JUDGMENT Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 4-4-2011 passed by the District Judge, Pauri Garhwal, in Misc. Application No. 33 of 2010 filed with second appeal, whereby the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal of the appellant has been rejected as well as the judgment and decree dated 31-3-2008, passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division) Srinagar in Civil Suit No. 15 of 2007, Asha Bahuguna Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. whereby the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was decreed ex parte against the appellant-defendant. 3. It emerges out from a perusal of the record that that the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent bearing Civil Suit No. 15 of 2007 was decreed ex parte against the defendant-appellant herein by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Srinagar (Pauri Garhwal) by judgment and decree dated 31-3-2008. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendant filed a regular appeal after the limitation had expired, therefore, the appellant moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay bearing Misc. Application No. 33 of 2010 on the ground that summons was received by the defendant on 7-12-2007. Thereafter, an advocate was also engaged to defend the suit and all relevant papers were handed over to the said advocate for Pairvi. Thereafter on 28-1-2008, it was decided between the appellant and the respondent that the respondent will send a proposal to the appellant for partnership in the firm. According to the appellant, no such proposal was sent by the respondent and the suit had been decreed ex parte. It came to the notice of the appellant only on 29-8-2010 that the suit was decreed ex parte on 31-3-2008. Thereafter, on 31-8-2010 the representative of the appellant company applied for copy of the judgment and obtained the copy on 30-9-2010 and since the representative of the company was out of station, therefore, the appeal could not be filed within time and there is no deliberate delay in filing the appeal. 4. As per averment made in the application by the appellant that the representative of the company-appellant applied for certified copy of the judgment and decree on 29-8-2010, which was received on 30-9-2010. Thereafter, the appellant was preferred before the first appellate Court on 29-11-2010. 5. 4. As per averment made in the application by the appellant that the representative of the company-appellant applied for certified copy of the judgment and decree on 29-8-2010, which was received on 30-9-2010. Thereafter, the appellant was preferred before the first appellate Court on 29-11-2010. 5. Against the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, objection were filed before the appellate Court. The appellate Court after considering the objection of the respondent, has held that the copy of the judgment was obtained on 20-11-2009 by the counsel for the appellant-defendant and again application for obtaining certified copy of the judgment was made on 29-8-2010. The learned appellate Court has held that the appellant is a corporation and it is not an individual and that no plausible explanation has been put forward to condone the delay of 2,1/2 years. The learned appellate Court ultimately did not find favour with the appellant-applicant and dismissed the application for condonation of delay by order dated 4-4-2011, which gave rise to this second appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the party should not suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission or misdemeanour of his lawyer. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance in paragraph 3 of the case of Rafiq and another Vs. Munshilal and another [(1981) 2 Supreme Court Cases, 788]. In that case, the second appeal of the appellant before the Apex Court had been disposed of in the absence of his advocate and thereafter an application was moved before the High Court of Allahabad for recall of the order dismissing the appeal and to permit him to participate in the hearing of the appeal. The application was rejected by the High Court on the ground that though the application was prepared and drafted and an affidavit was sworn on October 29, 1980, the same was not presented to the Court till November 12, 1980 and that there is no satisfactory explanation for this slackness on the part of the learned Advocate, who was requested to file the application. On these facts, the Apex Court has held that “However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. On these facts, the Apex Court has held that “However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order.” 7. Learned counsel for the appellant further relied upon the case of “Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katiji and others [1987)2 SCC, 107] wherein the Apex Court has inter alia laid down that refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. In that case, there was a delay of 4 days in filing the appeal before the Jammu and Kashmir High Court. In that case, the Apex Court has held that sufficient cause existed for the delay. Therefore, the delay was condoned. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has further relied upon the case of “The State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others [(1972) 1, S.C.C. Page 366]. In that case, the Apex Court has held in paragraph 30 that “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party.” 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the case of State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others [(1996) 3 SCC, 132], wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 11 has observed that the expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s day.” 10. Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the case of Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and others Vs. Gobardhan Sao and others [(2002) 3 SCC, 195], wherein the same view had been taken by the Apex Court as that of the case of State of Haryaya (supra). 11. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the case of Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and others Vs. Gobardhan Sao and others [(2002) 3 SCC, 195], wherein the same view had been taken by the Apex Court as that of the case of State of Haryaya (supra). 11. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Sharad Sharma, appearing on behalf of the respondent in reply has submitted that in the case at hand, it is not the case of the appellant that there had been any inaction on the part of the counsel for the appellant and that even there is even no whisper that the appellant made any effort to know the status of the suit from his counsel but there was deliberate omission or misdemeanour on the part of its lawyer and that even material fact had been concealed by the appellant before the learned appellate Court. The appellant was under obligation to make out “sufficient cause” for delay, but has failed. He also submitted that there is enormous and inordinate delay of about 2,1/2 years for which no plausible explanation has come forward from the side of the appellant, as has been indicated by the first appellate Court, therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant that there exists “sufficient cause” for delay on the part of the appellant. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a recent judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of “Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and another” [(2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases, 563], wherein the Apex Court has considered “sufficient cause” and unexplained delay by government department and has held that condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. 12. The ratio of the above judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be disputed, but in the case at hand, there is no averment in the application moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act that the delay in filing the appeal had occurred because of the negligence of the counsel. The only ground was taken that the representative of the appellant-company was out of station, therefore, the appellant could not file the appeal. 13. The only ground was taken that the representative of the appellant-company was out of station, therefore, the appellant could not file the appeal. 13. I have perused the order dated 4-4-2011 passed by the first appellate Court on the application for condonation of delay moved by the appellant. It appears that in the objection filed against the delay condonation application, a ground was taken that the counsel for the appellant had already obtained copy of the judgment on 20-11-2009, but in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this fact was not disclosed and averment was made that the appellant had come to know of the fate of the judgment for the first time on 29-8-2010. The learned appellate Court did not accept this version of the appellant on factual aspect. Another ground taken by the appellant was that the representative of the appellant had gone out of station, therefore, the appeal could not be filed within time. The learned appellate court did not accept this contention on the ground that the appellant is a corporation and it has separate legal cell and that the delay of 2,1/2 years has not been explained satisfactorily. The first appellate Court has ultimately held that the copies of the judgment were obtained by the appellant twice and despite that, appeal was not filed within time and the delay caused is deliberate. 14. So far as the satisfaction of the Court on delay is concerned, it is a finding of fact. The first appellate Court is the final court so far as finding of fact is concerned and on perusal of record including the affidavits filed by the parties, the first appellate Court has recorded a finding that the appellant has concealed the fact in his application (4-A) that copy of judgment was obtained earlier by his counsel, therefore, it cannot be accepted that the appellant got the knowledge of the ex parte decree of the suit for the first time on 29-8-2010. It has been held by the learned first appellate Court that the appellant failed to make out sufficient cause for delay and that delay has not been explained satisfactorily as well as that the delay caused is deliberate. It has been held by the learned first appellate Court that the appellant failed to make out sufficient cause for delay and that delay has not been explained satisfactorily as well as that the delay caused is deliberate. So far as the proposal mentioned in the delay condonation application is concerned, the same was required to be sent during the pendency of the suit and it has no concern with the delay condonation application. The findings recorded by the first appellate Court are finding of fact, which have been assailed in this second appeal. 15. Besides, no substantial question of law arises in this appeal, therefore, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. 16. The appeal is dismissed in limine. All pending applications stand disposed of.