Judgment :- Heard both sides. 2. The petitioner is a workman. Aggrieved by the award dated 18.01.2007 passed by the first respondent Labour Court, Chennai in I.D.No.645/1997 declining to grant any relief, the writ petition came to be filed. 3. The writ petition was admitted on 11.12.2007. On notice from this Court, the second respondent Management has filed a counter affidavit dated 13.02.2012. 4. The case of the workman was that he was employed in the second respondent Management with effect from 23.05.1989 as an Operator in the Assembly Section. In the second respondent factory, there were two Trade Unions. After a long time demands, the Trade Union, in which the petitioner was a member, namely the TI Diamond Chain General Workers Union was accepted as a collective bargaining agent. The Trade Union had certain demands with reference to the service condition of the workmen. As the Management was dragging and not coming to the conclusion, the Trade Union wanted to conduct certain agitation. As a first step, the family members of the workers were coming regularly to the factory gate and the secondly, a protest and meeting to condemn the attitude of the Management was organised. In order to highlight the urgency of the situation, two persons namely Chockalingam and Ragothaman went on indefinite fast with effect from 26.06.1995. During the indefinite fast in the pandal, number of workers used to assemble and also used to work for the Unions and doing small works including affixing of posters in various buses which were passing thereby. Even though the agitation was continuing for more than one month, there was no significant incident of any violence. During the agitation period, the second respondent Management took action against several persons, including one T. Lawrence. The second respondent Management was persistent in continuing action. On 07.06.1995, the Management accused the petitioner for slow in work and the petitioner was placed under suspension. He gave his explanation on 13.06.1995. But the Management did not take any action. On 30.06.1995, the Management charge sheeted the workman on the ground that with a view to intimidated the Senior Superintendent Thamaraiselvan, at about 07.50 a.m, on 30.06.1995, he obstructed the entrance and also kept a stick on his hand and accused the Superintendent that he was intimidating the persons working inside and warned him to behave himself. On 30.06.1995, the Management charge sheeted the workman on the ground that with a view to intimidated the Senior Superintendent Thamaraiselvan, at about 07.50 a.m, on 30.06.1995, he obstructed the entrance and also kept a stick on his hand and accused the Superintendent that he was intimidating the persons working inside and warned him to behave himself. Without calling for any explanation on the show cause notice, an enquiry was conducted. On the basis of the enquiry report, the petitioner was dismissed from service on 23.09.1996. The Trade Union proceeded against the dismissal of the petitioner and a consent petition containing 314 signatures of the workmen was filed before the Management for revoking the termination order. The Trade Union also threatened to go on strike on 28.12.1996. On that day, the Mill did not function. Subsequently, on coming to know that if a collective dispute is raised, it may delay the process of the reference to be made by the State Government, the workman raised an industrial dispute under Section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Conciliation Officer as he could not bring about mediation, submitted a failure report dated 11.07.1997. On the strength of the failure report, the workman filed a claim statement before the first respondent Labour Court on 07.11.1997. The said dispute was registered as I.D.No.645/1997 and notice was issued to the second respondent Management. The second respondent Management filed a counter statement dated 14.11.1998. 5. Before the Labour Court, the workman examined himself as W.W.1 and on his side, 15 documents were filed and marked as Exs.W1 to W15. On the side of the Management, 22 documents were filed and marked as Exs.M1 to M22 and no witnesses were examined on behalf of the Management. 6. The Labour Court held that the enquiry held against the workman was fair and proper. With reference to the charges, the Labour Court held that the evidence let in by the Management was sufficient to prove the charges and the findings of the Enquiry Officer was in conformity with the evidence recorded. On the question of punishment, the Labour Court held that the punishment do not require any interference. 7. Mr. S. Kumaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner took this Court to the elaborate enquiry proceedings. In fact, he has stated that the charges itself is comparted. On the question of punishment, the Labour Court held that the punishment do not require any interference. 7. Mr. S. Kumaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner took this Court to the elaborate enquiry proceedings. In fact, he has stated that the charges itself is comparted. The Management witness viz., Security Officer did not even know what was the utterances made by the workman. He merely stated that since the workers were at distance, he could not hear them. They are all shouting by saying "Hai, Hui". While the statement of the Superintendent Thamaraiselvan was that the workman had a stick, the Security Officer confirmed that the workman had a black tag. It was also admitted that the workers were assembled in front of the Pandal erected for the two persons, who were in the hunger strike and they were stopping the buses and affixing posters. The persons, who were actually found in the Pandal, are also examined and they denied any such incident and they were not cross examined by the Management. 8. Mr. S. Kumaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that it is the fundamental right of the workers to protest against the unfair labour practice of the Management and none of the workers involved in violence though the agitation was going on for more than one month and the present charge is comparted and not supported by any legal evidence. 9. In this context, Mr. S. Kumaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in PALGHAT BPL AND PSP THOZHILALI UNION VS. BPL INDIA LTD. AND ANOTHER [1996 (I) LLN 526]. In that case, though it was found that there were allegations of throwing stones and attacking officers, no identification of the evidence was done. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court held that removal from service was an extreme step and thus, upheld the exercise of power by the Labour Court under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court, in para 6 of the said judgment, has observed as follows: "6. In this case, the finding recorded by the High Court and the Labour Court is that stones were thrown and the officers were attacked which resulted in grievous injuries to the officers. But it is seen that the appellants alone were not members of the assembly of the workmen standing at the BPL Bus Stop. In this case, the finding recorded by the High Court and the Labour Court is that stones were thrown and the officers were attacked which resulted in grievous injuries to the officers. But it is seen that the appellants alone were not members of the assembly of the workmen standing at the BPL Bus Stop. The Labour Court had discretion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act to consider the quantum of misconduct and the punishment. In view of the surging circumstances, viz., the workmen were agitating by their collective bargain for acceptance of their demands and when the strike was on, the settlement during conciliation proceedings, though initially agreed to, was resiled later on. They appear to have attacked the officers when they were going to the factory. Under these circumstances, the Labour Court was well justified in taking lenient view and in setting aside the order of dismissal and giving direction to reinstate the workmen with a cut of 75% of the back wages up to the date of the award. In our considered view, the discretion exercised by the Labour Court is proper and justified in the above facts and circumstances. The High Court had not adverted to these aspects of the matter. It merely had gone into the question whether the act complained of is a misconduct." 10. Mr. S. Kumaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to a judgment of the Kerala High Court in P.B.ROCHO VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [1984 (2) LLN 841] for contending that in respect of a case involved in serious charge, the standard of fairness and reasonableness as interpreted and adopted by the Civil Court will apply to meet the ends of justice. In paras 10 and 14 of the said judgment, it was observed as follows: "10... The distinction between the standard of proof in criminal and civil proceedings is more a matter of words and "not one of any great moment" Lord Scarman, Ibld. It can indeed become too nice to be discernible, dependent upon what is at stake. In paras 10 and 14 of the said judgment, it was observed as follows: "10... The distinction between the standard of proof in criminal and civil proceedings is more a matter of words and "not one of any great moment" Lord Scarman, Ibld. It can indeed become too nice to be discernible, dependent upon what is at stake. This principle holds good with equal force in disciplinary proceedings before departmental authorities where, although the rules of evidence and procedure of a Civil Court are not strictly applicable, in cases involving serious charges with consequences as grave as dismissal, the standard of fairness and reasonableness, as interpreted and adopted by the Civil Court will apply to meet the ends of justice. Applying that standard, will a fair and reasonable disciplinary authority accept the evidence on record as a rational foundation for the finding and the consequences flowing from it? That is the question. 14. There is no reasonably reliable evidence to prove the charge of theft against the petitioner. The essential link to connect him with the alleged recovery of stolen articles has not been established. Whether or not any firewood was recovered or whatever was recovered, so long as there is no reliable evidence to reasonably connect the petitioner with the recovery of the stolen articles, charge (1) is not proved. The testimony of the Department's witnesses, widely disagreeing, as they do, on a material particulars and unsupported, as it is, by any independent evidence, such as the signature of the petitioner's wife or a contemporaneously recorded mahazar or the testimony of persons who had seen the petitioner removing the recovered articles from the campus or the evidence of persons in the neighbouring houses, who could speak to the recovery, is totally devoid of value to reasonably connect the petitioner with the serious charge of theft and the consequences flowing from a finding of such charge. In my judgment, the finding is so absurd that no fair and reasonable authority could have come to it. The finding on charge (1) must, therefore, fail. In the circumstances, for the reasons which I have stated, the findings on charges (2) and (3) are equally unsustainable. In my judgment, the finding is so absurd that no fair and reasonable authority could have come to it. The finding on charge (1) must, therefore, fail. In the circumstances, for the reasons which I have stated, the findings on charges (2) and (3) are equally unsustainable. I do not disturb the finding on charge (4) but the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is unsustainable for the reasons I have indicated." In the light of the same and on the basis of the recorded evidence, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner was innocent of the charges levelled against him. 11. Per contra, Mr. S. Ravindran for M/s. T.S. Gopalan & Co., learned counsel for the second respondent Management referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in New Shorrock Mills vs. Maheshbhai T. Rao [ 1996 (6) SCC 590 ] for contending that once the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the findings in the departmental enquiry is legal and proper and the order of punishment was not by way of victimization, then the Courts cannot interfere with such finding of fact. 12. Mr. S. Ravindran learned counsel for the second respondent Management further referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in L.K. Verma VS. HMT Ltd. [ 2006(2) SCC 269 ] for contending that even a verbal abuse can be held to be sufficient for inflicting dismissal as punishment. 13. Mr. S. Ravindran learned counsel for the second respondent Management lastly referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C. VS. H. Amaresh [ 2006 (6) SCC 187 ] wherein the Supreme Court held that Once a domestic tribunal based on evidence comes to a particular conclusion, normally it is not open to the tribunal and the courts to substitute their subjective opinion in place of the one arrived at by the domestic tribunal. 14. In the light of the above, it has to be seen that the charges levelled against the petitioner has been proved. It is an admitted fact that the incident took place outside the factory gate and not during the working hours. 14. In the light of the above, it has to be seen that the charges levelled against the petitioner has been proved. It is an admitted fact that the incident took place outside the factory gate and not during the working hours. It is also an admitted fact that the workers were gathered in large number in the Pandal erected for the hunger fast by the two workers and the other workers, who were gathered in support of them were making preparations for publication of the fast and they also carried the black flags put up on sticks. It is thereafter, the parties are at variance on the incident. While the Superintendent Thamaraiselvan states that he was threatened by the petitioner, the other persons in the Pandal denied such an incident and mere holding of a stick with black tag, cannot be said to be an illegal act on the part of the workman. The explanation offered by the workman is acceptable. However, the Labour Court simply brushed aside the explanation offered by the workman by going through the enquiry report submitted and it did not go into the actual incident that had taken place. 15. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to set aside the impugned award. Accordingly, the impugned award stands set aside and the second respondent Management is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service. With reference to the quantum of backwages, this Court is not inclined to order full backwages and it is suffice to order 50% of backwages together with attendant benefits. 16. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.