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2012 DIGILAW 2249 (BOM)

Yogesh Hanmant Madane v. State of Maharashtra

2012-12-04

P.D.KODE, V.M.KANADE

body2012
Judgment : (Per V.M. Kanade, J.) 1. Heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant and the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent. 2. Appellant has filed this appeal, challenging the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court which was pleased to convict the Appellant inter alia for the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. 3. Prosecution case in brief is that there was some dispute regarding right of way of the deceased and his family members over the land owned by the accused. Prosecution case is that on the date of the incident, in the morning, the deceased and his family members had used the said land belonging to the accused and at this stage there was an altercation between the two and the members pf the family of accused No.1 abused the members of the family of the deceased. The deceased and his family members, therefore, came to the house of the accused to question them whey they had abused them in the morning. After they entered the house, there was altercation in which the accused and his father were injured and the accused assaulted the deceased with an axe and gave one sinlge blow on his head. Prosecution case is that force with which the axe blow was given was such that the axe got entangled in his head. Prosecution case is that he also assaulted one another person before assaulting the deceased. Accused were arrested and charge-sheet was filed after investigation was over. Accused pleaded not guilty to the said charge. 4. Prosecution examined in all 12 witnesses and on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, Trial Court came to the conclusion that the accused had committed an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. 5. Mr. Chaudhry, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant submitted that even if the case of the prosecution is accepted in toto, the Appellant, by making suggestions in the cross-examination and on account of circumstances which were brought on record, had established that he had acted in self defence and, therefore, it could not be said that the accused had committed offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. He submitted that in the morning the deceased and his family members took the herd of about 40 to 50 sheep through agricultural land of the accused on which mataki crop was raised and the said crop was completely damaged on account of the sheep destroying the said crop and the accused suffered huge damage. He submitted that the deceased and his family members entered the house of the accused in the evening and started quarreling and also assaulted the Appellant and his father on account of which they have suffered injuries and, therefore, the Appellant had acted in self-defence and, as a result of that the deceased had been killed. He submitted that, therefore, at the most, the accused had exceeded in the exercise of his right of private defence and, therefore, his case would fall under section 304 Part-I and not under section 302 of Indian Penal Code. He submitted that, at the highest, sentence of five years could be awarded to him. He has taken us through the judgment and order of the Trial Court and also evidence of the witnesses who were examined by the prosecution. He has relied upon the following judgments:- (1) Yogendra Morarji vs. The State of Gujarat ( AIR 1980 SC 660 ) (2) State of U.P. vs. Lakhmi ( AIR 1998 SC 1007 ) (3) Periasami and another vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1997 CRI.L.J. 219) 6. On the other hand, Mrs. Bhosale, the learned APP appearing on behalf of the State vehemently opposed the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant. She invited our attention to the observation made by the Trial Court and submitted that the Trial Court had clearly observed that neither any specific suggestion was made by the accused asserting that he had acted in self-defence nor any material was there on record or circumstances to establish that he had acted in his right of self-defence. She also pointed out that the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that mataki crop was grown was not proved since P.W.1 in her evidence had clearly stated that the land was barren land. This submission has been countered by the learned Counsel Mr. Chaudhry for the Appellant, pointing out the admission given by P.W.1 in her cross-examination that mataki crop was grown on the said field. This submission has been countered by the learned Counsel Mr. Chaudhry for the Appellant, pointing out the admission given by P.W.1 in her cross-examination that mataki crop was grown on the said field. The learned APP has relied upon the following judgments:- (1) Ajit Singh vs. State of Punjab ( (2011) 9 SCC 462 ) (2) Dashrath Singh vs. State of U.P.( (2004) 7 SCC 408 ) 7. After having heard both the parties at length and after having perused the judgment and order of the Trial court as also having gone through the evidence on record, we are of the view that there is much substance in the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that even if the case of the prosecution is accepted in its entirety, taking into consideration defence of the accused, the case, at the highest, would fall not under section 302 but under section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code. 8. It is a well settled position in law that for the purpose of taking private defence, it is not necessary to specifically plead or adduce any evidence in support of the said defence. It is perfectly legal and permissible to rely on the evidence which is adduced by the prosecution for the purpose of proving that the circumstances which had been brought on record either through admissions given in the cross-examination or the suggestions which have been made in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses disclose that defence of self-defence taken by the Appellant is probable and the Court is duty bound to take into consideration such material on record and in the light of such material, considering the facts of the case arrive at a particular conclusion. The Division Bench of this Court in Shivaji Ganu Naik vs. State of Maharashtra and another( (2011) 9 SCC 462 ) has observed in para 13 of its judgment as under:- “13. It is well-settled that the right of private defence need not be specifically pleaded. Its benefit can be given to the accused if circumstances show that he may have acted in exercise of it. It is also well-settled that unexplained injuries of the accused are a strong basis for concluding that he might have acted in the exercise of such a right. Its benefit can be given to the accused if circumstances show that he may have acted in exercise of it. It is also well-settled that unexplained injuries of the accused are a strong basis for concluding that he might have acted in the exercise of such a right. In this case, it can be reasonably inferred that when the deceased Dhullappa came to the house of the appellant to take Irappa, he must have come armed with a weapon and prepared to assault him with that weapon, in order to achieve his objective. It should be remembered that even according to the prosecution the appellant was objecting to Dhulappa beating Irappa and taking him away. What appears probable to us is that when the appellant resisted Dhulappa's act of forcibly taking Irappa, he assaulted him on his wrist and only thereafter the appellant inflicted two knife blows on him.” The Apex Court in Yogendra Morarji vs. The State of Gujarat( AIR 1980 SC 660 ) has observed in paragraphs 39 and 40 of its judgment as under:- “39. Furthermore, the accused should not have fired all the three rounds in quick succession. He should have after firing one round waited for a second or two to see its effect on the persons attempting to gherao him. If that fire did not have the desire effect, then he should have fired the next round. But the mere fact that he did not assess the necessity of firing each successive shot does not negative good faith on his part in the exercise of his right because a person placed in peril is not expected to weigh “in golden scales” what amount of force is necessary to keep within the right. Thus, this is a case in which the accused has exceeded this limit of the right of private defence available to him under Sec. 101, Penal Code. Nevertheless, this is a circumstance which can be taken into account in mitigation of the sentence.” “40. Thus, this is a case in which the accused has exceeded this limit of the right of private defence available to him under Sec. 101, Penal Code. Nevertheless, this is a circumstance which can be taken into account in mitigation of the sentence.” “40. We agree with the High Court, that the offence committed by the accused is one under S. 304, Part II, Penal Code and does not amount to murder under any of the four clauses of the definition given in Section 300, Penal Code.” The Apex Court in State of U.P. vs. Lakhmi ( AIR 1998 SC 1007 )in para 16 of it s judgment has observed as under:- “16. The law is that burden of proving such an exception is on the accused. But the mere fact that accused adopted another alternative defence during his examination under Section 313 of the IPC without referring to Exception No.1 of Section 300 of IPC is not enough to deny him of the benefit of the Exception, if the Court can cull out materials from evidence pointing to the existence of circumstances leading to that exception. It is not the law that failure to set up such a defence would foreclose the right to rely on the exception once and for all. It is axiomatic that burden on the accused to prove any fact can be discharged either through defence evidence or even through prosecution evidence by showing a preponderance of probability.” The Apex Court in Periasami and another vs. State of Tamil Nadu1 in paragraphs 18 and 19 of its judgment has observed as under:- “18. The above legal position has been succinctly stated by Subbarao, J. (as he then was) in a case where an accused pleaded the exception under S. 84, IPC (Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 (at pp. 1566 and 1567) “The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in S. 299 of the Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution.................................. If the material placed before the Court, such as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of “Prudent man”, the accused will have discharged his burden. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution.................................. If the material placed before the Court, such as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of “Prudent man”, the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under S. 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself.” “19. In Pratap vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1976) 2 SCC 798 : ( AIR 1976 SC 966 ) a three judges bench was considering a case where the accused failed to adduce evidence to establish the exception under S.95, IPC. It was held that even if the accused failed to establish his plea, in a case where prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant on an essential ingredient of the offence of murder, the plea of right of private defence cannot reasonably be ruled out from prosecution evidence the benefit of it must go to the accused. In Yogendra Morarji v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 660 another bench of three judges of this Court dealt with S. 105 of the Evidence Act and observed thus (para 16) : “Notwithstanding the failure of the accused to establish positively the existence of circumstances which would bring his case within an Exception, the circumstances proved by him may raise a reasonable doubt with regard to one or more of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself with which the accused stands charged. Thus there may be cases where, despite the failure of the accused to discharge his burden under S. 105 the material brought on the record may, in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, be enough to induce in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt with regard to the mens rea requisite for an offence under S. 299 of the Code.” 9. In view of this settled position in law, it will have to be seen whether, in the facts of the present case, Appellant was justified in claiming that he had acted in self-defence and while doing so he, at the highest, exceeded his right of self-defence and, therefore, the offence would not fall under section 302 but under section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code. 10. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the Appellant/accused and his father were both injured in the attack by the deceased and his family members in the incident which took place in the house of the accused. This fact itself clearly shows that the deceased and his family members were the main aggressors since they had entered the house late in the evening and though they were not carrying any weapons, they had quarreled with the accused and the Appellant and his father had received certain injuries. Though the said injuries may be treated as minor injuries, the fact remains that the entire mob of the family of the deceased entered the house of the accused and started quarreling and, therefore, it is plausible that the Appellant had acted in self-defence. It is no doubt true that the deceased and his family members were not carrying any lethal weapons and, therefore, use of an axe with excessive force would clearly show that the Appellant had exceeded in exercising his right of private defence. Yet, the fact remains that this assault by the Appellant/accused would certainly not fall in the category of 'murder' under section 300 of the Indian Penal Code since he is covered by the exception. It is pertinent to note that the Chapter on general exceptions clearly contemplates a situation that right of private defence can be taken in cases where property and the person is in danger and in such cases owner of such property or person who is under attack can defend himself and while exercising the right of self-defence if any injury is caused, he would be absolved of the liability which the Act otherwise imposes for commission of the said act. The law, therefore, exonerates such person even if he commits an act of assault with an intention and knowledge that it would result in the death of the victim. The law, therefore, exonerates such person even if he commits an act of assault with an intention and knowledge that it would result in the death of the victim. The Indian Penal Code has contemplated various situations in which such a person can act in such a manner which would result in death of the offender. Sections 96, 97 and 100 of the Indian Penal Code read as under:- “96. Things done in private defence.- Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.” “97. Right of private defence of the body and of property.-Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend- First. – His own body and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body; Secondly.-The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.” “100. When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death.-The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:- First.-Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; Secondly.-Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; Thirdly.-An assault with the intention of committing rape; Fourthly.-As assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust; Fifthly.-An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting; Sixthly.-As assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.” However, the Indian Penal Code does not give a blanket exemption to such person and if he exceeds his right of self-defence which is given to him, then, in that case, provision prescribes that still his case would fall under the exception of having exceeded in exercising the right of private defence. Exception (2) of section 300 reads as under:- Exception 2.-Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.” 11. In our view, action of the Appellant would be covered under the second exception to Section 300. The deceased and his family members had entered the house of the Appellant late in the evening after the incident of trespassing had taken place in his field in the morning and the deceased had taken the herd of sheep into the crop of mataki in the field of the accused. In spite of the having caused damage to the said crop, deceased and his family members again came back late in the evening in the house of the accused and picked up a quarrel and assaulted the accused and as a result of which he suffered some injuries and, under these circumstances, the accused retaliated and defended himself and his family members. Obviously, therefore, it could not be said that the accused had committed the said act with premeditation since he had no instinct that the deceased and his family members would come to his house late in the evening. The said exercise of right of defence was without premeditation. However, the fact that the axe was used and single blow was given on the head of the deceased with such a force that the axe was embedded in the head of the deceased and was entangled and could not be removed from the head, shows that the Appellant had clearly exceeded in his right of private defence and, therefore his case would not fall under section 302 but under section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code. 12. Having held that the Trial Court had erred in convicting the Appellant under section 302, and not under section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code, the next question which falls for consideration is what sentence should be awarded to the Appellant. 12. Having held that the Trial Court had erred in convicting the Appellant under section 302, and not under section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code, the next question which falls for consideration is what sentence should be awarded to the Appellant. In the present, case mitigating circumstances are that the crop of the Appellant was destroyed by the deceased and his family members and in the evening they entered the house of the Appellant and there was skirmish between the two parties which was commenced at the instance of the deceased and his family members and, under such circumstances, the said incident had taken place. Bearing in mind the said peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the Appellant should be awarded sentence of five years of rigorous imprisonment. 13. In the result the following order is passed:- ORDER The judgment and order of the Trial Court to the extent of holding that the appellant has committed an offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life is set aside and quashed. Appellant, however, is convicted for the offence punishable under section 304 Part-II of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay fine of Rs 500/-and, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Appellant, if he has already undergone the sentence and paid fine, shall be released forthwith unless he is otherwise required in any other case. Accordingly, appeal is partly allowed and disposed of. Since this appeal itself is disposed of. Criminal Application No.1642 of 2012 does not survive and the same is also disposed of.