Judgment :- 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioners seeking for a direction to the respondents to pay compensation of Rs.10 lakhs as damages along with interest at the rate of 18% with effect from 14.4.2007 till the date of realization of the amount. 2. The writ petition was admitted on 07.11.2007. Pending the writ petition, in the application for an interim direction, only notice was ordered. On notice from this court, the second respondent, i.e., the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, has filed a counter affidavit dated 20.3.2012. The first respondent Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai has also filed a counter affidavit, dated 06.03.2012, to which the petitioner has filed a reply affidavit. 3. The stand of the petitioner was that the petitioners were husband and wife. They were residing at No.2, Nehru Street, M.G.R Nagar, Choolaipallam Chennai. They have two sons, i.e., Sooriya and Udhaya. Sooriya was the eldest son and Udhaya was the next son. Udhaya was about 4 years old. On 14.4.2007, after coming back from the school, while he was playing in front of the house, he came into contact with the live electric wire in the street light post just 10 feet away from the house and died on the spot due to electrocution. The respondents who were supposed to maintain the street lights have not cared to keep the lamp post in such a way that no person will come into contact with the same. It was only because of the action of the respondents, the death had taken place. The petitioners filed a complaint before the Sub Inspector of Police, M.G.R. Nagar Police station and investigation of the death was conducted. The autopsy was done by Dr. R. Baskar, Department of Forensic Medicine, Government Royapettah Hospital. He had issued the postmortem certificate on 15.4.2007 stating that the death was due to electrocution. The petitioners sent a legal notice on 23.7.2007 seeking compensation from the respondents. They have not sent any reply and also not paid any compensation. The petitioners due to the death of their second son had also undergone severe mental agony and pain. 4. In the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent TNEB, it was stated that the street lights were maintained exclusively by the Corporation of Chennai. They have not sent any reply and also not paid any compensation. The petitioners due to the death of their second son had also undergone severe mental agony and pain. 4. In the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent TNEB, it was stated that the street lights were maintained exclusively by the Corporation of Chennai. The electricity board only provide electricity supply to the Corporation at one main point and thereafter, the Corporation had laid underground cable and had erected street lamp post and is distributing the electricity supply through their own underground cable. The electricity board was no way connected with the accident. The death had occurred as per the sketch prepared by the police in the lamp post 1200/D No.130/Zone 9 located at Nagathamman Koil Street, Choolaipallam and that post was exclusively maintained by the Corporation. 5. In the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent Corporation, an attempt was made to state that no electric wire was hanging from the post freely and the terminals were properly insulated with electric insulation tape. Only street light cables are used by the corporation and no bare conductors or wires are used. The negligence if at all was on the part of the parents. There was no possibility of any electricity wire in the street light post. Further, the first respondent accused the parents, i.e., petitioners for allowing their child to play outside the street without showing any importance. It was the carelessness and negligence of parents which had resulted the incident. 6. In the reply affidavit, it was asserted that electrocution was only due to hanging of wire freely from the street light post which was 10 feet away from the house. 7. Therefore, it is clear that if at all the liability is only with the first respondent Corporation of Chennai and that the electricity board has no role to play. This court fully accepts the stand taken by the petitioners that their second son while playing in the street came into contact with the live wire in the electricity pole and died due to electrocution. The death of minor son Udhaya due to electrocution is also not disputed. 8. This court fully accepts the stand taken by the petitioners that their second son while playing in the street came into contact with the live wire in the electricity pole and died due to electrocution. The death of minor son Udhaya due to electrocution is also not disputed. 8. Therefore, the only question to be decided is whether the Corporation is bound to compensate for such electrification which had occurred due to negligence of the corporation in not maintaining the lamp post properly by allowing the live wire to be projected outside? 9. The allegation that the parents must take care of their child is a sweeping statement. No parents will allow their child to die due to electrocution. In the city of Chennai, there are hardly any playgrounds. Most of the time children are playing in the streets and they have no other place to play. Therefore, the Chennai Corporation is to maintain the lamp post by properly insulating them from others being come into contact. 10. The question of public tort and whether compensation can be ordered came to be considered by the Supreme Court vide its judgment in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa reported in (1993) 2 SCC 746 , wherein the Supreme Court held that in case of public tort, the court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution can certainly order compensation. In paragraphs 10,17 and 22, the Supreme Court had observed as follows : "10. In view of the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, Bhim Singh v. State of J & K, Bhim Singh v. State of J & K, Saheli: A Women's Resources Centre v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters and State of Maharashtra v. Ravikant S. Patil the liability of the State of Orissa in the present case to pay the compensation cannot be doubted and was rightly not disputed by the learned Additional Solicitor General. It would, however, be appropriate to spell out clearly the principle on which the liability of the State arises in such cases for payment of compensation and the distinction between this liability and the liability in private law for payment of compensation in an action on tort. It would, however, be appropriate to spell out clearly the principle on which the liability of the State arises in such cases for payment of compensation and the distinction between this liability and the liability in private law for payment of compensation in an action on tort. It may be mentioned straightaway that award of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort. This is a distinction between the two remedies to be borne in mind which also indicates the basis on which compensation is awarded in such proceedings. We shall now refer to the earlier decisions of this Court as well as some other decisions before further discussion of this principle. 17. It follows that ‘a claim in public law for compensation’ for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is ‘distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort’ resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. This is what was indicated in Rudul Sah and is the basis of the subsequent decisions in which compensation was awarded under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights. 22. This is what was indicated in Rudul Sah and is the basis of the subsequent decisions in which compensation was awarded under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights. 22. The above discussion indicates the principle on which the court's power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is exercised to award monetary compensation for contravention of a fundamental right. This was indicated in Rudul Sah and certain further observations therein adverted to earlier, which may tend to minimise the effect of the principle indicated therein, do not really detract from that principle. This is how the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah and others in that line have to be understood and Kasturilal distinguished therefrom. We have considered this question at some length in view of the doubt raised, at times, about the propriety of awarding compensation in such proceedings, instead of directing the claimant to resort to the ordinary process of recovery of damages by recourse to an action in tort. In the present case, on the finding reached, it is a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death of her son." 11. In view of the above, the incident had occurred only due to negligence of the corporation especially by allowing the live wire hanging from the post and that they should maintain the lamp post 1200/D No.130/Zone 9 located at Nagathamman Koil Street, Choolaipallam. The child unmindful of the consequences came into contact with it, got electrocuted and died. This court finds the claim for compensation at the rate of Rs.10 lakhs is on the high side and that it will be legitimate if a compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs only) is ordered against the corporation. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand allowed. The first respondent Corporation of Chennai is directed to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-(Rupees five lakhs only) as compensation to the petitioners within a period of twelve (12) weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. However, the parties are allowed to bear their own costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.