Judgment : These two criminal appeals arise out of the same judgment in C.C.No.13 of 1994 dated 18.02.2005 on the file of the Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, Vijayawada, preferred by Accused Officer No.2 and Accused Officer No.1, respectively. Therefore, both the appeals are clubbed and being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. At the relevant time, Accused Officer No.1 (appellant in Crl.A.No.627 of 2005) was working as Mandal Surveyor in the office of Mandal Revenue Officer, Narasaraopet and Accused Officer No.2 (appellant in Crl.A.No.488 of 2005) was working as Mandal Revenue Inspector in the said office. Both the Accused Officers were tried for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (for brevity ‘the Act’) r/w 34 IPC, based on grounds of bribe and trap. They were found guilty and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and also to pay a fine of Rs.2,500/-each, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 6 months on each count. Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 3. Accused Officer No.1 died during the pendency of appeal on 14.7.2007 and the appeal is pursued by his legal representatives. 4. Along with Accused Officer Nos.1 and 2, one Bezaam Venkateswara Prasannam was also charge sheeted as Accused Officer No.3. He died before the commencement of trial on 8.02.2000. Therefore the case proceeded only against Accused Officer Nos.1 and 2. 5. The accused-officers were charged for common intention taking the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code though the allegation was in relation to a single transaction. 6. A contention is raised as to whether accused-officers who are charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act can be tried and convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC; and if so, whether the conviction directed by the trial Court taking the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is violative. 7. To resolve the said controversy, a traverse on the relevant provisions, purpose and purport of the Act and the scope of Section 34 IPC is necessary. 8. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is a special Act enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to prevention of corruption and for matters connected therewith. The Act is intended to be a self-contained enactment. 9. 8. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is a special Act enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to prevention of corruption and for matters connected therewith. The Act is intended to be a self-contained enactment. 9. Section 3 empowers the Central Government or the State Government to appoint Special Judges to try the following offences, viz., - (a) any offence punishable under this Act; and (b) Any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in clause (a). 10. Section 4 of the Act enables the Special Judge to try any offence other than those mentioned in Section 3 of the Act, notwithstanding the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or any other law. It also enables the learned Judge to hold the trial under the Act on day-today basis notwithstanding the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. 11. Under Section 5 of the Act, the Special Judge is authorised to take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial and he shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code for the trial of warrant cases. The Judge is also authorised to tender pardon to an accused with a view to obtaining his evidence with full and true disclosure of the circumstances relating to the offence. 12. Under Sub-Section (3) of Section 5 of the Act, a Special Judge is placed on par with a Court of Sessions A Special Judge, while trying an offence punishable under the Act, is authorised to exercise all powers and functions exercisable by a District Judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944. 13. Section 6 of the Act empowers a Special Judge to try an offence committed by a public servant in relation to contravention of any special order referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 12-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 or an order referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of the said Section in a summary way. 14. Thus, the Act is self-contained, which is intended to deal with the offences under the Act. 15. The object underlying Section 34 IPC vis-à-vis the provisions of Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is necessary to examine the issue, whether in convicting the accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act, aid of Section 34 IPC is necessary. 16. 15. The object underlying Section 34 IPC vis-à-vis the provisions of Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is necessary to examine the issue, whether in convicting the accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act, aid of Section 34 IPC is necessary. 16. The purport of Section 34 I.P.C. is that if two or more persons intentionally commit an offence jointly, criminal liability would arise against each of them as if each of them had committed the offence individually. If parties go with the common purpose to execute the common object, each and every person becomes responsible for the act of each and every other person, each of them bears individual responsibility and each one of them becomes principal offender. The essence under the Section is the existence of common intention and participation in a criminal act in furtherance of the said intention. The section applies when both common intention and participation are present. But Section 34 does not create a substantive offence. It is only a rule of evidence to assess criminality. 17. The essential ingredients of Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act are that the person accepting the gratification should be a public servant and should accept the gratification for himself or another and the gratification should be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act in the exercise of his official duties. 18. Likewise under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, a public servant should have used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as such public servant and that he should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person. 19. Reading the provisions of Section 7 and 13, it is made punishable not only if a person accepts or receives illegal gratification for himself, but also when he receives illegal gratification for any other person. Both the persons viz., the one who has received for himself and the other who had received on behalf of another, are equally liable. They need not have common intention. Receipt of illegal gratification is sufficient even in the absence of common intention. Object of Section 34 IPC with regard to common intention is taken care of in Sections 7 and 13, which is inbuilt in so far as common intention is concerned. They need not have common intention. Receipt of illegal gratification is sufficient even in the absence of common intention. Object of Section 34 IPC with regard to common intention is taken care of in Sections 7 and 13, which is inbuilt in so far as common intention is concerned. Thus in my considered view while trying public servants under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act taking the aid of Section 34 IPC is redundant and taking the aid of Section 34 IPC ipso facto does not vitiate a conviction. 20. I now proceed to consider the case on its merits whether the appellants/Accused Officers are guilty of the charged offences. 21. As noticed earlier Accused Officer No.1 (in short AO.1) was working as the Mandal Surveyor. Accused Officer No.2 (in short AO.2) was working as Mandal Revenue Inspector. Accused Officer No.3 (in short AO.3)-Bezaam Venkateswara Prasannam (since died) was working as Head Assistant in the office of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Narasaraopet. 22. PW.1-defacto complainant is a retired army personnel. His ancestral land, admeasuring an extent of Acs.5.47 cents situated in Sy.No.1579/1 of Nambur Village, was under unauthorized occupation. PW.1 instituted L.G. Case No.76/1990 in the Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, for eviction of encroachers and delivery of possession. The case was decreed in his favour on 20.01.1993. A copy of the decree was forwarded to Revenue Divisional Officer, Narasaraopet, to take possession from the encroachers and deliver the same to PW.1. It is stated that the Revenue Divisional Officer in turn addressed letters Ex.P.9-dated 2.03.1993 (true copy signed on 16.04.1993) and Ex.P.8-dated 12.05.1993 (true copy signed on 20.05.1993) to the Mandal Revenue Officer for removal of encroachments as per the decree. It is alleged that there was no progress in the matter at the hands of AO.1. On 12.07.1993 PW.1 met AO.1 to find out the progress of eviction process. AO.1 then informed him to pay about Rs.30,000/-to Rs.40,000/-as bribe for being shared between him, the Mandal Revenue Inspector (AO.2) and Mandal Revenue Officer. On 24.7.1993, PW.1 met AO.1 again. Then he reduced his demand to Rs.5000/-and asked him to pay the amount on 26.07.1993. 23. Unwilling to pay the amount, P.W.1 met the DSP, ACB of Nizamabad Branch, Mr. Sai Baba (PW.6) in the Collector’s Office and presented Ex.P.1-complaint dated 24.07.1993 to him. On 24.7.1993, PW.1 met AO.1 again. Then he reduced his demand to Rs.5000/-and asked him to pay the amount on 26.07.1993. 23. Unwilling to pay the amount, P.W.1 met the DSP, ACB of Nizamabad Branch, Mr. Sai Baba (PW.6) in the Collector’s Office and presented Ex.P.1-complaint dated 24.07.1993 to him. In pursuance of Ex.P.1-complaint, PW.6 conducted pre-trap proceedings by securing the presence of mediators, viz., K.V. Narsimha Reddy (PW.4) and another viz., V. Bhavani Shankar and recorded the proceedings in Ex.P.10-mediator’s report, dated 26.07.1993. On the same day trap was conducted at about 8.30 p.m. It is alleged that the amount was handed over to AO.2 on demand by A.O.1 and the A.O.2 in turn handed over the amount to AO.3. The amount was recovered from AO.3 (since deceased). Colour test was conducted on both the hand fingers of AO.2 (MOs.4 and 5) and AO.3 (MOs.6 and 7) yielded positive result. Post trap proceedings were recorded in Ex.P.17-second mediators report. Thus according to the prosecution the Accused Officers demanded and accepted the illegal gratification for doing an official favour to PW.1 and thus guilty of the charged offences. 24. In order to establish the charges, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 8 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.26. Ex.X.1 and Exs.MO.1 to MO.10 were marked during the trial. 25. The Accused Officers pleaded not guilty. 26. The plea of AO.1 was that PW.1 did not approach him and he was not concerned with his work. The Execution of decree of the Special Court was stayed by the High Court and no official favour was pending with him. Hence there was no scope for PW.1 to pay the amount to him. He denied his presence on 26.07.1993 when the alleged trap was conducted and the amount was recovered. 27. The plea of AO.2 was that he was falsely implicated in the case. He took the plea that PW.1 never met him and that he did not demand any bribe nor accepted the same from PW.1. He further took the plea that when he was about to leave the office at 8.30 p.m., PW.1 tried to thrust the amount in his hands. When he pushed away, PW.1 took that amount and heeded towards AO.3 with that amount. Thus his plea was that he neither demanded nor accepted the amount on the date of trap. 28. He further took the plea that when he was about to leave the office at 8.30 p.m., PW.1 tried to thrust the amount in his hands. When he pushed away, PW.1 took that amount and heeded towards AO.3 with that amount. Thus his plea was that he neither demanded nor accepted the amount on the date of trap. 28. The trial Court on consideration of the evidence held both the Accused Officers guilty and accordingly convicted them. 29. I have heard Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned Senior Counsel instructed by Sri C. Praveen Kumar in Crl.A.No.488/2005; Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel in Crl.A.No.627/2005; and Sri M.B. Thimma Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for respondent in both the appeals. 30. As noticed above, PW.1 is the defacto complainant at whose instance the trap was conducted. According to him, AO.1 demanded Rs.30,000/-to Rs.40,000/-as bribe for implementing the decree of the Special Court. Allegedly the amount was meant to be shared between AO.1, AO.2 and the Mandal Revenue Officer. He again met AO.1 on 24.07.1993. On that day, AO.1 allegedly reduced his demand to Rs.5000/-and asked PW.1 to pay the amount on 26.07.1993. 31. In order to prove the demand on 12.07.1993 and on 24.07.1993 the prosecution has examined PW.1 and PW.2. 32. The version of PW.1 was that on 12.07.1993 AO.1 demanded Rs.30,000/-to Rs.40,000/-for being shared between himself and two other officers. The said version of PW.1 is not supported by PW.2, who is no other than his brother. PW.2 stated that he met AO.1 along with his brother on 12.07.1993 and on that day a demand for Rs.5,000/-alone was made. Two aspects are required to be noticed here. It is not the case of PW.1 that he was accompanied by PW.2 when he met AO.1. Secondly the version of PW.1 who stated that a demand was made for Rs.30,000/-to Rs.40,000/-is materially different from the version of PW.2, that a demand was made for Rs.5000/-only. If really PW.1 and PW.2 had met AO.1 on 12.07.1993 and that if AO.1 had actually demanded the bribe amount, there could not have been so much variation. As noticed earlier PW.1 and PW.2 are brothers, who have a stake in the matter. 33. Having regard to these aspects, it is difficult to believe that AO.1 demanded the amount on 12.07.1993. 34. As noticed earlier, second demand was on 24.07.1993. As noticed earlier PW.1 and PW.2 are brothers, who have a stake in the matter. 33. Having regard to these aspects, it is difficult to believe that AO.1 demanded the amount on 12.07.1993. 34. As noticed earlier, second demand was on 24.07.1993. According to PW.1 he met AO.1 in his office and he was asked to come back on 26.07.1993 with Rs.5000/-. Except the evidence of PW.1 there is no other evidence either direct or corroborative as to the demand on 24.07.1993. It is true that merely because there is direct or corroborative evidence is not available in the matters relating to demand, the evidence of the sole witness need not be rejected provided the demand is made out from the surrounding circumstances. The evidence on record would not show existence of any such circumstances, suggesting that there was a demand by AO.1 even on 24.07.1993. 35. AO.1 examined himself as DW.1 and marked Exs.D.3 and D.5 to prove that he was not present in the office on 24.07.1993 when the demand was allegedly made for the second time. Ex.D.3 is proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 29.12.1992 whereby duty was assigned directing that AO.1 should attend Municipal Office, Narasaraopet on every Tuesday and Saturday for attending town survey duties. Ex.D.5 is copy of tour diary for the month of July 1993. The said tour diary was sent to the Deputy Director, Survey and Land Records for approval after certified by the Mandal Revenue Officer on 27.07.1993. It shows that AO.1 inspected the lands in Sy.No.30A of Issapalem and took up the work relating to planting of survey stones. Ex.D.5 is supported by Ex.D.3 orders which require AO.1 to attend to survey duties on every Tuesday and Saturday. There is no reason to disbelieve the said documents since Ex.D.3 was passed by a competent officer and Ex.D.5 is a register, which is a duly maintained official record and certified by the Mandal Revenue Officer. 36. PW.7-investigation officer in his evidence admitted that he did not try to found out whether AO.1 was on official duty elsewhere on the alleged dates of demands made in Ex.P.1 by PW.1. 37. The trial Court was not inclined to place reliance on Ex.D.5 on the ground that it was in exclusive possession of AO.1. 36. PW.7-investigation officer in his evidence admitted that he did not try to found out whether AO.1 was on official duty elsewhere on the alleged dates of demands made in Ex.P.1 by PW.1. 37. The trial Court was not inclined to place reliance on Ex.D.5 on the ground that it was in exclusive possession of AO.1. It also doubted Ex.D.5 since the tour programme was closed before the end of the month, i.e., on 27.07.1993 itself. 38. I am unable to agree with the said reasoning since Ex.D.5 is supported by the order of a competent authority in Ex.D.3 pursuant to which AO.1 was required to attend to survey duties on all Tuesdays and Saturdays. Even if it is assumed that AO.1 was present in the office on 24.07.1993 as correct, that itself will not lead to any presumption that he demanded bribe from PW.1 on the said date. Initial burden is on the prosecution to prove demand and acceptance, de hors the plea of alibi of the accused. The burden cannot be placed on the accused officer to prove that there was no demand made by him. The burden shifts on the accused only after it has been established by the prosecution. As noticed above there is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to prove the demand by AO.1 even on 24.07.1993. The trial Court, which has placed the burden on the Accused Officer in this regard, has drawn the inference only on the basis of evidence of PW.1 and Ex.P.1-complaint, is not tenable. 39. As regards the demand and acceptance on the date of trap, i.e., 26.07.1993, the prosecution relied upon the evidence of PW.1-defacto complainant, PW.4-accompanying witness-cum-mediator and PW.6-trap laying officer. 40. According to the case of prosecution, the trap party reached the office of the Mandal Revenue Officer at 2.45 p.m. PW.1 did not find AO.1 in the office. He came back and informed to PW.6-trap laying officer that AO.1 was not available in the office. PW.6 then asked him to wait. He again came back to the office and waited for the arrival of AO.1. AO.1 came to the office at 4.00 p.m. He allegedly asked PW.1 to wait till the arrival of AO.2. PW.1 again went back and informed the same to PW.6. AO.2 allegedly came to the office later. PW.1 allegedly met him in the veranda of the office. He again came back to the office and waited for the arrival of AO.1. AO.1 came to the office at 4.00 p.m. He allegedly asked PW.1 to wait till the arrival of AO.2. PW.1 again went back and informed the same to PW.6. AO.2 allegedly came to the office later. PW.1 allegedly met him in the veranda of the office. AO.2 left the place after discussing about his file with AO.1. AO.1 allegedly told to PW.1 that he had to meet the Mandal Revenue Officer before accepting the bribe. AO.1 and AO.2 then went to the residence of Mandal Revenue Officer. PW.1 again met PW.6 and informed the said incident to him. PW.6 instructed PW.1 to wait till the Accused Officers returned to the office. 41. According to the evidence of PW.1, AO.1 and AO.2 came back to the office at about 8.30 p.m. AO.1 then asked PW.1 whether he brought the bribe amount by calling him into the chamber of the Mandal Revenue Officer. After PW.1 replied affirmatively, AO.1 asked him to handover the amount to AO.2. In the meanwhile, AO.3 came into the chambers. PW.1 then handed over the amount to AO.2 at about 8.40 p.m., and AO.2 gave that amount to AO.3 at about 8.55 p.m. AO.3 counted the amount and kept it in the left side pocket of his trouser. PW.1 then came out of the Mandal Revenue Officer’s chamber and informed the incident to PW.4-mediator, who was waiting out side the office. 42. Thus it is the specific allegation of PW.1 that AO.1 was personally present in the office and on his direction the amount was handed over to AO.2, who in turn handed over the same to AO.3. Unfortunately AO.3 is not alive to testify the incident. 43. Admittedly PW.4 was waiting outside the office and hence he was not an eyewitness to the incident. Similarly, the trap laying officer-PW.6 is also not an eyewitness. It is therefore necessary to examine the evidence of PW.1 with reference to the post-trap proceedings Ex.P.17 and the evidence of PW.4, PW.6 and PW.7. 44. A scrutiny of Ex.P.17 would show that the trap party entered the office at 9.00 p.m. i.e., immediately after the alleged payment was made by PW.1 at about 8.40 p.m. Admittedly AO.1 was not found there. He was summoned by the DSP from his residence. 45. 44. A scrutiny of Ex.P.17 would show that the trap party entered the office at 9.00 p.m. i.e., immediately after the alleged payment was made by PW.1 at about 8.40 p.m. Admittedly AO.1 was not found there. He was summoned by the DSP from his residence. 45. PW.4 admitted that he did not witness the transaction between PW.1 and AO.1 to AO.3. He went into the office along with other trap members and found AO.2 and AO.3. He admitted that AO.1 was not present in the office when the trap party entered into the office and he was summoned by PW.6-trap laying officer through his subordinate. He further admitted that he did not see AO.1 going out of the office. 46. PW.6-trap laying officer though stated that AO.1 entered into the office at about 1.30 p.m. along with AO.3, nowhere stated that AO.1 was present when the trap was conducted. He also did not state that he saw AO.1 going out of the office. 47. PW.7-investigation officer admitted that he did not verify during investigation whether AO.1 was physically present in the office. On the other hand, he admitted that as per Ex.P.17-mediators report AO.1 was not present in the office when the amount was recovered by the trap party. 48. Thus from the evidence of PW.6 and PW.7 it is evident that AO.1 was not present in the office when the alleged bribe amount was paid on 26.07.1993. The said evidence thus falsifies the evidence of PW.1, who stated that amount was demanded by AO.1 and on his direction it was given to AO.2. 49. It may be noticed that though PW.1, PW.4 and PW.7 stated that they saw AO.1 going into the office at 8.30 p.m. it is not possible to accept their version because if really AO.1 had come to the office, he would not have left the place without being noticed either by PW.1, who was allegedly with AO.1 at the time of paying the bribe, or by PW.4 and PW.6, who were waiting out side the office. It may also be noticed that when the trap was intended against AO.1, it is difficult to accept that he would have been allowed to go away from the office without being intercepted by PW.6 and his trap party. It may also be noticed that when the trap was intended against AO.1, it is difficult to accept that he would have been allowed to go away from the office without being intercepted by PW.6 and his trap party. The evidence as above would lead to the only conclusion that AO.1 was not present when the amount was allegedly tendered. 50. Thus on the analysis as above, it must be held that there was no demand and acceptance by AO.1 of any bribe amount from PW.1. 51. As regards AO.2, the prosecution relied on the same evidence as was relied upon against AO.1. Ex.P.1-complaint requires to be examined before examining the evidence relating to AO.2. PW.1 alleged in Ex.P.1-complaint that it was AO.1, who demanded the amount. No allegation whatsoever was made against AO.2 except quoting AO.1 saying that the amount would be shared among them including the Mandal Revenue Officer. On the other hand, it is stated that when he allegedly met AO.1 on 24.07.1993, AO.2 was called by AO.1 and after consultation, he left the place. Except the said statement no allegation was made against AO.2. 52. PW.1 in his evidence clearly admitted that AO.2 did not make any demands to pay the bribe amount at any point of time. Thus there cannot be any doubt that AO.2 never demanded the bribe amount from PW.1. 53. The only allegation against AO.2 is that during the trap, amount was paid to him as directed by AO.1. It is already noticed that AO.1 was not present in the office at the time of trap. Therefore, the question of PW.1 paying the amount to AO.2 at the instance of AO.1 is highly improbable. It is true that the colour test on AO.2 yielded positive result. The plea of AO.2 in that regard was that when the amount was sought to be placed in his hands, he pushed it away and PW.1 then headed towards AO.3. It is an admitted fact that the amount was not recovered from AO.2 but it was recovered from AO.3. 54. It may be noticed that the trap party was waiting since 2.45 p.m. to 8.45 p.m., to carry out the trap. PW.1 was occasionally meeting the trap laying officer after he failed to hand over the amount to AO.1. It is an admitted fact that the amount was not recovered from AO.2 but it was recovered from AO.3. 54. It may be noticed that the trap party was waiting since 2.45 p.m. to 8.45 p.m., to carry out the trap. PW.1 was occasionally meeting the trap laying officer after he failed to hand over the amount to AO.1. It is thus seen that the trap party was at the office of the Mandal Revenue Officer for over six hours from 2.45 p.m. to 8.30 p.m. Any amount of doubt would arise as to why the amount could not have been paid to any of the Accused Officers for such a long time. From the above circumstances, it can only be inferred that having given Ex.P.1, P.W.1 was desperately determined to pass on the amount to someone or the other. 55. One of the pleas of the Accused Officers requires to be noticed. According to them they were not aware of the decree in L.G.C. though it was passed on 20.01.1993. PW.3, who was examined by the prosecution, was working as senior assistant in the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer, who admitted in his evidence that Form-V notice was not sent to the office of Mandal Revenue Officer till 26.07.1993. It may be noticed that authorisation in Form-V is a pre-requisite for taking steps for implementation of decree. PW.3 though stated that a copy of the decree was received in the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer on 5.02.1993 and a letter was addressed to the Mandal Revenue Officer for eviction of encroachers on 2.03.1993 and a reminder was sent on 20.03.1993. It is in his evidence that on 18.04.1993 the Mandal Revenue Officer requested to issue Form-V notice through Ex.P.7-letter. On receipt of Ex.P.7-letter the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer addressed letters i.e., Ex.P.8-dated 12.05.1993 and Ex.P.9-letter dated 2.03.1993, with the particulars of encroachers so as to enable them to issue Form-V notice. Thus the evidence of PW.3 would show that though there was correspondence between the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer and Mandal Revenue Officer, the necessary authorisation in Form-V was not issued. 56. It may be true that by virtue of the said communication, the decree in the L.G.C was within the knowledge of the Mandal Revenue Officer. Thus the evidence of PW.3 would show that though there was correspondence between the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer and Mandal Revenue Officer, the necessary authorisation in Form-V was not issued. 56. It may be true that by virtue of the said communication, the decree in the L.G.C was within the knowledge of the Mandal Revenue Officer. But there is absolutely no evidence on record to show that the Mandal Revenue Officer in turn issued any orders authorising the Accused Officers to take further steps in the matter. Therefore, it can safely be assumed that there was no official favour pending with the Accused Officers so as to justify the demand and acceptance of illegal bribe from PW.1. 57. Yet another fact requires to be noticed. It is in the evidence that the decree in the L.G.C was stayed by the high Court on 20.04.1993 in W.P.No.2878 of 1993. PW.1 thereupon filed a petition to vacate the orders on 24.10.1993. There is no valid reason to assume that PW.1 was not aware of the stay orders for over three months. 58. Sri M.B. Thimma Reddy, learned Standing Counsel would however submit that since the amount was intended to be shared between the Accused Officers and that the amount was recovered from one of the accused, though AO.1 was not present at the time of payment of bribe amount, the presumption should be drawn against the Accused Officers in view of the recovery of amount from one of them. 59. As I have already held that the demand by AO.1 was not proved on all the dates, including the date of trap, I am unable to accept the said contention. 60. In the analysis as above, I am of the considered view that the prosecution did not prove demand and acceptance by adducing any acceptable evidence. The reasons of the trial Court in my considered view in convicting the Accused Officers are not tenable. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and the accused officers are entitled for acquittal. 61. Accordingly the judgment in C.C.No.13 of 1994 dated 18.02.2005 on the file of the Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, Vijayawada, is set aside and the Criminal Appeals are allowed. The bail bonds shall stand discharged. 61. Accordingly the judgment in C.C.No.13 of 1994 dated 18.02.2005 on the file of the Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, Vijayawada, is set aside and the Criminal Appeals are allowed. The bail bonds shall stand discharged. The fine amount, if any, paid shall be refunded to the Accused officers.