Sudhir Agarwal, J.:— 1. Heard Sri M.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri A.N. Bhargava, Advocate for respondent no. 1 and Sri Rohit Pandey, Advocate for respondents no. 12, 13 and 14. 2. Since pleadings are complete, as requested and agreed by learned counsel for the parties, I proceed to decide this case finally at this stage under the Rules of this Court. 3. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 21.10.2011 passed by Prescribed Authority/Judge Small Cause, Aligarh allowing release application of landlord-respondent no. 1 and the appellate order dated 11.04.2012 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 3, Aligarh dismissing petitioner's UPUB Appeal No. 11 of 2011 and confirming Prescribed Authority's judgment. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that there were several other shops available with respondent-landlord in respect whereto petitioners have specifically made averments and submissions before the courts below but they have not considered the same while passing impugned orders. He further contended that there was a premises available to respondent-landlord at Sarai Deen Dayal therein he had a residential accommodation as well as two shops. The landlord sold out only residential portion vide his sale deed dated 21.08.1996 and the shops were still available. However both the courts below, in this regard, have misread the documents, and, have not considered availability of the above two shops wherein the landlord could have settled his son, Amit, for commencing business. He also relied on Amin's report in respect of aforesaid shops which is on record as Annexure-CA-4 to the counter affidavit filed by respondent no. 1. 5. Sri M.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants also drew my attention to para 27 of their written statement wherein petitioners-tenants have pleaded that landlord-Girish Chandra Sharma and his brother, Ramesh Chandra Sharma own several other shops and properties inasmuch as there are six shops and other properties in Bazar Dube Ka Padav, Aligarh out of which several shops are vacant. Besides, in Mohalla Hathras Adda and Sarai Sultani Police Chowki, Aligarh, the landlord and his brother own and possess a huge property including a house in which there are four shops and two are vacant. Another huge property owned by both of them is in front of Mohalla Manik Chowk, Aligarh Ki Puliya, situated on the one side of road Sarai Deen Dayal and another side is Agra Road. Another huge property owned by both of them is in front of Mohalla Manik Chowk, Aligarh Ki Puliya, situated on the one side of road Sarai Deen Dayal and another side is Agra Road. In that property there were four shops constructed, lying vacant. Presently landlord and his brother, Ramesh Chandra Sharma have got a new construction made on the above side. There, on the Agra Road side, two big shops situated and behind that there is a house. Both these shops are lying vacant. He contended that the courts below have not considered availability of these shops which could satisfy the requirement of respondent-landlord. Therefore, as contended by Sri Gupta, the impugned orders are patently erroneous and liable to be set aside. 6. Sri A.N. Bhargava, Advocate appearing for respondent-landlord and Sri Rohit Pandey, Advocate appearing for respondents no. 12, 13 and 14 have supported the judgements impugned in this writ petition on the basis of reasons contained therein and said that petitioners have failed to demonstrate that any other accommodation owned by respondent no. 1-landlord was vacant and available to him, suitable for settling his son, for commencing a new business of his own. 7. In the present case the Prescribed Authority vide its judgment dated 21.10.2011 has held that need of landlord is genuine and bona fide and question of comparative hardship also lies in his favour, hence he has allowed the application filed under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1972") directing the petitioners-tenants to handover possession of shop in question to landlord. It is a very long decision in 34 pages. The same has been confirmed by Appellate Court by rejecting petitioners' UPUB Appeal No. 11 of 2011, vide judgment dated 11.04.2012. 8. The accommodation in question is clearly a non-residential accommodation and used for business purposes being a shop situated in Halwai Khana, Aligarh, which is admittedly a market area. The landlord sought release of aforesaid shop on the ground that his son, Amit, who possess technical qualification, intends to commence his own independent business of Civil Designing Drafting and Consultancy for which he needs a shop, to open his office, in the main market area, so that his commercial venture may prove to be effective and useful. The landlord sought release of aforesaid shop on the ground that his son, Amit, who possess technical qualification, intends to commence his own independent business of Civil Designing Drafting and Consultancy for which he needs a shop, to open his office, in the main market area, so that his commercial venture may prove to be effective and useful. There is no other shop owned by landlord, Girish Chandra Sharma in the City Aligarh which is suitable and available for aforesaid purpose. It is also pointed out that there is another shop on the east side of disputed shop which is already in possession of opposite party no. 2 and the business of petitioners-tenants may continue therein. The landlord also pleaded that out of two shops, adjoining, including the shop in dispute, the one of western side has come in share of landlord-respondent no. 1 and second one has gone in the share of his brother. The landlord has three sons, Vineet Bhardwaj, Sumit Sharma and Amit Sharma. Vineet is already doing his own independent business in the name and style "M/s B.S.A. Traders" while Sumit was student of M.S.W. Final. Amit completed his Diploma Engineering (Civil) three years ago and is sitting idle and unemployed. 9. The Trial Court formulated three questions for adjudication. Firstly, whether there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. This issue has been decided in favour of respondent no. 1-landlord and has been confirmed by Appellate Court also. Sri M.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners has not advanced any submission in respect of findings of courts below on aforesaid issue. 10. The second issue relates to bona fide need of landlord, i.e., for settling his son in business. The Trial Court found that Amit Sharma is unemployed and this fact has not been proved otherwise by tenants. He passed his Diploma Engineering (Civil) from Aligarh Muslim University in the year 1994-95 and since then is sitting idle. Regarding defendants no. 2 to 6, the Trial Court has recorded its findings as under: @ Hindi @ "Defendant No. 2 carries on business in the shop situated at Gilletwalon Ki Dharmshala at Achal Taal. Defendant No. 3 runs business of 'petha' at Police Chowki House No. 14/158. Defendant No. 4 resides in Agra and so does his family. He has no possession over the shop in question. Defendant No. 3 runs business of 'petha' at Police Chowki House No. 14/158. Defendant No. 4 resides in Agra and so does his family. He has no possession over the shop in question. Defendant No. 5 is a Syndicate Bank officer and Defendant No. 6 had died during the pendency of the case and he would permanently run business at Sikandararau. Hence, Defendant Nos. 2 to 6 run business separately and they have separate eating and residing arrangements as well. A copy of tax assessment by Nagar Nigam in regard to the separate business of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 has been presented by the applicant, which is filed vide Annexure No. 1 to Affidavit 45-C and vide list. Defendant No. 8 to 10 are wedded daughters and they have been residing out of Aligarh with their husbands." (English Translation by Court) 11. The defendants no. 8 to 10 are married daughters and residing with their husbands, therefore, they are also not interested in the tenancy rights of shop in question. Defendant no. 11 has died during the proceedings. Therefore, apparently, the shop in question is being run by defendant no. 1, Sri Khan Chand son of Sri Lala Jagannath Prasad though this writ petition has been preferred by five petitioners who are defendants no. 1, 2, 3, 7 and 9 in UPUB Case No. 7 of 1999. 12. During the course of proceeding, Sri Amit Sharma joined business of his brother as partner sometimes in 2008 but in my view that would not disentitle the landlord to settle his son Amit Sharma for starting his won independent business. None is expected to continue to remain idle if litigation relating to accommodation continues for a decade or more. Entering in partnership in a running business does not amount to running an independent business. Therefore, this fact by itself will not make any impact on the question of his need, whether bona fide or not or it has ceased to be so. 13. It is no doubt true that in the written statement description of various properties have been given but it is not said anywhere that those properties are owned by landlord-respondent no. 1 alone. 13. It is no doubt true that in the written statement description of various properties have been given but it is not said anywhere that those properties are owned by landlord-respondent no. 1 alone. The landlord has come up with a categorical case of division/partition of property between brothers, while, the tenants have admittedly claimed that various other properties, which they have mentioned in their written statement, are joint property of Sri Girish Chandra Sharma, the landlord in question and Sri Ramesh Chandra Sharma, his another brother (now deceased and substituted by his legal heirs). The Trial Court after analysing evidence, has held that eight shops at Hathras Adda belong to Sri Ramesh Chandra Sharma, (defendant no. 12) and not the landlord-respondent no. 1. On page 143 the Trial Court has said: @ Hindi @ "The applicant has a residential accommodation only at Kela Nagar. He does not have eight shops at Hathras Adda, rather they belong to the defendants of the second category. The applicant has neither any entitlement nor any share in this property." (English Translation by Court) 14. Sri Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, however has very vehemently argued that there were two shops available to landlord, Sri Girish Chandra Sharma at Mohalla Sarai Deen Dayal, Aligarh inasmuch as only the residential part of that building was sold out vide sale deed dated 21.08.1996, as is evident from Annexure-CA-4 at page 48 of the counter affidavit of respondent no. 1 and there remains two shops in his land. This part has completely been ignored by courts below. He drew my attention to page 44 of the counter affidavit which is a part of Annexure-CA-4 to show that there are two shops, No. 1 and 2, which were available to respondent no.1-landlord inasmuch as only the back portion thereof was sold and not the shops itself. 15. This Court finds that the arguments in respect to aforesaid two shops raised on behalf of petitioners-tenants have been noticed by Trial Court in paras 39 and 41 of its order. It is no doubt true that thereafter there is no discussion whether those shops were available to landlord or not and if they were available, their effect on the claim of landlord-respondent no. 1 regarding bona fide need about shop in question. It is no doubt true that thereafter there is no discussion whether those shops were available to landlord or not and if they were available, their effect on the claim of landlord-respondent no. 1 regarding bona fide need about shop in question. There is a lot of discussion by Trial Court of various authorities cited before it but it appears that in the volume of authorities he lost the real issue and while noticing contention of tenants in respect to aforesaid shops of Sarai Deen Dayal, forget to record his own findings in respect thereto. However, in para 85 he has categorically discussed and held that there is a partition between the family members of respondent no. 1 (landlord) and his brother in Misc. Case No. 10 of 1988 wherein a preliminary decree was made on 07.04.1995 and final on 28.08.1996 dividing property by metes and bounds between respondent no. 1-landlord and his other family members including his brother, Sri Ramesh Chandra Sharma. In respect thereto, there is no dispute between them. That being so, the shop in question has come in the share of respondent no. 1 and contrary thereto it appears that petitioners-tenants could not show that various properties, which they alleged to be jointly owned by respondent no. 1, Girish Chandra Sharma and his brother, Sri Ramesh Chandra Sharma is actually so owned by respondent no. 1. 16. The issue, therefore, now has confined to the two shops in Sarai Deen Dayal in respect whereto the contention raised on behalf of petitioners-tenants has been noticed in paras no. 39 and 41 of Trial Court's judgement. However, this Court finds, firstly, that regarding the aforesaid two shops, there is no averment in the present writ petition and it has not been taken as a ground to challenge the impugned orders before this Court. The only accommodation said to be available to landlord-respondent no. 1 has been mentioned in para 24 of the writ petition which does not include the aforesaid two shops of Sarai Deen Dayal. 17. During the course of argument when sale deed dated 21.08.1996 as also the site map was placed before this Court, the Court finds secondly, that aforesaid accommodation was in ruinous condition. In the map it has been darkened on page 44 of the counter affidavit. There is a clear mention of the words "fallen portion". 17. During the course of argument when sale deed dated 21.08.1996 as also the site map was placed before this Court, the Court finds secondly, that aforesaid accommodation was in ruinous condition. In the map it has been darkened on page 44 of the counter affidavit. There is a clear mention of the words "fallen portion". Thirdly, though in the map, Item 1 and 2 have been shown as shop but in the sale deed the boundary on western side has been mentioned to be the Government road, meaning thereby from East to West, the entire property was sold including the portion marked as Shop 1 and 2. 18. From these two documents it is evident that the condition of building was very bad, virtually ruinous, and the entire property was sold by respondent no. 1 (landlord) to his brother, Ramesh Chandra Sharma who was already having ownership on rest part of the building, having come to his share in partition. 19. Sri Gupta, therefore, though tried to read the word "house" in the sale deed so as to contend that it excludes the two shops but when the Court considered entire map at page 44 of the counter affidavit, with reference to boundaries mentioned in sale deed, it became very clear that it was in respect to entire property and nothing remained available in the aforesaid accommodation with respondent no. 1, having sold to his brother, Sri Ramesh Chandra Sharma in 1996. It is in these circumstances, both the courts below did not find any accommodation otherwise available to applicant-landlord, i.e., respondent no. 1 wherein his son could start his own and independent business. 20. Lastly, it is contended that landlord's own industry, namely, Neeta Industries was closed during pendency of case and, therefore, his son could have started business therein. However, it has not been shown that accommodation of "Neeta Industries" included any shop situated in any commercial area where the landlord may get his requirement met for which the application was filed. Mere availability of immoveable property is not sufficient unless it is shown that it is appropriate and suitable for the purpose for which the accommodation in question is required. Moreover, it is within the domain of landlord to determine as to how he has to settle his affairs. The tenants cannot dictate that the landlord should manage his requirements in a particular manner. Moreover, it is within the domain of landlord to determine as to how he has to settle his affairs. The tenants cannot dictate that the landlord should manage his requirements in a particular manner. Several authorities has already been discussed in long and detail by the courts below and I do not burden this judgment by repeating all those authorities but suffice it to mention that having gone through both the judgements at length, I do not find any manifest error therein warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. 21. The scope of judicial review in such matters where the orders of courts below are assailed before this Court in a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution is very limited. This power involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. But this power does not vest the High Court with any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. 22. In D. N. Banerji Vs. P. R. Mukherjee 1953 SC 58 the Court said: "Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere." 23. A Constitution Bench of Apex Court examined the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution in Waryam Singh and another Vs. Amarnath and another AIR 1954 SC 215 and made following observations at p. 571 : "This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal. 193 , to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". 24. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal. 193 , to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". 24. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 38 the Apex Court held that this Court has very limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution and even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power can be used sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of the Tribunal, etc. has resulted in grave injustice. 25. For interference under Article 227, the finding of facts recorded by the Authority should be found to be perverse or patently erroneous and de hors the factual and legal position on record. (See: Nibaran Chandra Bag Vs. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895 ; Rukmanand Bairoliya Vs. the State of Bihar & ors., AIR 1971 SC 746 ; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & ors., AIR 1980 SC 1896 ; Laxmikant R. Bhojwani Vs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Singh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576 ; Reliance Industries Ltd. Vs. Pravinbhai Jasbhai Patel & ors., (1997) 7 SCC 300 ; M/s. Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Sub-Judicial Magistrate & ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749 ; and Virendra Kashinath Ravat & ors. Vs. Vinayak N. Joshi & ors. (1999) 1 SCC 47 ). 26. It is well settled that power under Article 227 is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up-set conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. (See: Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni & ors., (1998) 3 SCC 341 ; Chandra Bhushan Vs. Beni Prasad & ors., (1999) 1 SCC 70 ; Savitrabai Bhausaheb Kevate & ors. Vs. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja, (1999) 2 SCC 171 ; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. Vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union & Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 143 ). 27. (See: Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni & ors., (1998) 3 SCC 341 ; Chandra Bhushan Vs. Beni Prasad & ors., (1999) 1 SCC 70 ; Savitrabai Bhausaheb Kevate & ors. Vs. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja, (1999) 2 SCC 171 ; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. Vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union & Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 143 ). 27. Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. It should not alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (See: Union of India & ors. Vs. Himmat Singh Chahar, (1999) 4 SCC 521 ). 28. In Ajaib Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-opeative Marketing cum Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that there is no justification for the High Court to substitute its view for the opinion of the Authorities/Courts below as the same is not permissible in proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 29. In Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri Vs. Bhaskar Balwant Aheer, AIR 2000 SC 931 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not appealable but supervisory. Therefore, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by Courts below unless there is no evidence to support findings or the findings are totally perverse. 30. In Indian Overseas Bank Vs. Indian Overseas Bank Staff Canteen Workers' Union (2000) 4 SCC 245 , the Court observed that it is impermissible for the Writ Court to reappreciate evidence liberally and drawing conclusions on its own on pure questions of fact for the reason that it is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by Tribunal. The findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose ordinarily should be considered to have become final. The same cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of Writ Court to warrant those findings. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere. 31. In Union of India Vs. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere. 31. In Union of India Vs. Rajendra Prabhu, (2001) 4 SCC 472 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, cannot re-appreciate the evidence nor it can substitute its subjective opinion in place of the findings of Authorities below. 32. Similar view has been reiterated in State of Maharashtra Vs. Milind & ors., (2001) 1 SCC 4 ; Extrella Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 ; and Omeph Mathai & ors. Vs. M. Abdul Khader, (2002) 1 SCC 319 . 33. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 , it was held that in exercise of supervisory power under Article 227, High Court can correct errors of jurisdiction committed by subordinate Courts. It also held that when subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned, the Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. However, it also said that be it a writ of certiorari or exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or law unless error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law; or, a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. 34. In Jasbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2006 ) 8 SCC 294, the Court said: "...while invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution, it is provided that the High Court would exercise such powers most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. The power of superintendence exercised over the subordinate courts and tribunals does not imply that the High Court can intervene in the judicial functions of the lower judiciary. The power of superintendence exercised over the subordinate courts and tribunals does not imply that the High Court can intervene in the judicial functions of the lower judiciary. The independence of the subordinate courts in the discharge of their judicial functions is of paramount importance, just as the independence of the superior courts in the discharge of their judicial functions." 35. In Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Court said that power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. The above authority has been cited and followed in Kokkanda B. Poondacha and others Vs. K.D. Ganapathi and another AIR 2011 SC 1353 and Bandaru Satyanarayana Vs. Imandi Anasuya (2011) 12 SCC 650. 36. In Abdul Razak (D) through Lrs. & others Vs. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle and others (2010) 2 SCC 432 , Apex Court reminded that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227, High Courts should not act as if they are exercising an appellate jurisdiction. 37. In T.G.N. Kumar Vs. State of Kerala and others (2011) 2 SCC 772 , the Court said that power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is both administrative and judicial, but such power is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. 38. In Commandant, 22nd Battalion, CRPF and others Vs. Surinder Kumar (2011) 10 SCC 244 , Apex Court referring to its earlier decision in Union of India Vs. R.K. Sharma (2001) 9 SCC 592 observed that only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, there can be judicial review under Articles 226 or 227. 39. The above discussion leaves no scope for interference with the orders impugned in this writ petition. I have no doubt in holding that this petition lacks substance and is devoid of merits. 40. Dismissed. 41. Interim order, if any, shall stand vacated. _____________