Judgment : Heard Shri S. D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri J. Vaz, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. 2. Rule. By consent heard forthwith. 3. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents waives service. 4. The above petition challenges an order passed by the learned Special Judge, N.D.P.S., Court dated 25.10.2012 whereby an application filed by the respondents under Section 36-A(4) of the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 for extension of time came to be partly allowed and the period was extended for a period of 90 days. 5. Shri S. D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order essentially on the ground that this Court by order dated 15.10.2012 had remanded the matter to the learned Special Judge to decide the extension as prayed by the respondents afresh in accordance with the material as available as on 01.09.2012 after hearing the parties in accordance with law. Shri S. D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel has pointed out that the learned Special Judge though has accepted the ratio as laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment reported in (2009)17 SCC page 631 in the case of Sanjay Kumar Kedia V/s Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau and another, to the effect that the seriousness of the offence should not be considered at the time of granting such application nevertheless while disposing of the application, the learned Special Judge has been carried away with the seriousness of the offence and implication of the petitioner in such offence to grant such application. The learned Senior Counsel has taken me through the impugned order passed by the learned NDPS Court and pointed out that the learned Special Judge at paras 16 and 17 has rightly observed the serious nature of the offence or that offence is grave is irrelevant for the purpose of deciding such an application but however while allowing the application, the learned Special Judge at para 34 has essentially granted the application on the assumption that the petitioner is involved in an offence which is of a serious nature. The learned Senior Counsel has thereafter taken me through the application under Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act and pointed out that the essential ingredients to be established to obtain an extension by the respondents are that the report of the Public Prosecutor should disclose the progress of the investigation and give specific reason as to why the custody of the petitioner is required for the purpose of seeking such an extension. Learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that it is incumbent upon the Public Prosecutor to make an independent opinion after going through the records to satisfy himself about the progress of the investigation and thereafter give specific reason as to why the custody of the petitioner is required for the purpose of carrying out further investigation. The learned Senior Counsel has taken me through the impugned order and pointed out that the learned Special Judge has not at all adhered to the said parameters as laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgment and as such erroneously granted the extension of time. The learned Senior counsel further pointed out that on bare perusal of the report of the Public Prosecutor, the essential ingredients as required have not been complied with in terms of the judgment of the Apex Court and as such the learned Special Judge was not justified to pass the impugned order. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that the learned Judge whilst passing the impugned order has not even given any specific reason as to why the custody of the petitioner is required for further investigation nor the learned Special Judge has applied its mind to ascertain the progress of the investigation on the aspects referred to by the Public Prosecutor while submitting his report dated 01.09.2012. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that it is well settled by the Apex Court that the Public Prosecutor should independently consider the said aspect while submitting his report for extension in terms of Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that the grounds on which the learned Special Public Prosecutor has given the report to seek extension are not at all relevant and as such, according to him no case is made out for any extension of time as sought by the respondents. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that the grounds on which the learned Special Public Prosecutor has given the report to seek extension are not at all relevant and as such, according to him no case is made out for any extension of time as sought by the respondents. The learned Senior Counsel has further pointed out that the learned Special Judge has also considered the matters which are otherwise not even the part of the report of the Special Public Prosecutor. The learned Senior Counsel has taken me through the impugned order and pointed out that it does not stand the tests as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar (supra). The learned Senior Counsel as such submits that the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6. On the other hand, Shri J. Vaz, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents has supported the impugned order. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has pointed out that though the seriousness of the offence is not stated to be a relevant aspect to be considered as laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment of Sanjay Kumar (supra) nevertheless the learned Special Judge cannot lose sight of the fact that the petitioner is involved in a grave offence against the public at large and as such the learned Special Judge was justified to consider the material on record and come to the conclusion that the respondents have made out a case for extension of time under Section 36-A(4) of NDPS Act. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has pointed out that the Public Prosecutor in his report at para 19, has specifically enumerated the aspects which are remain to be investigated for further investigation and as such, the learned Special Judge was justified to grant such an extension. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has further pointed out that the petitioner being a police officer is likely to tamper with the evidence and as such the learned Special Judge was justified to come to the conclusion that the petitioner deserves to remain in custody for carrying out further investigation. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has further pointed out that the petitioner being a police officer is likely to tamper with the evidence and as such the learned Special Judge was justified to come to the conclusion that the petitioner deserves to remain in custody for carrying out further investigation. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has pointed out that the learned Special Judge has considered the report of the Public Prosecutor as well as gone through the material on record and the case diary and has accepted the grounds on which the Public Prosecutor has sought such extension. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has further pointed out that as the learned Special Judge has been satisfied with the grounds for extension of time in terms of Section 36-A(4) of NDPS Act, there is no case made out by the petitioner for interference in the impugned order. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has further pointed out that the petitioner is involved in a grave offence and considering the exigency of the investigation, there is justification for the respondents to seek extension of time in terms of Section 36-A(4) of NDPS Act. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further pointed out that the learned Judge has rightly considered the material on record and has come to the conclusion that the respondents have made out a case for extension of time for the purpose of filing the charge sheet. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has further pointed out that the learned Special Judge has examined the case diary and has come to the conclusion that the grounds on which the extension has been sought in the report of the Public Prosecutor stands justified. The learned Special Public Prosecutor as such submits that no interference is called for in the impugned order. 7. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties and with the assistance of the learned Counsel perused the records. Considering the view I intend to take while disposing of the above petition, I find that elaborate enumeration of the facts are not necessary while disposing of the above petition. Before considering whether any interference is called for in the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge, it would be appropriate to consider the observations of the Apex Court in the judgment of Sanjay Kumar (supra). Before considering whether any interference is called for in the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge, it would be appropriate to consider the observations of the Apex Court in the judgment of Sanjay Kumar (supra). The Apex Court has observed at paras 10, 11, 12 and 13 thus: “10. It will be seen that Section 167 does not envisage an extension of the period of detention of an accused in custody beyond the specified periods. The legislature, however, thought in its wisdom, that certain special categories or situations required that the investigating agencies should be given more time to investigate a matter and to file their complaint or charge-sheets and such provisions have been made under special statutes. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter called “the TADA”) and the Act are two such special legislations. 11. Section 36-A(4) of the Act insofar as it is relevant, reads as under: “36-A. Offences triable by Special Courts.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), (a)-(d) * * * (2)-(3) * * * (4) In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A or for offences involving commercial quantity the references in subsection (2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), thereof to ‘ninety days’, where they occur, shall be construed as reference to ‘one hundred and eighty days’: Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days. (5) * * *” 12. The maximum period of 90 days fixed under Section 167(2) of the Code has been increased to 180 days for several categories of offences under the Act but the proviso authorises a yet further period of detention which may in total go up to one year, provided the stringent conditions provided therein are satisfied and are complied with. The maximum period of 90 days fixed under Section 167(2) of the Code has been increased to 180 days for several categories of offences under the Act but the proviso authorises a yet further period of detention which may in total go up to one year, provided the stringent conditions provided therein are satisfied and are complied with. The conditions provided are: (1) a report of the Public Prosecutor, (2) which indicates the progress of the investigation, and (3) specifies the compelling reasons for seeking the detention of the accused beyond the period of 180 days, and (4) after notice to the accused. 13. The question to be noticed at this stage is as to whether the two applications for extension that had been filed by the Public Prosecutor seeking an extension beyond 180 days met the necessary conditions. We find that the matter need not detain us as it is no longer res integra and is completely covered by the judgment of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu case. In this case, the Bench was dealing with the proviso inserted as clause (bb) in sub-section (4) of Section 20 of TADA, which is in pari materia with the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 36-A of the Act. This Court accepted the argument of the accused that an extension beyond 180 days could be granted but laid a rider that it could be so after certain conditions were satisfied.” 8. While applying the principles as laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment reported in 1994(4) SCC page 602 in the case of HitendraVishnu Thakur and Ors. V/s. State of Maharashtra and Ors., the Apex Court has inter-alia reiterated that for seeking extension of time, the Public Prosecutor after independent application of his mind to the request of the investigating agency is required to make a report to the designated Court indicating the progress of the investigation and disclose justification for keeping the accused in further custody of the investigating agency to complete the investigation. It is further observed by the Apex Court that the report of the Public Prosecutor must disclose on the face of it that he applied his mind and was satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered the grounds of further time to complete the investigation and that further time is necessary to complete the investigation. It is further observed by the Apex Court that the report of the Public Prosecutor must disclose on the face of it that he applied his mind and was satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered the grounds of further time to complete the investigation and that further time is necessary to complete the investigation. The report of the Public Prosecutor is not merely a formality but very vital because the consequences of its acceptance would affect the liberty of the accused. 9. In the light of the observations of the Apex Court in the said judgments, on perusal of the impugned order, I find that the learned Special Judge has not considered the parameters as laid down by the Apex Court whilst passing the impugned order. Though Shri Vaz, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents has pointed out that there are general observations noted by the Special Judge whilst passing the impugned order to come to such justification, I find that on perusal of the impugned order, the learned Special Judge has not considered whether the report of the Public Prosecutor stands the test as laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgment in the case of Hitendra Thakur ( supra ) as it is incumbent upon the learned Special Judge to consider the grounds on which the extension is sought and verify the progress of the investigation on the basis of the material produced before the learned Judge. On perusal of the report of the Public Prosecutor, there are specific aspects referred to in the report at para 19 thereof. But however, whilst passing the impugned order the learned Special Judge has not applied its mind to consider the progress of the investigation on such aspect and the compelling reason as to why the custody of the petitioner is required for further investigation. In the reply filed by the respondents to the above petition, in fact, the respondents have clearly summarised the requirements at para 7 of the said reply. But however, the said aspects have not been considered by the learned Special Judge whilst passing the impugned order. In the reply filed by the respondents to the above petition, in fact, the respondents have clearly summarised the requirements at para 7 of the said reply. But however, the said aspects have not been considered by the learned Special Judge whilst passing the impugned order. Shri Vaz, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents has fairly pointed out that though there are general observations disclosing the application of mind by the learned Special Judge on those aspects but however there are no specific findings on the basis of each and every material produced by the Public Prosecutor to justify the claim of the investigating agency for further extension of time. Shri Vaz, further states that there is sufficient material on record on that count. The Apex Court has clearly held that the Public Prosecutor has to independently apply its mind and disclose special reason as to why the custody of the petitioner is required for further investigation. It was incumbent upon the learned Special Judge to disclose the progress of the investigation and thereafter find out the compelling reason as to why the custody of the petitioner is required and give specific reason on that count. 10. Considering that the learned Special Judge has not applied the parameters as laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgments, I find it appropriate that the impugned order be quashed and set aside and the matter be remanded to the learned Special Judge to decide the application for extension of time filed by the respondents on the basis of the report dated 01.09.2012 afresh after hearing the parties in accordance with law. The learned Special Judge would have to consider the parameters as laid down by the Apex Court and decide as to whether such aspects are duly complied with whilst disposing of the application for extension of time. On this ground alone, I am inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 25.10.2012 and direct the learned Special Judge to decide the application for extension of time afresh in accordance with law. 11. On this ground alone, I am inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 25.10.2012 and direct the learned Special Judge to decide the application for extension of time afresh in accordance with law. 11. It is made clear that although the order granting extension of time is set aside, I am not inclined to release the petitioner on bail for not filing the charge sheet within the extended time and the petitioner shall continue to be in custody till disposal of the application under Section 36-A(4) of NDPS Act subject to order that the learned Special Judge may pass on the said application. Considering the urgency of the matter, I find it appropriate that the learned Special Judge be directed to dispose of the said application as expeditiously as possible and in any event within a period of seven days from the appearance. It is made clear that the application seeking extension shall be disposed of only on the basis of the material available till 01.09.2012. The learned Special Judge shall independently decide the said application by considering the judgments of the Apex Court referred to herein above. 12. It is brought to my notice by the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents that another application has been filed for further extension of time which is under consideration before the learned Special Judge. As such, the learned Special Judge shall consider to decide the earlier application before disposing of the fresh application filed by the respondents. The petitioner through his advocate and learned Special Public Prosecutor shall appear before the learned Special Judge of NDPS Court, on 6th December, 2012 at 2.30 p.m. 13. Criminal Revision application stands disposed of in above terms.