Judgment 1. THE petitioner challenges an award relating to a works contract by which the arbitrator has allowed the claim under several heads. THE petitioner does not assail the award made under the third head since the amount was admitted by the petitioner in course of the reference. THE matter is covered by the Arbitration Act, 1940. 2. THE first of the three grounds urged by the petitioner is that several heads of claim have been allowed by the arbitrator despite the respondent herein, by reason of the agreement between the parties, being precluded from claiming matters covered thereby. Secondly, the petitioner says that in the respondent having received payment after completion of the work 2 without any protest, there was complete accord and satisfaction which disentitled the respondent from making any further claim. Finally, the petitioner complains that even if the arbitrator found that there was some basis to the claim, there is no indication in the award as to how the arbitrator arrived at the figures in respect of the several heads of claim. THE petitioner refers to clauses 19 and 33 of the general conditions governing the contract: "19. THE contractor shall not be entitled to any compensation for any loss suffered by him on account of delays in commencing or exeucting the work, whatever the cause of delays may be, including delays arising out of modifications to the work entrusted to him or in any sub-contract connected therewith or delays in awarding contracts for other trades of the project or in commencement or completion of such works or in supply of materials from CTC Limited as mentioned thereinafter or in obtaining water and power connections for construction purposes or for any other reason whatsoever and the Employer shall not be liable for any claim in respect thereof. THE Employer does not accept liability for any sum besides the tender amount, subject to such variations as are provided for herein." "33. THE decision, opinion, direction, Certificate (Except for payment) with respect to all or any of the matters under Clause 2(a), 2(b), 4, 7, 12, 19, 28 (a, b, c, d, f) hereof (which matters are herein referred to as the except matters) shall be final and conclusive and binding on the parties hereto and shall be without appeal. THE decision, opinion, direction, Certificate (Except for payment) with respect to all or any of the matters under Clause 2(a), 2(b), 4, 7, 12, 19, 28 (a, b, c, d, f) hereof (which matters are herein referred to as the except matters) shall be final and conclusive and binding on the parties hereto and shall be without appeal. Any other decision, opinion, direction Certificate of valuation of the Chief Engineer or any refusal of the Chief Engineer to give any of the same, shall be subject to the right of Arbitration and review under Clause 35 hereof in the same way in all respect (including the provision as to opening the reference) as if it were a decision of the Chief Engineer." The petitioner says that by virtue of Clause 19 of the general conditions, the contractor was not entitled to make any claim "on account of delays....for any.....reason whatsoever..." The petitioner insists that Clause 19 of the general conditions debarred the contractor from making any claim on account of any delay. The related point that the petitioner makes is that since Clause 33 of the general conditions refers to Clause 19 as part of the excepted matters, in the sense there would be element of finality to such matters and they would not be adjudicated upon, the contractor could not have fashioned any claim on account of any delay or any consequential loss suffered by the contractor. The petitioner refers to Clause 34 of the general conditions that is the arbitration agreement between the parties where the excepted matters have been kept out of the purview of the arbitration. The petitioner suggests that whether or not the claim was on account of excepted matters, since the excepted matters were not arbitrable under the agreement between the parties, the arbitrator being a creature of the contract could not have exceeded his brief to adjudicate upon such matters. As to the accord and satisfaction, the petitioner says that the point was squarely taken as would be evident from paragraphs 47 to 50 of the award where the arbitrator referred to it. The petitioner asserts that the arbitrator did not make any conclusive pronouncement on such aspect of the matter before proceeding to consider the claim on merits. On the point of accord and satisfaction, the petitioner refers to the judgments reported at (1994) Supp. The petitioner asserts that the arbitrator did not make any conclusive pronouncement on such aspect of the matter before proceeding to consider the claim on merits. On the point of accord and satisfaction, the petitioner refers to the judgments reported at (1994) Supp. (3) SCC 126; (2009) 7 SCC 350 ; (2000) 8 SCC 1 and (2011) 10 SCC 420 . 3. IN the first of the four cases referred to by the petitioner, the matter was considered at the Section 20 stage under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Supreme Court found that the work in that case had been completed by December 30, 1980 and the further claim was rejected by August 12, 1981 after the petitioner had received full payment by May 19, 1981. The Supreme Court construed the documents executed by the contractor to imply that the contractor had accepted the final payment in full satisfaction of its claim and held, in such circumstances, that it could not make any further claim in respect of the matter. IN the second of the cases, the Supreme Court found that full and final payment had been received by the claimant in the proceedings without any protest or reservation and such conduct disentitled the claimant in that matter from making any further claim. The other two cases also elucidate the legal principle in the matter of accord and satisfaction and restrict the grounds for a claimant to make a further claim after having apparently received payment in full and final satisfaction of its claim. The law appears to be that when a valid discharge is issued, it operates as an estoppel against the claimant from making any further claim. 4. THE engineering contract in this case related to the construction of a tram-shed at the Rajabazar Tram Depot in Calcutta. It appears from the records that the petitioner herein had engaged some other person to design the construction and the respondent was engaged only to execute the work. For reasons not necessary to be gone into at this stage, it appears that a part of the construction collapsed whereupon the work was kept suspended for a substantial period of time. It appears from the records that the petitioner herein had engaged some other person to design the construction and the respondent was engaged only to execute the work. For reasons not necessary to be gone into at this stage, it appears that a part of the construction collapsed whereupon the work was kept suspended for a substantial period of time. THE work resumed, it was completed according to the specifications, some payments were received by the contractor and it lodged the claim for balance sum, including on account of cost overrun, escalation and the like which had been occasioned by reason of the suspension of the work for a considerable period of time. THE award considers the matter in great detail. THE petitioner says that the claim on account of extra costs towards idle labour under the first head, against which a sum of Rs.5.50 lakh has been awarded, was one of the matters that was covered by clause 19 of the general conditions and, as such, excepted under clause 33 of the conditions and, in any event, not arbitrable in terms of the arbitration agreement contained in clause 34 of the same set of conditions. It is the same argument which is made by the petitioner in respect of the claim under the second head for extra cost on account of idle labour and idle establishment expenses, against which a sum of Rs.2,46,240/- has been awarded. THE petitioner says that the claims under the fourth and fifth heads, on account of overstay and reduced profitability, were beyond the scope of the arbitrator's authority and the purview of the arbitration agreement. THE petitioner also questions the interest levied under the sixth and seventh heads. THE award in respect of the sixth head of claim allowed interest on the amount awarded under the first head of claim at the rate of 18% per annum from August 31, 1985 till December 21, 1990. THE interest granted under the seventh head of claim was also at the rate of 18% per annum but runs from November 1, 1989. The respondent has referred to the judgments reported at (2011) 5 SCC 758 ; (2002) 4 SCC 45 and (1989) 2 SCC 38 . THE interest granted under the seventh head of claim was also at the rate of 18% per annum but runs from November 1, 1989. The respondent has referred to the judgments reported at (2011) 5 SCC 758 ; (2002) 4 SCC 45 and (1989) 2 SCC 38 . The respondent says that since the authority exercised by Court under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is merely supervisory and not appellate, the Court is not called upon to make a detailed investigation into matters of evidence and what may or may not have weighed with the arbitrator in making the award. The respondent asserts that the Court would look for jurisdictional errors and matters of serious irregularities to interfere with an award rendered by a forum of consensus. 5. IN the first of the judgments referred to by the respondent, Supreme Court made a distinction between the factum and quantum relating to an excepted matter. The relevant clause in that case gave primacy to superintending engineer to levy a quantum of penalty or charge upon a particular occasion arising. The Supreme Court reasoned that while the exclusive authority of superintending engineer under the general conditions of the contract could not questioned, the factum as to whether the circumstances had arisen was arbitrable and it was within the arbitrator's domain to assess whether the occasion arose for the superintending engineer to levy the penalty. The petitioner has referred to a sentence at paragraph 10 of the same report for the proposition that if the agreement between the parties provides for certain excepted matters, the arbitrator would not be permitted to take up such excepted matters and adjudicate thereupon. 6. THE second of the cases cited by the respondent arose on a matter under Section 20 of the 1940 Act when an objection was taken for the reference of the disputes to arbitration on the ground that the disputes enumerated or, at any rate, some of them, were not arbitrable. At paragraph 14 of the report, the Supreme Court referred to Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts (11th ed.) and noticed that in American jurisprudence an exception had been carved out within what could be excepted matters. At paragraph 14 of the report, the Supreme Court referred to Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts (11th ed.) and noticed that in American jurisprudence an exception had been carved out within what could be excepted matters. THE Supreme Court noticed that the origin of the exception clause was in federal contracts but in course of time it was extended to private contracts and observed that in India a claim on account of delay in performance was governed by Sections 55 and 56 of the Contract Act. Paragraph 16 of the report enumerates the cases where there would be an exception to the exception clause, though it does not appear to have been exhaustively captured in the four grounds of exception which have been laid down therein. The third of the cases cited on behalf of the respondent, the earliest in point of time, enunciates the rules that would be applied by a Court in assessing a plea for the annulment of an arbitral award. The judgment is instructive and recognises that unless there was error apparent on the face of the record that would lead to the inescapable conclusion of legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal, a mere erroneous interpretation or such other trifles should overly enthuse a Court to set aside an award. 7. THE respondent says that both primary grounds urged by the petitioner - that of certain matters being excepted under the general conditions and of the application of the rule as to accord and satisfaction - have been referred to and discussed by the arbitrator. THE respondent relies on paragraphs 47 to 50 of the award and on paragraphs 82 to 86 thereof which cover the relevant aspects. THE respondent suggests that since the arbitrator was alive to either issue and rendered a decision thereon, unless such decision is demonstrably perverse, it would make no ground for setting aside the award. THE respondent has adequately dealt with the challenge lodged by the petitioner and it is also elementary that a Court does not sit with a toothcomb to find faults in an award. THE Court will step in only if it finds that the arbitrator was not aware of the ambit of his authority or rendered a perverse opinion on a matter on which such opinion could not reasonably have been formed. THE Court will step in only if it finds that the arbitrator was not aware of the ambit of his authority or rendered a perverse opinion on a matter on which such opinion could not reasonably have been formed. If the Court finds that one of the many plausible views on a certain aspect has been taken by the arbitrator, the Court would not interfere. 8. THE only aspect that remains is the petitioner's argument that since the excepted matters were not arbitrable under the arbitration clause contained in the general conditions, as to whether such matters were excepted matters or not also fell outside the purview of the arbitrator's authority. THE issue appears to have been answered against the petitioner in the second of the judgments relied upon by the respondent reported at (2002) 4 SCC 45 . THE opening paragraphs of the report indicate that the arbitration clause there also excluded the applicability thereof to excepted matters. At paragraphs 14 to 16 of the report, in course of discussing what could be excepted matters, the Supreme Court indicated the exceptions to the excepted matters as recognised by the law in this country. If the arbitration clause keeps excepted matters outside its purview and some of the matters which are said to be excepted matters are adjudicated to not be excepted matters, it would necessarily follow that the exceptions to the excepted matters, which are apparently excluded in the arbitration clause, would fall within the domain of the arbitrator's authority. THE question of interest has, however, to be addressed. Interest at the rate of 18% per annum has been awarded in respect of the first head of claim, but for a limited duration. There does not appear to be any serious ground made out for interference in respect thereof. However, interest at the rate of 18% per annum from January 1, 1991 till the date of the decree appears to be harsh, particularly considering the lower interest rate in the post-liberalization regime in this country. THE award of interest under the seventh head of claim is reduced from 18% per annum to 8% per annum for the period from November 1, 1989 till today and hereafter till the date of payment. THE rate of interest will operate only on the principal quantum awarded, save in respect of the first head of the claim. THE award of interest under the seventh head of claim is reduced from 18% per annum to 8% per annum for the period from November 1, 1989 till today and hereafter till the date of payment. THE rate of interest will operate only on the principal quantum awarded, save in respect of the first head of the claim. THE challenge to the award is otherwise dismissed, but without any order as to costs. As a consequence, there will be a judgment and decree in favour of the award-holder as awarded except that the interest payable under the seventh head of claim will stand modified to 8% per annum from November 1, 1989 till the date of realization. There will be no further order as to costs.