Judgment : This writ petition preferred by a fair price shop dealer challenges the validity of an order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupati, on 20.12.2011 suspending the authorization issued in favour of the writ petitioner to run and manage the fair price shop No.4 of Chiguruwada village, Tirupati Rural Mandal, pending enquiry and also directing the Tahsildar, Tirupati Rural to make alternative arrangements by attaching the ration cards to the adjacent fair price shop to avoid inconvenience to the card holders of fair price shop No.4 of Chiguruwada village, Tirupati Rural Mandal. The writ petitioner was appointed as a fair price shop dealer for Shop No.4, Chiguruwada village of Tirupati Rural in the year 2006. Though it is asserted by the writ petitioner that she has been distributing the essential commodities strictly in accordance with The Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution by Card System) Order, 2001, but nonetheless, the Deputy Tahsildar, Civil Supplies, filed a report on 14.2.2011 before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupati, alleging that when he has visited Chiguruwada village for inspection of the fair price shop at 10 AM, the shop was not opened and he has also noticed subsequently that the details of the stock available and the prices of the commodities has not been exhibited and that instead of the writ petitioner managing and running the fair price shop, some other individual by name Sri M.Venkata Muni was found running the shop and it was further noticed that the writ petitioner was not residing in the village at all. Based upon this adverse report of the Deputy Tahsildar, Civil Supplies, the impugned order came to be passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupati on 20.12.2011 suspending the authorization of the writ petitioner for running and managing the fair price shop pending enquiry. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner would strenuously contend that the allegations contained in the adverse report submitted by the Deputy Tahsildar, Civil Supplies, are the result of his imagination rather than being true. The case of the writ petitioner is that by 14.12.2011, all the essential commodities have been distributed to the card holders and hence there are no essential commodities available in the shop for the writ petitioner to keep the shop open. Further, on the notice board regularly the stock details and the price list is exhibited. The case of the writ petitioner is that by 14.12.2011, all the essential commodities have been distributed to the card holders and hence there are no essential commodities available in the shop for the writ petitioner to keep the shop open. Further, on the notice board regularly the stock details and the price list is exhibited. But, however, half of the details got washed away because of the rain and that was mistaken as if stock particulars and price list is not exhibited by the Deputy Tahsildar and further that Sri M.Venkata Muni is a member of the petitioner’s family being none other than the husband of the younger sister and since the petitioner is not maintaining good health on that particular day, to enable the inspection to go on, Sri Venkata Muni opened the shop. Therefore, it is not a case where someone else has been running the fair price shop in place of the writ petitioner. Apart from the above factual contest, it is contended by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the Revenue Divisional Officer has passed the impugned order without any regard to the principles of natural justice and the requirements of law inasmuch as the writ petitioner has not been afforded any opportunity of hearing prior to the impugned order is passed. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner in support of his contention has also placed reliance upon two earlier judgments rendered by this court in Nagaraja Gupta and another v. Joint Collector, Ananthapur 2005(1) ALT 95 and U.K.Narasimhulu v. Joint Colector, Kurnool District and others 2005(2) ALT 429 . It will be important to notice that in accordance with Sections 3 and 5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh, in terms of Government of India, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution Orders contained in GSR No. 630(E), dated 31.8.2001 framed the Andhra Pradesh Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2008, (herein after referred to as `Order’) duly superseding a similarly titled order of 2001. The expression “appointing authority” in respect of fair price shops is defined in clause 2(d) as meaning District Supply Officer (City) having jurisdiction over the area in respect of Hyderabad District, the District Supply Officer (City) having jurisdiction over the area in respect of Visakhapatnam city and the Revenue Divisional Officer or the Sub-Collector concerned in respect of other districts. The expression “appointing authority” in respect of fair price shops is defined in clause 2(d) as meaning District Supply Officer (City) having jurisdiction over the area in respect of Hyderabad District, the District Supply Officer (City) having jurisdiction over the area in respect of Visakhapatnam city and the Revenue Divisional Officer or the Sub-Collector concerned in respect of other districts. The expression “disciplinary authority” has been defined in clause 2(x) as meaning the District Supply Officer having jurisdiction over the area in respect of Hyderabad district, the District Supply Officer (City) having jurisdiction over the area in respect of Visakhapatnam (City) and the Revenue Divisional Officer or the Sub Collector concerned in respect of other districts and Asst. Supply Officers in Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam, Rajahmundry, Vijayawada, Tirupati and Kurnool Municipal Corporations and Tahsildars in other areas. Clause 5 exhaustively dealt with the procedure relating to authorization of fair price shops etc. Clause 5(5) thereof empowered the appointing authority at any time whether at the request or on suo motu, after making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary and for reasons to be recorded in writing, add to, amend, vary, suspend or cancel the authorization issued or deemed to be issued to him under this clause. Therefore, power has been conferred upon the appointing authority to add or amend or vary or suspend or cancel the authorization issued in favour of any dealer for valid reasons. This exercise can be carried out only after conducting an enquiry into the matter and for reasons to be recorded in writing. While new conditions or terms can be added to an existing authorization and similarly, the existing conditions may be amended or varied or curtailed suitably, after conducting an enquiry by the appointing authority, but the later other two stipulations viz., suspension or cancellation of the authorization can be construed as substantive measures of punishment due to the impact they leave behind. Cancellation signifies annulling the authorization granted in favour of the dealer. In other words, such a dealer cannot deal with the essential commodities henceforth. However, the expression “suspension” cannot have the same effect or impact as “cancellation” would have. If both `suspension and cancellation’ were to have the same meaning, impact or effect, then there was no necessity to use both these expressions simultaneously. One would have been sufficient. In other words, such a dealer cannot deal with the essential commodities henceforth. However, the expression “suspension” cannot have the same effect or impact as “cancellation” would have. If both `suspension and cancellation’ were to have the same meaning, impact or effect, then there was no necessity to use both these expressions simultaneously. One would have been sufficient. The meaning of the verb `suspend’ is understood by Webster English Dictionary as under: 1the act of suspending :the state or period of being suspended: as a:temporary removal (as from office or privileges) b:temporary withholding (as of belief or decision) c:temporary abrogation of a law or rule The expression `suspension’ is understood by Oxford English Dictionary as under: * the action of suspending someone or something or the condition of being suspended, in particular. * the temporary prevention of something from continuing or being in force or effect:the suspension of military action * the official prohibition of someone from holding their usual post or carrying out their usual role for a particular length of time:the investigation led to the suspension of several officersa four-game suspension Therefore, it can be clearly understood that `suspension’, is a measure which falls short of the measure of cancellation. It is a temporary measure in contra distinction to a permanent measure. Hence, the period for which, the appointing authority considered it appropriate or expedient to suspend the authorization of the fair price shop dealer or nominated retailer or hawcker or of an authorized establishment, is required to be specified. It is for the appointing authority to make a careful assessment as to what length of period, the authorization is required to be suspended which would be proportionate and reasonable to the gravity of the charges held established during the enquiry conducted by him. It could be for a period of one month or even up to a period of one year. Authorisation of a fair price shop is normally accorded and renewed for a period of three years. Therefore, depending upon the gravity of the charges, the period of suspension has got to be determined and specified in the order that is passed by the appointing authority. Authorisation of a fair price shop is normally accorded and renewed for a period of three years. Therefore, depending upon the gravity of the charges, the period of suspension has got to be determined and specified in the order that is passed by the appointing authority. In the absence of any such specification it can be inferred that the appointing authority has resorted to suspension of the authorization for the shortest of the periods, so as to ensure that the fair price shop dealer would correct himself and then conduct his affairs responsibly thereafter. Under clause 5(1)(A), every authorized fair price shop dealer/nominated retailer, shall lift at least 50% of the allotted scheduled commodities before the end of the month for distribution to the card holders during the succeeding month and the rest 50% of the allotted Scheduled Commodities for distribution in the current month shall have to be lifted before 10th of the month, by remitting the total value of the entire stock either in the shape of a demand draft or in any other mode of payment as specified by Government from time to time. Therefore, in the absence of specification of the period of suspension by the appointing authority while exercising the power under clause 5(5) of the Order, it should be construed that it will have the effect only for the currency of the month in which the said order is passed and not beyond. From the next month onwards, the authorization of the fair price shop dealer springs to life and would survive. The second proviso to clause 5(7) of the Order also enabled the disciplinary authority viz., the Assistant Supply Officer/Tahsildar also to exercise the power of suspending the authorization of the erring fair price shop dealer and tagging on the cards to the nearest fair price shop pending final action by the appointing authority, for a period of (90) ninety days only. Further, as per the said proviso action for continuing the suspension beyond (90) ninety days or cancellation of authorization shall be taken by the “appointing authority” as well as the disciplinary authority viz., Revenue Divisional Officers/Sub-Collector/District Supply Officers. This measure of suspension is a non substantive measure of suspension of authorization of a dealer. Further, as per the said proviso action for continuing the suspension beyond (90) ninety days or cancellation of authorization shall be taken by the “appointing authority” as well as the disciplinary authority viz., Revenue Divisional Officers/Sub-Collector/District Supply Officers. This measure of suspension is a non substantive measure of suspension of authorization of a dealer. Pending finalization of action resulting in cancellation of authorization of the fair price shop dealer, the interim measure of suspension can be resorted to by the disciplinary authority viz., the Assistant Supply Officer or the Tahsildar as the case may be, for a maximum period of 90 days. This measure of suspension is the same as that of a step in aid of the final action. This is a non punitive measure. Allegations thrown against a fair price shop dealer with regard to the alleged violations indulged in by him are yet to be established. They could be true or could be motivated. But, however, if those allegations are prima facie found to be grave in nature, this measure of interim suspension can be resorted to. This step is intended to help in preserving the evidence against the fair price shop dealer and also preventing him further access to the incriminating material gathered against him and or influencing the card holders who might be willing to depose against him. Since this is only an interim measure and that too resorted to by the disciplinary authority viz., Assistant Supply Officers or the Tahsildars, it can only be effective for a maximum period of 90 days and not beyond thereafter. For resorting to this interim measure, one is not required to conduct an enquiry before hand into the allegations thrown against the fair price shop dealer. Consequently, there is no further necessity to issue a show-cause notice to the fair price shop dealer before passing an order resorting to the interim measure of suspension of authorization pending enquiry. Since the very period of suspension is limited to 90 days, when invoked by the disciplinary authority, it goes without saying that any such order passed by the disciplinary authority resorting to interim measure of suspension is for a maximum period of 90 days. It is, therefore, open for such authorities to specify even a shorter duration while invoking the power of interim suspension of authorization. It is, therefore, open for such authorities to specify even a shorter duration while invoking the power of interim suspension of authorization. If no such shorter period is specified by them, it can be construed that the disciplinary authority intended the interim measure to subsist for a period of 90 days and cease to be effective immediately thereafter. The fact that the disciplinary authority has not prescribed that it is valid for 90 days nor even for a shorter duration, does not necessarily vitiate the order, only for that reason. What is relevant in law is availability of a provision for exercise of a particular power. Once the said power is available either non mentioning such a provision or wrong quotation of such a provision of law does not vitiate the exercise. Similarly, if the statute itself confers a limited power, the fact that the order has also not specifically adverted to the limits of that power does not vitiate the exercise. The non mentioning of the period of duration of the interim measure of suspension is purely a redundant exercise. If the duration of the period is not specified, it means that the disciplinary authority intended the interim measure to be subsisting for a period of 90 days or till the finalization of the disciplinary action initiated against the dealer, whichever is earlier. Though Nagaraja Gupta’s case and U.K.Narasimhulu’s case (supra 1 and 2) are arising under the now superseded A.P. State Public Distribution System Control Order, 2011, but, however, in the case of Nagaraja Gupta (supra 1), this court was dealing with a situation where the appellate authority has not passed any orders on the stay application moved pending the appeal, while in U.K.Narasimhulu’s case (supra 2), the court was dealing with a situation where the period of suspension as a substantive measure of punishment having not been specified. Hence, those two decisions are not applicable to the case on hand. In the instant case, the authorization of the writ petitioner has been suspended as an interim measure pending enquiry by the appointing authority. Even otherwise, every appointing authority has got the power to order for interim suspension of an authorization as every appointing authority has got implied power of cancellation or suspension. For these reasons, there is no merit in this writ petition and hence this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Even otherwise, every appointing authority has got the power to order for interim suspension of an authorization as every appointing authority has got implied power of cancellation or suspension. For these reasons, there is no merit in this writ petition and hence this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. But, however, without costs. However, the show-cause notice was issued to the writ petitioner on 20.12.2011 for which the petitioner has filed her reply on 21.1.2012.It is therefore only appropriate that the disciplinary action initiated against the writ petitioner by the 2nd respondent be finalized by passing appropriate orders within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order and communicate the same to the petitioner.