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2012 DIGILAW 233 (CHH)

TRIBHUVAN SINGH THAKUR v. STATE OF M. P.

2012-09-14

MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA

body2012
JUDGMENT 1. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.10.1993 passed by learned Special Judge, Raipur in Special Case No.38/1991, whereby and whereunder, the appellants have been convicted under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to "as the Act of 1988") and each of the appellants has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for 1 year and fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo R.I. for 5 months. Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. During the pendency of the appeal, appellant Balram died. 2. Prosecution story, as unfolded from the records of the case and the judgment of the learned trial Court is that during the period from 3.3.1986 to 5.2.1986, deceased appellant-Balram was posted and working as Property Tax Officer and the appellant Harishchand Yadav was posted and working as Recovery Officer in Nagar Palika Parishad (Municipality), Mahasamund. On 3.3.1986, complainant- Loknath Sahu (P.W. 7) made an application in the office of the Municipality for issuance of possession certificate of his House No. 189 in Ward No. 8 (new Ward No. 16). When complainant - Loknath contacted the appellant on 3.3.1986 and 5.3.1986 in connection with grant of certificate, each of the appellant demanded Rs.100/- bribe saying that if bribe is not given, the appellants will keep on wandering without any result. Further case of the prosecution is that the complainant - Loknath was asked to come with bribe money on 5.3.1986 in the offence of Municipality. As the complainant was not willing to give bribe, a complaint in Ex.P-1 was submitted before the Superintendent of Police (Vigilance). Complaint was verified by D.S.P. Mr. S.K. Verma (P.W.9) and panch witness M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W.1). After verifying the complaint, 4 currency notes each of Rs.50/- and totaling Rs.200/- were produced by the complainant and their numbers were noted, phenopthalien powder was smeared on those currency notes. Thereafter, the complainant was searched and no other currency notes, papers and articles were allowed to be kept with him and the currency notes were kept in the pocket of the complainant with instruction not to touch it before giving it to the appellants and not to shake hand either before or after giving currency notes. Thereafter, the complainant was searched and no other currency notes, papers and articles were allowed to be kept with him and the currency notes were kept in the pocket of the complainant with instruction not to touch it before giving it to the appellants and not to shake hand either before or after giving currency notes. The demonstration of reaction of sodium carbonate with phenopthalien powder was also given to the complainant in the presence of panch witnesses and the solution was kept and sealed in a bottle. Pre-trap panchnama in Ex.P-2 was prepared, in which, the entire proceedings were reduced in writing, singed by panch witnesses. Thereafter, the trap party along with panch witnesses and the complainant proceeded to office of the Municipality at Mahasamund. Further case of the prosecution is that the complainant- Loknath, went inside the office and handed over bribe money to each of the appellants and then came out and gave signal to trap party, whereupon, the members of trap party rushed to the spot and caught hold of the appellants. Hands of each of the appellants were washed in the solution of sodium carbonate, which turned pink. Hand wash were separately kept and sealed in bottles. Each of the appellants admitted having taken bribe and upon search made, bribe money was recovered from the pocket of the full pant of each of the appellants. Number of the notes recovered from the appellants tallied with the number of notes noted in pre-trap panchnama. Wearing apparels were also washed and wash was separately sealed in bottles. Currency notes used in trap were seized vide Ex.P-3 & P-5. Hands of the complainant were also washed with sodium carbonate mixed water, which turned pink and his hand wash was also separately sealed and kept in a bottle. Relevant application for issuance of certificate etc. were also seized vide Annexure P-10. Trap panchnama was prepared in Ex.P-11. Map of the spot was prepared in Ex.P-13. Dehati nalishi was recorded in Ex.P-14 and thereafter FIR was lodged in Ex.P-22. Vide memo dated 7.3.1986 (Ex.P-5), sealed bottles containing hand wash etc. as described above, were sent for chemical examination to Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Sagar and the report received from FSL, confirmed presence of phenopthalien powder and sodium carbonate in the hand wash of each of the appellants, wash of currency note's and hand wash of the complainant. Vide memo dated 7.3.1986 (Ex.P-5), sealed bottles containing hand wash etc. as described above, were sent for chemical examination to Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Sagar and the report received from FSL, confirmed presence of phenopthalien powder and sodium carbonate in the hand wash of each of the appellants, wash of currency note's and hand wash of the complainant. Sanction for prosecution was granted by the Administrator of Municipality, Mahasamund vide order dated 19.3.1990, for prosecution of each of the appellant for commission of offence under Section 161 of the IPC and Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1947"). Upon completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed in the Court of Special Judge, Raipur, who framed .charges on 26.6.1991 alleging commission of the offence as stated in the charge sheet. The appellants abjured guilt and denied either having demanded or accepted bribe. The appellant were therefore put to trial. 3. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined as many as 9 witnesses. Thereafter, the appellants were examined against incriminating circumstances and evidence appearing against them. In their examination, the appellants denied the incriminating circumstances and evidence and raised defence that house tax was outstanding against the complainant and the appellants used to raise objection by making note, therefore, they have been falsely implicated. It has been further stated that farce of proceedings were drawn in close door operation, in the absence of any of the independent witnesses. 4. Relying upon case of the prosecution, learned trial Court found each of the appellant guilty of commission of offence alleged and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment and also imposed fine, which have been described above. 5. Assailing the correctness and validity of judgment of conviction and order of sentence, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the entire criminal proceedings and consequent conviction are vitiated on account of illegal and invalid sanction, because so called Administrator, who granted sanction, was not appointed by the State Govt. as required under Section 328(3)(b) of the M.P./C.G. Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1961"). According to him, the Administrator who granted sanction was appointed by the Additional Collector to work as Administrator on account of dissolution of the Council. as required under Section 328(3)(b) of the M.P./C.G. Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1961"). According to him, the Administrator who granted sanction was appointed by the Additional Collector to work as Administrator on account of dissolution of the Council. Therefore, the said Administrator had no authority to exercise statutory power of grant of sanction in the capacity as the appointing authority of the appellants. Thus the order of sanction itself is void ab initio and therefore, the appellants could not be subjected to trial on the strength of a void order of sanction. Therefore, the conviction of the appellants is vitiated. It is then urged that even otherwise the order of sanction is materially defective as the prosecution has failed to prove that the competent authority duly and properly applied its mind to the relevant records of criminal case before deciding to grant sanction for prosecution. Therefore, for want of proper sanction also, the prosecution and consequent conviction are unsustainable in law. Next submission of learned counsel for the appellants is that though on the date of alleged commission of offence, Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 was in force and even the sanction for prosecution was granted to prosecute the appellants under the provision of the Act of 1947, charges were framed against the appellants alleging commission of offences under Section 7 & 13 (1) (d)/13(2) of the Act of 1988 which came into force subsequent to the date of alleged commission of offence. As the offence under the two Acts are materially different and distinct, the appellants could not be subjected to prosecution nor could be tried for offences under a penal statute which was not in force on the date of alleged commission of offences. The offence under the Act of 1988 is punishable with more rigorous punishment including minimum sentence required to be awarded, whereas, under the Act of 1947, there is no minimum sentence provided nor the punishment is as rigorous as under the Act of 1988. The learned trial Court convicted the appellants for offences under the Act of 1988, which caused serious prejudice. Therefore, the trial and conviction of the appellants for commission of offence under a penal statute, which was not even in force on the date of commission of offence, renders the trial and conviction both void ab initio. The learned trial Court convicted the appellants for offences under the Act of 1988, which caused serious prejudice. Therefore, the trial and conviction of the appellants for commission of offence under a penal statute, which was not even in force on the date of commission of offence, renders the trial and conviction both void ab initio. It is further submitted, the prosecution of the appellant and conviction under the Act of 1988, for all those reasons stated hereinabove, is not only illegal but also violative of appellants' fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. On the aspect of demand, learned counsel for the appellants vehemently urged that the story of demand is highly doubtful in view of serious and material contradiction in all material particulars stated in complaint (Ex. P-1) and deposition of complainant - Loknath (P.W. 7). The complainant was having enmity and had a definite motive to grind an axe against the appellants, because he was running into arrears of taxes which were not being paid and time and again the appellants were putting notes of objection regarding non-payment of taxes, which was coming in the way of the complainant. Therefore, complainant falsely implicated. The story of demand by the appellants is also doubtful because the appellant were not even competent to issue certificate as desired by the complainant and, therefore, there was no motive for the appellants to demand bribe. Further doubt is created on the story of the demand because there is no independent corroboration of demand from any other circumstances or oral evidence of any of the panch witnesses who accompanied trap party and none of them have stated that there was any demand made by the appellants from complainant, to satisfy which, complainant handed over bribe money- Learned counsel for the appellants also urged that the independent panch witnesses M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W.1) and H.B. Singh (P.W.8) are stock witnesses who are very frequently taken in various trap arranged by the vigilance office, proved by the evidence of P.W.9 - Investigating Officer. Therefore, the evidence of stock witnesses, coupled with doubtful story of demand, cannot be made basis to lend support to the story of the prosecution in so far as acceptance and recovery is concerned. Therefore, the evidence of stock witnesses, coupled with doubtful story of demand, cannot be made basis to lend support to the story of the prosecution in so far as acceptance and recovery is concerned. It is also submitted that even if it is assumed that currency notes were recovered from the appellants, the same was deposited with the appellants by the complainant by saying that they were for payments towards tax outstanding and this explanation, in the circumstances, is quite reasonable, probable and plausible as the appellant No.1 was Property Tax Officer and appellant No.2 was Tax Recovery Officer and therefore on preponderance of probabilities, the defence of the appellants is liable to be accepted and the appellants are entitled to be acquitted by giving them benefit of doubt. It is lastly submitted that even if the acceptance and recovery are held proved, in the absence of proof of demand, acceptance and recovery cannot be made a basis to convict the appellants. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgments in the cases of Subash Parbat Sonvane Vs. State of Gujarat, 2002 Cri.L.J. 2787, State Inspector of Police, Vishakhapatnam Vs. Surya Sankaram Karri, (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 225, Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1979 SCC (Cri) 926, State of T.N. Vs. M.M. Rajendran, (1998) 9 SCC 268 , Manoranjan Prasad Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar, 2004 SCC(Cri) 1213, Arun Kumar Pandey Vs. State of M.P., 2011(1) CGLJ 99 , Rajesh Singh Vs. State of M.P. 2007(2) MPHT 76 , Jagan M. Seshadri Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2002 Cri.L.J. 2982, Anand Parkash & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana, 2008 Cri.L.J. 1825, T. Subramanian Vs. State of T.N., (2006)1 SCC(Cri.) 401, State of Kerala and another Vs. C.P. Rao, (2011)6 SCC 450 , Panalal Damodar Rathi Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 1191 , State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. T. Venkateswara Rao, AIR 2004 SC 1728 , C.M. Girish Babu Vs. CBI Cochin, High Court of Kerala, (2009) 3 SCC 779 , Punjabrao Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2004 SCC(Cri) 1130, Som Parkash Vs. State of Punjab, 1992 Cri.L.J. 490 and Gulam Mahmood A. Malek Vs. State of Gujarat, 1981 SCC(Cri) 586. 6. T. Venkateswara Rao, AIR 2004 SC 1728 , C.M. Girish Babu Vs. CBI Cochin, High Court of Kerala, (2009) 3 SCC 779 , Punjabrao Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2004 SCC(Cri) 1130, Som Parkash Vs. State of Punjab, 1992 Cri.L.J. 490 and Gulam Mahmood A. Malek Vs. State of Gujarat, 1981 SCC(Cri) 586. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State, supporting the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Court below, submitted that proper and valid sanction was granted by a competent authority i.e. Administrator who was exercising of the powers of Council, which is appointing authority of the appellants. Learned counsel for the State submits that the learned trial Court has considered this aspect and found that the appellants have failed to produce any document during the course of trial to show that the appointment of the Administrator, who granted sanction was in any manner illegal or invalid. Therefore, he cannot be said to have illegally usurped the office of Administrator. The order of appointment which has not been placed before this Court during trial is not at all admissible in evidence at this stage. Learned counsel for the State submits that all through the trial, there was ample opportunity with the appellants to prove that the authority who granted sanction was not validly appointed, but the appellants failed to prove it and the trial Court rightly rejected this contention holding that there is no material evidence produced. The appellant has placed on record an ordinary photocopy which is neither here nor there. Unless the documents is accompanied by proper application under Section 391 Cr.P.C. for taking additional evidence on record, submissions resting on casual filing of the document are liable to be ignored. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that even otherwise, in the absence of any prejudice caused, the appellants cannot he heard on the issue any more, as the provision of Section 19(3) of the Act do not allow an accused to raise such ground against the judgment of conviction. It is next submitted, even if charges have been framed under the Act for commission of offence under Section 7 and 13(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act. Neither the trial nor the conviction is liable to be set aside as the appellants have failed to prove any prejudice caused to him. It is next submitted, even if charges have been framed under the Act for commission of offence under Section 7 and 13(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act. Neither the trial nor the conviction is liable to be set aside as the appellants have failed to prove any prejudice caused to him. Learned counsel submits that it is nowhere recorded in the order of the learned trial Court that even though the trial Court was inclined to impose only fine or minimal jail sentence, due to certain mitigating circumstances, statutory prescription of minimum sentence operated to award jail sentence of one year in respect of each of the offences found proved. As, even under the old Act of 1947 that much of sentence could be awarded, no prejudice has been caused. In all material aspects, the gravamen of offence, as contained in Section 161 of the IPC and Section 5(1)(d) of the Act of 1947 are similar to penal provision contained in Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the Act of 1988, no prejudice is caused and for that reason, appellants are not entitled to any benefit nor it has any vitiating effect on the trial and ultimate conviction. Learned counsel for the State then contended that as the order of grant of sanction itself shows detailed scrutiny of examination of material placed before the competent authority, the prosecution is not required to produce extraneous material to prove that there was application of mind. According to him, the order itself shows deep and pervasive application of mind to the relevant material collected during investigation by the police. Therefore, the order of sanction does not suffer from any invalidity on that account. Further submission is that the complainant as well as deposition of complainant - Loknath (P.W.7) are coherent and no material contradiction has come so as to disbelieve testimony of complainant with regard to demand. The circumstances clearly shows that the complainant was desirous of obtaining possession certificate which was not being issued for want of proper clearance by the appellant and the appellants abused their official position by demanding bribe. As far as independent corroboration is concerned, the circumstances of the case are not such that demand is liable to be disbelieved only on the ground that there is no independent corroboration. As far as independent corroboration is concerned, the circumstances of the case are not such that demand is liable to be disbelieved only on the ground that there is no independent corroboration. Further submission is that the acceptance and recovery is proved by leading, cogent and coherent evidence, supported by the version of independent panch witnesses. The currency notes were recovered from the possession of the appellant which has been proved by overwhelming evidence of number of prosecution witnesses. The hand wash of the appellants, wash of their wearing apparels have been examined by the FSL and traces of phenolphthalein powder found therein, which strongly corroborates the case of the prosecution with regard to acceptance of bribe, handling of bribe by the appellants. He further submits that the defence of the appellants that the amount was received by way of arrears of tax is neither probable nor plausible and does not satisfy the condition of preponderance of probability and has, therefore, been rightly rejected by the learned trial Court, In support of his submission, learned counsel for the State relied upon the judgments in the cases of Ashok Tshering Bhutia Vs. State of Sikkim, (2011) 4 SCC 402 , Balasubramanian Vs. State through Inspector of Police, (2010) 9 SCC 20 and State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Jiyalal, (2009) 15 SCC 72 . 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 8. One of the foremost ground to assail the correctness and validity of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is that sanction for prosecution has been granted by an authority incompetent under the law. Order of sanction dated 19.3.1990 has been produced by the prosecution and exhibited as Ex.P-24. The order has been passed by one Praveer Krishna, Administrator of Nagar Palika Parishad, Mahasamud. Perusal of order sheet dated 28.9.1993 recorded in trial shows that order of sanction produced by the prosecution was admitted by the appellant/accused and on the basis of the said admission, same was admitted in evidence as Ex.P-24. However, from the records of the Court below, there is no documentary or oral evidence led by the appellants to substantiate the plea in defence that the administrator who granted sanction for prosecution was not validly appointed in accordance with the provision contained in Section 328(3)(b) of the Act of 1961. However, from the records of the Court below, there is no documentary or oral evidence led by the appellants to substantiate the plea in defence that the administrator who granted sanction for prosecution was not validly appointed in accordance with the provision contained in Section 328(3)(b) of the Act of 1961. The order of sanction clearly records that it has been approved by the Administrator of the Council. The appellants did not come out with any case before the Court below that the Council was not dissolved nor did place any other material to show that the appointment of the Administrator was not in accordance with law or that there was no delegation of power by the State Govt. in favour of any other authority as provided under Section 345 of the Act of 1961. Learned trial Court has rightly recorded a finding in para-41 of its judgment that in the absence of any material document placed, it cannot be accepted that the appointment of the Administrator was not in any manner illegal. The proceedings of trial recorded by the trial Court reveal that the appellants were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and their statement was recorded on 9.10.1993 and on that date, the appellants stated that they do not want to produce any evidence in defence. Therefore, defence was closed. 9. During the pendency of this appeal, the appellants filed an application on 1.9.1997 praying for taking on record a copy of order dated 12.9.1989 appointing Praveer Krishan as an Administrator of the Municipal Council passed by the Upper Collector (Additional Collector), Raipur, Learned counsel for the appellant sought to impress upon this Court by submitting that the order has been passed by the Additional Collector, Raipur in the office of the Collector, Raipur, whereas, the competent authority to appoint Administrator is the State Govt. as specified in Section 328 (3) (b) of the Act of 1961. At the first place, the application has been filed seeking to bring on record a new document in evidence which was not filed by the appellants before the Court below. In the entire application, it has not been stated as to why the documents could not be placed on record before the Court below. At the first place, the application has been filed seeking to bring on record a new document in evidence which was not filed by the appellants before the Court below. In the entire application, it has not been stated as to why the documents could not be placed on record before the Court below. From the written statement which has been filed by the appellants, it is found that the plea of incompetency of Praveer Krishan was taken on the ground that there is no order/notification of the State Govt. appointing Praveer Krishan as Administrator. It is neither the case before the Court below nor before this Court that the Additional Collector in the office of Collector, Raipur was not delegated any power by the State Govt. in terms of Section 345 of the Act of 1961. Section 345 of the Act of 1961 permits delegation of power under Section 328 of the Act by the State Govt. to any other authority. It has nowhere been mentioned in the application dated 1.9.1997 that Additional Collector, Raipur, who appointed Praveer Krishan as Administrator was not delegated power under Section 328 in terms of provision contained in Section 345 of the Act of 1961. Moreover, despite sufficient and adequate opportunity availed by the appellants before the trial Court to produce the said document, the same was not produced before the Court. There is absolutely no justification in the application warranting this Court to take additional evidence in exercise of its power under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. The reception of additional evidence is not a matter of course on mere asking either by the prosecution or by the defence. It is an exception to the general rule and the power is required to be exercised with great care and only where there is likelihood of failure of justice unless additional evidence is allowed. Once enough opportunity has been grated to the appellants/accused, in the absence of cogent reason as to why the appellants could not produce the documentary evidence, the application of the appellants does not deserve to be allowed in the absence of any convincing reason for such failure before the Court below. In the case of Gave Dei Vs. Subasini Dei and another, 1998 Cr.LJ. 3071 (Orissa), plea of alibi was taken at belated stage and no witness was examined in trial Court to substantiate such plea. In the case of Gave Dei Vs. Subasini Dei and another, 1998 Cr.LJ. 3071 (Orissa), plea of alibi was taken at belated stage and no witness was examined in trial Court to substantiate such plea. It was held that appellate Court was not justified in permitting accused to adduce evidence to substantiate the plea of alibi. In the case of Mamatadevi Vs. Vijaykumar Agrawal, 2008 Cr.LJ.970 (Bombay), the accused disputed his signatures on the cheque and though he had enough opportunity before the trial Court to invite expert opinion, but he had not produced evidence. His application at the appellate stage to produce additional evidence of expert was rejected. It has to be noted that though the power is wide, recourse to exercise of power under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. should not be made ordinarily in a situation where a party did not avail opportunity to adduce evidence. Moreover, in the absence of any specific plea taken in the application that the authority who granted sanction was appointed by the Additional Collector as Administrator without there being any delegation of power under Section 328 of the State Govt. in terms of Section 345 of the Act of 1961, in the considered opinion of this Court, it cannot be said that refusal would lead to failure of justice. The application, therefore, deserves to be rejected. The objection to the competence of the authority granting sanction has, therefore, been rightly rejected by the learned trial Court and it warrants no interference in appeal, particularly when the appellants did not come out with any defence that there was no delegation, by giving any suggestion to any of the witnesses including Investigating Officer (P.W.9), so as to say that non-production of order of delegation in terms of Section 345 of the Act of 1961, warrants drawing of adverse inference against the prosecution. In view of the above discussions, reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Surya Sankaram Karri (supra) is misplaced. 10. Serious objection to the validity of the order of sanction proceeds on the submission that the order of sanction is materially defective as the prosecution has failed to lead any evidence that the competence authority duly and properly applied its mind to the relevant records of the criminal case before deciding to grant sanction for prosecution. 10. Serious objection to the validity of the order of sanction proceeds on the submission that the order of sanction is materially defective as the prosecution has failed to lead any evidence that the competence authority duly and properly applied its mind to the relevant records of the criminal case before deciding to grant sanction for prosecution. It has been argued that no material has been placed including concerned note sheet and file to substantiate that sanction was accorded after due and proper application of mind to the material collected during investigation. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed (supra). In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court has held that it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. It has further been held that this can be done in two ways either: (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction, or (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show that the facts were placed before the sanctioning authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. In that case, it was argued that sanction does not reveal facts constituting the offence and therefore, there is no evidence to show on what material the sanctioning authority applied its mind and granted sanction. What was before the Court was a resolution of the Standing Committee which only recorded the factum of grant of sanction without any consideration of facts constituting offence. Prosecution failed to produce before the Court any evidence to establish that the facts constituting offence were placed before the sanctioning authority by producing any note at the trial. Two witnesses were examined to prove the resolution. As resolution did not contain any facts constituting the offence, the sanction was held invalid. However, in the present case, the order granting sanction passed on 19.3.1990 (Ex.P-24) is an elaborate one which deals with relevant facts constituting offence under Section 5 (1)(d) and 5(2) of the Act of 1947 and under Section 161 of the IPC. As resolution did not contain any facts constituting the offence, the sanction was held invalid. However, in the present case, the order granting sanction passed on 19.3.1990 (Ex.P-24) is an elaborate one which deals with relevant facts constituting offence under Section 5 (1)(d) and 5(2) of the Act of 1947 and under Section 161 of the IPC. Therefore, in a case like present one, where the orders itself contains detail facts constituting offence, material collected by the investigating agency and reasons, showing application of mind, the prosecution is not required to further prove by leading any other evidence in the form of note-sheet to establish due and proper application of mind before grant of sanction. Present is a case where the prosecution has been able to prove its case by one of the two modes as stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed (supra). In view of the aforesaid discussion, the other two decisions M.M. Rajendran (supra) and Rajesh Singh (supra) are clearly distinguishable. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants has vociferously argued to convince this Court that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is unsustainable in law because the appellants could not have charged much less convicted for commission of offence under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act of 1988, as at the time of alleged commission of offence, it was the Act of 1947 which was in force and in operation. Therefore, the conviction under the Act of 1988 has violated fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. In order to appreciate this submission, it is necessary to examine the nature of protection guaranteed under Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India. Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India reads thus : "(1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence." 12. The aforesaid constitutional provision affords protection by setting two limitations upon the law making power of the Legislature. The aforesaid constitutional provision affords protection by setting two limitations upon the law making power of the Legislature. It prohibits: (i) the making of ex-post facto criminal law i.e. making an act as crime for the first time and then making that law retrospective. (ii) the infliction of the penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law which was in force when the act was committed. [please see G.P. Nayyar Vs. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1979 SC 602 , Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh ( AIR 1953 SC 394 ) and Kedar Nath Bajoria, son of Ramjidas Bajoria Vs. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1953 SC 404 )]. 13. Admittedly, at the time when offence is alleged to have been committed and when FIR was lodged, the Act of 1947 was in force. Moreover, the provision of Section 161 of the IPC was also in force. A comparative study and analysis of the provision contained in Section 161 of the IPC with the provision contained in Section 7 of the Act of 1988 and further similar comparison and analysis of provision contained in Section 5 (1) (d), 5(2) of the Act of 1947 with Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act of 1988, would reveal that the gravamen of offence under the corresponding provision as stated above, are one and the same. Even at the time when the act of taking bribe is alleged to have been committed, it was an offence under the law in force. Present is not a case where the act alleged to have been committed by the appellant was not an offence until enactment of the Act of 1988. Thus, Section 7 of the Act of 1988 is pari materia Section 161 of the IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) is pari materia Section 5 (1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act of 1947. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant has been charged and convicted for commission of an act under an ex-post facto criminal law. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant has been charged and convicted for commission of an act under an ex-post facto criminal law. In the present case, the appellants have been held guilty and sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 along with fine of Rs.500/- and in default of fine, 5 months additional R.I. For commission of offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act of 1988, each of the appellants has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment fine, R.I. for 5 months. The maximum punishment which could be awarded for commission of offence under Section 161 of the IPC is three years, which is more than the period of sentence actually awarded to the appellants. Similarly, the maximum punishment which could be awarded under Section 5(2) of the Act of 1947 is seven years, which is much more than the sentence which has actually been awarded to the appellants for commission of offence awarded to the appellants. Therefore, present is also not a case where it can be said that infliction of penalty is greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law which was in force i.e. the Act of 1947, when the act was committed. Thus, the arguments that conviction of the appellants is violative of constitutional protection guaranteed under Section 20(1) of the Constitution of India must fail. 14. The other limb of submissions that the conviction is liable to be set aside on the ground that the appellants were wrongly charged and convicted for commission of offence under the Act of 1988, needs to be examined. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagan M. Seshadri (supra), learned counsel for the appellants contended that the charges could not be framed under the Act of 1988, but, it could be framed only under the Act of 1947. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagan M. Seshadri (supra) definitely holds that where the alleged act is committed and FIR is lodged when the Act of 1947 was in operation, then the charges are required to be framed under the Act of 1947 and not under the Act of 1988. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagan M. Seshadri (supra) definitely holds that where the alleged act is committed and FIR is lodged when the Act of 1947 was in operation, then the charges are required to be framed under the Act of 1947 and not under the Act of 1988. However, the important question which crops-up for consideration is that whether only on that ground the trial is vitiated and conviction is liable to be set aside. This issue came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of M.W. Mohiuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 3 SCC 567 . That was a case where the trial of the case initially commenced under Section 161 of the IPC read with Section 5 (2) of the act of 1947 but the trial Court ultimately convicted accused under the provision of new Act of 1988 and argument was advanced that on this ground trial and conviction are vitiated. The arguments was repelled by the Supreme Court thus: "9. We may incidentally refer that the learned counsel also sought to contend that the trial of the accused initially commenced under Section 161 IPC read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 but the trial court ultimately convicted the accused under the provisions of the new Act of 1988. Therefore the trial is vitiated. We see no merit in this submission. Initially no doubt on 9-12-1983 the charges were framed under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 but when the trial actually commenced in the year 1990 the then Presiding Judge framed charges under Sections 13(d)(i), (ii) read with Section 13(2) and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the trial proceeded. We do not find any objection having been taken in the trial court nor such contention was put forward in the appellate court. Even otherwise we see no prejudice has been caused to the accused since the gravamen of the charges under the relevant provisions of both the Acts in respect of these offences are the same in substance and at any rate the appellant cannot raise such a contention for the first time in this Court when in fact no prejudice has been caused to him." 15. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court clearly shows that the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the conviction in the absence of there being any prejudice caused, by holding that the gravamen of the charges under the relevant provision of both the Act in respect of the offence alleged were the same in substance. The position in the present case is not different because, except by submitting that charges were wrongly framed and conviction ordered under the new Act of 1988, learned counsel for the appellants utterly failed to establish any prejudice caused to the appellants. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M.W. Mohiuddin (supra), unless prejudice is shown to have been caused, the conviction cannot be successfully challenged only on the ground that instead of framing charge under Section 161 of the IPC and Section 5 (1) (d) read with Section 5 (2) of the Act of 1947, charges were framed under Section 7 and Section 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act of 1988. In substance, the conviction cannot be set aside only on technical ground, but only when such wrong framing of charge has resulted in prejudice to the accused. From the reading of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, it is nowhere reflected that the learned trial Court had taken into consideration certain mitigating circumstances to award sentence lesser than the minimum sentence prescribed under Section 7 and Section 13 (2) of the Act of 1988, but in view of stringent provision, providing for minimum sentence, R.I. for one year was awarded for each of the offences alleged. In fact, learned trial Court has awarded sentence which is much more than the minimum sentence required to be awarded once the offence alleged are proved. There is no other material to show that the appellants were prejudiced because of framing of charges and conviction under the Act of 1988. Therefore, on this count also, the impugned judgment of conviction is not liable to be interfered with. 16. There is no other material to show that the appellants were prejudiced because of framing of charges and conviction under the Act of 1988. Therefore, on this count also, the impugned judgment of conviction is not liable to be interfered with. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants has strongly relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Arun Kumar Pandey (supra) to submit that in view of stringent provision of minimum punishment prescribed both under Section 7 as well as Section 13 (2) of the Act of 1988, serious prejudice has been caused, because each of them have been convicted for sentences up to one year for each of the offences and further that the case of M.W. Mohiuddin (supra) will not apply and distinguishable in the present case, because that was a case where the Supreme Court, on facts, found that no prejudice was caused, whereas, in the present case, a definite prejudice has been caused to the appellants. I am unable to accept the submission, firstly for the reason that in the case of Arun Kumar Pandey (supra), the principles based on prejudice theory has been applied in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court, but on facts, no prejudice was found to have been caused in that case. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that unless prejudice is shown, accused will not be entitled to any benefit only on technical ground having been made out. This is deducible from observation of the Supreme Court in the case of M.W. Jvlohiuddin (supra), referred to above. The Supreme Court clearly held that no prejudice was caused to the accused since the gravamen of charges under the relevant provision of both the Acts in respect of the offences alleged were the same in substance. The Supreme Court repelled the contention, clearly applying the prejudice theory. Therefore, it is required to be examined and analysed, in each and every case, based on its facts and circumstances, as to whether prejudice has been caused to the accused. However, on facts, as detailed above, this Court has held that no prejudice has been caused to the appellants on account of framing of charge under the Act of 1988. The order passed in Arun Kumar Pandey (supra) is therefore clearly distinguishable. 17. However, on facts, as detailed above, this Court has held that no prejudice has been caused to the appellants on account of framing of charge under the Act of 1988. The order passed in Arun Kumar Pandey (supra) is therefore clearly distinguishable. 17. Having examined aforesaid legal issues raised by the appellants, I shall now deal with other submission relating to proof of demand, acceptance and recovery. Before I proceed to deal with those submissions, it is profitable to note the approach required to be adopted while examining the evidence with regard to demand. 18. The status of person offering bribe and the caution required while assessing his evidence implicating a Govt. servant was examined by the Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in the case of M.O., Shamsudhin (supra), wherein, it was held as under : "12. Now confining ourselves to the case of bribery it is generally accepted that the person offering a bribe to a public officer is in the nature of an accomplice in the offence of accepting illegal gratification but the nature of corroboration required in such a case should not be subjected to the same rigorous tests which are generally applied to a case of an approver. Though bribe-givers are generally treated to be in the nature of accomplices but among them there are various types and gradations. In cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act the complainant is the person who gives the bribe in a technical and legal sense because in every trap case wherever the complaint is filed there must be a person who has to give money to the accused which in fact is the bribe money which is demanded and without such a giving the trap cannot succeed. When there is such a demand by the public servant from a person who is unwilling, and if to do public good approaches the authorities and lodges a complaint, then in after that the trap succeeds he has to give the money. There could be another type of bribe-giver who is always willing to give money in order to get his work done and having got the work done he may send a complaint. Here he is a particeps criminis in respect of the crime committed and thus is an accomplice. There could be another type of bribe-giver who is always willing to give money in order to get his work done and having got the work done he may send a complaint. Here he is a particeps criminis in respect of the crime committed and thus is an accomplice. Thus there are grades and grades of accomplices and therefore a distinction could as well be drawn between cases where a person offers a bribe to achieve his own purpose and where one is forced to offer bribe under a threat of loss or harm that is to say under coercion. A person who falls in this category and who becomes a party for laying a trap stands on a different footing because he is only a victim of threat or coercion to which he was subjected to. Where such witnesses fall under the category of 'accomplices' by reason of their being bribe-givers, in the first instance, the court has to consider the degree of complicity and then look for corroboration if necessary as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration that may be needed in a case may vary having regard to the facts and circumstances." What therefore, emerges from the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court is that the complainant's evidence has to be scrutinized carefully and the Court has to consider the degree of complicity and then look for corroboration, if necessary, as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration that may be needed in a case, may vary, having regard to the facts and circumstances. Evidence on record led by the prosecution, as also by the defence, therefore, is required to be scrutinized in order to find out as to whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the demand, acceptance and recovery. 19. Complaint (Ex.P-1) dated 5.3.1986 has been submitted in writing by the complainant- Loknath Sahu (P.W.7), in which, it has been clearly stated that an application was submitted for issuance of certificate on 3.3.1986 and when complainant met Harishchandra & Balram, the two appellants, in connection with issuance of certificate, both of them demanded Rs.200/- from him saying that he should come with Rs.200/-, then he will get certificate, otherwise, he will keep on wandering around. It also contains specific recital that Harishchandra told that he will take Rs.100/- and Balram will also take Rs.100/- to which Balram, also agreed and said that no sooner money is given, work will be done. The complaint clearly states the motive. The fact that complainant submitted an application on 3.3.1986 is also proved from seizure of letter dated 3.3.1986 given by the complainant in the office of Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat Mahasamund. The said document (Ex.P-8) was seized vide seizure memo of Ex.P-10. M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W.1), who is independent witness of the prosecution other than the complaint and police witness, has proved seizure of that letter as one of the seizure witnesses. The seizure of that letter has also been proved by another independent witness H.B. Singh (P.W.8). Thus, the seizure of letter from the office of the Corporation by Investigating Officer S.K. Verma (P.W.9), D.S.P., Lokayat Office, Bilaspur is fully proved. It is thus, proved that the complainant did submit application on 3.3.1986. The purpose for which the application was submitted was the purpose for which demand is stated to have been made in the complaint. 20. Complainant Loknath Sahu (P.W.7) has also very empathetically stated in para-4 of his testimony that he submitted application (Ex.P-8) and has proved his signature. He has very categorically stated that he met the appellants - Balram and Harish Chandra in connection with issuance of certificate, on which, Balram said that it will require him to give Rs.200/- otherwise, he will keep on wandering around the office. Harish Chandra told him that he will have to pay Rs.200/-, out of which, Harish Chandra will take Rs.100/- and he has also deposed regarding negotiations and then settlement at Rs.200/-. He was asked to come on the next date. A certificate in draft form was also seized from appellant-Harish Chandra in Ex P-10, which is a certificate in the name of father of the complainant stating that complainant is residing in the house. Seizure of said certificate has been proved by S.K. Verma (P.W.9) supported by the deposition of two independent witnesses of seizure namely M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W.1) and H.B. Singh (P.W.8). It is also relevant to note that Ex. P-8 contained a note on its back, which is signed on 5.3.1986 by one of the appellants relating to issuance of certificate. Complainant has further deposed that he reached the office on 5.3.1986. It is also relevant to note that Ex. P-8 contained a note on its back, which is signed on 5.3.1986 by one of the appellants relating to issuance of certificate. Complainant has further deposed that he reached the office on 5.3.1986. There is overwhelming evidence on record to show that a trap was organized on 5.3.1986. The story of demand is also corroborated from the evidence of independent witness M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W.1), who has deposed in para-8 of his deposition that he had accompanied the complainant and was also present in the office when the complainant Loknath met two appellants and said that he has come with the money and thereafter handed over Rs.100/- (two currency notes of Rs.50/-) to Balram and another Rs.100/- (two currency notes of Rs.50/-) to Harish Chandra, which they kept in the pocket of their full-pant. In para-27 of his cross-examination, he has stated that the complainant met Harish Chandra and stated that he has got money and certificate may be prepared. In para-28 of his cross examination, he has further explained that Harish asked the complainant whether he has brought money. Therefore, if the aforesaid evidence are linked together, the story of demand is not only proved by the independent and coherent evidence of the complainant-Loknath, but corroborated by independent witness M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W. 1). Learned counsel for the appellants argued and attempted to convince this Court with all vehemence at his command that the complainant -Loknath has a definite motive to falsely implicate the appellants because on his previous application submitted before the Corporation, specific note of objection was put up by the appellants that complainant is in arrears of taxes, on account of which, no cel1ificate could be issued. Therefore, the complainant is liable to be disbelieved in the absence of any independent corroboration from any direct or circumstantial evidence. To support this submission, reliance has been placed by the defence on various applications submitted by the complainant from time to time before the Chief Medical Officer of the Municipality, placed on record as Ex.D-1 to D-6. Those are the applications filed by the complainant in the Municipality between the period from 3.2.1986 to 22.2.1986. Those applications show that various applications were made by the complainant for issuance of certified copy etc. Ex. D-1 shows that a note has been put up on 26.2.1986 that property tax of Rs. 1011.41/- is recoverable. Those are the applications filed by the complainant in the Municipality between the period from 3.2.1986 to 22.2.1986. Those applications show that various applications were made by the complainant for issuance of certified copy etc. Ex. D-1 shows that a note has been put up on 26.2.1986 that property tax of Rs. 1011.41/- is recoverable. Note dated 25.2.1986 in Ex.D-2 also shows that it was proposed to issue No Objection Certificate after receiving of the arrears of tax. Similar are the noting on application dated 21.2.1982 (Ex. D-3) for issuance of No Objection Certificate. Ex.D-4 & D-5 also contained various notings. What therefore can be said from these documents is that the complainant Loknath had approached the office of the Municipality by moving several applications for issuance of N.O.C. etc. and various notes put up to the effect that the complainant is in arrears of taxes. This circumstance definitely requires minute scrutiny of the story of demand, but, at the same time, this by itself, could not be said to be a circumstance by itself to disbelieve the story of the demand. The scrutiny of evidence of demand and the corroboration of demand as noted hereinabove by this Court proves demand beyond reasonable doubt in the absence of there being any material contradiction or omission with regard to material particulars of demand. The independent prosecution witness M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W.1) has also corroborated because he heard appellant-Harish saying to complainant whether he has brought money and thereafter the money was taken out and given to each of the appellants who were sitting on two tables in the same room. 21. It has also been submitted that two independent witnesses namely M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W. 1) and H.B. Singh (P.W.-8) are stock witnesses as they have been frequently used as witness of trap in many cases. Therefore, they cannot be believed. This Court is unable to accept the submission that as a general proposition in all cases, version of independent panch witnesses is liable to be rejected because they happened to be witnesses in other trap case. If the evidence of independent panch witnesses is coherent, credible and nothing is elicited from their cross-examination to suggest that they are telling lie before the Court, there is no impediment in relying upon their testimony merely on the fact that in few more cases, they appeared as panch witness. If the evidence of independent panch witnesses is coherent, credible and nothing is elicited from their cross-examination to suggest that they are telling lie before the Court, there is no impediment in relying upon their testimony merely on the fact that in few more cases, they appeared as panch witness. Madan Gopal (P.W.5), S.P. Special Police Establishment (Lokayukt) has stated in para-4 of his cross-examination that Special Police Establishment does not requisition any particular gazetted officer directly for the purpose of being a witness and on the receipt of complaint, request is forwarded to the Collector for sending any gazetted officer as witness and Collector nominates and sends the officer. There is no material to show that two independent panch witnesses M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W. 1) and H.B. Singh (P.W. 8) had any personal interest in becoming witness in the present case of trap. In the trap proceedings, in the present case, they were nominated in natural course. Therefore, merely because in some cases in the past, they were used as panch witnesses in trap proceedings, their evidence cannot be discarded. The story of demand is also doubted on the submission that appellants were not competent to issue the certificate. There is uncontroverted evidence on record led by complainant that after he submitted the application, he met with two appellants and they told him that certificate would be prepared only after receipt of money. The appellants Balram at the relevant time was working as Property Tax Officer whereas Harish Chandra was working as Recovery Officer. B.D. Dhananjay (P.W.6) clearly states in para-8 of his deposition that application (Ex.P-8) and draft certificate was seized in Ex. P 9 from Harish Chandra. The seizure of Ex.P-9 from Harish has been proved by independent panch witnesses M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W.1) and H.B. Singh (P.W.8). S.K. Verma (P.W. 9) Investigating Officer has stated in para-20 of his cross examination regarding issuance of certificate. He has also stated in para-21 that he had obtained information (Ex.D-7) from the Chief Municipal Officer with regard to the procedure of issuance of certificate and they came to know that the draft of certificate is prepared by the appellant and it is also verified as to whether tax have been paid or not. Ex. D-7 dated 5.3.1986 is a memo issued by the Chief Municipal Officer to the Dy. S.P., Special Police Establishment. Ex. D-7 dated 5.3.1986 is a memo issued by the Chief Municipal Officer to the Dy. S.P., Special Police Establishment. Lokayukt Raipur, stating that there is no specific rules with regard to issuance of certificate and the application is processed through the concerned department and upon receipt of report, certificate is issued by the Chief Municipal Officer. In fact, it is the defence of the appellants that the Rs.200/- were received towards part payment of the arrears of tax by the appellants. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish that appellants in their capacity as Property Tax Officer and Tax Recovery Officer were involved in the process of issuance of certificate. This is clear from various noting put up by appellant-Balram on various applications submitted by the complainant, placed on record as Annexure D-1 to D-6. Therefore, to say that the appellants had no concern with the issuance of certificate and, therefore, it is improbable that they would demand any money for getting certificate issued, cannot be accepted. The very seizure of application (Ex.P-8) and draft of the certificate (Ex.P-9) from appellant-Harish Chandra, clearly establishes role required to be played by the appellants in the matter of issuance of certificate. 22. There is overwhelming evidence of acceptance as well as recovery of bribe money from each of the appellants. The proceedings of pre-trap panchnama have been proved by cogent and reliable evidence supported by independent panch witness M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W. 1) and H.B. Singh (P.W.-8). M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W. 1) has clearly supported the version of complainant-Loknath Sahu (P.W. 7) that on 5.3.1986 the complainant went to the office of the appellants and the bribe money was given, accepted and kept in the pocket of the full-pant. Loknath, Complainant (P.W.7) has stated in para-7 of his testimony that the complainant met with each of the appellate and Balram asked whether he has brought money and demanded and then it was paid which he kept in the pocket of his full pant. Thereafter, he took out application (Ex.P-8) and recorded his note on the back of it and then gave to Harish Chandra. Thereafter, Harish Chandra demanded the amount which was given and accepted by him and he also kept it in the pocket of full pant. In his cross-examination of para16, he stated that he gave money to Balram and also to Harish Chandra. 23. Thereafter, Harish Chandra demanded the amount which was given and accepted by him and he also kept it in the pocket of full pant. In his cross-examination of para16, he stated that he gave money to Balram and also to Harish Chandra. 23. Moreover, M.R. Bhardwewaj (P.W. 1) who is independent witness has very clearly stated that he had gone along with complainant - Loknath in the office and he witnessed handing over the money and acceptance of the same by each of the appellants and that both of them kept the money in pocket of their full pant. He has also deposed that Harish asked the complainant whether he has brought money. Therefore, the evidence on record including corroboration with regard to acceptance, proves acceptance of bribe. Abundance of evidence with regard to recovery of the bribe money from each of the appellants and its seizure proved by two independent prosecution witnesses M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W. 1) and H.B. Singh (P.W.-8) proves recovery of bribe money from each of the appellants. Nothing could be elicited from the cross-examination of independent panch witnesses as also from other witnesses of the prosecution namely Krishnapal Singh (P.W. 4), B.D. Dhananjay (P.W.6) an S.K. Verma (P.W.9) Dy. S.P., Investigating Officer to doubt the prosecution version with regard to recovery of the bribe money from each of the appellants. Supported by the evidence of two independent panch witnesses and from evidence of FSL to the effect that the bottles containing hand wash of the appellants were found containing traces of phenopthalien is a strong incriminating evidence against the appellants that both of the handled the currency notes. Two independent panch witnesses- M.R. Bhardwaj (P.W. 1) and H.B. Singh (P.W.-8) have clearly stated that the hands of each of the appellants were first washed and thereafter the notes were recovered from their pockets. The evidence with regard to wash of the hands, collection of samples, sending the samples to FSL does not create any doubt and the evidence in this regard is reliable, creditworthy and deserves acceptances. 24. A feeble defence has been raised to the effect that Rs.200/- were accepted towards recovery of part payment of arrears of tax. The evidence with regard to wash of the hands, collection of samples, sending the samples to FSL does not create any doubt and the evidence in this regard is reliable, creditworthy and deserves acceptances. 24. A feeble defence has been raised to the effect that Rs.200/- were accepted towards recovery of part payment of arrears of tax. The improbability of such defence is firstly established from the case of defence itself and the fact that even according to the defence, the complainant was in arrears of taxes and he was to pay more than Rs.1000/- as arrears of taxes. Secondly, if the arrears of tax was more than Rs.1000/-, it is improbable that only Rs.200/- would be accepted towards the payment of arrears of tax. Thirdly there is nothing to show that receipt was issued towards deposit of tax by the complainant Loknath. The defence regarding money being received for some other-purpose than illegal gratification is required to be established as plausible and probable by applying the principle of preponderance of probabilities. The defence of the appellants that Rs.200/- was received towards recovery of tax, is further falsified from cogent evidence of acceptance of bribe money by each of the appellants. The evidence of the prosecution that Rs. 100/- was recovered from each of the appellants itself falsifies the defence that amount was deposited towards recovery of tax. Had it been so, there was no occasion of recovery of Rs.100/- from each of the appellants. Therefore, the defence has rightly been rejected by the learned trial Court. 25. I have not independently dealt with each and every decision that has been cited by the appellants in support of various contentions which have been dealt with by this Court hereinabove. For the reason which have been assigned by this Court to sustain impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the decisions which have been relied upon by the appellants, have been found to be distinguishable and not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 26. In the result I do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 27. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Appellant Balram Singh died during pendency of the appeal, therefore, it is ordered that bail bonds of appellant - Harish Chandra are cancelled. 26. In the result I do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 27. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Appellant Balram Singh died during pendency of the appeal, therefore, it is ordered that bail bonds of appellant - Harish Chandra are cancelled. He shall surrender before the trial Court and then sent to jail to serve remaining part of the sentence awarded by the trial Court. Appeal Dismissed.