Judgment : This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 29/07/2003 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Margao (first Appellate Court) in Regular Civil Appeal no. 15 of 1989. 2. The said Regular Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1989 was filed by the Defendant no. 1 in Regular Civil Suit No. 206/82/D against the Judgment and Decree dated 15/12/1988 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Margao (trial Court) in the said suit. 3. The parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status in the said Regular Civil Suit No. 206/1982/D. 4. The plaintiff had filed the said suit for declaration that the deed of sale dated 23/1/1982 pertaining to the land bearing Chalta No. 7 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 of City survey of Margao is null and void since the said land belongs to and is in actual possession of the plaintiffs and for direction to the defendant no. 1 to sign and execute a deed of sale in favour of the plaintiffs, upon deposit by the plaintiffs, of the price due and consequent expenses, in respect of Chalta No. 3 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 and to deliver the peaceful possession of the same to the plaintiffs. 5. Case of the plaintiff's, in short, was as follows: There exists a property known as “DAVONDEM XETAVELEM” or “DAVODEM” at Margao which bears Land Registration No. 43.273 and Land Revenue No. 2388 and is bounded on the East by the property of Francisco Manuel de Miranda and Joao Floriano de Noronha; on the West and South by the lake Bogvoti; and on the North by the property of Bernardo Rebello and Antonio Joao Rodrigues. The said property bears Chalta nos. 2, 3, and 7 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 of city Survey of Margao. The said property comprises of an area of 4989 square metres and the right to half of the property is registered in the Land Registration Office under no. 45.975, in the name of plaintiffs no. 1 and 3, whereas right to the other half originally belonged to Mr. Francisco Xavier Miranda e Noronha, who is now deceased. By virtue of an amicable and oral partition of the property, effected about thirty years ago, the land bearing Chaltas no. 2 and 7 is being held by the plaintiffs, whereas the land under Chatla no. 1 and 3, whereas right to the other half originally belonged to Mr. Francisco Xavier Miranda e Noronha, who is now deceased. By virtue of an amicable and oral partition of the property, effected about thirty years ago, the land bearing Chaltas no. 2 and 7 is being held by the plaintiffs, whereas the land under Chatla no. 3 was held by Dr. Francisco Xavier Miranda e Noronha since about 30 years back. The said half of the plaintiffs' property bearing chaltas no. 2 and 7 is without any direct access to the road and is an enclaved property and the access to it lies through the other half constituted by Chalta no. 3. Therefore, the plaintiffs property is dominant heritage in relation to that of Dr. Francisco Xavier Miranda e Noronha which is servient heritage. On 13/08/1972, in the inventory proceedings bearing no. 6/74, the half of the said property which bears chalta no. 3 (suit property) and which was listed under Item no. 20 was allotted to the defendant no. 2, who is son of Dr. Francisco Xavier Miranda e Noronha. Without prior notice to the plaintiffs, the defendant no. 2, by deed dated 23/01/1982, sold his part to the defendant no.1 for a sum of Rs. 7,000/-alongwith Chalta no. 7 which did not belong to him and which belongs to the plaintiffs. The said Sale Deed was presented for registration on the same date. The plaintiffs by way of preemption are entitled to purchase the part of the said property from the defendant no. 2 which has been purchased by the defendant no. 1 and to a declaration that the sale of land bearing Chalta no. 7 is null and void. Hence the suit. 6. The defendants, by way of written statement, alleged as follows: The suit is not maintainable as there is no valid provision of law on which the reliefs as prayed for are based and the same is barred by Law of Limitation. The property purchased by defendant no. 1 from defendant no. 2, by Sale Deed dated 23/01/1982, is distinct and separate property, bearing Chalta no. 3 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 of the City survey, which was in peaceful and continuous possession of the Defendant no. 2 and prior to him by his predecessor in title. The defendant no. 2 has legally sold his property to defendant no. 1. 2, by Sale Deed dated 23/01/1982, is distinct and separate property, bearing Chalta no. 3 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 of the City survey, which was in peaceful and continuous possession of the Defendant no. 2 and prior to him by his predecessor in title. The defendant no. 2 has legally sold his property to defendant no. 1. The claim that the property of the plaintiffs is enclaved and has no access is false. The plaintiffs had filed an objection dated 25/01/1982 before the Southern Planning and Development Authority claiming right of pre-emption but the same was rejected and thereafter the plaintiff did not pursue the matter and therefore the Sale Deed was registered. The defendant no. 1 has already spent over an amount of Rs. 15,000/-towards development of the said property. The plaintiffs are therefore not entitled to any reliefs as claimed. 7. The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs' property, as described in paragraph 7 of the plaint is an enclaved property surrounded by other properties and not adjacent to any road and that access to their property bearing Chaltas no. 2 and 7 lies through the suit property i. e. chalta no. 3. She found that the suit property of defendant no. 1 separates the two portions of the plaintiffs and that it is not possible to have access to the property of the plaintiffs unless one enters the said property now purchased by the defendant no.1. In short, the trial Court held that the only access to go from one portion of plaintiffs' property to the other portion of their property, is through the suit property bearing Chalta no. 3 and that plaintiffs have a right of pre-emption, with respect to the suit property i. e. Chalta no. 3, in view of the provisions of Para 1 of Article 2309 of Portuguese Civil Code. The suit came to be decreed. The Sale Deed dated 23/01/1982 was declared as null and void insofar as it pertained to Chalta no. 7 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 and it was ordered that a Commissioner shall be appointed to ascertain the number of trees existing and to do valuation of the same before directing the defendant no.1 to execute Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiffs and also to hand over the possession of the same. 7 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 and it was ordered that a Commissioner shall be appointed to ascertain the number of trees existing and to do valuation of the same before directing the defendant no.1 to execute Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiffs and also to hand over the possession of the same. There is no dispute that the second part of the order pertains to Chalta no. 3 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 of Margao City. 8. In Regular Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1989, the learned first Appellate Court held that the evidence on record goes to show that there is no access or road upto the property bearing Chaltas no. 2, 3 and 7 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 and that Chaltla no. 3 lies in between Chaltas no. 2 and 7 and therefore in order to go to Chalta no. 7 from Chalta no. 2 or vice versa, one has to pass through Chalta no. 3. The first Appellate Court concurred with the findings of the trial Court that property of the plaintiffs is enclaved property and that plaintiffs are entitled to the right of pre-emption. The first Appellate Court, however added that such pre-emption is available to the plaintiffs under Article 2309 as well as Article 1566 of the Portuguese Civil Code. The Court, therefore, held that no interference is called for with the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial Court. The Appeal came to be dismissed. 9. There is no dispute that the Sale Deed dated 23/1/1982, insofar as it concerns Chalta no. 7 of P. T. Sheet No. 2 is null and void as the same belongs to the plaintiffs. No grievance is made by the defendants with respect to the part of decree, in this regard. 10. There were two defendants in the said Suit no.206/82/D. The respondents no. 4(a) to 4(e) of this second appeal are the legal representatives of the deceased defendant no. 2, who had sold the property bearing Chalta no. 3 to defendant no. 1. The Original Defendant no. 1 has filed this Second Appeal which has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law, namely: 1) Whether the court has not misconstrued the provisions of Article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code and/or has not misapplied the same? 2, who had sold the property bearing Chalta no. 3 to defendant no. 1. The Original Defendant no. 1 has filed this Second Appeal which has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law, namely: 1) Whether the court has not misconstrued the provisions of Article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code and/or has not misapplied the same? 2) Whether the provisions of Article 2309 have not been repealed by the extension of the Indian Easements Act to the State of Goa? 3) Whether the Court has not misconstrued the provisions of Article 1566 of the Portuguese Civil Code and/or misapplied the same? 4) Whether without seeking a declaration as regards the sale deed dated 23/01/1982 in so far as Chalta no. 3 of P. T. Sheet 2 was concerned, the plaintiffs (respondents) could yet succeed in their claim for pre-emption? 5) Whether a decree for re-conveyance of property (by a mandatory order to execute such a sale deed), could be granted even assuming, whilst denying, that the plaintiffs (respondents) had succeeded in their claim for pre-emption? 6) Whether the suit could be decreed when the plaintiffs had failed to seek a declaration of their alleged right of pre-emption? 7) Whether para 1 of Article 2309 of Portuguese Civil Code is not unconstitutional as pre-emption cannot be claimed on the ground vicinage? 11. Mr. Diniz, learned Counsel appearing for the defendant no. 1, submitted that the property was initially partitioned between the ancestors of defendant no. 2 and plaintiffs and the other half was sold by defendant no. 2 to the defendant no. 1. He therefore contended that defendant no. 2 and the plaintiffs were not co-owners of the said property sold to the defendant no.1 and that being so, pre-emption on the ground of co-ownership under Article 1566 of the Portuguese Code would not be available to the plaintiffs. He further pointed out that the plaintiffs are claiming access of 10 metres length to go to chalta no. 7 from Chalta no. 2 and vice versa saying that their property bearing Chaltas no. 2 and 7 is without any direct access to the road. He pointed out that the plaintiffs have not described the said access by means of its dimensions, exact location etc. and only for a small 10 metres long passage, they are claiming a very big property under chalta no. 2 and 7 is without any direct access to the road. He pointed out that the plaintiffs have not described the said access by means of its dimensions, exact location etc. and only for a small 10 metres long passage, they are claiming a very big property under chalta no. 3 of P. T. sheet no. 2, now belonging to the defendant no. 1. The learned counsel for the defendant no. 1 invited my attention to the prayers in the suit where the plaintiffs want a declaration that the deed of sale dated 23/01/1982, only insofar as it concerns chalta no. 7 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 is null and void since the same belongs to and in actual possession of the plaintiff. He further pointed out that the plaintiffs further want a direction to the defendant no. 1 to execute sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of chalta no. 3 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 and to deliver peaceful and actual possession of the same to the plaintiffs. He argued that the right of pre-emption is always against the vendor and not against the purchaser and therefore the plaintiffs had to pray for declaration that the sale deed dated 23/01/1982 insofar as it concerns chalta no. 3 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 is null and void and direction to vendor of the defendant no.1 to execute sale of the said property in favour of the plaintiffs. Learned counsel for the defendant no. 1, therefore, urged that only on this ground the suit ought to have been dismissed. 12. Mr. Diniz, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant no. 1, further submitted that Article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code speaks about indemnifying the servient owner for the loss which, a passage will cause. He therefore urged that praying for a direction to defendant no.1 to sell the property was not legal. He further argued that even otherwise the said article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code has been repealed. 13. Mr. Diniz, learned counsel appearing for the defendant no. 1 relied upon various judgments, as under:- i) Mahadeo Tatu Naik vs Ramakant Atmaram and anr. He further argued that even otherwise the said article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code has been repealed. 13. Mr. Diniz, learned counsel appearing for the defendant no. 1 relied upon various judgments, as under:- i) Mahadeo Tatu Naik vs Ramakant Atmaram and anr. [AIR 1985 Bombay 347] ii) Shri Karl Fernandes vs. Shri. Reginaldo T.C. D'Souza and others [1996 (0) BCI 392] iii) A. B. Abdulkadir and others v/s. State of Kerala and another [ AIR 1962 SC 922 ] iv) Dwarka Prasad V/s. Dwarka Das Saraf [ AIR 1975 SC 1758 ] v) Modern Dental College and Reserch Centre and others v/s. State of Madhya Pradesh and others [ (2009)7 SCC 751 ] vi) Efigenio Dias and another v/s. Malaquias Rosario D'Costa [2010(5) Bom. C.R. 818] vii) Miten Shyamsunder Mohota (Goidani) and another v/s. Union of India [2008(6) Bom. C.R. 124] viii) Atam Prakash v/s. State of Haryana and others [ (1986) 2 SCC 249 ] ix) Mary Roy and others v/s. State of Kerala and others [ (1986) 2 SCC 209 ] x) Mandali Ranganna and others v/s. T. Ramachandra and others [ (2008) 11 SCC 1 ] xi) Macario Antonio Francisco de Cunha and another v/s. Alex Fred D'Souza and others [1993(1) Bom. C.R. 465] 14. Learned counsel appearing for the defendant no. 1 further argued that the very premise on which the judgments of the lower courts were based was wrong. From the evidence on record, the learned counsel pointed out that in order to go to the public road, the plaintiffs have to pass through three more properties after passing through 10 metres distance from property of the defendant no. 1. He submitted that the plaintiff is not claiming right of easement or pre-emption in respect of other three properties but is claiming the same with respect to Chalta no. 3 in order to go from Chalta no. 2 to Chalta no. 7 and therefore in such circumstances Article 2309 would not be applicable. He contended that Article 2309 does not apply to connect one property to another. He further submitted that plaintiffs have not proved any right of way through the property of defendant no.1 and it has come on record that there are various other properties to pass. He argued that if the plaintiffs did not claim and prove right of way, then preemption will not apply. He further submitted that plaintiffs have not proved any right of way through the property of defendant no.1 and it has come on record that there are various other properties to pass. He argued that if the plaintiffs did not claim and prove right of way, then preemption will not apply. He also contended that it is not at all clear as to whether the pre-emption is claimed under Article 1566 or under Article 2309 of the Civil Code and that both are inconsistent with each other. He therefore contended that for all the reasons above, the first Appellate Court could not have rejected the appeal and ought to have allowed the same and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. He therefore prayed that the Second Appeal be allowed. 15. Per Contra, Mr. S. D. Lotlikar, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, argued that case of the plaintiffs comes under the second part of Article 2309 i.e. Para 1 of the same and since defendant no. 2 has sold the property to defendant no. 1, the plaintiffs want to be substituted in place of the defendant no.1 as they have the right of preference. He submitted that defendant no. 2 was bound to give a notice to the plaintiffs asking whether they wanted to buy the suit property and since this has not been done, the sale deed dated 23/01/1982 is null and void. He argued that merely because the provision of Article 2309 is included in the chapter of easements of access, the same need not be taken to apply to easements only. He further submitted that there is nothing in the Indian Easements Act corresponding to the provisions of Article 2309 and therefore the same cannot be taken to be repealed. Learned Counsel submitted that Article 1566 of the Portuguese Civil Code is not applicable to the present case. He argued that both the courts below have held that property of the plaintiffs is an enclosed property and that the access to their property bearing Chaltas no. 2 and 7 lies through the suit property bearing chalta no. 3. According to him, these are findings of fact which cannot be challenged in the Second Appeal. He further contended that under Article 2309 there is no need to ask for declaration that the sale deed is null and void. 2 and 7 lies through the suit property bearing chalta no. 3. According to him, these are findings of fact which cannot be challenged in the Second Appeal. He further contended that under Article 2309 there is no need to ask for declaration that the sale deed is null and void. According to him, necessarily there has to be a decree against the person who is in possession of the property by virtue of sale deed executed and it is the said purchaser i.e. the defendant no. 1 who is entitled to receive the money. Therefore, according to Mr. Lotlikar, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, there was nothing wrong in asking for a direction to be given to the defendant no. 1 to execute sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. He therefore submitted that no interference is called for with the impugned judgment and decree and that the appeal be dismissed. 16. I have carefully gone through the entire material on record and also various judgments relied upon by the parties. 17. A perusal of the pleadings in the plaint reveals that the same are incomplete as well as misleading. In paragraph 2 of the plaint the boundaries of entire property bearing Chaltas no. 2, 3 and 7 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 are given. But Chaltas no. 2 and 7 belong to plaintiffs and Chalta no. 3 belonged to defendant no. 2 and now belongs to defendant no. 1. The part bearing Chaltas no. 2 and 7 is named as a dominant heritage in relation to Chalta no. 3 now belonging to the defendant no. 1. The right of pre-emption is claimed by the plaintiffs in respect of said Chalta no. 3. But the boundaries of Chalta no. 3 are no t stated. The boundaries of Chaltas no. 2 and 7, thought they constitute the property of the plaintiffs, are not stated. It is pleaded in paragraph 7 of the plaint that the half of plaintiffs constituted by Chaltas no. 2 and 7 is a property without any direct access to the road and is 'predio encravado' and the access to it lies through the other half constituted by Chalta no. 3. From the above, one would get an impression that the portions bearing chalta no. 2 and chalta no. 2 and 7 is a property without any direct access to the road and is 'predio encravado' and the access to it lies through the other half constituted by Chalta no. 3. From the above, one would get an impression that the portions bearing chalta no. 2 and chalta no. 7 form a contiguous property and that there is no direct access from the road to this entire property and the access to the road lies through the other half constituted by Chalta no. 3. There is no specific pleading in the plaint that the portions bearing Chaltas no. 2 and 7 are separated by a small strip of about 10 metres width from Chalta no. 3 and that in order to go from Chalta no. 2 to Chalta no. 7, and vice versa, one has to pass through this strip from Chalta no 3. There is no pleading as to whether both the portions bearing Chalta no. 2 and Chalta no. 7 are dominant heritages and that in order to approach the road from both, Chalta no 3 serves as servient heritage. 18. Issue no. 1 as framed in Regular Civil Suit No. 206 of 1983 was whether the plaintiffs prove that their property as described in paragraph 7 of the plaint is a 'predio encravado', a property surrounded by other properties and not adjacent to any road. Issue no. 2 was whether the plaintiffs prove that access to their property-Chaltas no. 2 and 7 lies through the suit property (Chalta no. 3). Issue no. 3 was whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled to preemption in respect of the suit property (Chalta no. 3). The point no. 1 as formulated by first Appellate Court was whether the property of the plaintiffs is enclaved property. The point no. 2 was whether the plaintiffs are entitled for right of preemption. The above issues and the points have been answered by the lower Courts in the affirmative. No doubt these are findings of facts. There was no issue framed by trial Court as to whether the plaintiffs prove that the access to the public road from their property bearing chaltas no 2 and 7 is through chalta no. 3 belonging to the defendant no. 1. Similarly, there was no point formulated by the first Appellate Court, as above. The evidence on record establishes that the passage through Chalta no. 3 belonging to the defendant no. 1. Similarly, there was no point formulated by the first Appellate Court, as above. The evidence on record establishes that the passage through Chalta no. 3 does not take the plaintiffs to any public road and in fact, one has to pass through Chalta no. 3 only in order to go from Chalta no. 2 to chalta no. 7 and vice versa. The land under Chalta no. 2 or under Chalta no. 7 does not abut any public road. According to PW1, to go to the public road, they have to pass through the suit property and through three properties: one of Rebelo, second of Colaco and the third of Church. It is not known from the evidence as to on which side of which Chalta number lies the said three properties of Rebelo, Colaco and Church. In other words, there is no evidence on record to show as to on which side of which Chalta number lies the public road, after crossing the said three properties. 19. Admittedly, there is no pleading in the plaint as to under which provision of law, in the facts and circumstances pleaded in the plaint, the plaintiffs are entitled to preemption. 20. The lower Courts have only held that in order to go from one portion of the property of the plaintiffs to their other portion, one has to necessarily pass through Chalta no. 3 and that in terms of Para 1 of Article 2309, the plaintiffs are entitled to the right of preemption. 21. Besides the above, It is seen from the impugned judgment in Regular Civil Appeal No. 15/1989 that the learned first Appellate court has held that plaintiffs are entitled to pre-emption under Clause 1 of Article 2309 as well as under Article 1566 of the Portuguese Civil Code. A perusal of the provisions of Articles 2309 and 1566 of the Civil Code reveals that they are inconsistent with each other. 22. I shall first deal with the point whether Article 1566 of the Portuguese Civil Code, was applicable to the case at hand. The first Appellate Court has held that plaintiffs are co-owners of the remaining half which they claimed in the suit (land bearing Chalta no. 3 of P. T. Sheet no. 22. I shall first deal with the point whether Article 1566 of the Portuguese Civil Code, was applicable to the case at hand. The first Appellate Court has held that plaintiffs are co-owners of the remaining half which they claimed in the suit (land bearing Chalta no. 3 of P. T. Sheet no. 2), since there was no partition of the entire property amongst co-owners by metes and bounds or by any written document and hence the plaintiffs are entitled to claim right of pre-emption in respect of said remaining half in view of the provision of Article 1566 of Portuguese Civil Code. Article 1566 deals with right of preference of co-owners and states that the co-owners of an indivisible or undivided thing cannot sell to strangers their respective shares if the other co-owners should want it on the same terms. Para 1 of the said Article says that the co-owner to whom notice of sale was not given, may acquire the share sold to strangers, provided he applies within six months as from the date on which he has notice of the same and deposits, before delivery is effected, the price which under the terms and conditions of the contract, has been paid or has become due. It was the case of the defendants that the land bearing Chalta no. 3 is separate and distinct property. This land bearing Chalta no. 3 is referred to in the plaint as the other half. In the plaint, the plaintiffs themselves have averred that the right to the said other half belonged to Mr. Francisco Xavier Miranda e Noronha and that by virtue of an amicable and oral partition effected about thirty years ago, the said property is being held severally i. e. Chaltas no. 2 and 7 by plaintiffs and Chalta no. 3 by said Dr. Francisco Miranda. Thus, admittedly, the plaintiffs had not claimed co-ownership to the property bearing Chalta no. 3. It was nobody's case that the property bearing Chalta no. 3 was held by the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 in co-ownership. Article 1566 of the Civil Code, therefore, was not applicable to the present case. The first Appellate Court has misconstrued and misapplied the provision of Article 1566 of the Portuguese Civil Code to the case. 23. Substantial question no. 3 is therefore answered in favour of the defendants. 24. 2 in co-ownership. Article 1566 of the Civil Code, therefore, was not applicable to the present case. The first Appellate Court has misconstrued and misapplied the provision of Article 1566 of the Portuguese Civil Code to the case. 23. Substantial question no. 3 is therefore answered in favour of the defendants. 24. Now let us see whether Article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code was applicable to the case at hand. Article 2309 of the Civil Code provides as under: “The proprietors of enclosed tenements, that is, those that do not have any access to public ways, may demand pathway, or passage through adjacent lands, indemnifying for the loss which, with that passage, they may come to cause. However, when these lands are those mentioned in Article 456, the respective proprietor may escape that obligation, by acquiring the enclosed tenement for the price which may be judicially determined during the suit, with prior arbitration. 1st In the case of sale, private or judicial, ceding in payment, emphyteusis, or lease for a period of more than ten years, the proprietors of enclosed lands, as well as the owners of the tenements encumbered with the respective easement, whatever be the title of its creation, have the right of preference in the first place. 2nd Concerning judicial auctioning, what is provided under article 848 of Code of Civil Procedure shall be observed, the head-of-household or the execution creditor having to indicate the names of proprietors of the servient tenements, for the purpose of being notified for it. 3rd To avail of the right of preference, in other cases, those proprietors should be notified, in terms of Article 641 of Code of Civil Procedure, and, in the absence of notification, they may use their right in terms of §4th of Article 1566. 4th More than one proprietor presenting themselves to avail of that right, licitation among them shall be held, and the highest value offered shall revert to the benefit of the seller. 4th More than one proprietor presenting themselves to avail of that right, licitation among them shall be held, and the highest value offered shall revert to the benefit of the seller. 5th In case there are more than one proprietor with right of preference, none of them shall claim his right through court without first notifying the others, in terms of article 641 of Code of Civil Procedure, and, in case any of those notified presents himself to exercise the preference, licitation shall be held among the preferrers, the respective right being awarded to the one who offers the highest price for it, and thereafter deposits, within three days, in favour of the seller, the excess over the earlier price of agreement and pays, within thirty days, the conveyance tax.” 25. Both the Courts below have taken into consideration only the provision of Para 1 of Article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code as if the same is an independent provision. Para 1 of Article 2309 is a part of main enacting Article, since it inter alia refers to the right of the proprietors of enclosed properties and the meaning of the expression “proprietors of enclosed properties” is given in the opening part of the main Article. As has been rightly submitted by learned Counsel for the defendant no. 1, the said Para cannot be taken as a separate enactment. It is necessarily a part of the main Article, just like a proviso to any Section of law. The contention of learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, that Para 1 to Article 2309 of Portuguese Civil Code should be distinctly read without other parts of the said Article, does not appeal to my mind. In my view, whether it is to be read as proviso or sub-section, reading of each Para of Article 2309 separately and distinctly would not give correct interpretation of said Article 2309, as a whole. In the case of “Dwarka Prasad” (supra), the Apex Court has held that a proviso must be limited to the subject matter of the enacting clause. It is further held that it is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principle matter to which it is a proviso and that it is not a separate or independent enactment. It is further held that it is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principle matter to which it is a proviso and that it is not a separate or independent enactment. The Apex Court has further held that words are dependent on the principle enacting words, to which they are tacked as a proviso and they cannot be read as divorced from their context. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that a proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. From the reading of Para 1 of Article 2309 along with the main part of that Article, it is clear that the proprietors of landlocked tenements which do not have access to public ways have the right of preference in the first place. As observed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of “Shabbir Khan & Others Vs. Krishna Baburao Naik & Others” reported in [ 1998(3) Bom C.R. 877], the main opening part of Article 2309 clearly shows that the proprietors of landlocked properties are those who do not have communication to public roads. Para 1 of Article 2309 provides for right of pre-emption in favour of such proprietors of enclosed lands as also to owners of properties burdened with the respective easement in case of sale, emphyteusis, lease for a period of more than ten years, etc. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to have properly described the easement and the communication to public road. In fact, for better understanding, the plaintiffs ought to have produced on record a plan showing the easement, the public road and communication thereto from the plaintiffs property. Though the plaintiffs have pleaded in the plaint that their access to the road is through Chalta no. 3, however, the evidence on record reveals that this is not true. P.W 1, the plaintiff no. 3 has deposed that the access to their portion bearing Chaltas no. 2 and 7 is through the portion bearing chalta no. 3 of the defendant no. 2 and that there is no other way or access to go to their said property. 3, however, the evidence on record reveals that this is not true. P.W 1, the plaintiff no. 3 has deposed that the access to their portion bearing Chaltas no. 2 and 7 is through the portion bearing chalta no. 3 of the defendant no. 2 and that there is no other way or access to go to their said property. Thus, PW1 has not spoken about communication to any public road but about communication to their property through Chalta no. 3. P.W.1 has produced the survey plan as Exh. PW1/A which shows that a small portion of Chalta no. 3 lies in between Chalta no. 2 and Chalta no. 7, all of P. T. Sheet no. 2. The Deed of Sale dated 23/1/1982, produced by PW1 as Exh. PW1/D, which pertains to Chalta no. 3, reveals that the said property is not bounded on any side by public road. The evidence of PW2 and PW3 also reveals that it is in order to go from one portion of the plaintiffs' property to their other portion that one has to necessarily pass through the said property now purchased by defendant no. 1. There is concurrent finding given by the lower courts that the property of the plaintiffs is enclaved and in order to go from the portion bearing Chalta no. 2 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 to the portion bearing chalta no. 7 of P. T. Sheet no. 2, one has to pass through the suit property bearing chalta no. 3 of P. T. Sheet no. 2. The said passage through Chalta no. 3 does not lead to any public road. Thus, the plaintiffs do not claim right of pre-emption in respect of the property bearing Chalta no. 3 for communication to public road but for communication from one portion of their property to another. Article 2309 does not provide for right of pre-emption on the ground of ownership of contiguous property. 26. In her cross-examination, P.W.1 has stated that in order to reach the public road, they have to pass through the suit property and through other three properties namely of Rebelo, of Colaso and of Church. This is obviously not wholly true. On the southern side of Chalta no 7 is a lake by name Bogvoti. 26. In her cross-examination, P.W.1 has stated that in order to reach the public road, they have to pass through the suit property and through other three properties namely of Rebelo, of Colaso and of Church. This is obviously not wholly true. On the southern side of Chalta no 7 is a lake by name Bogvoti. The evidence of PW1 in her cross-examination only shows that the plaintiffs, in order to go from their property to the public road, have to pass through Chalta no. 3 and then through three properties namely of Rebelo, colaso and of Church. The plaintiffs have to pass through the suit property bearing Chalta no. 3 in order to come from their portion of the property bearing Chalta no. 2 to the portion bearing Chalta no. 7 and vice-versa. Thus, after passing through the land bearing Chalta no. 3, the plaintiffs cannot come to the public road, but they come to the other portion of their own property. There is nothing on record as to on which side of which Chalta number lies the property of Rebelo, colaso and Church and the public road. 27. Article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code does not apply to a property through which a person wants an access for him to go from one portion of his property to another portion. It applies when the proprietor of landlocked property has access to approach the public road through the property to which he is claiming the right of preemption. The primary object behind Article 2309 is to provide communication to the public roads in the case of landlocked properties. Chaltas no. 2 and 7 belong to plaintiffs. The plaintiffs do not say that there is a public road through Chalta no. 2 or through Chalta no. 7. This aspect of the matter was not at all considered by the lower Courts. 28. PW1 has stated that they have to cross the suit property only for a length of about 10 metres. The property bearing Chalta No. 3 admeasures 2359 square metres. Thus, in reality, the plaintiffs are claiming the right of pre-emption under Article 2309 of the Civil code, in order to get a big property when they need only an access to a length of about 10 metres, through the said property that also to go from one portion of their property to another portion of their property. Thus, in reality, the plaintiffs are claiming the right of pre-emption under Article 2309 of the Civil code, in order to get a big property when they need only an access to a length of about 10 metres, through the said property that also to go from one portion of their property to another portion of their property. 29. Thus, as rightly contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant no. 1, the very premise, on which the impugned judgments of the lower Courts, is based, was wrong. 30. In my view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions of Article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code were not available to the plaintiffs and the lower courts have misapplied the same. Substantial question of law at Serial no.1 is therefore answered in favour of the defendants. 31. In view of the above, the other substantial questions are not relevant and need not be answered. There is also no need to discuss various citations relied upon by the learned Counsel for the defendant no. 1. The appeal succeeds as regards Chalta no. 3 of P. T .Sheet no. 2 of Margao City, since even if pre-emption under Article 2309 of Portuguese Civil code is still in force in the State of Goa, the same is not applicable to the case at hand. 32. The appeal is therefore partly allowed. (a) The impugned judgments and decrees of the lower Courts, insofar as they pertain to Chalta no. 3 of P. T. Sheet no. 2 of City survey of Margao, are quashed and set aside. (b) Regular Civil Suit No. 15/1989, insofar as it pertains to said Chalta no. 3, is dismissed. (c) No order as to costs.