Judgment :- The petitioner has sought for a mandamus, forbearing the respondents from evicting the petitioner from Door No.2/417E and 2/417F, Old S.No.375/1, New.S.No.59/2 at Kilinjada, Hulical Town Panchayat, Coonoor Taluk, Nilgris District. 2. According to the petitioner, he is residing in S.No.2/417E and 2/417F at Kilinjada, Hulical Town Panchayat, Coonoor Taluk, Nilgris District. He had put up, houses measuring 200 sq.ft and 100 sq.ft. He has also grown orange, mango and other fruit bearing trees. He has been issued B-Memos by the revenue department. 3. It is the grievance of the petitioner that without adhering to Sections 6 & 7 of the Tamilnadu Land Encroachment Act, the revenue officials, attempted to forcibly evict the petitioner and others and hence, he was constrained to prefer W.P.21432 of 1994. This Court, after hearing both parties, by its order dated 22.12.1994, directed the respondents therein to pass appropriate orders after considering the reply to be submitted by the petitioner therein. 4. It is the further case of the petitioner that prior to institution of the writ petition, there was a threat of eviction in 1989 and that he has preferred O.S.No.165 of 1989 on the file of the learned District Munsif, Coonoor, for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants therein from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the property. On the dependents remaining exparte, the suit was decreed on 08.01.1991. While that be so, on 22.10.2003 about 11.00 am., the Tahsildhar, Coonoor, Nilgris and the Forest Range Officer, Coonoor, Nilgris, the 2nd and 3rd respondents, started demolishing the house and uprooted the fruit bearing trees, despite protest. The 3rd respondent claimed that the land belonged to the Forest Department. 5. According to the petitioner, he is in possession and enjoyment of the property in Door No.2/417E and 2/417F, Old S.No.375/1, New.S.No.59/2 at Kilinjada, Hulical Town Panchayat, Coonoor Taluk, Nilgris District, for many years and that he has also obtained a decree in O.S.No.165 of 1989 dated 08.01.1991. 6. In addition to the above pleading, Mr. 5. According to the petitioner, he is in possession and enjoyment of the property in Door No.2/417E and 2/417F, Old S.No.375/1, New.S.No.59/2 at Kilinjada, Hulical Town Panchayat, Coonoor Taluk, Nilgris District, for many years and that he has also obtained a decree in O.S.No.165 of 1989 dated 08.01.1991. 6. In addition to the above pleading, Mr. Arokia Maniraj, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when this Court in W.P.No.21432 of 1994 dated 23.12.1994 quashed the notice issued under Section 6 of the Tamilnadu Land Encroachment Act and that a further direction was given to adhere to the statutory provisions, it is not open to the revenue officials to take the law into their own hands and attempt to evict the petitioner, causing damage to the house as well as the fruit bearing trees. He also submitted that as violation of the decree for permanent injunction is per se apparent, the respondents have even committed the act of contempt. In these circumstances, he submitted that unless a writ of mandamus is issued, it would cause serious injury and hardship. 7. The Collector, Nilgris District, in his counter affidavit has submitted that the petitioner has constructed two houses measuring 200sq.ft and 100sq.ft, respectively and grown some fruit bearing trees in S.No.805/1 of Adhigaratty-II Village in Coonoor Taluk. According to him, the land has been notified as "Suttan Chola Reserve Forest" and that the encroachment was objectionable. The District Collector, Nilgris District has denied the contention that B-Memo has been issued in respect of S.No.805/1 of Adhigaratty Village. He further submitted that notice under Section 68(A) of Tamilnadu Forest Act, 1882 dated 16.03.2000, has been served. After following the statutory provision eviction proceedings were executed by the Forest Officials and not revenue officials. The District Collector has further submitted that penalty for encroachment has been collected only in rest of S.No.375/1 and not for the land in S.No.805/1 of Adhigaratty Village, which is a "Suttan Chola Reserve Forest" land. 8. As far as the decree is concerned, the 1st respondent has submitted that the permanent injunction in O.S.No.165 of 1989, on the file of the learned District Munsif, Coonoor, is only in respect of S.No.375/1 and not in respect of S.No.805/1. On the above pleadings the District Collector has sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 10. On the above pleadings the District Collector has sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 10. From the pleadings it could be deduced that there is a disputed question of fact as to which authority has carried out the eviction proceedings. Though the petitioner has contended that the revenue officials at the instance of the Forest officials have illegally disturbed his possession and enjoyment of two houses measuring 200 and 100 sq.ft respectively in S.No.805/1, Adhigaratty Village, Coonoor Taluk, which is said to be a forest land, the District Collector, Nilgris, in his counter affidavit has submitted that the eviction proceedings, were carried out only by the forest officials with the help of police after issuance of a notice under Section 68(A) of Tamilnadu Forest Act, 1882. Disputed question of fact is apparent from the pleadings. Courts have consistently held that if there is a disputed question of fact, the same cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Useful reference could be made to the following decisions. (a) In (1976) 1 SCC 292 (Arya Vyasa Sabha and Ors. v. The Commissioner of Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions & Endowments, Hyderabad and Ors.) the view taken by the High Court that disputed questions of fact are to be left open to be decided before the Civil Court was upheld by the Supreme Court. (b) In the decision reported in (2003) 4 SCC 317 (Rourkela Shramik Sangh v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Anr.) it is held that the disputed questions of fact could not be entertained in the writ proceedings. In paragraph 19, the Supreme Court held as follows: "19. The question as to whether the workmen concerned had been continuously working for a period of ten years so as to enable them to derive benefit of the judgment of this Court in R.K. Panda case (1994) 5 SCC 304 was essentially a question of fact...." In paragraph 22, the Honourable Supreme Court further held as follows: "22. ...a disputed question of fact normally would not be entertained in a writ proceeding. ...a disputed question of fact normally would not be entertained in a writ proceeding. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront Workers (2001) 7 SCC 1 ...." (c) In (2006) 9 SCC 256 (Himmat Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors.), the Honourable Supreme Court held that - 'the statement of the appellant or the 5th respondent was correct or not could not ordinarily be tested in writ proceedings and it is well known that in writ petition ordinarily such a disputed question of fact could not be entertained'. (d) In yet another decision reported in (2007) 7 MLJ 687 (Food Corporation of India v. Harmesh Chand), the Supreme Court held as follows: "Since the facts were seriously disputed by the appellant and no factual finding could be recorded without consideration of evidence adduced by the parties, it was not an appropriate case in which the High Court ought to have exercised its writ jurisdiction. The parties could have approached a civil court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter." 11. De hors, the above judgments stated supra, when petitioner has alleged interference with his possession and enjoyment and sought for an extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, atleast he should have enclosed adequate proof in support of the facts pleaded, to substantiate the allegations. Though 14 documents have been filed in the typed set of papers along with the writ petition, none indicates interference with the petitioner's possession or enjoyment either by the Forest or Revenue officials. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to extract paragraph No.13 of the judgment in Bharat Singh and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, reported in 1988 (4) SCC 534 , wherein the Supreme Court has distinguished between the pleading and proof, in a civil case and a writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, as follows: ".... In our opinion, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evident which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. In our opinion, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evident which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the court will not entertain the point. In this context, it will not be out of place to point out that in this regard there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, that is, a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it." As stated supra there is no supporting evidence. The rival pleadings are nothing but oath against oath and therefore, in the light of the decisions stated supra, mandamus sought for cannot be granted. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.