Sudhir Agarwal, J.:— 1. Heard Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents no. 1 and 3. 2. The dispute relates to a shop situated at Waqf Majid Turkmanpur near Kabristan Mubarak Khan Shaheed, Mohallala Turkmanpur City Gorakhpur. The petitioner, Laxmi Prasad, (now deceased and substituted by his legal heirs), is the tenant and the respondent no. 3 is the landlord of the shop in dispute. 3. The respondent no. 3 filed Suit No. 162 of 1988 in the Court of Judge Small Causes, Gorakhpur alleging that tenant has committed default in payment of rent and despite notice dated 17.08.1988 has not paid the rent. Hence, his tenancy was terminated and hence is liable for ejectment on the ground mentioned in Section 20(2)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act 1972 (hereinafter referred as to "Act, 1972"). 4. The suit was contested by petitioner. The Trial Court vide judgment 19.07.1994 decreed the suit and directed petitioner tenant to handover vacant possession of the disputed shop to the landlord, besides payment of arrears of rent, damages (pendente lite) and cost of the suit. The revisional court confirmed Trial Court's judgment by dismissing petitioner's Civil Revision No. 189 of 1984 vide judgment dated 19.03.1990. 5. The only question up for consideration is, the property in question, being a Waqf Property, in view of amendment inserted in 1994 in Section 2(1) exempting application of Act, 1972 to a Waqf Property, whether the suit was liable to abate and could not have continued thereafter. It has said that the amendment came into force on 26.09.1994. It has further been contended that the notice terminating tenancy was given on the ground under sub-section (2)(a) of Section 20 of Act, 1972 while the suit has been decreed on the ground under sub-section (2)(c) of Section 20, Act, 1972 which was not permissible and the impugned judgment therefore is liable to be set aside. 6. However, this Court finds no force in any of the submissions. 7. Considering the second submission at the foremost, the Court finds that in para 6, 7 and 8 of the plaint, it is alleged that material alteration has caused damage to the disputed accommodation and it is without any permission of landlord, making structural alteration in the building. 6. However, this Court finds no force in any of the submissions. 7. Considering the second submission at the foremost, the Court finds that in para 6, 7 and 8 of the plaint, it is alleged that material alteration has caused damage to the disputed accommodation and it is without any permission of landlord, making structural alteration in the building. The Trial Court has referred to the tenant's own admission that entire disputed building was demolished and thereafter, a new construction was raised. He has also recorded a finding that since entire earlier structure has been removed from the site, it would result in disfiguring the disputed building attracting Section 20(2)(c) of Act 1972. Besides, it has also recorded the finding of fact that there was default in payment of rent, arrears and other amount which was also not deposited by tenant on the first date of hearing. Hence, sub-section (4) of Section 20 would not help the tenant. Before the revisional court, it appears that the tenant raised only one ground i.e. his entitlement for benefit of Section 20 sub-section (4) which has been considered by Revisional Court. It has held that tenant is not entitled for such benefit having failed to deposit requisite amount on the first date of hearing. Besides, it has also considered question of validity of notice, demolition of entire rented accommodation and new construction raised by the tenant and thereafter has confirmed Trial Court's judgment. 8 Before this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner could not show anything so as to entitle himself for the benefit of Section 20 sub-section (4) of the Act. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that under Section 20(2)(c) unless a finding is recorded that the construction or structural alteration in the building is likely to diminish value or utility of the building in question or it has disfigured it, no decree for ejectment can be passed on the ground under Section 20(2)(c) of Act 1972. This Court finds that the tenant sought permission from the Prescribed Authority, by filing an application under Section 29 for repairs of the shop, stating that khaprail roof was seriously damaged whereafter an asbestos roof was raised which has been damaged by some miscreants, hence, he (tenant) be permitted to place asbestos sheets on the roof of the shop. This Court finds that the tenant sought permission from the Prescribed Authority, by filing an application under Section 29 for repairs of the shop, stating that khaprail roof was seriously damaged whereafter an asbestos roof was raised which has been damaged by some miscreants, hence, he (tenant) be permitted to place asbestos sheets on the roof of the shop. The permission was granted by Prescribed Authority/IInd Additional Civil Judge by its order dated 11.01.1989 only to the extent that requisite repairs and asbestos sheets shall be placed on roof and nothing else. Thereafter, another application was given by petitioner tenant to repair floor, plastering of walls and installation of a shutter in the shop. It was also allowed by the Prescribed Authority on 21.01.1985. Both these orders clearly show that permission was granted to petitioner-tenant to make certain repairs in the existing shop only. However, the evidence has come before the courts below that petitioner tenant got the entire shop demolished and thereafter raised a new construction. The finding in this regard recorded by Trial Court referring to petitioner-respondent's own statement may be reproduced as under:- @ Hindi @ "Laxmi Prasad D.W.-1 in his cross-examination has given clear testimony that the disputed house collapsed due to rain but no written statement has been given in relation to the house collapse due to rain. In his cross-examination, Laxmi Prasad D.W.-1 has further stated that he started constructing the house 2-3 days after its demolition and that he did not obtain written permission from the plaintiff for demolishing the house. Therefore, on the basis of the aforesaid statement of the defendant Laxmi Prasad D.W.-1 it is proved that the defendant had demolished the entire house and raised new construction over there without permission of the plaintiff. On the basis of the admission of the defendant, no further investigation is required and it stands proved that the defendant constructed a new house by demolishing an old shop." (English translated by the Court) 10. This finding has been confirmed by Revisional Court also. Before this Court also, learned Counsel for petitioner has not shown any perversity and misreading of evidence. That being so, it cannot be said that the petitioner has simply made some structural alterations etc. in the building. This finding has been confirmed by Revisional Court also. Before this Court also, learned Counsel for petitioner has not shown any perversity and misreading of evidence. That being so, it cannot be said that the petitioner has simply made some structural alterations etc. in the building. On the contrary, it is a complete demolition of existing tenanted shop, new construction whereof never was permitted to the petitioner, either by Prescribed Authority or by landlord or any provisions of law. In fact, the law is, when a tenanted accommodation is demolished in its entirety, immediately it will result in disappearing tenancy rights of tenant, and he would thereafter be liable for ejectment. In the present case, the tenant has raised a total new construction after complete demolition and therefore, without anything more, it can be said that the shop under tenancy with the petitioner has been totally disfigured by him, attracting Section 20(2)(c) of Act 1972. 11. So far as further submission of learned counsel for the petitioner with reference to Section 2 (1)(bbb) is concerned, this Court finds that it was inserted by U.P. Act No. 5 of 1995 w.e.f. 25.09.1994 while the suit in question was decided by the Trial court on 19.07.1994. Hence, this amendment would result in no consequence. 12. It has been held that the aforesaid amendment would not abate also pending proceedings and same would continue to be governed by the earlier law. 13. The submission of petitioner that shop in question is owned by a Waqf and in view of Section 2(1)(bbb), Act, 1972 is not applicable and therefore suit was liable to be abated, is thoroughly misconceived. The aforesaid amendment admittedly came into force w.e.f. 26.9.1994 by U.P. Act No.5 of 1995. The proceedings, which were pending prior thereto remain unaffected thereby. This issue, stands already settled by Apex Court as well as by a larger Bench i.e. Division Bench of this Court. In Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Amrit Lal & Company and Another, 2001(8) SCC 397 the Court held that insertion of certain provision in the principal Act, taking away application of the Act, would not affect pending proceedings, if on the date when proceedings were initiated, the same were well within its jurisdiction. 14. The said principle has been followed by a Division Bench in Champa Devi (Smt.) and another Vs. 14. The said principle has been followed by a Division Bench in Champa Devi (Smt.) and another Vs. Rent Control and Eviction officer (Ist), Allahabad and another, 2002(1) ARC 192 and in para 4 of the judgment, reference made to the larger Bench was answered as under: "Accordingly, the answer to the question referred would be that clause (g) to Section 2 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, inserted in the Act by Section 2 of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1995, will not affect the proceedings pending on the date of enforcement of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1995." 15. The same view has been taken by this Court in Writ Petition No.53119 of 2002 (Thakur Rang Ji Maharaj & Another Vs. Om Prakash Agarwal & Anr.) decided on 14.08.2012. 16. In view of the above authority of Apex Court and the Division Bench judgment as well as Single Judge of this Court, the submission that Amendment Act of 1995 would result in abating pending proceedings is clearly misconceived and is rejected. 17. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed. 18. No order as to costs. _____________