Sudhir Agarwal, J.— 1. Heard Sri Somesh Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Sandeep Agarwal, holding brief of Sri Rahul Sahai, Advocate for respondent No.3/1 and Sri Manish Tandon, Advocate for respondents No.3/1/1 and 3/1/2 and perused the record. 2. The writ petition is directed against judgment dated 19th March, 1997 passed by IVth Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar allowing respondent-tenants' Rent Appeal No.91 of 1995 and setting aside Prescribed Authority's order dated 28th April, 1995 consequent to which petitioner's application under Section 21(1)(a) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") has been rejected. 3. The facts, which are not in dispute before this Court, is that respondent No.2, Ram Narain, had purchased another accommodation i.e. House No.128/H-1/205, Kidwai Nagar, Kanpur. The respondent No.3 Smt. Sumitra Devi (now deceased and substituted by her legal heirs) is mother of respondent no.2. That being so, whether actual tenant in the case was respondents No.2 or 3 would make no difference. Purchase of another residential accommodation by respondent No.2 would admittedly attract explanation to Section 21(1) of Act, 1972 which reads as under: "(i) where the tenant or any member of his family who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained." 4. In view thereof, I do not find any relevance to look into the question whether tenant in the accommodation in question was respondents no.2 or 3 for the reason that legal consequences arising out of explanation to Section 21(1) of Act, 1972 applies to this case irrespective of the fact whether respondent no.2 would be tenant or respondent no.3. In the circumstances respondents no.2 and 3 obviously would stand excluded from having any right to contest petitioner's application under Section under Section 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972. 5. However, matter does not rest here. Release application under Section 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972, merely on account of absence of any party to contest the matter, cannot to be allowed unless landlord satisfy Prescribed Authority about genuity of his need as is required under Section 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972. 5. However, matter does not rest here. Release application under Section 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972, merely on account of absence of any party to contest the matter, cannot to be allowed unless landlord satisfy Prescribed Authority about genuity of his need as is required under Section 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972. It is the satisfaction of Prescribed Authority about bona fide of the need of petitioner/landlord and absence of tenant from contesting the matter from explanation to Section 21(1)(a) would only exclude the scope of consideration of matter on the aspect of comparative hardship but so far as bona fide need is concerned, that has to be considered. Unless the Prescribed Authority is satisfied on this aspect, release application cannot be allowed. 6. In the present case, petitioner-landlord sought release of accommodation in question for the benefit of family members of his brother. Sri Khare could not dispute that 'brother', 'sister' and their children do not attract the definition of "family" under Section 3(g) of Act, 1972 and therefore, for their benefit release application of petitioner, under Section 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972, cannot be allowed. 7. In the circumstances, I do not find any patent or legal error in the impugned appellate order in so far as it has rejected petitioner's application for release under Section 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972. However, as a result of exclusion of respondent-tenants, loosing their right to occupy accommodation in question after acquiring another residential accommodation in the same city, it would result a vacancy in the premises in question. Hence, it is legally open to the competent authority to initiate allotment proceedings and petitioner will also have his rights open, under other provisions of statute, to seek release of aforesaid accommodation in accordance with law, if any. 8. With the aforesaid clarification/observation, the writ petition is dismissed. _____________