Hon'ble GOMBER, J.—Aggrieved by the order of framing of charge dated 27.10.2010, passed by Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Tonk, in Sessions Case No. 36/2010, the complainant as also the accused persons filed their respective petitions under Section 397 read with 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `the Code'). 2. Hon'ble GOMBER, J.—Aggrieved by the order of framing of charge dated 27.10.2010, passed by Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Tonk, in Sessions Case No. 36/2010, the complainant as also the accused persons filed their respective petitions under Section 397 read with 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `the Code'). 2. Briefly stated facts, relevant for the purpose of disposal of these petitions, are that FIR No. 315/2009 under Sections 143, 341 and 323 IPC was registered at Police Station Deoli (Tonk), on the basis of written report submitted by complainant Banna Lal, which reads as under:- lsok esa] Jheku Fkkukf/kdkjh Fkkuk nsoyh fo"k;% jaft'k ds dkj.k esjs HkkbZ ds lkFk tku ysok ekjihV djus ckcr egksn; th mijksDr fo"k; esa fuosnu gS fd vkt fnukad 29-8-09 ds 9 cts lqcg esjk HkkbZ lq[kyky eksVj lkbfdy ls jek;yk ls cnyk vk jgk Fkk fd cnyk ds utnhd igyh gh jes'k iq= cnzhyky] lkaojk iq= jkes'oj] jkefuokl iq= jkes'oj] jkes'oj iq= Jou] ukjk;.k iq= gjxksiky] f'ko izdk'k iq= ukjk;.k] ukuwyky iq= dk'khjke] jkes'oj iq= n;kjke] 'kadj iq= ukjk;.k] jke/ku iq= eqdUuk /keZ iq= cnzhyky] lHkh tkrh tkV fuoklh cnyk o vU; 5-7 O;fDr;ksa us feydj esjs HkkbZ ij geyk dj fn;k bu yksxksa ds gkFkksa esa dqYgkfM+;k] vifBr yksgs ds lfj;k ikbi Fks jes'k iq= cnzh us esjs HkkbZ ds nksuksa iSjksa esa gYckuh ls ekjh] jkes'oj iq= n;kjke us ?kqVus ds uhps dqYgkM+h ekjh]ukjk;.k iq= gjxksiky us esjs HkkbZ ds cka;s gkFk esa gYckuh ds rh[ks ukSad ls xksn xksn dj Nsn dj fn;s laojk us gYckuh ls ekjdj nka;k iSj ij Nsn dj fn;k vkSj flj esa Hkh pksVs ekjh mDr lHkh yksxksa us lfj;ksa ikbi vkSj gYckfu;ksa ls xaHkhj ekjihV dh esjs HkkbZ ds fpYykus ij f?klk yky iq= txnh'k dqekor fuoklh jkFkkyk] iIiw iq= fd'ku yky tkV] fujek dqekjh iq=h ukuwyky fuoklh cMyk vkSj esa [kqn Hkkxdj x;k vkSj chp cpko djkrs le; fujek dqkjh o esjs lkFk Hkh ekjihV dh esjs iSj esa vkSj fujek ds ihB ij pksV vkbZ gSa] ge lHkh lq[kyky dks ysdj dsdM+h vLirky x;s tgka MkWDVjksa us lq[kyky dh xaHkhj gkyr gksus ds dkj.k t;iqj jsQj dj fn;k] esjk HkkbZ lq[kyky tkV xzke iapk;r ekysMk ds ljaip gSa dqN le; iwoZ xzke iapk;r }kjk ujsxk ;kstuk dk dke py jgk Fkk ftlesa bUgha vijk/kh O;fDr;ksa us dke esa ck/kk Mkyh Fkh ftl ckcr esjs HkkbZ us mDr fo:) iz'kklu dks f'kdk;r dh Fkh bl dkj.k ;g yksx esjs HkkbZ ls jaft'k j[kus yxs vkSj bl jaft'k ds dkj.k gh mDr yksxksa us esjs HkkbZ ij tku ysok geyk djds xaHkhj pksVs igqapkbZ gS] geus chp cpko djk;k vU;Fkk esjs HkkbZ dks tku ls ekj Mkyrs fjiksVZ djus vk;k gwa] fjiksVZ ntZ dj mfpr dk;Zokgh djus dh d`ik djsa ;g ?kVuk Nhrj iq= dk'khjke ds ?kj ds lkeus ?kfVr gqbZ gSA ,l-Mh-@- cUukyky tkV] fuoklh cMyk rglhy nsoyh fnukad 29-8-09** 3. After usual investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the petitioners before the concerned Magistrate for offences under Sections 147, 148, 341, 323, 325 and 308 read with 149 IPC. The case was committed to the Sessions Judge, Tonk, and was received by Additional Sessions Judge, by way of transfer. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, after hearing the charge arguments, read over the charges for offences under Sections 147, 148, 341, 323, 325 and 308 alternatively 325/149 and 308/149 IPC, which were denied by the accused persons and trial was claimed. It is this order of framing of charge, which has been assailed by the complainant, as also by the accused persons through their respective revision petitions. 4. The revisionist of revision petition No. 121/2011 is the complainant Banna Lal. The contention of learned counsel for the complainant was that there was sufficient evidence to prima facie proceed against the accused person for offence punishable under Section 307 IPC and that the learned trial Court has committed an error in framing charge under Section 308 and not under Section 307 IPC. 5. On the other hand, the revisionists of revision petition No. 1212/2010, (accused persons), contended that on the basis of material placed on record, charge under Section 308 IPC could not have been framed, because no injury was found on vital parts by the doctor, and the injuries found, were opined to be simple, and there was no opinion of the doctor about any of the injuries being sufficient to cause death or dangerous to life and, therefore, the case of prosecution could not travel beyond Section 325 IPC. 6. Learned counsel for the State, on the other side, contended that the material placed on record has to be taken on its face value, at the stage of framing of charge, and statements of witnesses cannot be looked upon with suspicion at this stage. 7. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the record. 8. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the court has not to weigh the facts, in a sensitive balance and to conclude that, if proved, the same would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused. At that stage, the court has not to consider as to whether sufficient grounds are available in the facts alleged to base the conviction of the accused. At that stage, the court has not to consider as to whether sufficient grounds are available in the facts alleged to base the conviction of the accused. Only a prima facie case is to be disclosed from the facts alleged and the same would be sufficient to framed the charge. Strong suspicion is sufficient to frame the charge. If the facts alleged disclose the commission of offence on general consideration of the material placed before the court by the Investigating Agency, that by itself would be sufficient to frame the charge. 9. Meaning thereby, sufficiency of the material to establish the offence alleged against the accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt, has not to be looked into at this stage. Court is not supposed to delve deeply into the merits of the matter and start a roving enquiry into the evidence, that is, brought forth before it, as if conducting a trial in arriving at a conclusion as to whether prima facie case was disclosed or not. Court has to only consider the material placed before it by the investigating agency and the material produced before it has to be considered and taken on its face value. 10. There is one fixed definition that can the term strong suspicion have a singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of its own independent facts and circumstances. 11. In the background of this legal position, if the facts of the case in hand are looked into, it shows that the brother of injured lodged report to the effect that at 9.00 a.m., when the complainant's brother Sukhlal was coming on his motorcycle from Ramaela to Badla, and when he reached near Badla, the accused persons being five to seven in number, attacked on his brother, and at that time they were laced with axes, sariyas, iron rods, pipes and halwani. The injuries were allegedly caused by the named persons by kulhari and halwani, on various parts of body, including his head. According to the complainant, on hue & cry, he as also Ghisa Lal, Pappu, Nirma reached the spot, and while intervening he and Nirma also got injuries on their persons. 12. The injuries were allegedly caused by the named persons by kulhari and halwani, on various parts of body, including his head. According to the complainant, on hue & cry, he as also Ghisa Lal, Pappu, Nirma reached the spot, and while intervening he and Nirma also got injuries on their persons. 12. According to the FIR, the injured was taken to Kekri Hospital, but on account of his being serious, he was referred to Jaipur. In the FIR itself, it was mentioned that the injured Sukhlal was Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat Malera, and on account of accused persons interfering in the Narega Project, the injured Sukhlal had lodged a report against them to the administration and, therefore, they were inimical towards Sukhlal, the Sarpanch, and in planned manner they attacked on him. 13. The record shows that the weapons mentioned in the FIR, were all dangerous weapons, being axe, iron rods, halwani etc., but the parts of body chosen for inflicting injuries were legs and other non vital parts, and no injury has been found on Sukhlal's vital parts. However, there is sufficient material to show that there were inimical relations between the accused and the injured Sukhlal on account of Narega Project and the circumstances under which the accused persons gathered laced with these dangerous weapons, show that they had the intention or at-least knowledge that using these dangerous weapons is likely to cause death. Section 308 IPC reads as under:- "Attempt to commit culpable homicide Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both, and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both." As is clear from above, that the act of accused persons, i.e. being 5 to 7 in number, laced with dangerous weapons, attacking the injured Sukhlal, Sarpanch, when he was alone, in the background of inimical relationship, shows their clear intention. Therefore, these does not appear to be any reason at this stage to interfere with the order of framing of charge, passed by the learned trial Court for offence under Section 308 IPC, and in these circumstances, the revision petition of the accused persons (1212/2010), is found as having no merit. It is not out of place to mention that the learned trial Court has also framed alternative charge under Section 308/149 and 325/149 IPC, and it can be decided after the evidence before the trial Court as to what offence is proved. 14. So far as the contention of the revisionist-complainant is concerned, it is pertinent to look into the provision of law for the same. Section 307 IPC reads as under:- "Attempt to murder Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to [imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned." 15. From a bare perusal of the said provision, it is evident that first part thereof does not contemplate that receipt of any injury on the part of the victim is a pre-requisite for convicting an accused thereunder. In the event injuries are received, the second part of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code is intention or knowledge. The legal position would be evident from the illustration (c) appended to the said provision, which reads as under: "(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section." 16. In Parsuram Pandey & Ors. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section." 16. In Parsuram Pandey & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2004) 13 SCC 189 ) it was held by Hon'ble Apex Court:- "To constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence must be present: (a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (b) the doing of an act towards it. For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of causing death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence "of attempt to murder." Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors. Some of the relevant considerations may be the nature of the weapon used, the place where injuries were inflicted, the nature of the injuries and the circumstances in which the incident took place." 17. Said decision, therefore, itself is an authority for the proposition that intention of or knowledge relating to the commission of murder and the doing of an act towards it, are the two ingredients of the offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, and the intention is inferred from various considerations i.e. the nature of the weapon, the part of the body chosen for inflicting injuries and the nature of injuries and the circumstances in which incident took place. Since the two ingredients necessary for attracting Sec. 307 IPC are missing, therefore, the argument of learned counsel for complainant Banna Lal (revisionist of Revision No.121/2011), is not sustainable. The learned trial court has rightly not found charge under Section 307 IPC. 18. In the case of Omwati (Smt.) and Anr. Since the two ingredients necessary for attracting Sec. 307 IPC are missing, therefore, the argument of learned counsel for complainant Banna Lal (revisionist of Revision No.121/2011), is not sustainable. The learned trial court has rightly not found charge under Section 307 IPC. 18. In the case of Omwati (Smt.) and Anr. vs. State reported in (2001) 4 SCC 333 , the Apex Court held that High Court should not ordinarily interfere with trial Court's order for framing of charge unless there is glaring injustice because the interference of High Court may encourage unscrupulous persons to protract trial and prevent culmination of criminal case which would amount to abuse of process of the court. 19. The petitioners will have ample opportunity to put forward their stand during the trial when witnesses are examined. I do not find any perversity or illegality in the impugned order warranting interference of this court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 20. The two revision petitions filed by the complainant as also by the accused persons, have no merit and deserve to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed but with no order as to costs.