JUDGMENT:- 1. The plaintiff is the lessee of the suit property. The defendant, who is the owner of the suit property, had leased out the property to the plaintiff's father-Murugesa Naicker in the year 1936. Since then, it is claimed that, both the plaintiff and his father has been paying the kist receipts to the competent authorities. But, subsequently, when the temple authorities with malafide intention refused to receive the lease amount, the plaintiff, by apprehending some unlawful action from the hands of the defendant, filed a suit in O.S.No.2248 of 1996 before the Vth Assistant City Civil Court, Madras, seeking for permanent injunction restraining the defendant, its employees, servants, workmen and agents in any manner interfering and disturbing and evicting the plaintiff from the property bearing Survey No.104/6, in a total extent of 16 cents in Thiruvanmiyur Village, Mylaore, Triplicane Taluk. 2. Opposing the said claim, a detailed written statement was filed by the defendant, taking a specific stand that the suit was not maintainable, as no notice was issued under Section 80 CPC to the defendant-Executive Officer. Further, the plaintiff also filed a writ petition in W.P.No.2357 of 1996 on the very same cause of action and the same was also pending, therefore, for the same cause action, when the writ was pending, no suit was maintainable. 3. Under these circumstances, the trial Court framed the following issues, after examining P.W.1 and marking Exs.A1 to A6, on the side of the plaintiff, as well as by examining D.W.1 and marking Exs.B1 to B7, on the side defendant. “i. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the permanent injunction as prayed for? ii. Is it correct that the suit is not maintainable?” 4. After framing the above issue, the trial Court has dismissed the suit filed the by the plaintiff, by holding that when it is accepted by the plaintiff himself that the defendant is the real owner of the suit property, the plaintiff is not entitled for the permanent injunction as prayed for against the true owner and to that effect, a judgment passed by this Court in SaraswatiAmmal v. Viveka Primary School ( AIR 2001 Mad 417 ) was cited. In respect of the second issue, it was held that, in the absence of pre suit notice under Section 80 of CPC, the suit was not maintainable. In respect of the second issue, it was held that, in the absence of pre suit notice under Section 80 of CPC, the suit was not maintainable. Aggrieved by the same, when an appeal was filed, learned first appellate Court has also dismissed the appeal. As against the same, the present second appeal has been filed. 5. This Court, at the time of entertaining the second appeal, framed the following substantial questions of law:- "i. Whether the lease revived after withdrawal of land acquisition proceedings? ii. Whether statutory notice under Section 80 CPC is mandatory before the suit against the respondent? iii. Whether the lower Courts failed to consider that the respondent without resorting to any legal remedy, can interfere with the physical possession and enjoyment of the suit property?" 6. Mr.AR.L. Sundaresan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that both the Courts below erroneously by disbelieving the plea of maintainability of the suit, for not issuing the pre suit notice under Section 80 of CPC, dismissed the suit refusing to decree a suit for permanent injunction against the defendant. When the plaintiff all along has approached the trial Court, complaining the unlawful interference from the defendant, the trail court has wrongly dismissed the suit, especially when the appellant is a statutory tenant entitled to the protection under the Tenancy Law. He further contended that the plaintiff need not issue a pre notice under Section 80 of CPC, before filing a suit for permanent injunction, since the Executive Officer of the Temple is not a State. 7. In respect of his submission that no notice under Section 80 of CPC is necessary before filing the suit, he has also relied upon a judgment of this Court in T. Kasinathanv. Special Officer, Sri Petharanaswamy, Pondicherry, passed in S.A.No.323 of 1997, dated 29.01.2007. But, the judgment does not give any answer to the said question, whether pre suit notice is required or not, while filing a suit against the Executive Officer of the Temple. Special Officer, Sri Petharanaswamy, Pondicherry, passed in S.A.No.323 of 1997, dated 29.01.2007. But, the judgment does not give any answer to the said question, whether pre suit notice is required or not, while filing a suit against the Executive Officer of the Temple. However, in the said judgment, it has been held that if a lessee is given any lease by the landlord for a specific period, after the expiry of the lease period, the lessee cannot have any right to be in possession, because after the lease is determined either by efflux of time or by notice to quit would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile tenant the status of a tenant or a right to be in possession. 8. Therefore, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that concurrent findings reached by the Courts below holding against the plaintiff that he was not there in possession of the suit property after 1984 and more particularly, when he filed a suit in the year 1996 in O.S.No.2248 of 1996, seeking permanent injunction, as a matter of settled law, a person asking for permanent injunction not to interfere with the possession, must establish by producing all the acceptable evidence and satisfy the Court that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. But, in the present case, on the date when he has filed a suit in the year 1996, the plaintiff, as held by the Courts below, was not in possession, therefore, the findings recorded by the Courts below that the plaintiff has approached the Court with un-cleaned hands by concealing all the vital aspects that he was not in possession, should not be interfered with by this Court, carries more weight. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent has also produced important photographs of the suit property to show that the plaintiff on the date of filing the suit was not in possession of the suit property. By going through the photographs, it can be seen that no thatched set or any superstructure was seen, as claimed by the plaintiff/appellant herein. Further, when the suit property was acquired by the Government, challenging the acquisition proceedings, the temple authorities had filed a writ petition. By going through the photographs, it can be seen that no thatched set or any superstructure was seen, as claimed by the plaintiff/appellant herein. Further, when the suit property was acquired by the Government, challenging the acquisition proceedings, the temple authorities had filed a writ petition. Subsequently, the Government withdrew the acquisition proceedings and thereafter, the plaintiff never even made any attempt to file a suit against the Government or took any steps to get impleaded in the pending writ petition. In that view of the matter, when there has been a concurrent finding against the plaintiff/appellant herein that, from the year 1984, the plaintiff was not in possession and also had not established his possession in the suit property, the same do not call for any interference. 10. Further, when the Courts below have rightly found that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property for more than 12 years from the year 1984 till the filing of his suit in the year 1996 and further concealing the fact that he was not in possession, when he filed a suit in the year 1996, as if he was in possession of the suit property, seeking for permanent injunction against the true owner, the trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit, on the basis of the ratio laid down by this Court in SaraswatiAmmal's case (cited supra), therefore, such findings cannot be disturbed, for the reason that he was neither in possession after 1984, nor proved by way of producing any evidence that he continued to be a lessee. 11. It is also an admitted fact that the suit property belongs to the defendant/respondent temple Devasthanam, namely, Devasthanam of Maruntheeswarar temple, Tiruvanmiyur. When the plaintiff himself had admitted that the suit property belongs to the temple Devasthanam, by merely impleading the Executive Officer of Arulmighu Maruntheeswarar Temple, he cannot ask for permanent injunction, in view of the proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 79 as well as sub-section 3 thereof, which is extracted as under:- (2) ---------- Provided further that no such suit shall be instituted by a person who is let into possession of the property or who is a lessee, licensee or mortgagee, of the religious institution or endowment. (3) No injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Joint Commissioner under Section 78. (3) No injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Joint Commissioner under Section 78. A close reading of the above provision clearly shows that no suit shall be instituted by a person, who is let into possession of the property as a lessee, licensee or mortgagee of the religious institution or endowment. 12. Further, it is not out of context to refer to Order XXXI Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C., 1908, which are given as under: "1. Representation of beneficiaries in suits concerning property vested in trustees, etc.-In all suits concerning property vested in a trustee, executor or administrator, where the contention is between the persons beneficially interested in such property and a third person, the trustee, executor or administrator shall represent the persons so interested, and it shall not ordinarily be necessary to make them parties to the suit. But the Court may, if it thinks fit, order them or any of them to be made parties. 2. Joinder of trustees, executors and administrators.-Where there are several trustees, executors or administrators, they shall all be made parties to a suit against one or more of them : Provided that the executors who have not proved their testator's will, and trustees, executors and administrators outside India, need not be made parties." A close reading of rule 2 shows that where there are several trustees, executors or administrators, they shall all be made as parties to a suit against one or more of them. Therefore, as per Order XXXI Rule 2 when the temple Devesthanam is administratively represented by the Board of Trustees, the plaintiff should have made them parties to the present suit for seeking injunction. Admittedly, the plaintiff/appellant has failed to implead the Board of Trustees of the temple Devasthanam. Therefore, though the findings given by the Courts below that the suit is not maintainable for not issuing pre-suit notice under Section 80 CPC is not in order, yet, for the reason that the suit was filed without impleading the Board of Trustees of the Devasthanam in terms of Order XXXI Rule 2, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 13. In the light of the above, by answering the substantial questions of law against the appellants, the Second Appeal stands dismissed. Consequently, the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are hereby confirmed. 13. In the light of the above, by answering the substantial questions of law against the appellants, the Second Appeal stands dismissed. Consequently, the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are hereby confirmed. No costs.