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2012 DIGILAW 2161 (MAD)

Petitioner v. Respondent

2012-05-16

R.SUBBIAH

body2012
Judgment : R. Subbiah, J. 1. Original Application No.189 of 2012 is filed by the plaintiffs to grant an order of interim injunction restraining the defendants from taking any administrative and policy decisions or implementation of any such decisions taken involving financial transactions, property dealings, operation of bank accounts or receiving foreign aids or other amounts affecting the personnel of the Diocese by effecting transfer or taking any disciplinary actions and appointing or constituting any Boards or committees of management of all institutions. 2. Original Application No.190 of 2012 is also filed by the plaintiffs to grant an order of interim mandatory injunction directing the 3rd defendant to convene a meeting of the postponed meeting fixed on 5th to 8th of October, 2011 of the Karnataka Central Diocesan Council forthwith, by appointing a retired High Court Judge as an Observer to conduct the meeting of the Diocesan Council strictly in accordance with the constitution of Church of South India Karnataka Central Diocesan Council to discharge the functions of the Administrative Committee of the Karnataka Central Diocesan Council. 3. Application No.1891 of 2012 is filed by defendants 3 and 4 to reject the plaint in the suit. 4. Application No.1475 of 2012 is filed by the plaintiffs to appoint a retired Judge of this Court as an interim Administrator to discharge the duties and functions of the Administrative Committee of the 3rd respondent till such time a valid meeting is conducted by the 3rd defendant with the assistance of observers to be appointed by this Court. 5. The facts, which are necessary to dispose of all the applications, are as follows: To avoid confusion, the parties will be hereafter referred to as they are arrayed in the plaint. The 1st plaintiff is the member of CSI Church at Tiptur, Karnataka and the 2nd plaintiff is the member of CSI Church at Tumkur, Karnataka State. They have filed the present suit against the defendants in a representative capacity on behalf of the members of the Karnataka Central Diocese, after obtaining permission under Order I Rule 8 C.P.C. According to the plaintiffs, the 1st defendant, Church of South India (C.S.I.), is spread over the four southern States, viz., Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh. To facilitate easy governance and administration, there are dioceses in the C.S.I. and each diocese is headed by a Bishop. To facilitate easy governance and administration, there are dioceses in the C.S.I. and each diocese is headed by a Bishop. The bishop of a diocese is basically a presbyter ordained for the Ministry and upon his or her selection as a Bishop, he or she is consecrated to be the Bishop of a Diocese. Presently, there are 22 dioceses including the one in Jaffna. There are three dioceses in the Karnataka Region. In each diocese, there are a number of churches governed and administered by persons who are ordained for ministry. Chapter VII of the Constitution of C.S.I. deals with the Pastorate Committees. Chapter VIII of the Constitution deals with the Diocesan Councils. The Diocese is administered through a Diocesan Council within the frame work of the Constitution of the Church of South India. Every Diocesan Council shall consist of (a) the Bishop of the Diocese, (b) the Assistant Bishop,(c) All Presbyters, (d) Lay representatives and (e) Nominated members in the council. Every Diocesan Council has the power to make rules, pass resolutions and take executive action for the general management and good governance of the Church in the diocese, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and in particular to those concerning the Synod of the Church. The Council has the right to an effective voice in the appointment of its bishop, and the right to make regulations with regard to the acceptance of candidates for ordination to the ministry. 6. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that the Karnataka Central Diocese has its own constitution and byelaws and in accordance to this, the term of the Diocesan Council is defined as two years. According to the Constitution and Bye-laws of the Karnataka Central Diocese, the Diocesan Council shall ordinarily meet once in every two years and intimation of the holding of every ordinary session of the Council shall be given to the pastorates six months before hand to enable them to elect their lay representatives to the Council. The date of the meeting of the council shall be notified to all members not less than two months previously. The agenda shall be prepared by the Executive Committee and sent to the members of the Diocesan Council one month prior the date of the Council along with the relevant papers. The date of the meeting of the council shall be notified to all members not less than two months previously. The agenda shall be prepared by the Executive Committee and sent to the members of the Diocesan Council one month prior the date of the Council along with the relevant papers. Page No.58 of the Constitution and Byelaws of the Karnataka Central Diocese says that the Executive Committee shall constitute a Panel of Election officers, consisting of five persons, who shall be communicant members of the CSI ordinarily residing within the jurisdiction of the Diocese. The panel of Election Officers will be responsible for preparation of guidelines and calendar of events, notification and conduct of elections at the Area Council/s and the Diocesan Council soon after intimation for elections are received from the Area Chairperson of the respective Area Council/s and the Secretary of the Diocese, for the Diocesan Council. According to the Constitution and Bye-laws of the Karnataka Central Diocese, the Bishop had sent an intimation to all the Pastorates in the Diocese in the month of February, 2011 about the meeting of the Diocesan Council and asked the Pastorates to set in motion the first set of elections, namely, Elections of the Pastorate Committee and elect their representatives to the Diocesan Council. The elections of the Pastorate Committee shall be completed before 30th of June during the election year. The Executive Committee of the Karnataka Central Diocese in its meeting held on 10.03.2011 decided to call for the meeting of the Diocesan Council from 05.10.2011 to 08.10.2011. The Executive Committee also decided the venue for the meeting as Bishop Cotton Girls School Auditorium, St. Mark's Road, Bangalore-560 001. The Executive Committee also approved the agenda for the meeting. While so, the Secretary of the Diocese had sent a notice to all the members of the Diocesan Council on 03.08.2011 informing them about the date and venue for the meeting of the Diocesan Council. Mark's Road, Bangalore-560 001. The Executive Committee also approved the agenda for the meeting. While so, the Secretary of the Diocese had sent a notice to all the members of the Diocesan Council on 03.08.2011 informing them about the date and venue for the meeting of the Diocesan Council. In the said circumstances, a civil suit was filed before the XVI Assistant Judge, City Civil Court in O.S.No.7479 of 2011 by one of the members of the Karnataka Central Diocese, who claims various relief in the suit challenging the election process of the Bangalore City Area Council and also sought for an injunction from conducting any of the proceedings or meetings of the XXI Biennial Diocesan Council scheduled to be held between 5th and 8th October, 2011 at the Bishop Cotton Girls' School Auditorium, St. Mark's Road, Bangalore. In the said suit, the City Civil Court had granted an order of injunction and as such, the process of election to be held for the post of various office bearers and the Committees were stalled. In the meantime, another member of the Karnataka Central diocese has also filed a suit in O.S.No.7443 of 2011 and sought for declaration as well as consequential relief of injunctions restraining the eligible and competent members from contesting the post at the pastorate level, area council and diocesan council in the Karnataka Central Diocese and as a representative to the Synod of the Church of South India. On account of the order of injunction granted by the XVI Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, the election to the office bearers could not take place. Hence, Civil revision petitions in C.R.P.Nos.3961, 4026, 4027 and 4035 of 2011 have been filed for vacating the injunction granted by the City Civil Court. This Court, by an order dated 14.12.2011, while disposing of the civil revision petitions, expressed its confidence that the Synod will definitely take a reasonable decision considering the issues involved and would conduct the election at an early date. 7. This Court, by an order dated 14.12.2011, while disposing of the civil revision petitions, expressed its confidence that the Synod will definitely take a reasonable decision considering the issues involved and would conduct the election at an early date. 7. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that though they were expecting an early election for the Diocesan Council in view of the said order passed by this Court, there was a total inaction on the part of the 3rd defendant in issuing the election notification and as such, the members of the Karnataka Central Diocese gave a representation to the Legal Questions Committee of the 1st defendant on 04.01.2012 requesting it to reconsider its earlier decision on giving fresh early dates and take a fresh decision on the subject matter in the scheduled meeting to be held on 07.01.2012 in the office of the 1st defendant at Chennai and make necessary arrangements for the conduct of the meeting. Even after receipt of the letter, no effective steps have been taken. According to the Constitution of CSI, if the Diocesan Council is unable to meet within the specified time, the Administration of the Diocese will rest with the synod. The 3rd defendant used this provision and on 17.01.2012 requested the Moderator of the Synod to constitute an Administrative Committee. The names of the members of the Administrative Committee were suggested by the bishop and the Moderator appointed the persons recommended by the Bishop to form the Administrative Committee. While constituting the Administrative Committee, the posts of Administrative Secretary, Finance Administrator and Ministerial Secretary were recommended by the Bishop of the Diocese. 8. The 3rd defendant had nominated persons of his choice so as to avoid the proceedings being taken against him for the various irregularities and illegalities committed by him in the administration of the affairs of the Church and also the financial irregularities and transactions, which are not only detrimental to the Church of South India but also detrimental to the entire community in general, which would frustrate the image and reputation of the religious institutions, which are being governed by the management of the 1st defendant. The conduct of the third defendant is manifested by his actions, which are tainted with illegalities and immoralities thereby trying to stall the meeting being convened where there will be democratic process of election to the various posts of Karnataka Central Diocesan Council. There is no semblance of convening of the meeting by the 3rd defendant. Hence, the present suit has been filed for the following reliefs. “(a) for a declaration that the Constitution of the Administrative Committee by the 2nd defendant for the Karnataka Central Diocesan Council dated 17.01.2012 is illegal, invalid and non est in the eyes of law and not binding on the members of the 3rd defendant including the plaintiffs; (b) for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking any administrative and policy decisions involving financial transactions, property dealings, operation of bank accounts, etc; (c) for a mandatory injunction directing the 3rd defendant to convene a meeting of the postponed meeting fixed on 5th to 8th of October, 2011 of the Karnataka Central Diocesan Council by appointing a retired High Court Judges as an Observer to conduct the meeting of the Diocesan Council strictly in accordance with the constitution of Church of South India, Karnataka Central Diocesan Council to discharge the functions of the Administrative Committee of the Karnataka Central Diocesan Council; (d) for appointment of a retired Judge of the High Court of Madras as an Interim Administrator to discharge the duties and functions of the Administrative Committee of the 3rd defendant”. 9. In A.No.1891 of 2012 filed by 3rd and 4th defendants for rejection of the plaint, it has been averred that cause of action for the present suit is based upon only in the form of nullifying the earlier order passed by this Court in CRP Nos.3961, 4026, 4027 and 4035 of 2011. Therefore, a suit of this nature cannot have a cause of action and the suit is in the nature that the 3rd and 4th respondents are questioned for complying with the orders passed by this Court as per the provisions of the Constitution of the Church of South India and Constitution and Bye-laws of the Karnataka Central Diocese of the Church of South India, which is sheer abuse of process of law. The Administrative Committee is not constituted only for the Karnataka Central Diocese and the other Dioceses where either the elections could not be held or the elections were challenged, Administrative Committee has been set up by the Synod Executive Committee. Therefore, the Administrative Committee has not been appointed only for the Karnataka Central Diocese and it has been appointed when the democratic process of electing representatives could not take place. There cannot be any vacuum in the administration and as such, the Synod Executive Committee has appointed the Administrative Committee. Moreover, the plaint averments do not disclose any cause of action and when it is a matter pertaining to the Karnataka Central Diocese, the territorial jurisdiction of the suit lies only in the court at Karnataka and not in Chennai. Further, under Order I Rule 8 C.P.C., leave has not been granted which is a mandatory requirement before filing the suit. Thus, they prayed for the rejection of the plaint. 10. The plaintiffs have filed a counter to the said application contending that the present suit has been filed along with Application No.1361 of 2012 under Order I Rule 8 C.P.C. in a representative capacity on behalf of the members of the Karnataka Central Diocese and the said application was allowed by the Master, and as directed by Master, publication was effected in one English daily and in one vernacular language and copies of the publications were also filed before the Court. Therefore, the plaintiffs have duly complied with the provisions under Order I Rule 8 of C.P.C. The defendants, instead of filing counter to the applications taken out by the plaintiffs for interim orders, they have chosen to file the present frivolous and vexatious application for rejection of plaint only to stall the proceedings on untenable grounds. The probable defence that may be taken by the defendants in written statement at a later date shall not govern such an application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. A reading of the entire averments contained in the plaint would reveal the fraudulent conduct of the office bearers, who are conducting the affairs of the 3rd defendant prejudicial and detrimental to the inters of the members of the3rd defendant and as such, the application for rejection of plaint cannot be maintained. Only if the suit is barred by law or if the suit does not disclose a cause of action, an application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. could be sustained. But, in the instant case, such a situation does not arise. Therefore, the application to reject the plaint is liable to be dismissed. 11. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 12. Though the learned counsel appearing on either side made elaborate arguments in respect of the applications taken out by the plaintiff as well as by the 3rd and 4th respondents, this Court is of the opinion that it would be appropriate firstly to deal with the application to reject the plaint since the result of the said application will have a bearing on other applications. 13. At the outset, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for defendants 3 and 4 submitted that the suit has been filed by the two members of CSI Church of Karnataka Central Diocese. The suit was filed questioning the Constitution of the Administrative Committee by the 2nd defendant as well as for a direction that the 3rd defendant shall convene a meeting of the postponed meeting of the Karnataka Central Diocese by appointing a retired High Court Judge as an observer. Thus, by inviting the attention of this Court to the suit prayers, the learned senior counsel submitted that the main issue involved in the suit is only with regard to the meeting and election of Karnataka Central Diocese. The cause of action for filing the suit has arisen within the jurisdiction of Court at Karnataka and absolutely, no cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. That apart, the learned senior counsel submitted that the leave has not been granted under Order I Rule 8 of C.P.C. in accordance with the Original Side Rules. In this regard, the learned senior relied on Order III Rule 2 of Original Side Rules and submitted that on the application filed by the plaintiffs, Form No.10 in Appendix 2 of Original Side Rules ought to have been issued to the other defendants and consequential enquiry ought to have been conducted by the Master of this Court before allowing application under Order I Rule 8 of C.P.C. 14. With regard to the merits of the case, the learned senior counsel submitted that originally the two members of the Karnataka Central Diocese have filed two suits in O.S.No.7479 of 2011 and 7443 of 2011 on the file of XVI Assistant Judge, City Civil Curt. On account of the interim injunction granted in the said suits, election to the office bearers of the 3rd defendant could not take place. Challenging the same, C.R.P.Nos.3961, 4026, 4027 and 4035 of 2011 have been filed before this Court and this Court, while disposing the matters, has observed as follows: “46. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in C.R.P.(PD) No.4035 of 2011 contended that if the election is not conducted and the council has not elected fresh representatives, the existing representatives would represent the Diocese and filing the suit and the getting an order of interim injunction is only for the said purpose. He has also pointed out that in case the new council cannot be convened within three months from the expiry of the term of the old council, the Bishop/Officer shall report the matter to the Synod which shall take steps for the proper administration of the diocese. In view of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, the election could not be conducted in time and I hope, the Synod will definitely take a reasonable decision considering the said issue”. By relying upon the said observation made by this court in the civil revision petitions, the learned senior counsel submitted that pursuant to this order only, the Synod had taken the decision to appoint an interim administrative committee and moreover, the Committee was appointed not only for the Karnataka Central Diocese but for the other dioceses where either the elections could not be held or the elections were challenged. The order passed in the revision petitions was not challenged by the plaintiffs. Once the Administrative Committee is constituted, the prayers for injunction as against the Administrative Committee and also for appointment of a retired Judge of Madras High Court are not maintainable. 15. The order passed in the revision petitions was not challenged by the plaintiffs. Once the Administrative Committee is constituted, the prayers for injunction as against the Administrative Committee and also for appointment of a retired Judge of Madras High Court are not maintainable. 15. The learned senior counsel appearing for the 3rd and 4th defendants submitted that a mere reading of the averments made in the plaint would show that except a statement made in the plaint no concrete proof has been produced before the Court warranting this Court to appoint a retired High Court Judge as an interim administrator to discharge the duties. Further, a reading of the averments made in the plaint would show that it is only in the form of grievance of the members and absolutely no case has been made out for the said appointment. Therefore, on that ground also, the plaint is liable to be rejected. 16. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs submitted that the plaintiffs have filed Application No.1361 of 2012 to grant permission to institute a suit as against the defendants in a representative capacity on behalf of the members of the Karnataka Central Diocese Church of South India. The Master of this Court has allowed the said application by order dated 15.03.2012. That apart, the plaintiffs have also filed an application in A.No.1199 of 2012 to grant leave to sue against defendants 3 to 5 since they are residing outside the jurisdiction of this Court and leave was granted on 09.03.2012. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs without obtaining necessary orders from this Court. Since leave was granted by the Master of this Court, permitting the plaintiffs to file a suit in a representative capacity, the application filed by defendants 3 and 4 to reject the plaint on the ground that Form No.10 has not been served on them as per Original Side Rules before granting leave, is not legally sustainable. 17. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs by producing a judgment reported in E. C. of the Synod Church of South India .vs. Rt. Rev. Dr. V. Devasahayam Bishop ( (2009) 8 MLJ 329 ), has submitted that only in the event of no permission was sought for or granted under Order I Rule 8 C.P.C., it could be said that the suit is not maintainable. Rev. Dr. V. Devasahayam Bishop ( (2009) 8 MLJ 329 ), has submitted that only in the event of no permission was sought for or granted under Order I Rule 8 C.P.C., it could be said that the suit is not maintainable. For the same analogy, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgment reported in The Victoria Edward Hall .vs. M. Samraj ( 2001 (3) CTC 129 ) and reiterated that in the instant case, the Court has already granted leave under Application No.1361 of 2012 by order dated 15.03.2012 and as such, the submission made by the learned senior counsel for defendants 3 and 4 that without conducting the enquiry, the Master had granted leave, has no legs to stand. That apart, by relying upon a judgment reported in D. Gopal. vs. Raghava Naicker (AIR 1990 Madras 314), the learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that even assuming that the procedure prescribed under Order I Rule 8 of the Original Side Rules has not been complied with, it follows that the plaintiff had given up or waived the normal procedure prescribed and the non-compliance with these Rules would not in any manner render the proceedings in any suit or matter void, unless directed by Court. Thus, no case has been made out by defendants 3 and 4 for rejecting the plaint with regard to the leave granted by this Court permitting the plaintiffs to file the suit in a representative capacity. That apart, the learned counsel submitted that the power of this Court is derived under clause 12 of the Letters patent and not under sections 17 and 20 of C.P.C. Under such circumstances, it is not correct to state that there is no cause of action for filing the suit. 18. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs further submitted that under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C., the plaint could be rejected on two circumstances, (i) if the suit is barred by any law for the time being and (ii) if the suit does not disclose any cause of action. But, in the instant case, a reading of entire averments would show that the cause of action is made out as against the defendants to file a suit before this Court. But, in the instant case, a reading of entire averments would show that the cause of action is made out as against the defendants to file a suit before this Court. In this regard, elaborate arguments were made by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, by inviting the attention of this court to the entire averments made in the plaint as against the defendants that the appointment of administrative committee by the 2nd defendant to manage the affairs of the Karnataka Central Diocese Council by postponing the election would detrimental to the entire community in general which would frustrate the image and reputation of the religious institutions and, therefore, he insisted for the appointment of a retired High Court Judge as an interim observer measure to discharge the duties and functions of the Administrative Committee of the 3rd defendant. With regard to the other submissions made by the learned senior counsel for defendants 3 and 4 that the administrative committee was appointed by the Synod only pursuant to the order of this Court in the civil revision petitions, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that contrary to the order passed in the revision petitions, the Synod, instead of conducting the election, appointed the administrative Committee thereby postponing the election. Under such circumstances, the plaintiffs have every right to question the act of the 2nd defendant. Therefore, no infirmity could be found in the prayers sought for by the plaintiffs and thus, he prayed for the dismissal of the application. 19. Learned counsel appearing for defendants 1 and 2 submitted that though the plaintiffs have obtained leave under Order I Rule 8 of C.P.C. to file the suit in a representative capacity, they have not obtained permission to institute the suit against the unregistered bodies, namely, 1st and 3rd defendants. Therefore, on this ground, the suit is not maintainable and hence, the application to reject the plaint filed by defendants 3 and 4 is liable to be allowed. In this regard, the learned counsel has relied upon a judgment reported in Rev. Noble Gambeeran .vs. Peter P. Ponnan (1999 (I) M.L.J.392). 20. Therefore, on this ground, the suit is not maintainable and hence, the application to reject the plaint filed by defendants 3 and 4 is liable to be allowed. In this regard, the learned counsel has relied upon a judgment reported in Rev. Noble Gambeeran .vs. Peter P. Ponnan (1999 (I) M.L.J.392). 20. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs, by way of reply, submitted that once permission is granted by this Court to file a suit in a representative capacity, now it cannot be said that no permission was obtained separately to file a suit against an unregistered body and an application under Order I Rule 8 could be made at any stage. Therefore, there is no need to reject the plaint merely on the reasoning that no permission was obtained for filing the suit as against defendants 1 and 3 being the unregistered bodies. 21. This Court has paid its anxious consideration on the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record. 22. The submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing for defendants 3 and 4 is mainly on two folds; (i) before granting leave, as required under Order III Rule 2 of Original Side Rules, Form No.10 was not issued to the defendants and no enquiry was conducted by the Master; and (ii) no cause of action has been made out to file the suit before this Court. 23. With regard to the first fold of submission, it is the reply of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the Master had granted leave in A.No.1361 of 2012 permitting the plaintiffs to institute a suit in a representative capacity and this court has also granted leave to file a suit as against defendants 3 and 5 in A.No.1199 of 2012 under clause 12 of the Letters Patent since the said defendants are residing outside the jurisdiction. When the suit has been filed with the leave of this Court, now no infirmity could be found in the procedure adopted by the Master in allowing the application No.1361 of 2012. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has relied on the decision reported in (2009)8 MLJ 329 (supra), wherein it has been held that so long as no permission was either applied or granted, it cannot be stated that the suit is in order. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has relied on the decision reported in (2009)8 MLJ 329 (supra), wherein it has been held that so long as no permission was either applied or granted, it cannot be stated that the suit is in order. But, in the instant case, as contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, leave was granted by this Court. Further, from the dictum laid down in the judgment reported in AIR 1990 Madras 314 (supra), I am of the opinion that non-compliance of the Original Side Rules in granting leave under Order I Rule 8 of Original Side Rules would not in any manner render the proceedings in any suit or matter void, unless so directed by the Court. The relevant portion from the said judgment is as follows: "4. Ordinarily, when an application seeking leave to institute a suit in a representative capacity is filed under O.3, R.2 of the Original Side Rules read with O.1, R.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such an application should be dealt with under O.14, R.10(14) of the Original Side Rules by the Master. However, in instant case, the appellant had moved before the Judge on the Original Side. Presumably, the appellant was obliged to do so because he wanted to secure orders in the other application filed, which could not have been dealt with by the Master of this Court. Obviously, therefore, when the appellant moved the Judge on the Original Side, it follows that the appellant had given up or waived the normal procedure prescribed in O.14, R.10(14) of the Original Side Rules with reference to such an application, namely, a disposal of the same by the Master. It is also pertinent to point out that under O.1, R.8 of the Original Side Rules, non-compliance with these rules would not in any manner render the proceedings in any suit or matter void, unless directed by Court. The proceedings could not be characterised as non est, for, the outcome of the proceedings, was only the result of the course adopted by the appellant himself and even as per O.1, R.8 of the Original Side Rules, non-compliance with these rules would not render the proceeding void, unless directed by the Court...". The proceedings could not be characterised as non est, for, the outcome of the proceedings, was only the result of the course adopted by the appellant himself and even as per O.1, R.8 of the Original Side Rules, non-compliance with these rules would not render the proceeding void, unless directed by the Court...". Therefore, I am of the opinion that when the Master had granted permission and when this Court had also granted leave to sue and when the defendants have not chosen to file an appeal against the order passed by the Master of this Court in A.No.1361 of 2012, now the defendants cannot turn round and say that the plaint has to be rejected since Form No.10 has not been issued to them as per the Original Side Rules. 24. With regard to the next fold of submission, I find that it is the main grievance of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the defendants have colluded and postponed the election process of the Karnataka Central Diocese at their convenience. It is the further grievance of the plaintiffs that though this Court has made an observation in the order passed in civil revision petitions that the Synod would take a decision within a reasonable period with regard to the election process, the synod by appointing the administrative committee has postponed the election. Therefore, the plaintiffs have filed the suit challenging the decision taken by the synod, which is situated within the jurisdiction of this Court. 25. After going through the materials, I find that with regard to the declaration prayer sought for by the plaintiffs, the suit is maintainable before this Court since the synod, which had appointed the administrative committee, is within the jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover, a reading of the plaint averments would show that there is a cause of action for filing the suit against the defendants before this Court; however, I am of the opinion that the present suit is not maintainable as against the defendants 1 and 3 for the reason that no permission was obtained by the plaintiffs to file the suit as against the respondents/defendants 1 and 3, which are the unregistered bodies under Order I Rule 8. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment delivered in the similar set of facts reported in 1999(I) M.L.J.392 (supra) and the relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder: "7. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment delivered in the similar set of facts reported in 1999(I) M.L.J.392 (supra) and the relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder: "7. Along with the suit, plaintiff filed an application under O.1, Rule 8, C.P.C., seeking permission for himself to represent the other members of the C.S.I. Christian Community to file the suit. He also filed another application, namely, I.A.No.536 of 1998 for temporary injunction to restrain defendants 2 and 3 from exercising any Executive, Administrative and disciplinary powers including convening of any committee and board meeting in respect of C.S.I. Vellore Diocese giving effect to the illegal transfer of the Pastors and initiating any further disciplinary actions against the Pastors and subordinates, etc., till the fourth defendant finally adjudicates the complaints against the third defendant, pending disposal of the suit, and also to grant an ad-interim injunction. 21. From the cause-title of the plaint, it is seen that the third defendant is impleaded only in his official capacity. Second defendant is the Executive Committee of the C.S.I. Vellore Diocese represented by its Honorary Secretary, and it is said that even though third defendant is named, he is the Bishop and he is carrying out his business in his office at Vellore. Though the plaintiff has filed an application under O.1, Rule 8 C.P.C., to permit him to institute the suit as representative of the Christian community, as against the second defendant, no such application is filed. Admittedly, second defendant is an unincorporated body. A Church is also an unincorporated body, and a suit against them is not maintainable without getting permission under O.1, Rule 8, C.P.C. Section 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure says thus: "Every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed". For instituting a suit in a representative capacity or for filing a suit against a representative body, the procedure under O.1, Rule 8, C.P.C. has to be complied with. It says that "where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, (a) one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested. (Remaining portion omitted as unnecessary). It says that "where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, (a) one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested. (Remaining portion omitted as unnecessary). Therefore, institution of the suit itself must be with permission of the court. Again, under O.7, Rule 4, C.P.C., when the plaintiff sues in a representative character, the plaint shall show not only that he has an actual existing interest in the subject matter, but that he has taken the steps (if any) necessary to enable him to institute a suit concerning it. "O.7, Rule 9, C.P.C. provides the procedure for admitting the plaint, and Sub-rule (2) of the said Rule also says that 'where the plaintiff sues, or the defendant or any of the defendant is sued in a representative capacity, such statement shall show in what capacity the plaintiff or defendant sues or is sued". 22. In Kalyan Singh .vs. Smt. Chhori (1990) I S.C.C.266, in paragraph 13 of the judgment, their Lordships have said that for a representative suit, the court's permission under O.1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory". Admittedly, as against the second defendant, no such permission has been sought for. So long as there is no permission granted and has not been applied for, it cannot be said that there is a suit against it. At this juncture, learned counsel for plaintiff represented that as per the constitution and By-laws of the Church, the Honorary Secretary is competent to represent the Diocese and he can sue and be sued. According to me, when the church itself is an unincorporated body, it cannot be considered as a legal person. When a separate procedure is provided under O.1, Rule 8, C.P.C., without complying with that provisions, no suit could be instituted even if their By-laws provide for the same. For that view, I take support form the decision reported in Corporation of Trivandrum v. K. Narayana Pillai, 1968 K.L.T.285. That was a suit against a Football Association, which was an unincorporated body. For that view, I take support form the decision reported in Corporation of Trivandrum v. K. Narayana Pillai, 1968 K.L.T.285. That was a suit against a Football Association, which was an unincorporated body. An argument was taken before the High Court that the Rules of the Football Association, provide that the Secretary of the Association can represent the association in suits and, therefore, it would be enough if the secretary is impleaded in his capacity as secretary, as a decree obtains with him on the party array would bind the association. Repelling the contention the learned Judge has held thus: "....The Foot Ball Association is an unincorporated body. I do not know how I can pass an order for impleading such an Association. In this case, it may be noted, only the honorary treasurer of the Association has been impleaded. Appellant's counsel submitted that as the Rules of the Foot Ball Association provide that the Secretary of the Association can represent the Association in suits, it would be enough if the Secretary is impleaded in his capacity as Secretary as a decree obtained with him on the party array would bind the association, and, therefore, this Court may direct the impleading of the Secretary of the Association. I am not sure whether by impleading the Secretary of the Association the appellant will be able to get a decree binding on the Foot ball Association. Even if Rules of the Association provide that the Secretary can represent the Association in suits by or against it, I do not know whether a decree obtained against the Secretary in his capacity as Secretary would bind the Association. The Secretary of a club or other association cannot sue alone in respect of a matter in which the Association is interested even if he is authorised so do to by a resolution of the members of the association. The suit must be brought by all the members of the Association, or by the Secretary on his own behalf and on behalf of the other members under O.1, Rule 8 (See: Mohammedan Association v. Bakshi, (1884) I.L.R. 6 All.284). I think, the same would be, the result, if a suit is brought against the Secretary as representing the Association.....". ........... 24. In this case, Rev. Y. Williams is the name of the Honorary Secretary representing the Executive Committee. I think, the same would be, the result, if a suit is brought against the Secretary as representing the Association.....". ........... 24. In this case, Rev. Y. Williams is the name of the Honorary Secretary representing the Executive Committee. He becomes representative of the Executive Committee only when he is allowed to represent the Executive Committee by filing an application and it becomes a representative suit only after issuing a notice on the application. As on date, there is no representative suit against the second defendant at all. If there is no suit, naturally, it also follows that no injunction can be granted,. O.39 Rule1, C.P.C. provides that an injunction must be against a party to the suit". 26. The dictum laid down in the said judgment is squarely applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Hence, I am of the view that since defendants 1 and 3 are the unregistered bodies, the applicant/plaintiff ought to have obtained permission of this Court to sue defendants 1 and 3 as required under Order 1 Rule 8 C.P.C. As on date, there is no representative suit against defendants 1 and 3 since no permission was obtained to file a suit against them, which are the unregistered bodies. Though it is the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that they have obtained leave under Order I Rule 8, the said permission was obtained only to enable the plaintiffs to file the suit in a representative capacity on behalf of the other members of the Diocese. But no permission was obtained by them to file the suit as against the unregistered bodies, namely, defendants 1 and 3. If no permission is obtained from the Court to file a suit against the unregistered body, it cannot be said that there is a suit against them. The decree that is going to be passed against the unregistered body will not have a binding effect on them. However, as found earlier, permission could be obtained at any stage. In this regard, a reference could be placed in the judgment reported in Krishnan Vasudevan and others .vs. Shareef and others ((2005) 12 SCC 180) and the order is extracted hereunder: "1. Leave granted. 2. However, as found earlier, permission could be obtained at any stage. In this regard, a reference could be placed in the judgment reported in Krishnan Vasudevan and others .vs. Shareef and others ((2005) 12 SCC 180) and the order is extracted hereunder: "1. Leave granted. 2. After permitting an amendment in the plaint, the trial court refused to hear an application under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC filed by the plaintiffs on the ground that such an application could not be entertained at that stage. 3. Order 1 Rule 8 CPC does not prescribe any stage at which the application can be filed. In our opinion, the trial court ought to have heard and decided the application on its own merits without regard to the stage at which it was filed. The error committed by the trial court should have been corrected by the High Court. 4. The appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dated 13-10-1997 and the order of the trial court dated 12.11.1996 are both set aside. The application under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC shall be heard and decided on its own merits by the trial court". Therefore, I am of the opinion but for the failure to obtain permission to file a suit as against defendants 1 and 3, the suit is in order and hence the plaint has to be returned for compliance of Order I Rule 8 to enable the plaintiffs to get necessary permission to sue as against defendants 1 and 3. In view of the said finding, this court is not dealing with the other submissions with regard to the merits of the case. Hence, the other applications, viz., O.A.Nos.189 and 190 of 2012 and the Sub-Application No.1475 of 2012 are not dealt with at present. Therefore, the plaint is returned to the plaintiffs to get necessary permission from this Court to sue defendants 1 and 3, within four weeks from today and accordingly, Application No.1891 of 2012 is disposed of.