Hon'ble Prakash Krishna,J. :- The petitioner herein instituted original suit no.1065 of 1999 against Smt. Samudra Devi for specific performance of contract to sell dated 11th of December, 1996 with the allegation that the defendant agreed to sell the property described at the foot of plaint for a sum of Rs.40,000/- out of which a sum of Rs.20,000/- was given as advance money. But she refused to execute the sale deed within the time agreed. During the pendency of the suit, Smt. Samudra Devi expired on 19th of April, 2002. To substitute her heirs a substitution application dated 9th of November, 2007 along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the substitution application and to set aside the abatement of the suit was preferred. The respondent no.1 who is claiming heirship of Smt. Samudra Devi on the basis of a Will in her favour, filed objections stating that no case for condonation of delay has been made out. The fact that Smt. Samudra Devi expired on 19th of April, 2002 was communicated by her counsel to the plaintiff's counsel on 9th of November, 2004 and no substitution application was filed immediately thereafter. The condonation of delay in filing the substitution application was sought for by the petitioner on the ground that he had no knowledge about the death of Smt. Samudra Devi before 9th of April, 2007 as she was living in a different village with her relatives at a distance of about fifty miles. The Courts below have refused to condone the delay and rejected the substitution application on the finding that the plaintiff was informed about the death of Smt. Samudra Devi on 9th of November, 2004 and the substitution application was filed on 9th of November, 2007 i.e. after about three years. Heard Sri Sanjiv Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Onkar Nath, learned counsel for the contesting respondent no.1. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Time and again, the Apex Court has laid down that the phrase "sufficient cause" in connection with section 5 of the Limitation Act should not be interpreted in pedantic manner. In such matters, the Court should keep in mind that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. Time and again, the Apex Court has laid down that the phrase "sufficient cause" in connection with section 5 of the Limitation Act should not be interpreted in pedantic manner. In such matters, the Court should keep in mind that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. It has been observed that refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the case of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay (See Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 ). In Ram Sumiran and others Vs. DDC and others, AIR 1985 SC 606 , the Apex Court in substitution matter and matters with regard to setting aside of abatement has held that the petitioners being persons from rural area, application deserves to be allowed. In Ram Nath Sao Vs. Gobradhan Sao and others, AIR 2002 SC 1201 , the Apex Court after noticing its various earlier pronouncements has laid down the law with reference to expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of C.P.C in the following manner:- 11. "Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the Courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the Courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, Courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way." As against the above, the learned counsel for the respondents could place reliance upon the findings recorded by the two Courts below in favour of the respondent no.1. Looking to the fact that substantial right of petitioner/plaintiff is involved and there is no question of any malafide or delay in such matters i.e. a suit relating to specific performance of contract to sell where a substantial amount has been given as advance money, it would be appropriate to condone the delay and set aside the abatement subject to payment of heavy cost to compensate the contesting respondent. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed conditionally. The impugned orders dated 27th of July, 2007 passed by the trial Court on the substitution application and 2nd of August, 2008 passed by the revisional Court confirming the order dated 27th of July, 2007 rejecting the substitution application are hereby set aside. The delay in filing the substitution application is condoned subject to payment of Rs.7,000/- (Rupees Seven Thousand only) within a period of one month by the petitioner to the contesting respondent no.1. The amount of cost shall be deposited by the petitioner within the aforesaid period of one month before the trial Court and the said amount shall be paid over to the contesting respondent no.1 herein. The amount of cost shall be deposited by the petitioner within the aforesaid period of one month before the trial Court and the said amount shall be paid over to the contesting respondent no.1 herein. It is made clear that if the petitioner fails to deposit the cost within the time stipulated as above, the writ petition shall stand dismissed.