JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sabhajeet Yadav, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the contesting respondent and the learned Standing Counsel at great length. 2. By means of instant writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the orders dated 6.8.1996, 5.11.1996 passed by the Collector, Deoria, and the order dated 17.5.2004 passed by the Additional Commissioner Gorakhpur Division Gorakhpur. Further, a writ of mandamus has also been sought for, to affirm the allotment order dated 27.3.1993 passed by the Assistant Collector Salempur district Deoria. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the vide order dated 6.8.1996 passed by the Collector, Deoria, in the case of Indrasan Tiwari v. Smt. Shanti Devi-village Naunapar Tappa Bhatani Pargana and Tahsil Salempur district Deoria, under Section 122- C(6) of the U.P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act (in short referred to as the Act), the lease dated 27.3.1993 in respect of allotment of plot No. 816 area 2 dismal of Abadi land, to the petitioner has been cancelled on the ground that firstly the allottee is not eligible person secondly her husband is a Government Servant and thirdly the proposal has also not been made by the village Pradhan in accordance with the rules. This order was sought to be recalled by the petitioner by preferring recall application which has been rejected by a detailed order dated 5.11.1996. Feeling aggrieved by these orders, the petitioner preferred Revision No. 41/20/D of 1996-Smt. Shanti Devi v. Indrasan Tiwari and others, before the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur, which has also been dismissed by the Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur vide order dated 17.5.2004. These orders are impugned in the instant writ petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically submitted that the aforesaid allotment of lease pertaining to the land in question was given to the petitioner in lieu of her sterilization under which the petitioner had under gone operation of Tubectomy, therefore, the respondents who are officers of the State, cannot cancel the allotment made to the petitioner under the aforesaid scheme and they are bound by principle of estoppel. It is also submitted that the respondent No. 4, at whose instance, the proceeding for cancellation of allotment of lease of the petitioner, was initiated before the Collector, has no locus standi to challenge the aforesaid allotment made in favour of the petitioner as he is not aggrieved person for the said allotment. It is also submitted that the respondent No. 4, at whose instance, the proceeding for cancellation of allotment of lease of the petitioner, was initiated before the Collector, has no locus standi to challenge the aforesaid allotment made in favour of the petitioner as he is not aggrieved person for the said allotment. Lastly, he has also submitted that the initial impugned order dated 6.8.1996 passed by the Collector was against the principle of natural justice as the petitioner was not afforded opportunity of hearing to have her say in the matter before passing the said order. 5. I have given anxious consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the record of the case. 6. For better appreciation of the controversy involved in this case, it would be useful to refer the provisions of Section 122-(C) of the Act, which is quoted below: “122-C. Allotment of land for housing site for members of Scheduled Castes, agricultural labourers, etc.—(1) The Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division of his own motion or on the resolution of the Land Management Committee, may earmark any of the following classes of land for the provision of abadi sites for the members of the Scheduled Castes and [the Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward and Classes and the persons of General Category living below poverty line] and agricultural labourers and village artisans- (a) lands referred to in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 117 and vested in the Gaon Sabha under that section; (b) lands coming into possession of the Land Management Committee under Section 194 or under any other provisions of this Act; (c) any other land which is deemed to be or become vacant under Section 13, Section 14, Section 163, Section 186, or Section 211; (d) where the land earmarked for the extension of abadi and reserved as abadi site for Harijans under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, is considered by him to be insufficient, and land earmarked for other public purposes under that Act is available, then any part of the land so available. (2) Notwithstanding anything in Sections 122-A, 195, 196, 197 and 198 of this Act, or in Sections 4, 15, 16, 28-B and 34 of the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, the Land Management Committee may with the previous approval of the Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division allot for purposes of building of houses, to persons referred to in sub-section (3) - (a) any land earmarked under sub-section (1) ; (b) any land earmarked for the extension of abadi sites for Harijans under the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953; (c) any abadi site referred to in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 117 and vested in the Gaon Sabha; (d) any land acquired for the said purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (3) The following order of preference shall be observed in making allotments under sub-section (2)- (I) an agricultural labourer or a village artisan residing in Gram Sabha and belonging to any of the following categories in the order of preference : (a) persons belong to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes; (b) persons belonging to Other Backward Classes; (c) persons belonging to the general category living below poverty line.]; (ii) any other agricultural labourer or village artisan residing in the village. (iii) any other person residing in the Gram Sabha and belonging to any of the following categories in the order of preference : (a) persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes; (b) persons belonging to Other Backward Classes; (c) persons belonging to the general category living below poverty line.]; (iv) a person with disability residing in the village.] Explanation I.—The expression “agricultural labourer” shall have the same meaning as in Section 198. Explanation II.—The expression ‘village artisan’ means a person who does not hold any agricultural land and whose main source of livelihood is manufacture or repair of traditional tools, implements and other articles or things used for agriculture or purposes ancillary thereto and includes a carpenter, weaver, potter, blacksmith, silversmith, goldsmith, barber, washerman, cobbler or any other person who normally earns his livelihood by practising a craft either by his own labour or by the labour of any member of his family in any rural area: Provided that no person shall be deemed to be a village artisan whose total income (including income of his or her spouse and minor children) exceeds two thousand four hundred rupees in a year.] [Explanation III.—The expression “ person with disability” shall mean a person with any disabilities mentioned in Clause (i) of Section 2 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection & Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995(Act No. 1 of 1996)]. [Explanation IV.—Preference shall be given to a person who either holds no house or has insufficient housing accommodation considering the requirements of his family. [Explanation V.—The expression “ persons of General Category living below poverty line” shall have the same meaning as in Section 198]. (4) If the Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division is satisfied that the Land Management Committee has failed to discharge its duties or to perform its functions under sub-section (2) or it is otherwise necessary or expedient so to do, he may himself allot such land in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3). (5) Any land allotted under this section shall be held by the allottee on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. (6) The Collector may of his own motion and shall on the application of any person aggrieved by an allotment of land under this section inquire in the manner prescribed into such allotment, and if he is satisfied that the allotment is irregular, he may cancel the allotment, and thereupon the right, title and interest of the allottee and of every other person claiming through him in the land allotted shall cease. (7) Every order passed by the Assistant Collector under sub-section (4) shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (6) and every order passed by the Collector under sub-section (6) shall be final, and the provisions of [Section 333 and Section 333-A] shall not apply in relation thereto. (7) Every order passed by the Assistant Collector under sub-section (4) shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (6) and every order passed by the Collector under sub-section (6) shall be final, and the provisions of [Section 333 and Section 333-A] shall not apply in relation thereto. (8) [***] [(9) In Rule 115-L of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952, sub-rule(2) shall be deemed always to have been omitted.]” 7. So far as the question of locus standi of respondent No. 4 Indrasan Tiwari in respect of allotment in question is concerned, it is to be noted that proceeding under sub-section 6 of Section 122-C of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, is an inquiry to be held by the Collector either on his own motion or on the application of any aggrieved person in respect of irregularity of allotment. It is not a proceeding like proceeding of regular suit. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the application made by any person who may or may not be aggrieved person, can be made basis for initiation of suo moto inquiry by the Collector. It is not necessary that the application should always be made by the aggrieved person to the Collector for initiation of such inquiry for cancellation of allotment for the reason that in some cases of irregular allotment, it is possible that there may not be any aggrieved person and/or aggrieved person may be manipulated and be restrained from challenging such allotment, that is why the Legislature has authorised the Collector to initiate suo moto inquiry of his own motion for cancellation of irregular allotment. For this simple reason, I am of the view that the complaint regarding irregularity of allotment of petitioner could be made by the respondent No. 4, who may or may not be aggrieved by such allotment, on the basis of which the inquiry held by the Collector can be treated to be suo moto proceeding and no fault can be found in such inquiry merely on the ground of absence of locus standi of respondent No. 4. Accordingly, this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is misplaced and cannot be accepted. 8. Accordingly, this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is misplaced and cannot be accepted. 8. So far as the question of affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before cancellation of allotment of Patta in her favour is concerned, it is no doubt true that before cancelling such Patta, it is necessary to hear the person in whose favour allotment of Patta was made as cancellation proceeding is quasi-judicial proceeding and entails civil consequences. But question arises for consideration is that as to whether the petitioner was afforded opportunity of hearing to have her say in the matter before cancellation of her allotment or not? If not, whether a fresh opportunity of hearing should be given to the petitioner or not? 9. In this connection, it is to be noted that from the record, it transpires that before passing initial order dated 6.8.1996 of cancellation of Patta of the petitioner, the Collector Deoria had sent notice to the petitioner through registered post and inspite of service of such notice she did not appear before him. The aforesaid fact has been noticed by the Collector, Deoria vide order dated 5.11.1996 passed on recall application of the petitioner, copy of which is on record as Annexure 2 to the writ petition, wherein it is stated that the notice was sent to the petitioner Smt. Shanti Devi through registered post but after sufficient notice, she did not appear before the Collector in as much as she was not eligible person to be alloted land of the Gaon Sabha and on merit also the allotment of land made in favour of the petitioner was found to be irregular and illegal, therefore, the order dated 6.8.1996 earlier passed by him was maintained. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity of hearing prior to the impugned order dated 6.8.1996 passed against her, despite thereof she has failed to avail such opportunity, therefore, Collector cannot be blamed for the same. However, even if, the petitioner was not heard before passing the initial order dated 6.8.1996, she was heard subsequently prior to passing the order dated 5.11.1996, as such, no fault can be found in the said orders. 10. However, even if, the petitioner was not heard before passing the initial order dated 6.8.1996, she was heard subsequently prior to passing the order dated 5.11.1996, as such, no fault can be found in the said orders. 10. Besides this, the Revisional Authority has also heard the petitioner while deciding the revision preferred by her, vide order dated 17.5.2004 and it has been categorically held that the husband of the petitioner is an Inspector (Food & Civil Supplies) in Government Department of U.P. and the petitioner has Pakka house as well as sufficient agricultural land. She is not member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. She does not belong to the community of village artisans, she is member of general category but is not living below poverty line, therefore, she was not eligible and entitled for allotment of land of Gaon Sabha for house site. Accordingly, while upholding the order dated 6.8.1996 passed by the Collector, the revision filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. Thus, in view of aforesaid findings of facts recorded by the revenue authorities, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner has been afforded reasonable opportunity of hearing to have her say in the matter, therefore, no further opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the petitioner by remanding the matter back before the Collector. 11. There is yet another reason for taking aforesaid view in the matter. It is to be noted that it cannot be disputed that the petitioner belongs to general category. Her husband is working as an Inspector (Food & Civil Supplies) in department of State Government. His salary and other emoluments are much more than prescribed limit as such she cannot be held to be person of general category living below the poverty line. She has pacca house and sufficient agricultural land in the village. Therefore, in this backdrop of the case, in my considered opinion, she is not eligible person under Section 122-C (3) of the Act, who could be allotted the land of Gaon Sabha for building of house. Accordingly, the allotment made in her favour was irregular and illegal, therefore, the same was rightly cancelled by the Collector. Therefore, in this backdrop of the case, in my considered opinion, she is not eligible person under Section 122-C (3) of the Act, who could be allotted the land of Gaon Sabha for building of house. Accordingly, the allotment made in her favour was irregular and illegal, therefore, the same was rightly cancelled by the Collector. This factual position of the petitioner cannot be disputed by her even if she would have been given opportunity of hearing to have her say in the matter prior to the initial order of cancellation dated 6.8.1996 was passed. Therefore, unless the aforesaid factual situation can be legitimately disputed by the petitioner and her case would be improved on merit, in my opinion, providing further opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by remitting the matter back to the Collector, would be an exercise in futility by this Court and would also be abuse of process of law and no useful purpose would be served by such exercise. This view finds support from the law laid down by Apex Court in the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 , wherein the it has been held that “where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs” 12. This proposition has again been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 2583 , wherein in paragraph No. 22 of decision the Apex Court has held as under: “22. It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice.” 13. It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice.” 13. Further by placing reliance on earlier decisions rendered in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of A.P., AIR 1966 SC 828 and in Mohammad Swalleh v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut, AIR 1988 SC 94 in para 18 of the said decision Apex Court held that Court can still refuse to strike down the order if such striking down results in restoration of another order passed in favour of petitioner in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise is not in accordance with law. The pertinent observations made by Apex Court ( AIR 1999 SC 2583 at page 2588) are as under : “...it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law.” 14. In view of the aforesaid legal position, I am of the considered opinion that since the petitioner cannot dispute aforesaid factual position regarding her non-eligibility for allotment of the land of Gaon Sabha for house site under Section 122-C (3) of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and by getting further opportunity of hearing before the Collector, she would not be able to improve her case on merit, therefore, providing further opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, would be abuse of process of law and would be an exercise in futility under Article 226 of the Constitution. Not only this, but by doing so, this Court would restore the irregular allotmwnt of land of Gaon Sabha made in favour of the petitoner by Asstt. Collector, Salempur, Deoria on 27.3.1993 and would perpetuate illegality. therefore, I am not inclined to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner in the above factual back drop of the case. 15. Collector, Salempur, Deoria on 27.3.1993 and would perpetuate illegality. therefore, I am not inclined to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner in the above factual back drop of the case. 15. So far as submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the land of Gaon Sabha was allotted to her in lieu of her sterilization under which the petitioner had under gone operation of Tubectomy, and the respondent State functionaries are bound by the principle of estoppel is concerned, it is to be noted that since the petitioner’s allotment was found to be contrary to the law i.e. against the provisions of Section 122-C of the Act, therefore, no plea of estoppel is operative against State machinery i.e. the Collector in cancelling the irregular Patta allotted to the petitioner which was contrary to the provisions of Section 122-C of the Act. Therefore, the submission of the petitioner, in this regard is also misplaced and has to be rejected. 16. In view of foregoing discussions, in my opinion, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is hereby dismissed. ——————