JUDGMENT:- Elipe Dharma Rao, J. 1. For the sake of convenience and better understanding, the parties are referred to as per their ranking in W.P.No.16348 of 1995. 2. The writ petitioner joined the services of the respondent Corporation as Driver on 9.3.1987. On 23.12.1992, when he was on duty in the bus bearing registration No. TN-45N-0018 and when the bus was proceeding from Madurai towards Tiruchirappalli, at about 6.45 pm., one bullock cart was proceeding ahead of the bus near Poolankulathupatti. At the same time, another bus bearing Registration No.TN-45N-0543, which also belonged to the respondent Corporation was coming in the opposite direction. The petitioner, under the impression that he could pass the bullock cart before the arrival of the opposite bus, drove the bus in a rash and negligent manner and attempted to overtake the bullock cart by driving the vehicle to the right side of the road and in the process, he not only dashed the bullock cart but also dashed against the other bus coming in opposite direction and thus caused a major accident. 3. A charge memo was issued by the respondent Corporation to the writ petitioner, for which he has submitted his explanation and having found the same to be not satisfactory, domestic enquiry was contemplated against the petitioner by the respondent Corporation, appointing Mr. K.S. Narasimhan, a retired District Judge, as the enquiry officer. The writ petitioner participated in the enquiry with one observer. The Enquiry Officer, in his report dated 15.2.1993, has observed that the driver of the other bus bearing registration No.TN-45N-0543, by name Mr. Moorthy, was also responsible for the accident, to some extent, and has held the charges levelled against the writ petitioner proved. Based on the report, a show-cause notice dated 16.4.1993 was issued to the writ petitioner, requiring him to explain as to why he should not be dismissed from service, for which the writ petitioner submitted his explanation on 18.6.1993. Thereafter, considering the past conduct of the writ petitioner and other circumstances, the second respondent/General Manager has dismissed the writ petitioner from service by the order dated 1.12.1994. Aggrieved, the writ petitioner preferred appeals dated 22.12.1994 and 13.2.1995 and they were rejected on 14.3.1995 by the first respondent/Managing Director, as appellate authority. Against this rejection order passed by the appellate authority, the petitioner filed W.P.No.16348 of 1995. 4. Aggrieved, the writ petitioner preferred appeals dated 22.12.1994 and 13.2.1995 and they were rejected on 14.3.1995 by the first respondent/Managing Director, as appellate authority. Against this rejection order passed by the appellate authority, the petitioner filed W.P.No.16348 of 1995. 4. The Management stiffly opposed the claim of the petitioner by filing a detailed counter affidavit. According to Management, the writ petitioner has straight away filed the writ petition, without approaching the labour court and that the cost of damages caused to both the vehicles and the bullock cart, including labour charges comes around Rs.10,200/= and that considering the past conduct of the writ petitioner, it has become inevitable for them to pass the impugned order. 5. The learned single Judge, referring to the aspect of the disciplinary authority requiring the writ petitioner to show cause, as to why he should not be dismissed from service, has observed that 'it will not be proper for the disciplinary authority to come to any conclusion before the opportunity is given to the delinquent to have his say on the enquiry report' and further observing that 'it is needless to state that in the mind of the delinquent a definite apprehension is raised that he may not get fair or purposeful and open-minded hearing', has allowed the writ petition. The learned single Judge has further ordered as follows: "14. Therefore, while setting aside the order of dismissal, I am remitting the matter for the issue of a proper show-cause notice. It is made clear that the result of the proceedings shall be subject to the following:- (i) The reinstatement will be only for the purpose of the enquiry and the petitioner will not be entitled to any backwages if he is ultimately found guilty of the charges. (ii) If he is found not guilty and is entitled to be reinstated, then the petitioner shall be entitled only to 50 per cent of backwages. (iii) The process of enquiry by the disciplinary authority is to be completed within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." 6. Against this order of the learned single Judge, the Management has come forward to file W.A.No.2189 of 2002. During pendency of the writ appeal, the writ petitioner has come forward to file M.P.No.3 of 2008, praying to condone the delay of 1933 days in filing the writ appeal. Against this order of the learned single Judge, the Management has come forward to file W.A.No.2189 of 2002. During pendency of the writ appeal, the writ petitioner has come forward to file M.P.No.3 of 2008, praying to condone the delay of 1933 days in filing the writ appeal. The writ petitioner, in the affidavit filed in support the condone delay petition, has submitted that he filed an appeal in the form of a cross objection on 8.11.2004 under the bonafide impression that cross-objection was maintainable and the same has been returned on 16.11.2004 and therefore, he has filed the present application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. This application has been opposed by the respondents/Management, by filing a counter affidavit. In the counter affidavit, the Management has stated that the cross-objection was returned on 16.11.2004 and from then onwards, no step has been taken by the writ petitioner to file the appeal and without offering any explanation for the delay, the petitioner has come forward to file the present petition, which should be rejected. 7. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petitioner has argued that when the Enquiry Officer has found the other bus driver also responsible for the accident, initiating action only against the writ petitioner, without any such action against the other bus owner is nothing but discrimination, treating equals in equally and on this ground itself, the writ petitioner should succeed. The learned senior counsel would further argue that no independent eye witness was examined so as to prove the alleged guilt of the writ petitioner and based only on the evidence of M.W.1, an Engineer, the alleged charges against the writ petitioner were held to be proved, which is illegal and need to be set aside. 8. In support of his arguments, the learned senior counsel would rely on the following judgments: 1. TATA ENGINEERING & LOCO MOTIVE CO. LTD. vs. JITENDRA PD. SINGH AND ANOTHER [ (2001) 10 SCC 530 ]; 2. PANDIAN ROADWAYS CORPORATION LTD. vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, ADDL.LABOUR COURT, MADURAI AND ANOTHER [2002 (1) LLN 348] and 3. An unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.2238 of 2000, dated 3.10.2007 and 4. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS vs. RAJPAL SINGH [(2010) 5 SCC 783]. 9. PANDIAN ROADWAYS CORPORATION LTD. vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, ADDL.LABOUR COURT, MADURAI AND ANOTHER [2002 (1) LLN 348] and 3. An unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.2238 of 2000, dated 3.10.2007 and 4. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS vs. RAJPAL SINGH [(2010) 5 SCC 783]. 9. In the first judgment cited above, three workmen, though on almost identical charges, found guilty of misconduct in connection with the same incident, the Management has imposed three different punishments on them, to explain, while one of them was punished with one month's suspension and another reinstated into service pursuant to court's order, the third one was imposed with the punishment of dismissal. In such circumstances, the Honourable Apex Court has held the same to be discriminative. 10. In the second judgment, when services of a driver were terminated for rash and negligent driving based on the evidence of only one witness, an Assistant Engineer, who was not an eye witness, a Division Bench of this Court has held that in the absence of any explanation for not examining the eye-witnesses, no credence could be attached to the uncorroborated evidence of the Assistant Engineer. 11. In the third judgment also, another Division Bench of this Court, in a case of fatal accident whereupon the driver of the Transport Corporation was dismissed from service, having found that no independent witness was examined, has allowed the prayer of the driver for reinstatement, by relying on the second judgment cited above. 12. In the fourth judgment, when the Management has inflicted different punishments for identical charges, though the delinquency and incident occurred on the same day, the Honourable Apex Court while upholding the decision of the High Court for reinstatement, on the ground that such punishment is discriminatory in nature, has, however, set aside the direction of the High Court regarding payment of 50% backwages. 13. 13. Relying on the above judgments, the learned senior counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner would argue that since the punishment of dismissal inflicted on the writ petitioner is discriminatory in nature, insofar as the other driver was let off freely by the Management and that the very finding of the Enquiry Officer (holding the writ petitioner guilty of the charges) is based solely on the evidence of the Engineer, the dicta laid down in the above quoted judgments, would squarely apply to the case on hand and would pray to order reinstatement of the writ petitioner with all consequential and monetary benefits. 14. On the other hand, on the part of the appellants/Corporation, it has been argued that the learned single Judge has ordered reinstatement of the writ petitioner, of course, for a limited purpose of conducting fresh enquiry, solely based on the finding that the punishment has been indicated in the show-cause notice. The learned counsel would further argue that the writ petitioner should establish the prejudice, if any caused to him. He would further argue that the writ petitioner, against whom the charges are proved, cannot claim parity with the other bus driver, against whom no charges were framed. The learned counsel would further argue that it is the specific finding of the learned single Judge that there is a procedural irregularity in issuing the show-cause notice, and therefore, this Court should not order, reinstatement of the writ petitioner. 15. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel for the appellants would rely on the following judgments: 1. STATE OF PUNJAB vs. HARBHAJAN SINGH GREASY (Dr.) [ (1996) 9 SCC 322 ]; 2. BALBIR CHAND vs. FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. AND OTHERS [ (1997) 3 SCC 371 ]; 3. STATE OF U.P. vs. HARENDRA ARORA AND ANOTHER [ (2001) 6 SCC 392 ]; 4. HIRAN MAYEE BHATTACHARYYA vs. SECRETARY, S.M. SCHOOL FOR GIRLS AND OTHERS [ (2002) 10 SCC 293 ] and 5. DIRECTORATE OF FILM FESTIVALS AND OTHERS vs. GAURAV ASHWIN JAIN AND OTHERS [ (2007) 4 SCC 737 ]. 16. In the first judgment cited above, the Honorable Apex Court has held: "It is now a well-settled law that when the enquiry was found to be faulty, it could not be proper to direct reinstatement with consequential benefits. DIRECTORATE OF FILM FESTIVALS AND OTHERS vs. GAURAV ASHWIN JAIN AND OTHERS [ (2007) 4 SCC 737 ]. 16. In the first judgment cited above, the Honorable Apex Court has held: "It is now a well-settled law that when the enquiry was found to be faulty, it could not be proper to direct reinstatement with consequential benefits. Matter requires to be remitted to the disciplinary authority to follow the procedure from the stage at which the fault was pointed out and to take action according to law. Pending enquiry, the delinquent must be deemed to be under suspension. The consequential benefits would depend upon the result of the enquiry and order passed thereon. But since, the respondent has retired from service, now no useful purpose will be served in directing to conduct enquiry afresh. However, the respondent is not entitled to the back wages as he avoided responsibility as a doctor to treat the flood victims and that was cause for the suspension. Disallowance of the back wages would not stand in the way of computation of the pensionary benefits as if he had continued in service." 17. In the second judgment cited above, the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows: "Merely because one of the officers was wrongly given the lesser punishment compared to others against whom there is a proved misconduct, it cannot be held that they too should also be given the lesser punishment lest the same mistaken view would be repeated. Omission to repeat same mistake would not be violative of Article 14 and cannot be held as arbitrary or discriminatory, leading to miscarriage of justice. It may be open to the appropriate higher authority to look into the matter and take appropriate decision according to law." 18. In the third judgment cited above, the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'the delinquent seeking the order of his dismissal to be quashed on the ground that copy of enquiry officer's report is not furnished to him, must show that he was prejudiced thereby, otherwise, the said omission would not be fatal to the order of dismissal.' 19. In the fourth judgment cited above, the Honourable Apex Court held that 'no reinstatement nor back wages need be paid when the court directs that the principles of natural justice should be followed.' 20. In the fourth judgment cited above, the Honourable Apex Court held that 'no reinstatement nor back wages need be paid when the court directs that the principles of natural justice should be followed.' 20. In the fifth judgment cited above, the Honourable Apex Court has held that: "When a grievance of discrimination is made, High Court has to first examine whether petitioner has established a right entitling him to the relief sought. The fact that some others, who are similarly situated, have been granted relief which the petitioner is seeking may be of some relevance, but where in law, a writ petitioner has not established a right or is not entitled to relief, the fact that a similarly situated person has been illegally granted relief is not a ground to direct similar relief to him. That would be enforcing a negative equality by perpetuation of an illegality, which is impermissible." 21. Relying on the above judgments, the learned counsel for the appellants would argue that the writ petitioner has not established any prejudice having been caused to him in not proceeding against the other driver and therefore, he cannot claim parity with the other driver. On such arguments, he would pray to allow the claim of the appellants/Management. 22. First of all, it must be mentioned that it is not the show-cause notice which is under challenge in the writ proceedings, but it is the order of dismissal passed against the writ petitioner by the Management. Before filing the writ petition, the writ petitioner has availed the appellate remedy available to him and having failed in his attempt, he has come forward to file this writ petition, without approaching the Labour Court, as the present dispute is an 'industrial dispute' to be adjudicated and decided by the Labour Court with due opportunities for both the parties to establish their respective pleas. Therefore, in our considered view, the learned single Judge was not right in dissecting the case from the angle of show-cause notice, since the show-cause notice was never challenged by the writ petitioner and in fact, he has even replied to the same. 23. The fact that the enquiry officer, a retired District Judge, in his report has held that the other bus driver also contributed to some extent to the accident, cannot be denied. 23. The fact that the enquiry officer, a retired District Judge, in his report has held that the other bus driver also contributed to some extent to the accident, cannot be denied. In that case, it can very easily be presumed that entire blame cannot be thrown on the writ petitioner and make him the scape-goat for the entire incident. In all fairness, the disciplinary authority should have taken this aspect into consideration, while imposing major punishment of dismissal on the employee. But, the disciplinary authority, ignoring this aspect, has taken 19 delinquencies of the writ petitioner into consideration, as 'past conduct' so as to serve walking papers on the writ petitioner. 24. While on the part of the employee it has been strenuously argued that he has been awarded 'accident free driving' certificates by the Management for the years 1987-88 and 1991-92, it has been contended on the part of the Management that the employee was in service of the management for a period of 7 years and 9 months, having been appointed on 9.3.1987 and dismissed by the order dated 1.12.1994 and out of this period of 7 years and 9 months service, he has been awarded 'accident free driving' awards only for two years and no such awards were given to him for rest of the service of five years and 9 months. It is also seen that in his service of 7 years and 9 months, the employee was awarded with 19 punishments. 25. All the 19 punishments imposed on the respondent/writ petitioner, as listed in the show-cause notice, pertain to minor delinquencies and they do not, in any way, relate to rash and negligent driving, so as to say that the writ petitioner is a habitual offender. When it is the specific finding of the enquiry officer that the other bus driver has also contributed to some extent to the accident, not initiating any action against him and proceeding only against the respondent, and ultimately dismissing him from service, will definitely amount to discrimination, treating equals inequally. 26. When it is the specific finding of the enquiry officer that the other bus driver has also contributed to some extent to the accident, not initiating any action against him and proceeding only against the respondent, and ultimately dismissing him from service, will definitely amount to discrimination, treating equals inequally. 26. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the management are not applicable to the facts of the present case for the reason that in the case on hand, while major punishment of dismissal has been inflicted on the writ petitioner, not even any action has been initiated against the other driver, whose role in the accident was pointed out by the enquiry officer. No explanation of whatsoever emanated from the appellants/Management as to what made them to treat equals inequally. While such a glaring discrimination is available in the case, we are not in a position to appreciate the contention of the appellants/Corporation that no parity could be claimed by the writ petitioner. When the finding of the Enquiry Officer is that the entire blame cannot be thrown on the writ petitioner, the punishment of dismissal from service slapped on the writ petitioner is, shockingly disproportionate to the alleged and proved charges. 27. In UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER vs. S.S.AHLUWALIA [ 2007 (6) SUPREME 521 ], the Honourable Apex Court has held that "The Court can interfere with the punishment only if it finds the same to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges found to be proved, in which case the matter is to be remitted to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the punishment. In an appropriate case, however, in order to avoid delay the court can itself impose lesser penalty..." Therefore, to uphold the majesty of justice, we consider it an appropriate case to cause our interference into the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. 28. The learned single Judge, having observed that the enquiry officer's report has not been furnished to the employee and that the disciplinary authority has arrived at a conclusion of dismissing the employee from service even in the show-cause notice, has directed that the writ petitioner be reinstated into service for the limited purpose of proceeding with the enquiry, after issuing proper show-cause notice. But, in our considered opinion, the said exercise, after lapse of 18 years from the date of order of dismissal is nothing but driving the parties to another round of litigation. As per the affidavit filed in W.P.No.16348 of 1995, the respondent/writ petitioner was aged 34 years in the year 1995 and thus, he is 51 years of age now and taking into consideration of all these facts, we are of the considered view that ends of justice would be met if the order of dismissal is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority for imposing lesser punishment, after reinstating the respondent/writ petitioner into service. 29. Considering the fact that the impugned order of dismissal was slapped on the writ petitioner in a discriminative manner and that the writ petitioner is not in services of the appellants Corporation for quite a long time and that he straight away came forward to file the writ petition without approaching the Labour Court, we are of the considered view that ends of justice would be met by ordering 25% backwages. Further, for the proved delinquency, in our considered view, stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effective will commensurate the delinquency. The writ petitioner shall be treated as continuing in service for all other purposes. The disciplinary authority is directed to pass necessary orders within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the result, W.A.No.2189 of 2002 is dismissed. M.P.No.3 of 2008 and the WASR are allowed, in the above manner. No costs.