JUDGMENT Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary,J. (Oral) Claimant before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal below is the son of deceased Devi Chand, who died on the spot itself at the age of 50 years, in the accident of vehicle No.HP-34-A-5653, which occurred on 8.4.2007 around 12.45 p.m., near Bangora, Tehsil Arki, District Solan. Shri Naresh, who also died in the accident, was on the wheels of ill-fated vehicle. As per registration certificate Ext.PW1 /B, issued by the Block Medical Officer, Arki, Distict Solan, the deceased father of the claimant was running a shop under the name and style of M/s Thakur Sweet and Karyana shop at Dhundan and allegedly earning Rs.10,000/- per month. Thus, a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- was claimed as compensation in the claim petition filed before the Tribunal. 2.Respondent No.2 in this writ petition was impleaded as respondent No.1 in the claim petition in the capacity of the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, whereas the petitioner, hereinafter referred to as respondent No.2, being the insurer. 3. Respondent No.1 in reply to the claim petition has denied the contentions therein that the accident had taken place due to rash or negligent driving on the part of the driver of the vehicle and also that the deceased was running business as well as managing the agriculture affairs and also that he was the only bread earner in the family being wrong. Such submissions in para 24 of the claim petition were stated to be in the special knowledge of the petitioner. It was also denied that a sum of rupees ten lacs was liable to be awarded as compensation. The rest of the contentions in the claim petition were admitted to be correct. 4.It is further submitted that the ill-fated car was purchased by respondent No. 1 from a Finance Company and the same was duly insured with respondent No.2, however, inadvertently the insurance cover note was issued in the name of deceased Devi Chand, who was his real brother. The mistake so occurred was brought to the notice of Finance Company immediately in writing, however, neither it was rectified nor the policy was issued. It was, however, submitted that since the vehicle was duly insured with respondent No.2, therefore, it is the said respondent, who is responsible to indemnify the liability to pay compensation, in case it is held to be so by the Court. 5. It was, however, submitted that since the vehicle was duly insured with respondent No.2, therefore, it is the said respondent, who is responsible to indemnify the liability to pay compensation, in case it is held to be so by the Court. 5. The second respondent has submitted by way of preliminary objections that there was no contract of insurance between the said respondent and the insured, respondent No.1 nor the person on the wheels of the vehicle, in question, was having a valid and effective driving licence. The vehicle was also not having a valid registration and fitness certificate at the relevant time nor respondent No.1 was the registered owner thereof. It is also alleged that the claim petition was filed by the petitioner in collusion with respondent No.1 and as such he has not approached the Court with clean hands. On merits, respondent No.2-insurer has denied the entire case as set out in the claim petition being wrong. 6.The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal below, after holding the trial, has arrived at a conclusion that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving attributed to the driver of the vehicle and late Devi Chand died in the accident on the spot itself. It was further held that the driver was having a valid and effective driving licence and respondent No.1 had a valid registration and fitness certificate of the vehicle at that time. The income of the deceased was assessed as Rs. 10,000/- per month. It was further held that the claimant being his son was dependent on the income of his deceased father. While placing reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Sarla Verma Vs. DTC, 2009(6) Scale 129, the dependency was taken as 2/3rd and it was held that the loss the claimant sustained on account of death of his father was Rs.6667/- per month. Keeping in view the age of the deceased father of the claimant above 50 and below 55 years, multiplier of 10 was applied and the total amount payable as compensation was assessed as Rs.8,00,040/-, besides Rs.5000/- towards loss to the estate and Rs.5000/- towards funeral expenses. Keeping in view the age of the deceased father of the claimant above 50 and below 55 years, multiplier of 10 was applied and the total amount payable as compensation was assessed as Rs.8,00,040/-, besides Rs.5000/- towards loss to the estate and Rs.5000/- towards funeral expenses. Thus, a sum of Rs.8, 10,040/- was awarded as compensation together with interest @ 7.5% per annum against both the respondents jointly and severally, however, in view of the ill- fated vehicle being held to be insured with respondent No.2, the said respondent was saddled with the liability to indemnify the insured-respondent No.1. 7. During the course of arguments, the question of maintainability of this writ petition was raised and hotly contested on both sides. 8. Although an insurer has a right to prefer an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, yet on limited grounds, as provided under Section 149(2) of the Act. In a case where the award on the face of it is a perversity, the insurer is entitled to file a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the same. What is the term “perversity”, however, has to be seen in the light of legal meaning assigned to it by way of judicial pronouncements, including by our own High Court and also the Hon’ble Apex Court. Since it is a question of maintainability of the writ petition, which is hotly contested by the parties on both sides, therefore, it being a legal question, needs adjudication at the very outset. 9. On behalf of the claimant-respondent No.1 reliance has been placed on a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sadhna Lodh Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and another, (2003) 3 SCC 524. In this judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court while interpreting the scope of Sections 173 and 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and also the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, has held as under: “6. The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the Tribunal. The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the Tribunal. Section 149(2) of the Act limits the insurer to file an appeal on those enumerated grounds and the appeal being a product of the statute it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided under Section 149(2) of the act (see National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi). This being the legal position, the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to the High Court to entertain a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even if where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and judgment of a District Judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under Section 115 CPC has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. As a matter of illustration, where a trial court in a civil suit refused to grant temporary injunction and an appeal against refusal to grant injunction has been rejected, and a State enactment has barred the remedy of filing revision under Section 115 CPC, in such a situation a writ petition under Article 227 would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, where the State Legislature has barred a remedy of filing a revision petition before the High Court under Section 115 CPC, no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 10.Reliance on behalf of respondent No. 1-claimant has also been placed again on a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bijoy Kumar Dugar Vs. Bidyadhar Dutta and others, 2006 ACJ 1058. Vide this judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court has disposed of two appeals, i.e. one against the judgment of the High Court in an MAC appeal, which was filed in the High Court by the claimants against the inadequacy of the amount of compensation and the other against the judgment of the High Court in a Civil Writ Petition filed by the Insurance company, whereby the payment of interest on the amount of compensation was restricted by the High Court for a limited period. 11.The first part of the judgment ibid, which pertains to the appeal filed by the claimant against the inadequacy of the award is not relevant for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition, whereas the second part thereof, which deals with the appeal preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the judgment passed by the High Court in Civil Writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India restricting thereby the payment of interest on the award amount for a limited period, is relevant for the purpose of disposal of the present writ petition. The said appeal was preferred by the claimant feeling aggrieved against the judgment, whereby the payment of interest amount was ordered to be restricted for a limited period by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. While dealing with this aspect of the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “16. While dealing with this aspect of the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “16. As noticed in the earlier part of this judgment, the High Court modified the award of the MACT to the extent that the insurance company is only liable to pay interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum on the amount of compensation from 10.1.1989 to October, 1990, when it filed written statement too the claim petition and prior to those dates the insurer was not at fault.17. It is not disputed that the right of appeal is a statutory right to the parties and where the law provides a remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the MACT. Under right to file an appeal before the High Court on limited grounds available under Section1 49(2). The appeal being a product of the statute it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act. However, in a situation where there is collusion between the claimant and the insured or the insured does not contest the claim and further, it the MACT does not implead the insurance company to contest the claim on the grounds available to the insured or to a person against whom the claim has been made. If the permission is granted and the insurer is allowed to contest the claim on merit, in that case it is open to the insurer to file an appeal against the award of MACT on merits. Thus, in such a situation, the insurer can question the quantum of compensation awarded by MACT. As noticed earlier in the present case, the insurer made a challenge to the award of the MACT before the High court in the writ petition on the ground of its liability to pay the interest on the amount of compensation for a specified period without obtaining the permission of the MACT as contemplated under the statute. Thus, in the light of the decision of this Court in Sadhana Lodh Vs. National Insurance Co. Thus, in the light of the decision of this Court in Sadhana Lodh Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2003 ACJ 505 (SC), dealing with the provisions of Section 173 and 149(2) of the Act and the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and also section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court held that since the insurer has a remedy by filing an appeal before the High court on the available defences envisaged under the statute, writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution by an insurer challenging the award of the MACT is not maintainable.”11.It is thus seen that in the judgment cited supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has completely ruled out the possibility of filing a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, keeping in view the remedy of appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, available to an insurer, though may be on limited grounds as provided under Section 149(2) of the Act. The departure from such legal principles can only be in those cases, where there is collusion between the claimant and the insured and the insured does not contest the claim and further where the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal does not implead the insurance company to contest the claim petition and that too after seeking permission by the insurer of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal concerned to contest the claim on the grounds available to the insured or to a person against whom claim has been made. If such permission is granted, only in that event the insurer may contest the claim on merits, however, only by filing an appeal against the award of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. It is only in such a situation that the insurer is entitled to question the quantum of compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 12.By placing reliance on Sadhna Lodh’s case supra, it has further been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that by filing a petition under Articles 226/277 of the Constitution of India, the ground of challenge cannot be enlarged merely on the ground that the insurer has limited grounds for challenging the award given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 13.On the other hand, on behalf of the petitioner, reliance has been placed on a judgment of Full Bench of our own High Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. 13.On the other hand, on behalf of the petitioner, reliance has been placed on a judgment of Full Bench of our own High Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Soma Devi and others. In this judgment, while taking note of the provisions contained in Section 173 read with Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and interpreting the scope of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in a case where the insurer challenges the award passed by MACT by filing a writ petition as well as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sadhna Lodh’s case cited supra, the Full Bench of this Court has held as under: “11. Their Lordships of the Apex Court, therefore, have clearly and categorically held and decided that for whatever reasons the grounds of challenge with respect to an award cannot be enlarged by an insurer by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that insurer having limited grounds available to it under section 173 of the Act, it is therefore permissible for it by invoking the extra­ordinary jurisdiction of the High court to extend or enlarge the grounds by taking recourse to the remedy of filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. This has been held impermissible. 14. The aforesaid proposition of law thus sets at rest any controversy, or doubt about the maintainability of any such petition under Articles 226 of 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, the Division bench judgment of this Court in Sumitra Devi, 2003 ACJ 262 (HP), taking a view contrary to the aforesaid view of the Apex Court, is hereby overruled. 14. The aforesaid proposition of law thus sets at rest any controversy, or doubt about the maintainability of any such petition under Articles 226 of 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, the Division bench judgment of this Court in Sumitra Devi, 2003 ACJ 262 (HP), taking a view contrary to the aforesaid view of the Apex Court, is hereby overruled. The overruling of the judgment in Sumitra Devi, or for that matter reliance placed by us (in doing so) upon the ratio in Sadhana Lodh, 2003 ACJ 505 (SC), does not and cannot mean that, apart from an award based on any question relating to the quantum of compensation not being liable to be challenged by an insurer in a petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the doors of this court are always completely shut to a person, including an insurer, in invoking this court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, where such a person, including an insurer satisfies this court that the award is a complete perversity, or a nullity in the eyes of law, or that either the Tribunal has had no jurisdiction in passing he award, or the award has been passed on grounds and for reason which, on the touchstone of any constitutional or legal provision or even a provision in common law, cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For instance, where an insurer approaches this court by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of Constitution of India assailing an award of the Tribunal on the ground that, contrary to all principles as are found in the law of Torts or those relating to fixing tortius liability, the claimant had no cause to prefer any claim at all or that there was no wrong done by any one, not the least by the insurer respondent, as far as the alleged causing of the alleged injuries or for that matter even factum of accident was concerned. For instance, in a case like CWP No. 679 of 2001 (which is one of the cases referred to this Full Bench for consideration) where a truck driver while driving a truck died because of a mishap not attributed to any one else, and despite admitted case of the legal heirs of the deceased truck driver that this accident did not occur on account of any rashness or negligence of anyone (because no other vehicle or no other person was involved in the causing of this mishap), the claim petition was nonetheless filed by the legal heirs of the deceased truck driver against the insurer respondent (and the insurer of the truck alone was made the sole respondent in the claim petition), and despite the insurer respondent raising the objection as to the maintainability of the claim petition and the Tribunal having actually framed an issue to that effect, an award was nonetheless passed against the insurer. 15.In such like cases, where the award on the face of it being perverse, and scope, purview and operation of section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act being what it is (totally restrictive), the only remedy available to an insurer naturally would be to challenge the award by approaching this court by invoking this court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of t he Constitution because the power of judicial review vesting in this court in suchlike cases cannot be abdicated and should not be considered obliterated and hence it would become the duty of this court to exercise this power. 16.Taking another fact situation, by way of citing another reference, when it is brought to the notice of this court by invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution that a fraudulent act was committed in obtaining the award against the insurer or that otherwise a fraud was committed upon the insurer and either, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or otherwise, insurer has no remedy of \either approaching the Tribunal for reviewing or recalling of the award because of the absence of any statutory provision to that effect, or that the scope of the appeal under Section 173 of the Act is so limited as to exclude the consideration of any such contingency or situation, this court cannot and should not hesitate in entertaining the petition and granting or moulding the relief appropriately. “ 17.Further, after placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh, 2000 ACJ 1032, it is finally held by the Full Bench of this Court as under: “15. It, therefore, becomes abundantly clear that in all such like cases where the award on the face of it is a perversity, or is based on fraud, and the insurance company has no remedy under the Motor Vehicles Act of either challenging the award in appeal or being either to have it recalled or reviewed by the Tribunal itself, the power of judicial review by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution can always be invoked and exercised by this court in dispensing justice to the parties. 18. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, while dealing with the reference made to us vide single Bench order dated 18.7.2003, we hold that with respect to an insurer, if it challenges the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal only on the ground of compensation being high, excessive or unreasonable, in a petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, such a petition in view of Section 173 of the Motor vehicle Act, 1988 is not maintainable. This was the limited, rather the only question of law, which was referred to us for consideration and we have answered it accordingly. “ 19.On behalf of the petitioner, reliance has also been placed again on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Vs. Prem Chand and others, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1046. In this judgment, after placing reliance on the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Soma Devi’s case cited supra, the assessment of dependency towards parents in the case of death of an unmarried son as 2/3rd of the earnings of the deceased, has been held contrary to the law so laid down by this Court repeatedly and in such circumstances, the award was held as perversity and hence, it was modified by reducing the dependency to 1/3rd. 20. Now if adverting to the grounds on which award Annexure P-11 has been assailed before this Court, it has been submitted that the Tribunal below has erroneously awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.8, 10,040/- by taking the monthly income of the deceased as Rs. 20. Now if adverting to the grounds on which award Annexure P-11 has been assailed before this Court, it has been submitted that the Tribunal below has erroneously awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.8, 10,040/- by taking the monthly income of the deceased as Rs. 10,000/- merely on the sole testimony of the claimant to this effect and without there being any documentary evidence or other material available on record. The statements of PW- 1 and PWs No. 2 to 5 are stated to be not appreciated in its right perspective and to the contrary the Tribunal has based its findings merely on surmises and conjectures. 21.Now, it is to be seen in the light of the law laid down by a Full Bench of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, discussed supra, that the above grounds are available to the petitioner to assail the impugned award by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court in the present writ petition. The answer to this poser, in all fairness and ends of justice, would be in negative, for the reason that in the given facts and circumstances of this case in the event of the present writ petition being entertained, it would amount to enlarge the limited grounds available to an insurer for challenging the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which, in view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sadhna Lodh’s and Bijoy Kumar Dugar’s cases supra, would be illegal, besides being dehors the remedy of statutory appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, available to the insurer, no doubt on limited grounds, as provided under Section 149(2) of the said Act. 22.It would be worthwhile to mention here that in the given facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioner has assailed the impugned award being excessive on the ground that the evidence available on record was not appreciated in its right perspective by the Tribunal below. I am afraid, as neither the Hon’ble Apex Court nor this Court, in the judicial pronouncements cited supra, ever intended to entertain a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, on such grounds by the High Court or exercise its writ jurisdiction to reduce, modify or set aside the award. I am afraid, as neither the Hon’ble Apex Court nor this Court, in the judicial pronouncements cited supra, ever intended to entertain a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, on such grounds by the High Court or exercise its writ jurisdiction to reduce, modify or set aside the award. Not only this, if a writ petition is entertained and for that matter the impugned award is either set aside or modified, it would amount to open a floodgate for the institution of such petitions by the insurer, which is not at- all contemplated under the law or the statutory provisions, i.e. Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 23.The statute provides a right of appeal against an award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to an insurer, no doubt on limited grounds. The insurer may contest a claim petition on all the grounds, as are available to an insured or a person against whom the claim has been made, however, only in those cases where there is collusion between the claimant and the insured, subject to satisfying the Tribunal, seized of the matter, qua the existence of such collusion, during the course of hearing in an application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, filed for seeking the permission of the Tribunal for contesting the claim petition and only after the grant of such permission by the Claims Tribunal, on all grounds as are available to the insured. 24.As noticed at the outset, the present is a case where the insurer had approached the Tribunal below for seeking such permission by filing an application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, however, unsuccessfully, as the application so filed was dismissed by the Tribunal below, vide a speaking order dated 1.7.2008. The insurer had not chosen to assail the order, so passed, before this Court and now when the award has been passed, in a clandestine manner sought the indulgence of this Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India on the sole ground that the award being not supported by cogent evidence qua the income of the deceased is on excessive side. 25.On behalf of the insurer, reliance has been erroneously placed on the judgment of this Court in Soma Devi’s case supra, because in the operative portion of this judgment, it has been said in so many unambiguous and unequivocal terms that in a petition of this nature, if the challenge to an award passed by a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is only on the ground of compensation being high, excessive or unreasonable, such a petition, in view of there being a remedy of appeal available under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is not maintainable. 26.As regards the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sadhna Lodh’s and Bijoy Kumar Dugar’s cases, cited supra, as already pointed out, the same not only completely bars the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain such petition, but also goes one step further while holding that exercise of such power by the High Court would amount to enlarge the grounds available to an insurer under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act for filing an appeal, which is not legally permissible nor intended under the statute. 27.As regards the ratio of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Vs. Prem Chand and others supra, the same is distinguishable because in that case the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had assessed the dependency of the claimants, who were parents of the deceased, an un-married son, as 2/3rd, whereas as per the settled legal principles, it should have been assessed as 1/3rd. So far as the case in hand is concerned, the legality and validity of the award has been assailed on the sole ground that it is excessive and also that since no documentary evidence qua the income of the deceased as Rs. 10,000/- was produced by the claimant, therefore, his own testimony while in the witness box as PW- 1 and that of his brother-in-law PW-3 Ram Lal,, should not have been believed as a gospel truth while assessing the compensation and as such the award allegedly being perverse is required to be set aside. 28.Thus, the present is a case where the petitioner seems to be aggrieved by the manner in which the Tribunal below has appreciated the evidence. 28.Thus, the present is a case where the petitioner seems to be aggrieved by the manner in which the Tribunal below has appreciated the evidence. However, on such ground the entire award cannot be said to be perverse nor on the basis thereof the insurer can be permitted to question the legality and validity of the award by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court. This writ petition being not maintainable cannot thus be entertained in the present form. 29.Once it is held that this writ petition is not maintainable in the present form, there is no need to enter into the questions such as assessment of the income of the deceased at par with a skilled labourer; the dependency of the claimant upon his deceased father and also the application of multiplier etc. etc., raised during the course of arguments by the learned counsel on both sides and also to refer the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 and that of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in S. Lolakshi and another Vs. N. Tataiah and others, 2001 ACJ 1830, because in this petition, no interference with the impugned award is warranted. 30.However, before parting with the judgment this Court may not be failing in its duty to observe that in a case where the claimant and the insured or any other person against whom the claim has been made, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals should examine such cases with all circumspection and take all reasonable care and caution while appreciating the evidence produced by the parties and make assessment of the compensation, if any, payable to the claimant after taking into consideration all pros and cons of the case. The approach while considering the application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act filed by the insurer to contest the claim on those ground also, which are available to an insured, should also not be rigid and hyper technical and rather liberal. 31.For all the reasons recorded hereinabove in this judgment, this writ petition being not maintainable is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. No costs.