 4 and section 6 of the said act of 1894. This was a case where before coming into the force of the said act of 1976, the process of acquisition under the land acquisition act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the said act of 1894) was already commenced by issuing the notifications under section 4 and section 6 of the said act of 1894. Before possession could be taken of the lands of the petitioners under the said act of 1894, a notification under section 10(1) of the said act of 1976 was issued. The challenge before this court was to the initiation of the proceedings under the said act of 1976 on the ground that there was already a proceeding for acquisition under the said act of 1894. In the context of the factual controversy before this court, the division bench held that once final statement under section 9 of the said act of 1976 and notification under 10(1) of the said act of 1976 are issued, the acquisition proceedings under the said act of 1894 would become inoperative in view of overriding effect given to the provisions of the said act. In the case of manne khan (supra), before the allahabad high court, a similar controversy arose and in the context of the said controversy, the allahabad high court invoked section 42 of the said act of 1976. In the present case, before the acquisition of the land under the said act of 1976 was completed, the acquisition under the mhada act was initiated. Thus, the acquisition under section 41 of the mhada act does not become illegal because the same was made after the date of notification under section 10(1) of the said act of 1976 was issued. As pointed out earlier, the subsequent notification under the mhada act was issued before the vesting under 10(3) of the said act of 1976 had taken place. 9. The other limb of argument is that the acquisition and vesting under the provisions of section 41 of the mhada act is in violation of section 10(4) of the said act of 1976. There is a complete prohibition under section 10(4) of the said act of 1976 against any transfer by any person and that the transfer effected in contravention of sub-section 4 shall be deemed to be null and void. As pointed earlier, the embargo under section 10(4) is, against any ‘person’. There is a complete prohibition under section 10(4) of the said act of 1976 against any transfer by any person and that the transfer effected in contravention of sub-section 4 shall be deemed to be null and void. As pointed earlier, the embargo under section 10(4) is, against any ‘person’. The word ‘person’ has been defined by clause (i) of section 2 of the said act of 1976. Clause (i) reads thus :- “ (i)”person” includes an individual, a family, a firm, a company, or an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not; ” 10. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the word ‘person’ shall include the state government. It is pertinent to note that the clause (k) of section 2 defines the word ‘state’. Clause (k) reads thus :- “ (k)”state” includes a union territory and “state government”, in relation to any land or building situated in a union territory or within the local limits of a cantonment declared as such under section 3 of the cantonments act, 1924 (2 of 1924)*, means the central government; “ 11. If the intention of the legislature was to include the state government in the definition of “person”, there was no necessity to incorporate clause – k of section 2 which defines 'state' which includes a state government. More importantly, section 3 of the said act of 1976 provides that no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of ceiling limits. If the submission of learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is accepted that the word ‘person’ includes the state government, the prohibition against holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit will apply even to the state government. Therefore, such absurd interpretation cannot be accepted. On this aspect, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the allahabad high court in the case of state of uttar pradesh and ors v/s kanhaiya lal makund lal sarraf (supra). In the said decision, the question which arose is whether a state government was a person competent to contract under the contract act of 1872. The allahabad high court observed that the word ‘person’ is not defined under the contract act. In the said decision, the question which arose is whether a state government was a person competent to contract under the contract act of 1872. The allahabad high court observed that the word ‘person’ is not defined under the contract act. After considering the definition of ‘person’ under the general clauses act, the allahabad high court held that there is reason to give the word “person” an extended meaning and the definition under the general clauses act was not exhaustive. The allahabad high court held that if the government is not a person within the meaning of section 72 of the contract act, 1872, the government would not be competent to enter into a contract. The allahabad high court was dealing with the provisions of a statute which does not define the word person. rEliance placed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners on the decision of full bench of madhya pradesh high court in the case of surajmal arjunda vaidya (supra) will not help the petitioner as the issue arose for consideration of the madhaya pradesh high court was whether the words ‘person and authority’ are wide enough to include even the government. As pointed out earlier, if the state government is treated as a person within the meaning of clause (i) of section 2 of the said act of 1976, then the result will be absurd in as much as even section 3 will apply to the state government. Therefore, the acquisition under the mhada act will not be hit by section 10(4) as what is prohibited by the said provision is the transfer by a person within the meaning of section 2(i) of the said act of 1976. 12. There is one more aspect of the matter. For challenging the aforesaid notification issued under mhada act in the year 1986, the present petition was filed in the year 1997. There is a reply filed by mr. D.g. rAmtirth, deputy engineer of the housing and area development board, pune to this petition. Apart from noting the admitted position that the original petitioner received compensation on account of acquisition, it is pointed out that on the land acquired under the said notification, 3041 bidi workers houses have been constructed and entire survey no. 113/3 admeasuring 20300 sq.mtrs has been fully developed and houses thereon have been allotted to the bidi workers. Apart from noting the admitted position that the original petitioner received compensation on account of acquisition, it is pointed out that on the land acquired under the said notification, 3041 bidi workers houses have been constructed and entire survey no. 113/3 admeasuring 20300 sq.mtrs has been fully developed and houses thereon have been allotted to the bidi workers. The gross delay and latches was sought to be overcome by contending that as the acquisition was nullity, the delay will not matter and infact, a reliance was placed on the decision of the apex court where delay of 30 years was not considered as fatal. Apart from the fact that on merits the challenge in this petition must fail, this is a case where the possession was immediately taken over on the basis of the notification of the year 1986 and by the time the petition was filed, the acquired land was fully utilized for construction of houses for bidi workers. Hence there is no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly rejected. rUle is discharged with no order as to costs.