Judgment :- K. MOHAN RAM, J. 1. W.P.No.20076 of 2010 has been filed to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the order of the 1st respondent in R.O.C.No.873/2003/RG/B3/B2 dated 7.5.2009 and quash the same and consequently direct the 1st respondent to regularize the suspension period from 25.1.2006 to 20.7.2007 and to pay difference in wages for the suspension period. 2. W.P.No.21873 of 2010 has been filed for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the order of the second respondent in G.O. (2D) No.457 dated 13.7.2007 and its consequent review order in G.O.(Ms) No.720 dated 20.6.2008 and quash the same and consequently direct the first respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with back wages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits. 3. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the above writ petitions are set out below:- a. According to the petitioner he was appointed as Judicial Magistrate on 2.3.1998 and was discharging his judicial duties to the best of his ability with due diligence and care to the satisfaction of his superiors. b. By proceedings in ROC.No.873/2003/RG/B3 dated 25.1.2006, which was issued on 26.1.2006, he was placed under suspension. In respect of an incident said to have taken place on 6.4.2006, a charge memo dated 6.4.2006 was issued to him, for which the petitioner submitted a reply dated 29.6.2006. Another charge memo, dated 24.1.2007 was also issued in respect of certain serious allegations and he submitted his explanation, dated 12.2.2007 to the said charge memo. c. The cases of the Judicial Officers, who were completing the age of 50 years during the month of May and June 2007 were reviewed under F.R.56(2). The Annual Confidential Report and work done statements along with the vigilance reports of the aforesaid Judicial Officers were placed by the Registry as per the order of the Hon'ble The Chief Justice before the Hon'ble Administrative Committee. The Annual Confidential Report and work done statements along with the vigilance reports of the aforesaid Judicial Officers were placed by the Registry as per the order of the Hon'ble The Chief Justice before the Hon'ble Administrative Committee. In the meeting held on 3.4.2007, the Hon'ble Administrative Committee, on considering the remarks recorded in the confidential reports, work done statements and other relevant records including the latest vigilance reports relating to the officers concerned including the petitioner herein, has resolved that it is just and necessary to retire the petitioner and one another officer compulsorily under F.R.56(2) on attaining the age of 50 years as their continuance in service is against the public interest. The Hon'ble Full Court in the meeting held on 11.4.2007 had resolved to approve the minutes of the Hon'ble Administrative Committee dated 3.4.2007. Then the Government being the appointing authority of the writ petitioner was addressed by the High Court in Ref.No.D.O.Lrs.No.110/2006-Con.B1 dated 18.4.2007 requesting for issuance of orders retiring the writ petitioner from service compulsorily under F.R.56(2) in public interest. The Government by G.O.2(D) No.457 Home (Cts. IA) Department, dated 13.7.2007 have issued orders compulsorily retiring the writ petitioner. d. By order dated 20.7.2007, the petitioner's suspension was revoked and he was reinstated into service and posted as Additional District Munsif, Chidambaram on 23.7.2007 A.N. By High Court's Notification No.126/2007, dated 1.8.2007, the petitioner was relieved from the service and as against the orders of compulsory retirement, the writ petitioner filed W.P.No.34351 of 2007 to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus after calling for the records relating to the order of the second respondent in G.O.(2D) No.457 dated 13.7.2007 and quash the same and consequently direct the 1st respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with back wages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits. 4. In the writ petition, the petitioner has taken the following grounds to challenge the order of compulsory retirement:- a. The petitioner requested to furnish documents relied upon by the respondents to retire him compulsorily but such prayer was rejected. b. Till he was placed under suspension, his performance was excellent and there was nothing adverse against him. c. There is no public interest involved to compulsorily retire the petitioner from service; and d. Though departmental proceeding was initiated, but without following the same to its end, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from service. b. Till he was placed under suspension, his performance was excellent and there was nothing adverse against him. c. There is no public interest involved to compulsorily retire the petitioner from service; and d. Though departmental proceeding was initiated, but without following the same to its end, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from service. e. The impugned order was passed because of mala fide on the part of certain officers. 5. The said writ petition came to be dismissed. Along with the writ petition, the petitioner filed M.P.Nos.1 to 3 of 2007 seeking the following interim orders:- a. To direct the first respondent/Registrar General, High Court of Madras to furnish the copy of work done statement, all other relevant records including the latest vigilance report relied on to pass impugned order to the petitioner pending disposal of the writ petition. b. To stay the order of the second respondent/The Government of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary, Home (Cts. IA) Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9 passed in G.O.(2D) No.457, dated 13.7.2007 pending disposal of the writ petition. c. To direct the first respondent/Registrar General, High Court of Madras, to pay difference in wages for the suspension period from 25.1.2006 to 1.8.2007 to the petitioner pending disposal of the writ petition. 6. W.P.No.34351 of 2007 was dismissed by order, dated 10.3.2008 by a Division Bench of this Court on merits and all the connected M.Ps. were also dismissed. Against the order, dated 10.3.2008, the petitioner filed a Review Application No.94 of 2009 in W.P.No.34351 of 2007 and the same was also dismissed on 17.8.2009. The petitioner filed S.L.P.No.12035 of 2008, which was also dismissed by order, dated 8.9.2008. By order, dated 17.8.2009 the Division Bench dismissed the Rev.Appn.No.94 of 2009. Again, the petitioner filed M.P.No.2 of 2009 in Rev.Appn.No.94 of 2009 in W.P.No.34351 of 2007 seeking to clarify the order passed in Rev.Appln.No.94/2009, dated 17.8.2009 and the clarification petition was also dismissed on 27.11.2009 7. Further, the petitioner filed a review petition, dated 29.8.2007 before the second respondent seeking to review the order of compulsory retirement, dated 13.7.2007 and the said review petition also came to be dismissed by the Government in G.O.(Ms) No.720, Home (Courts. I) Department, dated 20.6.2008. 8. Further, the petitioner filed a review petition, dated 29.8.2007 before the second respondent seeking to review the order of compulsory retirement, dated 13.7.2007 and the said review petition also came to be dismissed by the Government in G.O.(Ms) No.720, Home (Courts. I) Department, dated 20.6.2008. 8. In W.P.No.21873 of 2010 the petitioner is seeking for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus calling for the records relating to the order of the second respondent in G.O. (2D) No.457 dated 13.7.2007 and its consequent review order in G.O.(Ms) No.720 dated 20.6.2008 and quash the same and consequently direct the first respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with back wages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits. 9. The petitioner by his representation, dated 19.12.2007 requested the first respondent to regularize the suspension period from 26.1.2006 A.N. to 23.7.2007 and to pay the difference in wages for the suspension period. The first respondent, by Proceedings in ROC.No.873/2003/RG/B3/B2, dated 7.5.2009 rejected his request. 10. Challenging the same, the petitioner has filed W.P.No. 20076 of 2010. 11. Since the learned counsel for the first respondent has raised a preliminary objection regarding the very maintainability of the above writ petitions, we are not referring to the contentions raised in the affidavit filed by the writ petitioner and the contentions raised by the respondents in their counter statements at this stage. 12. Mr. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 3 in W.P.No.21873 of 2010 submitted that all the grounds urged in this present writ petition were also raised earlier in W.P.No.34351 of 2007 and all these contentions have been considered at length by the earlier Division Bench and since W.P.No.34351 of 2007, review petition, clarification petition and the S.L.P. filed by the petitioner have all been dismissed, the order passed by the Division Bench in W.P.No.34351 of 2007, dated 10.3.2008 has attained finality and the above W.P.No.21873 of 2010 being the second writ petition is not maintainable. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel based reliance on a decision of the Apex Court reported in (1993) 2 SCC 495 (State of U.P. and another vs. Labh Chand). 13. Countering the said submissions, Mr. S. Prabakaran, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel based reliance on a decision of the Apex Court reported in (1993) 2 SCC 495 (State of U.P. and another vs. Labh Chand). 13. Countering the said submissions, Mr. S. Prabakaran, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. P. Vijendran, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no enquiry was conducted before passing the impugned order of compulsory retirement and therefore, the order of compulsory retirement is vitiated; since the pensionary benefits have not been paid along with the order of compulsory retirement, the order amounts to punishment; and since the fundamental rights of the petitioner have been deprived of, the principle of res judicata will not apply and therefore, the second writ petition is maintainable. 14. The learned counsel further submitted that in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner's case should be treated as an exceptional case and the second writ petition may be entertained and in the alternative, the learned counsel submitted that the respondents should be directed to pay the pension and retirement benefits to the petitioner. 15. The learned counsel submitted that as far as the order of compulsory retirement is concerned, the above writ petition can be treated as second writ petition, but as far as the challenge relating to the order of the second respondent rejecting the review petition of the petitioner is concerned, the above writ petition is the first writ petition and therefore, the same is maintainable. 16. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel based reliance on the following decisions:- a. Baldev Raj Chadha vs. Union of India and others (1980) 4 SCC 321 ). b. Arun Kumar and others vs. Union of India and others ( (2007) 5 SCC 580 ). c. Ashok Kumar Srivastav vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., and others ( (1998) 4 SCC 361 ). 17. As far as W.P.No.20076 of 2010 is concerned, Mr. b. Arun Kumar and others vs. Union of India and others ( (2007) 5 SCC 580 ). c. Ashok Kumar Srivastav vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., and others ( (1998) 4 SCC 361 ). 17. As far as W.P.No.20076 of 2010 is concerned, Mr. S. Prabakaran, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since admittedly, the petitioner's suspension was revoked by order, dated 20.7.2007 and he was reinstated into service and he had taken charge for the post of Additional District Munsif, Chidambaram and he was discharging his duties as Additional District Munsif, Chidambaram and only thereafter, he was compulsorily retired and therefore, his services during the suspension period should be regularized and the difference in wages should be directed to be paid. 18. The learned counsel submitted that during the suspension period, for the first six months, he was paid 50% of the salary as subsistence allowance and for the rest of the period he was paid 75% of the salary as subsistence allowance and therefore, the balance salary due has to be directed to be paid. The learned counsel submitted that as per G.O.No.623, dated 14.7.1983, if an officer is compulsorily retired, the disciplinary proceedings should be dropped. When admittedly, the disciplinary proceedings were not proceeded with and no punishment had been imposed on the writ petitioner, the petitioner's suspension period should be regularized and the difference in salary should be directed to be paid. 19. Countering the said submissions, Mr. C.T. Mohan, learned counsel for the first respondent basing reliance on a decision of the First Bench of this Court reported in 2011-LAWS(MAD)-6-247 (S. Ulaganathan vs. Registrar General, High Court of Madras, Chennai) = 2011 -MadLJ-6-401 submitted in that case that what are all the contentions put forth in this writ petition, had been put forth by one another Judicial Officer, who was also compulsorily retired, namely, S. Ulaganathan, but the said contentions were rejected. 20. The learned counsel submitted that in the said decision it has been laid down that as per the guidelines issued in G.O.Ms.No.623 dated 14.7.1983 if any case of government servant, who is under suspension, is recommended for compulsory retirement, he cannot straight away be allowed to be retired compulsorily under FR.56(d) unless the suspension order is revoked reinstating such government servant into service. It is only under this guideline the suspension order of the petitioner was revoked and he was reinstated into service, so that the order of compulsory retirement could be given effect to and it was further held that the suspension order was not revoked on the basis of any finding recorded in the departmental enquiry and therefore, the question of regularizing the period of suspension does not arise. 21. According to the learned counsel, the said decision squarely applies to the facts of this case also. 22. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the materials available on record. 23. It is not in dispute that the petitioner filed W.P.No.34351 of 2007 challenging the order of compulsory retirement and the same was dismissed on 10.3.2008 on merits. It is also not in dispute that Rev.Appln.No.94 of 1999 filed by the petitioner to review the order dated 10.3.2008 passed in W.P.No.34351 of 2007 was also dismissed on 17.8.2009 and the clarification petition also came to be dismissed on 27.11.2009. It is also not in dispute that the SLP filed against the order passed in W.P.No.34351 of 2007 also came to be dismissed on 8.9.2008. Thus, it is clear that the order passed in W.P.No.34351 of 2007, dated 10.3.2008 has become final. It cannot also be contended that W.P.No.34351 of 2007 has not been disposed of on merits. Therefore, when the writ petition was dismissed on merits after considering all the contentions raised earlier, the very same contentions cannot be raised once again in the present writ petition No.21873 of 2010. 24. In the decision reported in ( (1993) 2 SCC 495 ), referred to supra, in paragraph 20, the Apex Court has laid down as follows:- "When a Judge of single Judge Bench of a High Court is required to entertain a second Writ Petition of a person on a matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain such petition, if an earlier Writ Petition of the same person on the same matter had been dismissed already by another single Judge Bench or a Division Bench of the same High Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-availing of alternate remedy. Second Writ Petition cannot be, so entertained not because the learned single Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, but because entertaining of such a second Writ Petition would render the order of the same Court dismissing the earlier Writ Petition redundant and nugatory, although not reviewed by it in exercise of the recognised power. Besides, if a learned single Judge could entertain a second Writ Petition of a person respecting a matter on which his first Writ Petition was dismissed in limine by another learned single Judge or a Division Bench of the same Court, it would encourage an unsuccessful Writ Petitioner to go on filing Writ Petition after Writ Petition in the same matter in the same High Court, and have it brought up for consideration before one Judge after another. Such a thing, if is allowed to happen, it could result in giving full scope and encouragement to an unscrupulous litigant to abuse the process of the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in that any order of any Bench of such Court refusing to entertain a Writ Petition could be ignored by him with impunity and relief sought in the same matter by filing a fresh Writ Petition. This would only lead to introduction of disorder, confusion and chaos relating to exercise of writ jurisdiction by Judges of the High Court for there could be no finality for an order of the Court refusing to entertain a Writ Petition. It is why, the Rule of judicial practice and procedure that a second Writ Petition shall not be entertained by the High Court on the subject-matter respecting which the first Writ Petition of the same person was dismissed by the same Court even if the Order of such dismissal was in limine, be it on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternate remedy, has come to be accepted and followed as salutary Rule in exercise of writ jurisdiction of Courts." 25. The said decision squarely applies to the facts of the case. In the said decision, the Apex Court has held that even if the writ petition of the same person was dismissed by the same court in limine, be it on the ground of laches or on the ground of non exhaustion of alternate remedy, the second writ petition is not maintainable. In the said decision, the Apex Court has held that even if the writ petition of the same person was dismissed by the same court in limine, be it on the ground of laches or on the ground of non exhaustion of alternate remedy, the second writ petition is not maintainable. But in this case, the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner was not dismissed in limine or on the ground of laches or on the ground of non exhaustion of alternate remedy, but the writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench on merits and therefore, we are of the considered view that the decision referred to supra squarely applies to this case. 26. In the decision reported in ( (1998) 4 SCC 361 ), which is a decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in paragraph 11 it has been laid down as follows:- "It is well neigh settled that a decision on an issue raised in writ petition under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution would also operate as res judicata between the same parties in subsequent judicial proceedings. The only exception is that the rule of res judicata would not operate to the detriment or impairment of a fundamental right. A Constitution Bench of this Court has considered the applicability of rule of res judicata in writ proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution in Daryao & ors. vs. State of U.P. & ors. [ 1962 (1) SCR 574 ] and it was held that the basis on which the rule rests is founded on consideration of public policy and it is in the interest of public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decision pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over in the same kind of litigation." 27. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the fundamental right of the petitioner has been deprived of, the rule of res judicata would not operate and therefore, the second writ petition is maintainable. But we are unable to accept the said contention of the learned counsel for the simple reason that the learned counsel is unable to point out as to how and which fundamental right of the petitioner has been deprived of. But we are unable to accept the said contention of the learned counsel for the simple reason that the learned counsel is unable to point out as to how and which fundamental right of the petitioner has been deprived of. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that simply because the petitioner has been compulsorily retired, any of his fundamental rights has been deprived of and therefore, the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the facts of the case. 28. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, his case should be treated as an exceptional case and the second writ petition should be entertained. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel based reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2007) 5 SCC 580 , referred to supra. A perusal of the said decision shows that the said decision is absolutely not applicable to the facts of this case. In that decision, the question which arose for determination was whether the State Government could have invoked Rule 14 of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959 (dealing with power of relaxation) when there was no provision in the said Rules for absorption of deputationists on permanent basis from Central Reserve Police Force ("CRPF") into Punjab Police Service. 29. In that case, an IPS Officer was killed by terrorists and on account of the above incident, his sister was appointed as Assistant Commandant in CRPF as her assignment was relatively safer in CRPF than in Punjab Police Service. On completion of her probation, she was appointed on deputation to the post of Superintendent of Police in Punjab Police. She retained her lien as Assistant Commandant in CRPF when she was absorbed as DSP in Punjab Police. 30. In such factual background, the aforesaid question came up for consideration and while answering the said question, the Apex Court has held that it was an exceptional appointment and not a compassionate appointment and there is no infirmity in the action taken by the Government. Therefore, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case. 31. The learned counsel based reliance on the decision reported in ( (1980) 4 SCC 321 ), referred to supra. Therefore, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case. 31. The learned counsel based reliance on the decision reported in ( (1980) 4 SCC 321 ), referred to supra. In the said decision, the Apex Court has considered the scope of judicial review in writ petition challenging the order of compulsory retirement of a person in public interest and therefore the said decision is also not applicable to the facts of the case. Therefore, we are of the considered view that in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decision reported in ( (1993) 2 SCC 495 ), W.P.No.21873 of 2010, being the second writ petition challenging the order of compulsory retirement, is not maintainable and on this ground alone, the challenge of the petitioner relating to the order of compulsory retirement has to be rejected and accordingly, the same is rejected. 32. As far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the above writ petition, since the review order passed by the second respondent in G.O.(Ms) No.720, dated 20.6.2008 is challenged, the above writ petition is the first writ petition as no other writ petition has been filed earlier is concerned, we are unable to countenance the said submission for the following reasons. 33. In the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent in W.P.No.21873 of 2010, it is stated that the petitioner had filed a review petition before the Government and in turn the Government sought the views of the High Court on the review petition. The petitioner had also filed an additional review petition before the Government. The views of the High Court were sought for on the additional review petition. By a communication in D.O.Lr.No.110/2006-Com.B1, dated 12.12.2007, it had been stated that the High Court has resolved that there was no ground made out for review by the petitioner. Thereafter, the Government has dismissed the review petition. The views of the High Court were sought for on the additional review petition. By a communication in D.O.Lr.No.110/2006-Com.B1, dated 12.12.2007, it had been stated that the High Court has resolved that there was no ground made out for review by the petitioner. Thereafter, the Government has dismissed the review petition. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that when the writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order of compulsory retirement was dismissed by a Division Bench, review petitions and clarification petition have also been dismissed and the SLP filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the Apex Court, the Government cannot review the order of compulsory retirement and there is no error whatsoever in dismissing the review application by the Government. But, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the order rejecting the review petition is a non speaking order and therefore, the said order is not sustainable. 34. In the decision reported in (2011) 10 SCC (Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) through Lrs. and others vs. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) and others, the Apex Court after surveying the entire case laws relating to compulsory retirement of a Judicial Officer and Articles 235, 124(6, 227, 223 & 234 and Articles 163, 77, 245 and 309 of the Constitution of India, has laid down as follows:- "Under Article 235 of the Constitution, the control over the subordinate judiciary, vested in the High Court, is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation and it is to sub-serve a basic feature of the Constitution i.e, independence of judiciary. Among other things, it includes: (a)(i) disciplinary jurisdiction and a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment, dismissal, removal and reduction in rank of the District Judges and initial posting and promotion to the cadre of District Judges, (ii) in Article 235 the word "control" is accompanied by the word "vest" which shows that the High Court alone is made the sole custodian over the judiciary and (iii) suspension from service of a member of judiciary with a view to hold disciplinary enquiry; (b) transfers, promotion and confirmation of such promotions, of persons holding posts in judicial service, inferior to that of District Judge; (c) transfer of District Judges; (d) recall of District Judges posted on ex-cadre posts or on deputation on administrative posts; (e) award of selection grade to the members of the judicial service including District Judges and grant of further promotion after their initial appointment to the cadre; (f) confirmation of the District Judges who have been on probation or are officiating after their initial appointment or promotion by the Governor to the cadre of District Judges under Article 233; and (g) premature or compulsory retirement of Judges of the District Courts and of subordinate courts. The scheme envisaged by the Constitution does not permit the State to encroach upon the area reserved by Articles 233, 234 and the first part of Article 235 either by legislation or rules or executive instructions. Article 235 has no concern with the conferring of jurisdiction and powers on the Court but it only relates to administrative and disciplinary jurisdiction over the subordinate courts. Therefore, the conferment of power of the prescribed authority by the State Legislature on the judicial officers cannot be construed to mean that the power of the High Court under Article 235 is inoperative or inchoate as the High Court alone is the sole authority competent to initiate displinary proceedings against the subordinate judicial officers or to impose various punishments including passing of order of compulsory retirement on verification of the service record. The State is least competent to aid and advise the Governor on such subjects. The State is least competent to aid and advise the Governor on such subjects. While the High Court retains the power of disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary including power to initiate disciplinary proceedings, suspend them during enquiries and impose punishment on them, but when it come to the question of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or termination of services of judicial officers on any count whatsoever, the High Court becomes the recommending authority and cannot itself pass the orders. The formal order to give effect to such a decision has to be passed by the State Governor on the recommendations of the High Court. The test of control is not the passing of an order against a member of the subordinate judicial service, but the power to take such decision and action. In disciplinary proceedings if an action is taken by the High Court against the judicial officer the recommendations made by the High Court bind the Governor and he is left with no discretion except to act according to the recommendations. The Governor under scheme of Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution cannot refuse to act in terms of recommendations made by the High Court and there is no manner of doubt that the Governor has to act on the recommendation of the High Court and that is the broad basis of Article 235. In the matter of disciplinary action against a member of the Subordinate Judicial Service, the Governor has no option, but to pass final order on the basis of the recommendation of the High Court by passing an order in accordance with the decision of the High Court and the Governor cannot take any action against any member of the judicial service without and contrary to the recommendation of the High Court." 35. The aforesaid decision clearly lays down that the Governor under scheme of Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution cannot refuse to act in terms of recommendations made by the High Court and there is no manner of doubt that the Governor has to act on the recommendation of the High Court and that is the broad basis of Article 235. In the matter of disciplinary action against a member of the Subordinate Judicial Service, the Governor has no option, but to pass final order on the basis of the recommendation of the High Court by passing an order in accordance with the decision of the High Court and the Governor cannot take any action against any member of the judicial service without and contrary to the recommendation of the High Court. 36. In this case, as pointed out above, the Hon'ble Administrative Committee of the High Court has resolved to compulsorily retire the writ petitioner from service and the resolution of the Administrative Committee was considered by the Hon'ble Full Court in its meeting and has approved the resolution and the recommendation of the Administrative Committee. Thereafter, the High Court communicated the decision of the Full Court to the Government of Tamil Nadu to compulsorily retire the writ petitioner from service. Accepting the recommendation of the High Court, which means the Full Court, the Governor has issued the impugned order of compulsory retirement. Similarly, when the petitioner sought for review of the order of compulsory retirement issued by the Government, the Government, as stated above, has sought for the view of the High Court and the High Court had sent its views and accepting the views of the High Court, the review petition has been dismissed. 37. When the Apex Court has laid down that in the matter of disciplinary action against a member of the Subordinate Judicial Service, the Governor cannot refuse to act in terms of the recommendation made by the High Court and in the matter of disciplinary action against a member of the Subordinate Judicial Service, the Governor has no option but to pass final order on the basis of the recommendation of the High Court and the Governor has no other option except to accept the views/recommendations of the High Court and accordingly, the Government dismissed the review petition and therefore, there is absolutely no infirmity or error in the order passed by the Government by rejecting the review petition filed by the writ petitioner and therefore, we are of the considered view that for the aforesaid reasons, W.P.No.21873 of 2010 is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, the same is dismissed. 38. 38. As far as W.P.No.20076 of 2010 is concerned, the relief sought for is to quash the proceedings of the first respondent in R.O.C.No.873/2003/RG/B3/B2 dated 7.5.2009 and to direct the first respondent to regularize the suspension period from 25.1.2006 to 20.7.2007 and to pay difference in wages for the suspension period. 39. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent, similar issue that arises for consideration in this writ petition, came up for consideration before the First Bench of this court in the case of S. Ulaganathanvs. Registrar General, High Court of Madras, Chennai (2011 LAWS (MAD) – 6- 247, in W.P.No.9639 of 2010 and by order, dated 9.6.2011 the First Bench dismissed the writ petition. The facts of that case and the case on hand are similar. In the first writ petition filed by the petitioner in W.P.No.34351 of 2007, the petitioner had sought for quashing of G.O.2(D) No.457, dated 13.7.2007, which compulsorily retires the petitioner from service, and consequently direct the first respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with backwages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits. The writ petition, as stated above, came to be dismissed on merits and in paragraph 23, the Division Bench has ultimately held as follows:- "23. In view of the records of service and other facts as noticed above, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order, G.O.2(D) No.457 dated 13th July, 2007, issued from Home (Cts. IA) Department, Government of Tamil Nadu nor inclined to grant relief to the petitioner. There being no merit, the writ petition is dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs." 40. Thus, it is clear that the Division Bench was not inclined to grant any relief to the petitioner including the granting of back wages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits. 41. It is also pertinent to point out that the petitioner filed M.Ps. seeking for various interim reliefs pending disposal of the writ petition and in one such petition, the petitioner had sought for direction to pay difference in wages for the suspension period from 25.1.2006 to 1.8.2007 and the said M.P. also came to be dismissed. 41. It is also pertinent to point out that the petitioner filed M.Ps. seeking for various interim reliefs pending disposal of the writ petition and in one such petition, the petitioner had sought for direction to pay difference in wages for the suspension period from 25.1.2006 to 1.8.2007 and the said M.P. also came to be dismissed. Therefore, when the reliefs sought for in the present writ petition have already been rejected by the earlier Division Bench and the suspension order was not revoked on the basis of any finding recorded in the departmental enquiry, the question of regularizing the period of suspension cannot and does not arise. Further, as pointed out above, the decision of the First Bench of this Court in the case of S. Ulaganathan reported in 2011 LAWS (MAD)-6- 247 squarely applies to the facts of the case and therefore, we are of the considered view that the writ petition has no merits and the same is liable to be dismissed and accordingly the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. 42. Mr. S. Prabakaran, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted the petitioner had not been paid any pensionary and retirement benefits. The learned counsel fairly submitted that the petitioner had not completed the required qualifying service for claiming pension. But yet the learned counsel submitted that the case of the petitioner may be treated as an exceptional case and on sympathetic grounds pension and other retirement benefits may be directed to be paid. But such a direction cannot be issued by us. If the petitioner is entitled to claim any pensionary or retirement benefits, it is open to the petitioner to make a representation to the first respondent and if such representation is made, the first respondent shall consider the same in accordance with the relevant rules and pass orders on merits within two months from the date of making such representation. However, it is made clear that we have not gone into the merits of the claim of the petitioner regarding his pension and other retirement benefits. In fine, both the writ petitions are dismissed without any costs. Connected M.Ps. are also dismissed.