JUDGEMENT Dev Darshan Sud, J. This appeal has been instituted by the wife against the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court granting a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between the parties to this petition. 2. The facts necessary for adjudication are being considered. The respondent-husband instituted petition under Section 13 (i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) pleading that the parties were married on 18th June, 2002 in accordance with the tenets of Hindu religion, customs and rites at village Saheli in District Hamirpur. They resided together as husband and wife for some time. There is no chilad out of this wedlock. The respondent- husband pleaded that they lived together as husband and wife for a short period when everything seemed to be all right, but later on it was alleged that she started complaining that she had been forcibly married by her parents against her wishes and desire. On June 03, 2003, the respondent-appellant herein insisted that she wanted to visit her parents. She was asked to go there only for a few days but she did not like this as she wanted to stay there for a longer period. Incensed by this refusal, she consumed poison. She was rushed to various hospitals where by timely medical treatment, her life was saved. The dispute(s) between them were compromised on June 7, 2003. The respondent pleads that despite this, she refused to accompany him to the matrimonial home and threatened him that she would consume poison again and implicate his entire family in false criminal cases. The respondent asserts that she finally left the matrimonial home on June 18, 2003 accompanied by her father and ever since she has not returned despite the best efforts made by the respondent herein. Again, the matter seemed to have been compromised on September 8, 2003. Thereafter she lived with him for about 11/2 months and then left the house without any reasonable cause. The so called compromise(s) were a ruse to lend false assurance to the husband that all was forgiven and forgotten. 3. The petition was resisted by the appellant, who pleaded sufficient cause for staying away and pleaded for award of special costs under Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The so called compromise(s) were a ruse to lend false assurance to the husband that all was forgiven and forgotten. 3. The petition was resisted by the appellant, who pleaded sufficient cause for staying away and pleaded for award of special costs under Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. She pleaded that she was not permitted to come to the matrimonial home by the father of the respondent herein on one pretext or the other. She says that her in-laws had an aversion for her. They were demanding dowry. They were openly proclaiming that they had better matrimonial alliances for their son. When she went to Ludhiana to join the company of the respondent, she was again forced to leave his house by her Jeth (elder brother of the petitioner-respondent herein). 4. The learned Court below settled seven issues. The onus of first two issues which related to the fact as to whether the respondent-appellant herein had treated her husband (respondent herein) with cruelty and whether she was guilty of desertion, was on the respondent and on the other four settled issues i.e. on the question of maintainability, estoppel, the fact that the husband had not approached the Court with clean hands as he had suppressed material facts and whether she was entitled to exemplary costs, the onus was on the appellant. The respondent examined five witnesses in all including himself. 5. Adverting to the first issue, the learned Court found that marriage between the parties was performed on June 18, 2002, as pleaded, they lived together for about a year, but her behaviour was not very cordial and she had a mercurial temper. He stated that the marriage was not consummated. Whenever he approached her, she spurned him. She used to threaten that she would consume poison and involve the entire family in criminal cases. On 3rd June, 2003, when she asked for permission to visit her parents and was told by his parents to go there for 2/3 days, she did not like this and consumed poison. She was rushed to the Bhoranj hospital, from where she was referred to Hamirpur and then to Dharamshala hospital for better medical treatment and management. Compromise Ext.PW1/A was entered into between the parties. After this, she stayed in the matrimonial home for 6/7 days, but then she again left for her parents on 8th June, 2003. She was rushed to the Bhoranj hospital, from where she was referred to Hamirpur and then to Dharamshala hospital for better medical treatment and management. Compromise Ext.PW1/A was entered into between the parties. After this, she stayed in the matrimonial home for 6/7 days, but then she again left for her parents on 8th June, 2003. Again the respondent went to her parents to call her. A Panchayat was convened and another compromise Ext.PW1/B was entered into where it was provided that the appellant will not consume poison in future. But despite all this, she was still staying with her parents. He denied the suggestion that they were having cordial relations and living happily. He was candid enough to admit that his family members had stated that the appellant was older than the husband and therefore it is not a good match, but beyond this, there was no maltreatment meted out to her. He also denied the suggestion that his family members tried to administer poison to the appellant. The compromises Ext.PW1/A and Ext.PW1/B had been entered into fairly and freely and no party was forced to sign them. He admitted that his wife had completed studies from ITI at Awahdevi. 6. PW2 Jagat Ram, father of the respondent, states that after marriage the appellant stayed in their house for about a year, during which period she also visited her parents. He corroborates that on 3rd June, 2003 when she wanted to visit her parents, he told her to go there on the next morning or after a day, but she did not like this and consumed poison. On 18th June, 2003 she left the matrimonial home alongwith her father without informing anyone. A Panchayat was convened and compromise Ext.PW1/B was arrived at on 8th September, 2003. 7. PW3 Madho Ram, who remained as the President of Gram Panchayat, Mahal from 1992 to 2005, says that the parties are residents of this Panchayat. He did not receive any written complaint about any maltreatment/torture by the respondent. He admitted that the petitioner-respondent herein had told him that his wife was not staying with him. He says that in August, 2003 the petitioner-respondent herein had filed an application before the Panchayat stating these facts. He did not receive any written complaint about any maltreatment/torture by the respondent. He admitted that the petitioner-respondent herein had told him that his wife was not staying with him. He says that in August, 2003 the petitioner-respondent herein had filed an application before the Panchayat stating these facts. On 8th September, 2003, the parties compromised the matter and Ext.PW1/B was entered into between them which was signed by him also and the seal of Panchayat was also affixed. 8. PW4 Hari Ram corroborates the husband on the point of fact that the parties lived together for some time including the fact that she used to threaten that she would consume poison; she was not interested in marriage etc. He corroborates the witnesses on the point of compromise etc. having been arrived at. 9. PW5 Surati Ram states that the marriage between the parties was solemnized in the year 2002 and that the appellant had been leaving the matrimonial home without informing anybody about it. He says that the appellant had been complaining that her marriage was settled forcibly by her parents. She had threatened time and again that she would consume poison and implicate the entire family of the petitioner- respondent in criminal cases. 10. RW1 Saroj Kumari accepts the fact of marriage, but denies the allegations made against her. She went to the extent of saying that on 3rd June, 2003 she was administered poison by her in-laws and elder brother and his wife of the respondent. Thereafter, compromise was entered into between the parties on 7th June, 2003. During Diwali, she had gone to visit her parents, where she had been permitted to stay for seven days, but on the third day, her father-in-law had telephoned her father that he should not be sent back till they informed him to do so. From April 2005 to April 2006 she had undergone training in tourism and travel, during which period, she was visiting her matrimonial home, but she was turned away by her in-laws. She used to be turned out of the house without providing food etc. According to her, the respondent was living in Ludhiana where she had gone in November, 2006 and lived there for 4/5 days. 11. She used to be turned out of the house without providing food etc. According to her, the respondent was living in Ludhiana where she had gone in November, 2006 and lived there for 4/5 days. 11. RW2 Bimla Devi, the mother of the appellant, says that after a period of one year of the marriage, her daughter was not allowed to live in the matrimonial home by the parents of the petitioner-respondent herein, her ‘jeth’ and ‘jethani’ (elder brother of the respondent and his wife). She says that when she talked to father-in-law of her daughter; he stated that he was very satisfied with he work. She says that in-laws of her daughter asked her (witness) to take her (daughter) away. In cross examination, she admitted that the appellant was never tortured by her husband-respondent nor she (appellant) informed her about any maltreatment by her in-laws. She expressed her ignorance about the fact as to whether the appellant had consumed poison. Compromise Ext.PW1/B was arrived at before the Panchayat and was signed by her (this witness). After the compromise, the parties lived together for about 11/2 months. She admits that her daughter never saw the petitioner before the marriage and that she had refused to settle the marriage. She then says that the appellant was not willing to get married but it was settled with the intervention of one Baldev and father- in-law of the respondent, who forced this alliance. RW3 Prem Chand and RW5 Hans Raj have supported the version of the appellant. 12 It was this evidence before the learned District Judge on which the entire case of the parties was considered. Adverting to the first issue, the learned Court holds that the submission of the respondent-husband that his wife did not allow him to consummate the marriage was established on the statement of the respondent-husband and the fact that the appellant herein never stated anything in evidence about having normal sexual co-habitation with the respondent itself proved the fact. The learned Court then takes into consideration the fact that the wife had consumed poison and was threatening to involve the entire family in criminal cases. The evidence on record establishes that on 3rd June, 2003 when the appellant insisted that she be allowed to visit her parents and was granted permission only for a few days, she had resorted to the extreme step of consuming poison. The evidence on record establishes that on 3rd June, 2003 when the appellant insisted that she be allowed to visit her parents and was granted permission only for a few days, she had resorted to the extreme step of consuming poison. Thereafter, the appellant was rushed to Bhoranj hospital, Zonal hospital Hamirpur, and then to Dr. Rajendera Prasad Medical College and Hospital, Kangra. After this two compromises Ext.PW1/A dated 7.6.2003 and Ext.PW1/B dated 8.9.2003 were entered into between the parties with the last recording the factum of consumption of poison which act it was promised would not be repeated in future by the appellant. On the totality of the evidence what the learned Court found was that the parties were not living a normal life. The learned Court found no reasonable cause justifying the withdrawal of the appellant from the company of the respondent. Animus deserendi was writ large and established. In addition the evidence proved the abstinence of the appellant from normal sexual cohabitation. The petition was allowed and decree of divorce granted directing dissolution of the marriage between the parties. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urges that the learned Court below was in error in granting the decree as prayed for. He submits that (a) the evidence which was led by the petitioner was beyond the pleadings and could not be looked into; (b) two compromises Ext.PW1/A and Ext.PW1/B themselves condoned the acts of cruelty if any as the parties co-habitated thereafter as husband and wife. (c) There was no effective hearing in the case. 14. Adverting to the last point first, learned Senior counsel has drawn my attention to the order sheets of the Court. What I find is that on 14.9.2010 the case was fixed for further proceedings/hearing on 18.10.2010, but the same was taken up on 15.9.2010 and therafter on 27.9.2010. When the case was taken up for hearing on 15.9.2010, a note has been made that it is a targeted and an old case which requires to be disposed of on priority according to the directions of the High Court. On that day, presence of the counsel of both the parties was marked and the case was adjourned for 27.9.2010 on which date the arguments were heard and judgment was pronounced. This submission therefore requires to be rejected. 15. On that day, presence of the counsel of both the parties was marked and the case was adjourned for 27.9.2010 on which date the arguments were heard and judgment was pronounced. This submission therefore requires to be rejected. 15. On the point of condonation of cruelty, I need not say that the consistent pattern of conduct of the appellant is such that, as found by the learned Court below, she used to hold out consistent threats of consuming poison and involving the entire family in criminal cases. In this eventuality, it cannot be said that once a compromise has been entered into, condonation can be inferred. It is for this reason that both the compromises Ext.PW1/A and Ext.PW1/B are entered into within a short period of time i.e. within three months, which indicates a frame of mind of the parties to the compromise. In other words, it is nothing more than merely a writing on a piece of paper, the parties are not serious about living as husband and wife. Vide Ext.PW1/A the father of the respondent has written that they (appellant and respondent) would live amicably and in Ext.PW1/B it records that the parties will live happily. But the evidence on record indicates otherwise. Immediately after entering into the compromise(s) within a couple of days things are back to “normal” that is to say an atmosphere of strife and distress prevailed. The matrimonial home could hardly be described as congenial or conducive to a healthy married life but the atmosphere was vitiated on account of the acts of the appellant. I also find from the record that RW2 Bimla Devi mother of the appellant herself states about the fact that there was no complaint about maltreatment of the appellant herein. I also find that the appellant urges that the marriage was forced upon her by the respondent as admitted by her. The circumstances in totality do not provide a reasonable cause for the appellant to withdraw from the company of the respondent. Desertion is writ large in conduct of the appellant as no justification has been brought on the record to justify the parties to stay apart.26. Various facets on cruelty have been considered by the Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh 2007(4) SCC 511 holds: “101. Desertion is writ large in conduct of the appellant as no justification has been brought on the record to justify the parties to stay apart.26. Various facets on cruelty have been considered by the Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh 2007(4) SCC 511 holds: “101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet it is deemed appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive:(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii)On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party.(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deepanguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v)A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.(vi)Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty.(vii)Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty.(viii)The conduct must be much more than jealously, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.(ix)Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilization without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.(xii)Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.(xiii)Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty.(xiv)Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such likesituations, it may lead to mentalcruelty”.(at pp.546-547) These principles are to be applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case. These principles have been again reiterated and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Suman Kapur vs. Sudhir Kapur (2009)1 SCC 422 holding: “34. In Sirajmohmedkhan Janmohamadkhan v. Hafizunnisa Yasinkhan (1981)4 SCC 250 this Court stated that the concept of legal cruelty changes according to the changes and advancement of social concept and standards of living. It was further stated that to establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. Continuous cessation of martial intercourse or total indifference on the part of the husband towards marital obligations would lead to legal cruelty.35.In Shobha Rani vs. Madhukar Reddi (1988)1 SCC 105 this Court examined the concept of cruelty. It was observed that the term “cruelty” has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. Continuous cessation of martial intercourse or total indifference on the part of the husband towards marital obligations would lead to legal cruelty.35.In Shobha Rani vs. Madhukar Reddi (1988)1 SCC 105 this Court examined the concept of cruelty. It was observed that the term “cruelty” has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. It has been used in Section 13 (1) (i-a) of the Act in the context of human conduct and behaviour in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties or obligations. It is a course of conduct of one spouse which adversely affects the other spouse. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it is a question of decree which is relevant. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment and then as to the impact of such treatment on the mind of the other spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference to the drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse.36.There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. The absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. Mens rea is not a necessary element in cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or willful ill-treatment.”(at pp 431-432) 27.Learned counsel appearing for the appellant relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ravi Kumar vs. Julmidevi 2010(4) SCC 476 to urge that the grounds for desertion have to be pleaded and proved. On the facts of the case, their Lordships have held that no grounds have been proved to establish desertion and there was sufficient justification for the wife to stay away. The Court then proceeds: “19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. On the facts of the case, their Lordships have held that no grounds have been proved to establish desertion and there was sufficient justification for the wife to stay away. The Court then proceeds: “19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of vilence, sometime it may take a different form. At times, it may be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. 20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its categories can never be closed. Whether the husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial cases can be of infinite variety-it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and words. That possibly explains why Lord Denning in Sheldon v. Sheldon (1966)2 WLR 993 held that categories of cruelty in matrimonial cases are never closed.”(at pp. 480-481) The second decision relied upon by the learned counsel is Pankaj Mahajan vs. Dimple alias Kajal (2011)12 SCC 1. The Court had found a number of acts which were: “36. From the pleadings and evidence, the following instances of cruelty are specifically pleaded and stated. 480-481) The second decision relied upon by the learned counsel is Pankaj Mahajan vs. Dimple alias Kajal (2011)12 SCC 1. The Court had found a number of acts which were: “36. From the pleadings and evidence, the following instances of cruelty are specifically pleaded and stated. They are:(i)Giving repeated threats to commit suicide an even trying to commit suicide on one occasion by jumping from the terrace.(ii) Pushing the appellant from the staircase resulting into fracture of his right forearm.(iii) Slapping the appellant and assaulting him.(iv) Misbehaving with the colleagues and relatives of the appellant causing humiliation and embarrassment to him.(v)Not attending to household chores and not even making food for the appellant, leaving him to fend for himself.(vi)Not taking care of the baby.(vii)Insulting the parents of the appellant and misbehaving with them.(viii)Forcing the appellant to live separately from his parents.(ix)Causing nuisance to the landlord’s family of the appellant, causing the said landlord to force the appellant to vacate the premises.(x)Repeated fits of insanity, abnormal behaviour causing great mental tension to the appellant.(xi)Always quarrelling with the appellant and abusing him. (xii) Always behaving in an abnormal manner and doing weird acts causing great mental cruelty to the appellant.37. All these factual details culled out from the pleadings and evidence of both the parties clearly show the conduct of the respondent wife towards the appellant husband. With these acceptable facts and details, it cannot be concluded that the appellant husband has not made out case of cruelty at the hands of the respondent wife. We are satisfied that the appellant husband had placed ambple evidence on record that the respondent wife is suffering from “mental disorder” and due to her acts and conduct, she caused grave mental cruelty to him and it is not possible for the parties to live with each other, therefore, a decree of divorce deserves to be granted in favour of the appellant husband. In addition to the same, it was also brought to our notice that because of the abovementioned reasons, both the appellant husband and the respondent wife are living separately for the last more than nine years. There is no possibility to unite the chain of marital life between the appellant husband and the respondent wife.”(at pp 16-17) 28.As held by the Supreme Court, there can not be water tight compartmentalized definition of cruelty. There is no possibility to unite the chain of marital life between the appellant husband and the respondent wife.”(at pp 16-17) 28.As held by the Supreme Court, there can not be water tight compartmentalized definition of cruelty. Adverting to the last decision in Pankaj Mahajan’ s case, I do not find that the Supreme Court has laid down any different principles. Further, I am unable to accept the contention of learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the respondent has condoned all acts of cruelty by entering into the compromises. The first compromise is between the parents of the parties to this petition. The second one is between the parties themselves. What requires to be noticed is the fact that the compromise only seems to be a cloak for temporary respite and not to accept each other’s faults and condone them in the true spirit of forgiveness so that they could look forward for a better future and happy congenial married life. It cannot be said that the appellant who has been constantly threatening the respondent by involving him and his entire family in police cases and also not joining his company does not constitute acts of cruelty. What follows from this is that there can be no doubt in these circumstances that the respondent did not live a normal sexual life with the appellant as husband and wife. There can be no other conclusion for the reason that she has been staying away from him. The unjustified withdrawal of the appellant from the company of the husband established by evidence on record clearly proves animus deserendi. Adverting to the submission that the evidence is at variance of the pleadings, all that I need say is that after going through the evidence and pleadings of the parties, I find that both the parties were allowed to lead evidence and to cross examine witnesses without objection on all the facts as stated by them. Though the facts may not have been stated meticulously in the pleadings, but nonetheless the grounds indicated the behaviour of the appellant and the evidence does not in any manner disclose that it is not supportive of the pleadings. This submission therefore requires to be rejected. Mental cruelty as contemplated by Section 13 (i-a) and (i-b) of the Act stands proved on record of the case. This submission therefore requires to be rejected. Mental cruelty as contemplated by Section 13 (i-a) and (i-b) of the Act stands proved on record of the case. 29.Considering the long unjustified withdrawal of the appellant from the company of the respondent, there can be no question about both of them cohabitating normally as husband and wife. In these circumstances, mental cruelty stands established. In Raman Kumar vs. Smt. Baksho Thandi, AIR 2008 P&H 95 the Court holds: “10. It can be seen that relationship between the appellant and his wife were not normal. They have stayed together for a very short duration. The allegation is that wife has not allowed the appellant to have a normal sexual relationship. The appellant may not have been wise enough to make clear averment in this regard. It would appeal that he obviously meant to convey that he was denied normal sexual relationship by his wife when he averred that he was not permitted to cohabit marriage. The allegation is that wife has not allowed the appellant to have a normal sexual relationship with her. This aspect perhaps would have come out clearly if the wife had further participated to support her stand and had faced cross-examination. The appellant is done (sic) by the word “cohabit” instead of clearly saying that he was not allowed to consummate marriage. This may not require any elaborate or further discussion in factual background of this case. The wife is still not interested in contesting the appeal. Learned counsel appearing for the wife, on receipt of instructions from the attorney of respondent-wife would say that even respondent-wife is not keen to continue with this relationship and accordingly had not participated to contest this divorce petition before the trial Court after filing reply. There is, thus, no use to pend this appeal ad make the parties to live with this broken relationship awaiting the outcome of the appeal. The plea of the appellant that the respondent-wife did not allow him to cohabit marriage, cannot be read to assign a meaning that plea of denial of sexual relationship is not made. There is, thus, no use to pend this appeal ad make the parties to live with this broken relationship awaiting the outcome of the appeal. The plea of the appellant that the respondent-wife did not allow him to cohabit marriage, cannot be read to assign a meaning that plea of denial of sexual relationship is not made. The over­all behaviour of the wife which has been established by the unrebutted evidence of the appellant would go to show mental cruelty on her part towards the husband, Since the wife has not come forward to contest the appeal and also did not seriously contest the divorce petition, the plea of the appellant is not negative from the evidence and material on record.” (at p. 98)In these facts and circumstances of the case, there is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.