JUDGMENT Dev Darshan Sud,J.This appeal has been preferred by the owner of vehicle involved in the accident. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner Puneet Patial alias Vinay was riding his scooty HP-22A-6889 from his native village Mattan Sidh to Bhota side on National Highway No.88, Hamirpur­Shimla Road. At around 5.10 P.M. when he reached near village Bheera, car of the appellant herein, struck the scooty resulting in serious injuries to the claimant who was hospitalized and treated in the Regional Hospital, Hamirpur and referred to Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla; considering that his injury was serious, he was referred to the PGI, Chandigarh, where his right arm was amputated, resulting in 85% permanent disability. Case FIR No.153/2009, dated 16th Mary, 2009 was registered against the appellant under Sections 279, 337 of the Indian Penal Code. On the pleadings of the parties, five issues were settled. The respondents contested the claim on the ground of maintainability and mis-joinder of necessary parties. Adverting to these issues which were settled as issue Nos.3 and 4, the Tribunal holds, “No evidence has been adduced on these issues by the respondent No.1. So, both these issues are answered against the said respondent for want of evidence.” 3. On the first settled issue as to whether the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the car by Narinder Singh alias Sanju, driver of the car (respondent No.3 before the learned Tribunal below). The Tribunal holds, on the basis of the FIR Ex.PW-1/A, proved by PW-1 Vijay Parkash, that PW-7 Puneet Patial, petitioner in the present case, who has given a graphic description of the accident stating that on the fateful day when he was travelling from Mattan Sidh to Bhota and had reached near Bheera, car No.HP-32-1243, being driven on the wrong side of the road at a fast and reckless speed, struck the scooty on which he was traveling as a result he fell down and sustained serious injuries, his right arm was crushed, he sustained injuries on the other parts of his body and was bleeding profusely. He was rushed to the Regional Hospital at Hamirpur from where he was referred to Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla, which in turn again referred him to PGI, Chandigarh, where his right arm was amputated. He states that a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- was spent on his treatment. He was rushed to the Regional Hospital at Hamirpur from where he was referred to Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla, which in turn again referred him to PGI, Chandigarh, where his right arm was amputated. He states that a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- was spent on his treatment. He had a bright carrier as evidenced by Ex.PW-7/A and Ex.PW­7/B. He wanted to join the Indian Army, but obviously because of the nature of the injuries suffered by him, he was rejected as being physically unfit as proved by Ex.PW-7/D, which was the medical examination held for recruits to the Indian Army. The Tribunal concludes on this evidence that the accident was the result of the rash and negligent acts of the driver of the offending vehicle. 4. PW-8, Shamsher Singh states that he is a driver with bus No.HP-67-0246. He was an eye witness to the accident. He states that he was going from his house towards Bheera Bazar and saw the accident, which was caused by the rash and negligent act of the driver of maruti car No.HP-32-1243 which dashed into thescooty. He says that it was respondent No.3 driver who is responsible for the accident. 5. RW-1, respondent No.1 Jai Ram, states that the car in question was sold by him to respondent No.1 Virender Kumar. He had passed on the information to the Registering and Licencing Authority. He was not aware of the fact that as to whether the accident occurred on 16th May, 2009. 6. Respondent No.3, Narinder Singh, while appearing as RW-3, states that the accident was because of the fault of the driver of the scooty (in this case the claimant). RW-3 Pankaj says that he was travelling in car No.HP-32-1243 and the accident was the result of the rash and negligent driving by the petitioner. 7. On the evidence on record, more especially that of the petitioner and PW-8, the learned Tribunal holds that the accident resulted from the rash and negligent acts on the part of the driver of the car. There was nothing on the record to establish the contentions/stand taken by the respondent that it was because of the rash and negligent act(s) of the petitioner which resulted in the accident. 8. There was nothing on the record to establish the contentions/stand taken by the respondent that it was because of the rash and negligent act(s) of the petitioner which resulted in the accident. 8. Adverting to the medical treatment received by the claimant, the learned Tribunal referred to the evidence of PW-2 Dr.L.R. Verma who stated that the petitioner-claimant remained admitted in the Indira Gandhi Medical College and that crush injuries were sustained by him in his right arm with open Grade-3 with fracture of shaft humerus right side with fracture of both bones. He states that the petitioner was discharged so that he could receive better treatment in a better equipped hospital. Cash memos Ex.P-1 to Ex.P­11 were proved by him. 9. PW-3 Dr.Ramesh Sen proved the treatment of the petitioner in the PGI, Chandigarh where his arm was amputated above the elbow. He proved on record Ex.PW­3/A and Ex.PW-3/B, OPD Card and slip of the claimant. PW-4 Dr.Arun Kumar states that after the accident the petitioner-claimant was brought to the Regional Hospital, Hamirpur and was checked by him. MLC Ex.PW­4/A was signed by this witness. He was referred to Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla, for further management. Dr.Ramesh Chauhan, who appeared as PW-5, stated that the petitioner has suffered press injuries (crush injuries) and was bleeding profusely at that time and first aid treatment was given to him. He was immediately referred for better treatment either to Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla or Rajender Prashad Medical College, Tanda for further management. He states that he was member of the Board which issued disability certificate (Ex.PW-5/A) certifying85% permanent disability. It was these facts which weighed with the Tribunal in assessing the compensation. 10. In Govind Yadav vs. New India Assurance Co.Ltd., 2012 ACJ 28, the Supreme Court considers the entire case law with respect to the principles for award of damages for injuries/disablement and holds:- “10. The personal sufferings of the survivors and disabled persons are manifold. Some time they can be measured in terms of money but most of the times it is not possible to do so. If an individual is permanently disabled in an accident, the cost of his medical treatment and care is likely to be very high. The personal sufferings of the survivors and disabled persons are manifold. Some time they can be measured in terms of money but most of the times it is not possible to do so. If an individual is permanently disabled in an accident, the cost of his medical treatment and care is likely to be very high. In cases involving total or partial disablement, the term `compensation’ used in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, `the Act’) would include not only the expenses incurred for immediate treatment, but also the amount likely to be incurred for future medical treatment/care necessary for a particular injury or disability caused by an accident. A very large number of people involved in motor accidents are pedestrians, children, women and illiterate persons. Majority of them cannot, due to sheer ignorance, poverty and other disabilities, engage competent lawyers for proving negligence of the wrongdoer in adequate measure. The insurance companies with whom the vehicles involved in the accident are insured usually have battery of lawyers on their panel. They contest the claim petitions by raising all possible technical objections for ensuring that their clients areeither completely absolved ortheir liabilities minimized. This results in prolonging the proceedings before the Tribunal. Sometimes the delay and litigation expenses’ make the award passed by the Tribunal and even by the High Court (in appeal) meaningless. It is, therefore, imperative that the officers, who preside over the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal adopt a proactive approach and ensure that the claims filed under Sections 166 of the Act are disposed of with required urgency and compensation is awarded to the victims of the accident and/or their legal representatives in adequate measure. The amount of compensation in such cases should invariably include pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. In R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Private Limited (1995) 1 SCC, this Court while dealing with a case involving claim of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ward v. James (1965) 1 All ER 563, Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 12 (page 446) and observed: “9. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non- pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv)inconvenience, hardship, discomfort,disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life. In the same case, the Court further observed: “(12) In its very nature whenever a tribunal or a court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guesswork, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standards.”15. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar Mishra v.New India Assurance Co.Ltd., 2010 ACJ 2867 (SC) and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar, 2011 ACJ 1 (SC), must be followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts in determining the quantum of compensation payable to the victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanent disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident.”(pp.31-32 & 35) 11.The medical evidence on record is clear andtelling. The petitioner was a young boy of 19 years at the time of the accident. The petitioner was a young boy of 19 years at the time of the accident. The medical evidence on record shows amputation of his right arm. Disability has been certified as permanent disability of 85% for having lost the use of his right arm. The petitioner was of young age, suffering permanent disability of 85%, the possibility cannot be ruled out of his not getting employment in a number of jobs. True, that it may be possible for him to live a healthy life, but the yearning of living a normal life would remain with him till as long as he lives. He will be disabled for employment in a number of professions/vocations. In addition, what happens to his matrimonial prospectus will be a big question mark. He loses the chance of leading a normal life, participating in normal activities, sports etc. 12. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that as to what the learned Tribunal awarded was a figure in excess of what was due to the petitioner. No such point is being urged before me. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.