Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 2240 (RAJ)

Hashmat Alam v. State

2012-11-29

MEENA V.GOMBER

body2012
Hon'ble GOMBER, J.—The instant criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking quashment of FIR No. 121/2012 lodged by complainant-respondent No. 2 at P.S. JDA, Jaipur registered for offence under Sections 420, 406 and 120B IPC. 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that when the parties have amicably settled their dispute out of Court, no fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the matter alive for trial and, therefore, prayed that this petition may be allowed in view of compromise arrived at between the parties in the light of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Manoj Sharma vs. State and Ors. (2008) 16 SCC 1. 3. Learned Public Prosecutor and counsel appearing on behalf of complainant-respondent No. 2 corroborate the fact of arriving at compromise. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor for the State as well as learned counsel for complainant-respondent No. 2, and perused the material available on record as well as the case law cited on the subject. 5. In the judgment in the case of Manoj Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashment of proceedings of an FIR under Sections 420, 406 and 120-B IPC, held that except Section 420 IPC, which could be compounded with the permission of the Court, other offences under Sections 406 and 120B IPC, mentioned in FIR, could not even be compounded with the permission of the Court and that High Court or even Supreme Court would not ordinarily be justified in doing something indirectly which could not be done directly. But the Apex Court in para 23 of the judgment, observed that however, Section 320 Cr.P.C. cannot be read in isolation, but has to be read along with the other provisions in Cr.P.C., and one such other provision, as per the Apex Court is Section 482 Cr.P.C. Para 23 of the judgment reads as under: "....However, it has to be pointed out that Section 320 Cr.P.C. cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with the other provisions in Cr.P.C. One such other provision is Section 482 Cr.P.C. which reads: "482. It has to be read along with the other provisions in Cr.P.C. One such other provision is Section 482 Cr.P.C. which reads: "482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." The words "Nothing in this Code" used in Section 482 is a non-obstante clause, and gives it overriding effect over other provisions in Cr.P.C. The words "or otherwise to secure the ends of justice" in Section 482 implies that to secure the interest of justice sometimes (though only in very rare cases) the High Court can pass an order in violation of a provision in Cr.P.C..." 6. Although in this case, while interpreting Section 320 along with Section 482 Cr.P.C., having a non-obstante clause, the Apex Court observed that this matter should be determined elaborately by a larger Bench in some later case. 7. Accordingly, a Division Bench of Apex Court in the matter of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. on 23.11.2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 8989/2010) expressed that the decisions rendered in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 675 , Nikhil Merchants vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another (2008) 9 SCC 677 and Manoj Sharma vs. State of others (2008) 16 SCC 1, require reconsideration and the matter was directed to be placed before a larger Bench to reconsider the correctness of the aforesaid three decisions. 8. It was observed that in these decisions Apex Court has indirectly permitted compounding of non-compoundable offences whereas Section 320 Cr.P.C. mentions certain offences compoundable, certain other offences as compoundable with the permission of the Court and the other offences as non-compoundable vide Section 320(7) Cr.P.C. 9. Further the Court expressed that something which cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly and non-compoundable offences cannot be compounded by the Court whether directly or indirectly. 10. Further the Court expressed that something which cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly and non-compoundable offences cannot be compounded by the Court whether directly or indirectly. 10. Larger Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP (crl) No. 8989/2010 in the matter of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another decided on 24.9.2012 along with other SLPs No. 6138 of 2006, No. 5203 of 2011, 259 of 2011, 5921 of 2009, 7148 of 2009, 6324 of 2009 and Cr. Appeal Nos. 2107-2125 of 2011 held in para 57 as under:- "57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding of FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plentitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercises in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceedings or complaint of FIR may be exercises where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question (s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings." 11. Accordingly, Hon'ble Larger Bench answered the reference saying that it cannot be said that (i) B.S. Joshi (ii) Nikhil Merchant and (iii) Manoj Sharma were not correctly decided. 12. Accordingly, Hon'ble Larger Bench answered the reference saying that it cannot be said that (i) B.S. Joshi (ii) Nikhil Merchant and (iii) Manoj Sharma were not correctly decided. 12. In view of the Apex Court's pronouncement in the matter Manoj Sharma vs. State (supra) & Gian Singh (supra), I am of the considered view that although Sections 406 & 120B IPC are not compoundable even with the permission of the Court, but in view of the pronouncements discussed hereinabove and the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. and keeping in view the nature of offence being private in nature, I am of the considered view that when the parties have arrived at a compromise out of Court, keeping the matter alive with no possibility of result in favour of the prosecution, will serve no purpose as because of compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. 13. Accordingly, in the light of principles of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, this petition is allowed and the FIR No. 121/2012 registered at PS-JDA, Jaipur for offences under Sections 420, 406 and 120-B IPC, and criminal proceedings pending pursuant thereto against the petitioner, are hereby quashed in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties and the petitioners are acquitted of these charges. 14. Criminal Misc. petition as also the stay application stand disposed.