JUDGMENT Mr. K. Kannan, J.: (Oral) - The petitioner is a Cooperative Society which claimed a property as a purchaser from an allottee under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1954 (for short, ‘the 1954 Act’). The purchase was in respect of 6 standard acres and 3 ¾ units from one Avtar Singh on 05.01.1963. The sale by Avtar Singh was in his capacity as an adopted son of Nihal Kaur, who had been displaced from the place now in Pakistan and migrated to India. An objection to the allotment to the vendor Avtar Singh was taken by respondents 4 and 5, namely, Bahal Singh and Chanan Singh respectively, who contended that they were the only sons of Nihal Kaur and their claim had been satisfied by an allotment in favour of their other mother of an extent of 19 standard acres and 14 ¼ units and that the allotment secured by Avtar Singh had been by deceit having suppressed the allotment already made in Punjab and falsely stating that he was the adopted son of Nihal Kaur. The allotment made to Avtar Singh was, under the circumstances, cancelled by the State upholding the objections given by the sons of Nihal Kaur. The authorities under the Act have affirmed the original order of cancellation and the writ petition challenges the order passed under P-2 by the Financial Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Haryana. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that if the property were to be taken as an excessive allotment and it was liable for cancellation, the State shall only cancel such extent of allotment which was retained by the original allottee and protect the subsequent purchaser, who has parted with consideration under the bona fide belief that the vendor was lawfully entitled to the property through allotment from the State. The learned counsel would further contend as a second limb of argument that Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act could protect a purchaser who had parted with consideration from the allottee and the property purchased shall be allowed to be retained without fear of being cancelled at the instance of the State. The learned counsel would further contend as a second limb of argument that Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act could protect a purchaser who had parted with consideration from the allottee and the property purchased shall be allowed to be retained without fear of being cancelled at the instance of the State. The learned counsel would contend as an alternative plea that in the event of the other contentions being rejected, the petitioner should be allowed to be retained in the property and sold by the State on a preferential basis at the rate of the property on the date when the cancellation of the sale had been made. 3. As regards the first contention that in the event of the allotment being found as excessive, the cancellation shall be in respect of the property which is retained by the owner, such a plea could arise in situations where there is some other property retained by the allottee. In this case, it would have made difference if the property had been purchased from Nihal Kaur herself. The property allotted to the vendor, Avtar Singh was on suppression of fact of allotment to Nihal Kaur and it could not be protected in the hands of a purchaser by directing any portion of property allotted to Nihal Kaur to be deducted, for, she had no role to play in the defective allotment made in favour of Avtar Singh. It shall not, therefore, be possible to subject the holding of Nihal Kaur to be deducted out the extent allotted in excess to Avtar Singh. As regards the applicability of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act the said Section shall apply only in cases where a transfer is made by an ostensible owner, with the consent express or implied by the person, who was interested in the immovable property. The ostensible owner, in this case, was the allottee and a purchaser to such an allottee would be protected only in a case where the Government being the owner, which had an interest in the property and which also had a right to cancel the allotment, had acceded to the sale by any express orders or by implied conduct. I cannot see any complicity of the State in the manner of sale executed by the allottee in favour of the Cooperative Society. I cannot see any complicity of the State in the manner of sale executed by the allottee in favour of the Cooperative Society. I would, therefore, also reject the contention that Section 41 has any applicability to such a situation. 4. The counsel contends that the Society has parted with consideration and has carried out substantial improvements and has held on to the property for more than 3 decades and that it shall be allowed to continue in possession of the property at a price determined on the date when the cancellation order was made. The cancellation order was made in this case in the year 1963 and, in my view, it would be grossly inappropriate to allow the property to be taken at the price of the year 1963. The allotments which are made unde the 1954 Act were meant to benefit persons, who had been displaced from the place now in Pakistan or to specific categories of persons, who were identified under the relevant rules as eligible beneficiaries. A Cooperative Society was just not a party purchasing a property from a person claiming to be a displaced person and not identified either under the Act or under the Rules as a beneficiary to secure such allotment. If I should therefore allow for the purchaser to retain the property, it cannot come through any recognition of a pre-existing right, but it is merely with a view to make scales even to allow for the retention of the property for a Society which could serve a larger interest to promote the objectives of cooperative movement and not to benefit any private individual. The direction for retention of the property itself is a benefit per se and as regards the valuation the petitioner it cannot obtain any privilege except that it will have the right of a preemptive offer before the offer goes to any other member of the public. A market valuation in relation to the property shall be determined by the competent authority under the 1954 Act within a period of 3 months and communicated to the petitioner for eliciting of acceptance of the offer within a reasonable time that it may specify. If the offer is not accepted within the time so stipulated, the government shall be at liberty to resume possession of the property and dispose of the same in accordance with law. 5. If the offer is not accepted within the time so stipulated, the government shall be at liberty to resume possession of the property and dispose of the same in accordance with law. 5. The writ petition is disposed of on the above terms. --------------