ORDER D.N. PATEL, J. 1. In all the aforesaid writ petitions, respective learned counsels appearing for the petitioners have submitted that tomorrow (15th February, 2012) Jharkhand Academic Council is going to hold the examination for the posts of Higher Secondary School Teacher (+2 Teachers), in pursuance of public advertisement no.117/11. It is further submitted that all the candidates, who are petitioners in these writ petitions, have been initially appointed as Primary School Teachers [barring the petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 4767 of 2011] and after appointment of these petitioners as Primary Teachers, they are on deputation for teaching 11th and 12th standard i.e. Higher Secondary School Standard (+2 standard). It is also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondent-State of Jharkhand has prescribed the maximum age for the candidates, belonging to general category, as 40 years, for female candidates 43 years etc. and for different type of candidates, different maximum age limit has been fixed as on 1.1.2011. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, this cut off date is absolutely arbitrary and the cases of the petitioners ought to have been considered by the respondent-State authorities relaxing the age, because they are working on deputation in Higher Secondary Schools (+2 Schools) since last 6/7 years. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also contended that there is also 50% reservation for those teachers, who are teaching in Secondary School standard i.e. teaching in Std. VIII to X. This type of reservation could not have been fixed by the respondents, ousting the Primary Teachers, who are teaching in Std. I to VII and whatever is the reservation fixed as per the advertisement for Secondary School Teachers, should also be made applicable to the Primary School Teachers. Learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the following decisions: (i) (2006)9 SCC 507 (Malik Mazhar Sultan & anr. v. U.P. Public Service Commission & ors.) (ii) 2008(2) J.L.J.R. 543 (Sanjeev Kumar Sahay & ors. v. State of Jharkhand & ors.) (iii) 2009(2) J.L.J.R. 474 (Prem Ranjan etc. v. State of Jharkhand & ors.) (iv) 2008(3) J.C.R. 267 (Sanjeev kumar Sahay & Ors v. State of Jharkhand & Ors) 2. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the advertisement for the posts of Teachers in Higher Secondary Schools (+2 Schools) has been published after approximately 24 years. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the advertisement for the posts of Teachers in Higher Secondary Schools (+2 Schools) has been published after approximately 24 years. Lastly in the year, 1987, the recruitment process for these very posts was conducted and, therefore, those, who are in the services, will be deprived of their opportunity, if age relaxation is not given by the respondent-State of Jharkhand and, therefore, as there was lethargic approach on the part of the respondent authorities, in not giving public advertisement year to year, the cut off date should be fixed by this Court, instead of 1.1.2011 to 15th November, 2000, the year in which the State of Jharkhand has been bifurcated from the erstwhile State of Bihar. All these candidates have not got any opportunity to compete with others from the year, 2000 onwards. This aspect of the matter has also not been properly appreciated by the State and arbitrarily the cut off date has been fixed as 1.1.2011 in public advertisement no.117/11 for the posts of Teachers in Higher Secondary Schools (+2 standard). Learned counsel for the petitioners have also submitted that there are no statutory rules for the posts in question and, therefore also, relaxation of age should have been given, at least to those, who are in the services as on the date of advertisement. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent-State has submitted that the cut off date, which has been fixed as 1.1.2011 is not at all arbitrary, because the advertisements have been given initially being Advertisement No. 74/11, thereafter, Advertisement No.80/11, thereafter Advertisement No.100/11 and cancelling all the aforesaid three advertisements, now Advertisement No.117/11 has been finally published on 24th December, 2011 and, therefore, the year, 2011 started with the 1st day of January, 2011 and, therefore, the cut off date has been fixed as 1.1.2011 for the total posts of teachers as 1840. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the State that whenever any cut off date is fixed for calculation of the age of the candidates, certain candidates are bound to be there, who are falling on a wrong side of the cut off date, but, that cannot be the only reason for quashing the cut off date. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the State that whenever any cut off date is fixed for calculation of the age of the candidates, certain candidates are bound to be there, who are falling on a wrong side of the cut off date, but, that cannot be the only reason for quashing the cut off date. Learned counsel for the State has also submitted that all the petitioners [except the petitioner of W.P.(S) No.4767 of 2011] are appointed as Primary Teachers in the Primary Schools, who are teaching from Std. I to Std. VII and, therefore, there cannot be any reservation for these candidates. Looking to the advertisement, 50% of the reservation is meant only for those teachers, who are in the Government Secondary Schools. The posts of teachers in a Higher Secondary Schools will be filled up in the ratio of 1:1 i.e. 50% will be selected by direct recruitment whereas 50% posts are reserved for those teachers, who are teaching in Secondary Schools and, therefore, those, who are appointed in a Primary Schools as Teachers, cannot claim reservation of 50%, but, if they are otherwise qualified, having Master Degree etc. and are falling within the age limit, as per their category, namely, General Category, Female candidate Category etc., they can compete with other candidates by appearing in the examination and they have already been issued admit cards to appear in the examination, which is going to be held tomorrow. Thus, those candidates, who are overage, are not allowed to appear in the examination for the posts in question. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the State that it is true that there are no statutory rules for recruitment of the posts, in question, but, as per the administrative instructions, issued by the Secretary, Human Resources Development Department, dated 5th July, 2011, which is at Annexure B to the counter affidavit, filed by the respondent-State in W.P.(S) No. 4709 of 2011, the age fixed for different type of candidates are as under: SI. No. Category Age For physically handicapped 1. General Category 40 Years 45 Years 2. Lady (Unreserved/ Backward 43 Years 48 Years Class/ Extremely Backward Class) 3. Other Backward Class 42 Years 47 Years 4. Scheduled Caste (Male/ 45 Years 50 Years Female) 5. Scheduled Tribe (Male/ 45 Years 50 Years Female) 4. No. Category Age For physically handicapped 1. General Category 40 Years 45 Years 2. Lady (Unreserved/ Backward 43 Years 48 Years Class/ Extremely Backward Class) 3. Other Backward Class 42 Years 47 Years 4. Scheduled Caste (Male/ 45 Years 50 Years Female) 5. Scheduled Tribe (Male/ 45 Years 50 Years Female) 4. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the State that is is a policy decision of the State whereby the maximum age limit has been prescribed. This maximum age limit may not be altered by this Court, otherwise there may not be any certainty for such relaxation of age and the maximum age limit will be highly uncertain, once the age relaxation is granted by this Court. Always when cut off date is prescribed for any examination, for calculation of the maximum age limit, there shall be few candidates, who might have crossed that age limit. The State cannot satisfy all. Few candidates are bound to remain there, who may not be eligible, because of overage. Learned counsel for the State has relying upon the decisions, rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Malik Mazhar Sultan & anr. v. U.P. Public Service Commission & ors., as reported in (2006)9 SCC 507 , and in the case of Dr. Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan & ors., as reported in (1997)6 SCC 614 , submitted that the cut off date may not be shifted by this Court, in view of the aforesaid decisions, otherwise it will be unfair for those candidates, who have never applied, though they are similarly situated like the petitioners i.e. overage candidates. Discretion vested in the State may not be altered by this Court merely because vacancies have arisen earlier than the date of advertisement or merely because there is a belated advertisement, given by the State and it is submitted on the basis of the aforesaid decisions that even though there is a delayed advertisement by the State, no age relaxation may be provided only on those grounds. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the Jharkhand Academic Council has also adopted the arguments, canvassed by the learned counsel for the State and has submitted that for the total 1840 vacancies, they have received approximately 19200 applications and those, who are falling within the criteria of age limit, they have been given the admit cards to appear in the examination for the posts of Teacher in Higher Secondary Schools, which is going to be conducted tomorrow i.e. on 15th February, 2012. The petitioners having crossed the maximum age limit, as per the public advertisement, they cannot be allowed to appear in the examination, going to be conducted by Jharkhand Academic Council on 15th February, 2012. He has also placed reliance upon the decisions, cited by the learned counsel for the State. 6. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I see no reason to entertain these writ petitions for the following facts and reasons: (i) All the petitioners [except petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 4767 of 2011] have been appointed as Teachers in Primary Schools, meant for Std. I to Std. V. They are working on deputation in the Higher Secondary Schools for Std. XI & Std. XII. The deputation is of the year, 2004 in most of the cases. (ii) An advertisement was published by the respondent-Jharkhand Academic Council, initially being Advertisement No.74/11, thereafter 80/11 and thereafter, 100/11 and by cancelling all the aforesaid three advertisements, the latest advertisement bearing Advertisement No.117/11 was finally published on 24th December, 2011 for holding examination for the posts of Teacher in Higher Secondary Schools (+2 Schools), for 1840 posts. (iii) This Advertisement also reveals that following will be the maximum age limit, for different categories of candidates whereas the minimum age for all the categories is 21 years as on 1st January, 2011, because the advertisement was given in the year, 2011. SI. Category Maximum Age For physically No. handicapped 1. General Category 40 Years 45 Years 2. Lady (Unreserved/ Backward Class/ 43 Years 48 Years Extremely Backward Class) 3. Other Backward Class 42 Years 47 Years 4. Scheduled Caste (Male/Female) 45 Years 50 Years 5. SI. Category Maximum Age For physically No. handicapped 1. General Category 40 Years 45 Years 2. Lady (Unreserved/ Backward Class/ 43 Years 48 Years Extremely Backward Class) 3. Other Backward Class 42 Years 47 Years 4. Scheduled Caste (Male/Female) 45 Years 50 Years 5. Scheduled Tribe (Male/Female) 45 Years 50 Years (iv) It is vehemently contended by the learned counsels for the petitioners that the cut-off date, which has been fixed as 1st January, 2011, is arbitrary and it should have been 15th November, 2000 i.e. the date on which the State of Jharkhand has been bifurcated from the erstwhile State of Bihar. These petitioners are over-aged and they all must be given chance to appear in the examination by giving age relaxation. This contention is not accepted by this Court, mainly for the reason that the aforesaid cut-off date of 1st January, 2011 has been fixed by executive instructions dated 5th July, 2011, which is at Annexure A to the counter affidavit, filed by the respondents in W.P.(S) No. 4783 of 2011, wherein, it has been stated at Clause 3 that on 1st January of the year, in which the advertisement will be given, the minimum age of a candidate shall be 21 years and maximum will vary from 40 years to 45 years, so far general category is concerned, and for female candidates, for Other Backward Class, for Scheduled Caste, for Scheduled Tribe and for handicapped candidates, it will vary from 45 years to 50 years. Admittedly, the public advertisement has been given in the year, 2000 and, therefore, the cut-off date for fixing the age of the candidates, is 1st January, 2011. (v) It is contended by the learned counsel for the State that this is a policy decision, taken by the State Government and already a higher age limit has been fixed as a maximum age limit, keeping in mind all the circumstances. Looking to the aforesaid Clause 3(iii) of the decision dated 5th July, 2011 taken by the Principal Secretary, Human Resources Development Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, and also keeping in mind the fact that there is no clause for age relaxation, the prayer of the petitioners cannot be allowed. (vi) Maximum age limit and the cut-off date is being fixed, keeping in mind several aspects of the matter. (vi) Maximum age limit and the cut-off date is being fixed, keeping in mind several aspects of the matter. The Courts must be slow in exercising powers of judicial review for change of cut-off date, unless it is capricious and whimsical. (vii) Fixing the cut-off date for determining the minimum or maximum age is the discretion of the Rule Making Authority. There cannot be any cut-off date, which can be fixed with so much mathematical accuracy and with so much statistical nicety, which can avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. Once the cut-off date is fixed, some candidates are bound to fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary, unless the cut-off date is so “wide of the mark, as to make it wholly unreasonable.” (viii) There cannot be any lump sum or general or wholesale relaxation of age, merely because the advertisement has been published at a much belated stage nor can there be wholesale relaxation, because the vacancies occurred in the earlier years, specially when there is no allegation of malafide in connection with delay in issuing the advertisement. (ix) It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the cut-off date cannot be provided by executive orders, because there are no statutory rules for the post of Teachers to be appointed in Higher Secondary Schools (+2 Schools). This contention is also not accepted by this Court. In absence of any statutory Rules, always the executives can pass the orders for the subjects, for which the State Government has power to draft the law, as per Article 162 of the Constitution of India. Merely because some candidates will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date, that cannot be a ground, by itself, for holding that the cut-off date, so fixed, is ultra vires to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (x) Grant of lump sum, general or wholesale relaxation to all the petitioners, on the ground that since long the examination for the posts, in question, has not been held by the respondents, would tantamount to : (a) highly uncertainty about the maximum age limit, because there may be candidates, who are of 50 years, 55 years or 59½ years. All cannot be allowed by lump sum age relaxation to appear in the examination. All cannot be allowed by lump sum age relaxation to appear in the examination. 60 years is the age of superannuation for the post of Teachers in Higher Secondary Schools. If the petitioners' contention is accepted that instead of 1st January, 2011, the cut-off date should be 15th November, 2000, then perhaps for some categories, the maximum age limit will be 60 years; for example, for “Handicapped Scheduled Tribe candidates”, the maximum age limit will be 60 years. Therefore, such type of absurd proposition cannot be accepted by this Court that cut-off date may be fixed by this Court as 15th November, 2000 (the date on which the State of Jharkhand is separated from the erstwhile State of Bihar) instead of 1st January, 2011. One more argument has been canvassed that few candidates are over-aged by few months and, therefore, the age relaxation may be given in their favour. This contention also is not accepted by this Court, mainly for the reason that if this contention is accepted, it will lead to arbitrariness and uncertainty. (b) Such type of lump sum, general or wholesale relaxation of age will lead to unfairness to those candidates, who have never applied for the posts, in question, though they are similarly situated to the petitioners ( i.e. over-aged candidates), keeping in mind the maximum age limit, prescribed in the advertisement. Thus, uncertainty in determining the maximum age and unfairness to a large number of candidates, who have not applied, thinking that they are over-aged or thinking that they are age-barred, permits not this Court to alter the cut-off date from 1st January, 2011 to th November, 2000 or for any jig jag cut-off date i.e. separate cut-off date for every individual petitioner. Such type of “accommodative approach” cannot be adopted by the Court. (xi) Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a further contention that 50% seats have been reserved for the Teachers, who are teaching in Secondary Schools. This classification is arbitrary. This contention is also not accepted by this Court mainly for the reason that the Government wants Teachers to be appointed in the Higher Secondary Schools i.e. for Std. XI and Std. XII (+2 Schools) and, therefore, reservation has been kept for the Teachers, who are teaching in Std. X. The petitioners have agitated the ground that they are Teachers, but, there is no reservation for them. XI and Std. XII (+2 Schools) and, therefore, reservation has been kept for the Teachers, who are teaching in Std. X. The petitioners have agitated the ground that they are Teachers, but, there is no reservation for them. It may be noted that all these petitioners, except petition of W.P.(S) No. 4667 of 2011 are the Teachers, appointed in Primary Schools i.e. for Std. I to Std. VIII. Thus, looking to the complex study of higher standards, namely, Std. XI and Std. XII, prescribing reservation of 50% for those, who are teaching in Secondary Schools i.e. in Std. X, is not an unreasonable reservation and it cannot be said to be an arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India nor the percentage of reservation can be said to be excessive. Petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 4767 of 2011 is such a candidate who has never applied for the post of Teacher in the Higher Secondary School, in pursuance of the public advertisement being Advertisement No. 117/11. This candidate has come directly to this Court in the writ petition and is seeking age relaxation. The prayer of this candidate-petitioner cannot be accepted by this Court, as he is over-age as on 1st January, 2011, the cut-off date, which is prescribed in the public advertisement and also prescribed in the executive instruction dated 5th July, 2011 and for the reasons, stated in this decision. (xii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, as reported in (1975) 1 SCC 305 , at paragraph no.10 as under: “10. The concessional rate of duty can be availed of only by those who satisfy the conditions which have been laid down under the notification. The respondent was not a manufacturer before September 4, 1967 as it had applied for licence only on September 5, 1967 and it could not have made a declaration before September 4, 1967 that its total clearance for the financial year 1967-68 is not estimated to exceed 75 million matches. In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the concessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated, if, by adopting the device of fragmentation, the larger units could become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions (see Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Dr Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General, Bhikuse Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Daruka & Co. v. Union of India. The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide off the reasonable mark See Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. per Justice Holmes.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the classification, created by the cut-off date with those Teachers, who are over-aged, because of the cut-off date i.e. January, 2011, and those, who are not over-aged, cannot be said to be arbitrary classification. On the contrary, the executive instruction dated 5th July, 2011, which is at Annexure A to the counter affidavit, filed by the respondents in W.P.(C) No. 4783 of 2011, is absolutely reasonable and it has been stated in Clause 3(iii) thereof that as on 1st day of January of the year, in which the publication is made, a candidate should have minimum 21 years of age and maximum will vary from category to category from 40 years to 45 years and for handicapped candidates of different categories, it will vary from 45 years to 50 years. (xiii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra, as reported in (1990) 2 SCC 669 , at paragraph nos. 6, 7 and 8 as under: 6. There is no dispute that the eligibility of a candidate as to age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police should be determined according to Rule 5 of the A.P. Police Services Rules. It is, therefore, necessary to look first at that Rule. Rule 5 so far as is relevant provides: “5. Qualifications.-(A) No person shall be eligible for appointment as a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Category 2 by direct recruitment unless he - (i) has completed the age of 21 years and had not completed the age of 26 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. 7. The rule prescribes the minimum as well as the maximum age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police. Minimum age is 21 years. The candidate must have completed 21 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. He should not have also completed 26 years as on that day. The Tribunal while construing this rule has observed: “According to the procedure the process of selection begins with the issue of the advertisement and culminates in forwarding the list to the appointing authority. The essence of the process lies in the preparation of the list. A selection can be said to have been done only when the list is prepared. In this view the eligibility of the candidates as to age has to be determined at this stage.” If the word ‘selection’ is understood in a sense meaning thereby only the final act of selecting candidates with preparation of the list for appointment, then the conclusion of the Tribunal may not be unjustified. But round phrases cannot give square answers. Before accepting that meaning, we must see the consequences, anomalies and uncertainties that it may lead to. The Tribunal in fact does not dispute that the process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment. But round phrases cannot give square answers. Before accepting that meaning, we must see the consequences, anomalies and uncertainties that it may lead to. The Tribunal in fact does not dispute that the process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment. Indeed, it consists of various steps like inviting applications, scrutiny of applications, rejection of defective applications or elimination of ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview or viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for appointment. Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps. When such are the different steps in the process of selection, the minimum or maximum age for suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific, and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications. It would be, therefore, unreasonable to construe the word selection only as the factum of preparation of the select list. Nothing so bad would have been intended by the rule making authority. 8. The appeal therefore, is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal.” (Emphasis supplied) In the aforesaid decision, the cut-off date was 1st July, 1983, because the advertisement was published in August, 1983. This cut-off date was under challenge, because Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Police Service Rules states that maximum age limit is 26 years as on 1st July of the year in which the selection is made. Selection has different stages and, therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there cannot be any fluctuating cut-off date or uncertain cut-off date (due to different stages of selection process) and, therefore, whatever was fixed by Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission as cut-off date i.e. 1st July, 1983 was held as a valid one. Selection has different stages and, therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there cannot be any fluctuating cut-off date or uncertain cut-off date (due to different stages of selection process) and, therefore, whatever was fixed by Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission as cut-off date i.e. 1st July, 1983 was held as a valid one. In the facts of the present case also, petitioners have raised the contention that they are age-barred by few years only and as the examination for the posts, in question, was not conducted since last few years, though they are over-aged, they all may be allowed to appear in the examination, by giving variable age relaxation i.e. by giving different age relaxations for different petitioners. This contention is not accepted by this Court, because it will lead to fluctuating or uncertain cut-off date and there will be uncertainty about the maximum age limit also. (xiv) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, as reported in (1994) 4 SCC 212 , in paragraph nos. 7, 8 and 11, as under: 7. In this context, it would also be useful to state that when a court is called upon to decide such a matter, mere errors are not subject to correction in exercise of power of judicial review; it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise which can be declared to be void, as stated in Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago in which Justice McKenna observed as follows: “It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void ....” The aforesaid was noted by this Court in Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan in which case also reasonability of fixation of a date for a particular purpose had come up for examination. 8. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void ....” The aforesaid was noted by this Court in Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan in which case also reasonability of fixation of a date for a particular purpose had come up for examination. 8. Having known the legal parameters within which we have to function, let it be seen whether fixation of 1st August as cut-off date for determining the eligibility of applicants qua their age can be held to be arbitrary despite preliminary examination being conducted before that date. As to why the cut-off date has not been changed despite the decision to hold preliminary examination, has been explained in paragraph 3 of the special leave petition. The sum and substance of the explanation is that preliminary examination is only a screening test and marks obtained in this examination do not count for determining the order of merit, for which purpose the marks obtained in the main examination, which is still being held after 1st August, alone are material. In view of this, it cannot be held that continuation of treating 1st August as the cut-off date, despite the Union Public Service Commission having introduced the method of preliminary examination which is held before 1st August, can be said to be “very wide off any reasonable mark” or so capricious or whimsical as to permit judicial interference. xx xx xx 11. For the aforesaid reasons, equity does not demand any favour to be shown to the respondent. The result is that appeal is allowed with costs by setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal. Cost assessed as Rs 10,000. The respondent would not be treated or deemed to have passed the examination in question and whatever benefit of the same was given to him pursuant to Tribunal's directions shall stand cancelled.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision also, the cut-off date fixed as 1st August was held as a valid one. Such type of cut-off date may appear to be unjust or oppressive, yet it will be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may be justified. (xv) It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Such type of cut-off date may appear to be unjust or oppressive, yet it will be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may be justified. (xv) It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. (Mrs.) Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & ors., as reported in A.I.R. 1985 SC 1367, in paragraph no.29, as under: “29. The object of this legislation was to provide for absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing. So therefore experience and continuous employment were necessary ingredients. The Hindi version of the Ordinance used the expression “ke prarambh ke samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein” is capable of meaning “and are continuing” to work as such at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance. Keeping the background of the purpose of the Act in view that would be the proper construction and if that is the proper construction which is in consonance with the English version of the Ordinance and the Act as well as with the object of the Act then in our opinion the Act and the Ordinance should be construed to mean that only those would be eligible for screening who were appointed prior to June 25, 1975 and were continuing at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. June 12, 1978 i.e. approximately about three years. If that is the correct reading, then we are unable to accept the criticism that those who were for a short period appointed prior to June 25, 1975 then again with interruption were working only at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. June 12, 1978 would also be eligible. In other words people with very short experience would be eligible for absorption. That cannot be the purpose of the Act. It cannot be so read reasonably. Therefore on a proper construction it means that all temporary lecturers who were appointed as such on or before June 25, 1975 and were continuing as such at the commencement of the Ordinance shall be considered by the University for screening for absorption. The expression “were continuing” is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. The expression “were continuing” is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. If a Legislature considers a particular period of experience to be necessary, the wisdom of such a decision is not subject to judicial review. Keeping the aforesaid reasonable meaning of clause 3 of the Ordinance and Section 3 of the Act in view, we are of the opinion that the criterion fixed for screening for absorption was not an irrational criterion not having any nexus with the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the criticism that a teacher who was working even for two or three months only before June 25, 1975 and then with long interruptions was in employment of the University at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance would be eligible but a teacher who had worked continuously from June 26, 1975 i.e. after the date fixed i.e. June 25, 1975 for three years would be ineligible and as such that will be discrimination against long experience, cannot be accepted. Such a construction would be an unreasonable construction unwarranted by the language used in the provisions concerned. It is well-settled that if a particular period of experience is fixed for screening or for absorption, it is within the wisdom of the Legislature, and what period should be sufficient for a particular job or a particular employment is not subject to judicial review. We need not refer to a large number of decisions on this point.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, in this case also, for grant of a benefit of regularization, cutoff date was fixed as 25th June, 1975 that those, who were appointed prior to the aforesaid date, will be eligible for scrutiny for regularization, cannot be said to be arbitrary choice of date. (xvi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan & ors., as reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614 , in paragraph nos. 5, 7, 11 and 17, as under: “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. (xvi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan & ors., as reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614 , in paragraph nos. 5, 7, 11 and 17, as under: “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rule-making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works1 and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra2 the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is made. Such a cut-off date was challenged. This Court considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said, “when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”. This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cut-off date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing an independent cut-off date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in determining the maximum age. xx xx xx 7. In the present case, the cut-off date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut-off date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cut-off date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cut-off date may well contend that the cut-off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier; or in the alternative that the cut-off date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cut-off date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Works and later cases that the cut-off date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cut-off date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cut-off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. xx xx xx 11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age-limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner contended. xx xx xx 17. In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cut-off date under the relevant rules are dismissed while the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the Rules concerned relating to the cut-off date being fixed with reference to 1st of January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision also, whenever there is a cut-off date, given for determining maximum or minimum age for the post, in question, there are bound to be some candidates, who will be over-aged or who are age-barred, but, this alone cannot be the reason for holding that the cut-off date, fixed by the respondent authorities is arbitrary. Here also, keeping in mind the cut-off date as 1st January, 2011, few candidates like the petitioners will be over-aged or will be age-barred and, thus, there cannot be any cut-off date, so precise that there cannot be any candidate, who will not be over-aged or age-barred. (xvii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Public Service Commission & ors. v. Arvind Singh Chauhan & ors., as reported in (2009) 9 SCC 135 , in paragraph nos. 19, 20, 23 and 24, as under: “19. As far as the finding of the High Court is concerned, had the intention of the Commission been to consider 31-3-2003 as a cut-off date for eligibility, it would have been explicitly specified. v. Arvind Singh Chauhan & ors., as reported in (2009) 9 SCC 135 , in paragraph nos. 19, 20, 23 and 24, as under: “19. As far as the finding of the High Court is concerned, had the intention of the Commission been to consider 31-3-2003 as a cut-off date for eligibility, it would have been explicitly specified. The Division Bench has referred to the Circular dated 22-3-2002 issued by the Department of General Administration of the State Government. The relevant portion of the Circular reads: “Keeping in view the increasing problem of unemployed youths in the State and keeping the interest of the unemployed youths in mind, the Government has again considered and has taken a decision that a further relaxation of two years more needs to be given. Meanwhile, thereby now from March 2000 to March 2003, the maximum age-limit for appointment in government services will be thirty-five years.” 20. Rule 5(C) of the State Services Examination Rules on which reliance was placed by the appellant states: “5. (C)(a) A candidate must have attained the age of 21 years and must not have attained the age of 30 years on 1st January next following the date of commencement of the competitive examination.” xx xx xx 23. On account of no record of any concession made on the part of the appellants and considering all the circumstances of the case, it is clear that the respondents were over aged on the specified cut-off dates which makes their application liable for cancellation. 24. In view of the above discussion, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set aside. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, cut-off date fixed was 1st January, the next following date of commencement of competitive examination. The cut-off date was slightly shifted as 31st March, 2003 by the decision of the Hon'ble High Court. This was not permitted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision and it has been held that there is no concession, given by the Public Service Commission for age relaxation and, therefore, the candidates cannot get the benefit of the age relaxation. Appeal preferred by the Public Service Commission was allowed. This was not permitted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision and it has been held that there is no concession, given by the Public Service Commission for age relaxation and, therefore, the candidates cannot get the benefit of the age relaxation. Appeal preferred by the Public Service Commission was allowed. (xviii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary & ors., as reported in (1996) 10 SCC 536 , in paragraph no.21, as under: “21. We find considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Shri Banerjee. It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan at p. 269.) In the present case, the date, 31-12-1993, as fixed by notification dated 21-6-1995, in the matter of grant of exemption from the eligibility test for appointment on the post of lecturer has a reasonable basis keeping in view the time taken in submitting the Ph.D. thesis or obtaining M. Phil. degree by candidates who had undertaken the study for Ph.D. or M. Phil. degree prior to the issuance of the 1991 Regulations and the date, 31-12-1993, cannot be held to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has proceeded on the basis that the cut-off date for the purpose of granting exemption from eligibility test should have nexus with the date of the advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lecturers. The High Court was in error in taking this view. ......................................” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision, the choice of cut-off date as a basis for classification cannot be held as arbitrary, even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice of that cut-off date. The High Court was in error in taking this view. ......................................” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision, the choice of cut-off date as a basis for classification cannot be held as arbitrary, even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice of that cut-off date. (xix) It has been by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, as reported in (1990) 3 SCC 368 , in paragraph no.8, as under: “8. In the present case as pointed out earlier the past practice was to fix the last date for receipt of applications a month or one and a half months after the date of actual publication of the advertisement. Following the past practice the State Government fixed the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988. Those who had completed the required experience of three years by that date were, therefore, eligible to apply for the posts in question. The respondents and some of the intervenors who were not completing the required experience by that date, therefore, challenged the fixation of the last date as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is obvious that in fixing the last date as January 31, 1988 the State Government had only followed the past practice and if the High Court's attention had been invited to this fact it would perhaps have refused to interfere since its interference is based on the erroneous belief that the past practice was to fix June 30 of the relevant year as the last date for receipt of applications. Except for leaning on a past practice the High Court has not assigned any reasons for its choice of the date. As pointed out by this Court the choice of date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the same unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The choice of the date for advertising the posts had to depend on several factors, e.g. the number of vacancies in different disciplines, the need to fill up the posts, the availability of candidates, etc. It is not the case of anyone that experienced candidates were not available in sufficient numbers on the cut-off date. The choice of the date for advertising the posts had to depend on several factors, e.g. the number of vacancies in different disciplines, the need to fill up the posts, the availability of candidates, etc. It is not the case of anyone that experienced candidates were not available in sufficient numbers on the cut-off date. Merely because the respondents and some others would qualify for appointment if the last date for receipt of applications is shifted from January 31, 1988 to June 30, 1988 is no reason for dubbing the earlier date as arbitrary or irrational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in striking down the government's action of fixing the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988 as arbitrary.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision also, merely because some of the petitioners will be accommodated if the cut-off date is shifted, which by itself is no reason for holding that the earlier cut-off date fixed by the authority is arbitrary or irrational. (xx) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn., as reported in (2004) 2 SCC 76 , from paragraph nos. 29 to 36, as under: “29. It is now well settled that for the purpose of effecting promotion, the employer is required to fix a date for the purpose of effecting promotion and, thus, unless a cut-off date so fixed is held to be arbitrary or unreasonable, the same cannot be set aside as offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the cut-off date so fixed having regard to the directions contained by the National Industrial Tribunal which had been given a retrospective effect cannot be said to be arbitrary, irrational, whimsical or capricious. 30. The learned counsel could not point out as to how the said date can be said to be arbitrary and, thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 31. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. In University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary1 it has been observed: (SCC p. 546, para 21) “21. ... 31. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. In University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary1 it has been observed: (SCC p. 546, para 21) “21. ... It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, SCC at 310 : SCR at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan, SCC at 66 : SCR at p. 269.)” 32. If a cut-off date can be fixed, indisputably those who fall within the purview thereof would form a separate class. Such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object which the decision of the Bank to promote its employees seeks to achieve. Such classifications would neither fall within the category of creating a class within a class or an artificial classification so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 33. Whenever such a cut-off date is fixed, a question may arise as to why a person would suffer only because he comes within the wrong side of the cutoff date, but, the fact that some persons or a section of society would face hardship, by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 34. In State of W.B. v. Monotosh Roy it was held: (SCC pp. 76-77, paras 13-15) “13. In All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers Assn. v. Union of India a Bench of this Court distinguished the judgment in Nakara6 and pointed out that it is for the Government to fix a cut-off date in the case of introducing a new pension scheme. The Court negatived the claim of the persons who had retired prior to the cutoff date and had collected their retiral benefits from the employer. The Court negatived the claim of the persons who had retired prior to the cutoff date and had collected their retiral benefits from the employer. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. P.N. Menon. In State of Rajasthan v. Amrit Lal Gandhi the ruling in P.N. Menon case was followed and it was reiterated that in matters of revising the pensionary benefits and even in respect of revision of scales of pay, a cut-off date on some rational or reasonable basis has to be fixed for extending the benefits. 14. In State of U.P. v. Jogendra Singh a Division Bench of this Court held that liberalized provisions introduced after an employee's retirement with regard to retiral benefits cannot be availed of by such an employee. In that case the employee retired voluntarily on 12-4-1976. Later on, the statutory rules were amended by notification dated 18-11-1976 granting benefit of additional qualifying service in case of voluntary retirement. The Court held that the employee was not entitled to get the benefit of the liberalized provision which came into existence after his retirement. A similar ruling was rendered in V. Kasturi v. Managing Director, State Bank of India. 15. The present case will be governed squarely by the last two rulings referred to above. We have no doubt whatever that the first respondent is not entitled to the relief prayed for by him in the writ petition.” 35. In Vice-Chairman & Managing Director, A.P. SIDC Ltd. v. R.Varaprasad in relation to “cut-off” date fixed for the purpose of implementation of Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it was said: (SCC p. 580, para 11) “The employee may continue in service in the interregnum by virtue of clause (i) but that cannot alter the date on which the benefits that were due to an employee under VRS were to be calculated. Clause (c) itself indicates that any increase in salary after the cut-off point/date cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculation of payments to which an employee is entitled under VRS.” 36. The High Court in its impugned judgment has arrived at a finding of fact that the Association had failed to prove any malice on the part of the authorities of the Bank in fixing the cut-off date. A plea of malice as is well known must be specifically pleaded and proved. The High Court in its impugned judgment has arrived at a finding of fact that the Association had failed to prove any malice on the part of the authorities of the Bank in fixing the cut-off date. A plea of malice as is well known must be specifically pleaded and proved. Even such a requirement has not been complied with by the writ petitioners.” (Emphasis supplied) In the aforesaid decision also, the whole concept of cut-off has been explained and it has been held that the cut-off date cannot be held as arbitrary, irrational, whimsical, capricious or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, merely because some candidates come within the wrong side of the cut-off date, especially when there is no malafide alleged for delayed advertisement. In the facts of the present case, ground of malafide for late advertisement has never been canvassed. (xxi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shankar K. Mandal v. State of Bihar, as reported in (2003) 9 SCC 519 , in paragraph no.5, as under: “5. Pursuant to the directions contained in the earlier judgment of the High Court as affirmed by this Court, a fresh exercise was undertaken. Since the present appellants were not selected, writ petitions were filed before the High Court. In the writ petition which was filed by fifty-five persons and disposed of by the Division Bench the conclusions were essentially as follows: (1) Some of the writ petitioners (Writ Petitioners 5, 18, 23, 28, 41 and 53) were overage at the time of their initial appointment and their cases were, therefore, wholly covered by the directions given by the High Court, and they were not entitled to relaxation of age; (2) So far as Writ Petitioners 6, 26, 30 and 55 are concerned, the stand was that they had not crossed the age-limit at the time of making the applications for appointment and, therefore, were within the age-limit at the time of initial appointment and were, therefore, entitled to relaxation of age in terms of the judgment passed by the High Court earlier and affirmed by this Court. This plea was turned down on the ground that what was relevant for consideration related to the age at the time of initial appointment and not making of the application; (3) As regards Writ Petitioner 24, he was underage at the time of appointment. He was permitted to file a representation before the Director of Primary Education and the High Court ordered that his case would be considered afresh; (4) In respect of Writ Petitioners 9 and 17, it was noted that they were refused absorption on the ground that they had not made any application in response to advertisement issued pursuant to the order passed by this Court. Since no material was placed to substantiate this stand and no reasons had been communicated for non-absorption, direction was given to consider representations if made by them within one month from the date of judgment. The said judgment is under challenge in CA No. 916 of 1999. The appellants have taken the stand that in terms of this Court's judgment, a person who was not overage on the date of initial appointment was to be considered. Though it was conceded before the High Court that they were overage at the time of initial appointment, much would turn as to what is the date of initial appointment. The High Court had not considered as to what was the applicable rule so far as the eligibility regarding age is concerned. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent State however submitted that having made a concession before the High Court that they were overage on the date of appointment, it is not open to the appellants to take a different stand. The crucial question is whether appellants were overage on the date of their initial appointment. It is true that there was concession before the High Court that they were overage on the date of initial appointment. But there was no concession that they were overage at the time of making the application. There was no definite material before the High Court as to what was the eligibility criteria so far as age is concerned. No definite material was placed before the High Court and also before this Court to give a definite finding on that aspect. But there was no concession that they were overage at the time of making the application. There was no definite material before the High Court as to what was the eligibility criteria so far as age is concerned. No definite material was placed before the High Court and also before this Court to give a definite finding on that aspect. What happens when a cut-off date is fixed for fulfilling the prescribed qualification relating to age by a candidate for appointment and the effect of any non-prescription has been considered by this Court in several cases. The principles culled out from the decisions of this Court (see Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar, Bhupinderpal Singh v. State of Punjab and Jasbir Rani v. State of Punjab) are as follows: (1) The cut-off date by reference to which the eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the candidate seeking a public employment is the date appointed by the relevant service rules. (2) If there is no cut-off date appointed by the rules then such date shall be as appointed for the purpose in the advertisement calling for applications. (3) If there is no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications were to be received by the competent authority.“ (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision also, assuming without admitting that there are no statutory rules for the posts of Teachers, to be appointed in a Higher Secondary Schools (+2 Schools) and assuming that there are no executive instructions also, then also the cut-off date will be the date, as appointed for the purpose in the advertisement. In the facts of the present case, looking to Advertisement No.117/11 dated 24th December, 2011 for the posts, in question, it has been stated in Clause No. a(iii) that as on 1st January, 2011 the minimum age required is 21 years whereas the maximum age limit will be 40 to 45 years for different categories of candidates like General category, Female category, OBC category, SC and ST categories and in case of handicapped candidates in different categories, the maximum age limit, stated in the advertisement as on cut-off date i.e. 1st January, 2011 is 45 years to 50 years. Thus, the cut-off date has already been given in the advertisement. Thus, the cut-off date has already been given in the advertisement. As per the aforesaid decision also, there is no reason for this Court to make any deviation from the cut-off date. In the facts of the present case, there are administrative instructions, as stated herein above dated 5th July, 2011, as per the decision taken by the Principal Secretary, Human Resource Development Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi that the cut-off date will be 1st January of the year, in which the public advertisement is published. (xxii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Sajal Kumar Roy, as reported in (2006) 8 SCC 671 , in paragraph nos. 10 and 11, as under: “10. It is not in dispute that the appellants have framed rules for recruitment known as the Education Code for Kendriya Vidyalayas. Article 45 of the said Code provides for age-limit in the following terms: “45. Age-limits The following upper age-limits have been prescribed for recruitment to the posts: Assistant Commissioner 30-40 years Principal 35-50 years PGT 40 years TGT 35 years Primary teacher 30 years Music teacher 30 years Other teachers including librarian 35 years LDC and UDC 25 years Group D Lab Attendants 18-25 years The upper age-limits are relaxable in the case of special categories as follows: (i) Scheduled Caste/Tribe 5 years (ii) Retrenched Central Government Period of their service in employees including defence civil/military departments personnel increased by 3 years. The appointing authority can, in his discretion, relax these age-limits in deserving cases on the recommendation of the Appointing Committee/Selection Committee.” 11. The respondents are not members of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Age-limit is prescribed for appointment to the general category of employees. The upper age-limit for appointment to the post of LDC is 25 years. The advertisement also says so. The Rules, as noticed hereinbefore, are in two parts. The first part talks about the age-limit. The second part provides for relaxation. Such relaxation can be granted for the purpose specified i.e. in favour of those who answered the descriptions stated therein. Relaxation of age-limit even in relation to the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribe candidates or the retrenched Central Government employees, including the defence personnel is, however, not automatic. The appointing authorities are required to apply their mind while exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to relax the age-limits. Relaxation of age-limit even in relation to the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribe candidates or the retrenched Central Government employees, including the defence personnel is, however, not automatic. The appointing authorities are required to apply their mind while exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to relax the age-limits. Discretion of the authorities is required to be exercised only for deserving candidates and upon recommendations of the Appointing Committee/Selection Committee. The requirements to comply with the rules, it is trite, were required to be complied with fairly and reasonably. They were bound by the rules. The discretionary jurisdiction could be exercised for relaxation of age provided for in the rules and within the four corners thereof. As the respondents do not come within the purview of the exception contained in Article 45 of the Education Code, in our opinion, the Tribunal and consequently, the High Court committed a manifest error in issuing the aforementioned directions.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid case also, grant of age relaxation was quashed and set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the facts of the present case, there is no clause for age relaxation. Looking to the aforesaid decision, the age relaxation can be given only as per the rules and as provided by the respondents. It should be within the four corners of the law. In absence of any such policy decision by the State for age relaxation, it cannot be granted in the judicial review. (xxiii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Subbarayudu, as reported in (2008) 14 SCC 702 , in paragraph nos. 5 to 9, as under: “5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. (See State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal.) 6. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. (See State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal.) 6. No doubt in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India this Court had struck down the cut-off date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken in Nakara case as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal1. 7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (vide SCC para 5), Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. (vide SCC para 31), University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary, etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. 9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Govt. 9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi the court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, even if no reason has been given in the counter affidavit of the Government that why a particular cut-off date has been fixed or chosen, still the court must not declare it as arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, because the fixation of cut-off date has various considerations. (xxiv) Learned counsels appearing for the petitioners have placed heavy reliance upon the decisions, rendered by Hon'ble Patna High Court in the case of Dr. Rabindra Kumar Singh & Ors v. State of Bihar & Ors., as reported in 2000(3) PLJR 231 and in case of Subodh Kr. Jha v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., as reported in 2005(3) JCR 505 . (xxv) It is submitted by the learned counsel for the State that in both the aforesaid decisions, the aforesaid binding decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have not been pointed out at all and hence they are per incuriam. For canvassing this contention of per incuriam, learned counsel for the State has put reliance on the following decisions: A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, as reported in (1988)2 SCC 602 Pr. Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, as reported in (1990)3 SCC 682 -Pr. 40; Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal, as reported in (1975) 2 SCC 232 -Pr. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 -Pr.128 onwards; (xxvi) Looking to the aforesaid decisions, I accept the contention raised by the learned counsel for the State that these two decisions are per incuriam. The binding decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court have not been cited at all. The aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cover the issue, involved of fixing of cut-off date and grant of age relaxation. The binding decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court have not been cited at all. The aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cover the issue, involved of fixing of cut-off date and grant of age relaxation. Thus, in view of the binding decisions of approximately one dozen decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the cut-off as 1st January, 2011, which has been prescribed by the executive instructions and which is referred in the public advertisement for the posts of Teachers in Higher Secondary Schools (+2 Schools) is arbitrary, whimsical or capricious and, thus, I see no reason to alter it and re-fix as th November, 2000 (the date on which the State of Jharkhand has been bifurcated from the erstwhile State of Bihar). (xxvii) Learned counsels for the petitioners have also relied upon the decisions, rendered by this Court in the case of Sanjeev kumar Sahay & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., as reported in 2008(3) JCR 267 . (xxviii) Learned counsel for the State has again relied upon the aforesaid decisions and submitted that the aforesaid decision is also per incuriam and is based upon the concession, given by the learned Advocate General of the State for age relaxation, paragraph nos. 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 thereof, read as under: “21. Learned Advocate General appearing for the State has very fairly submitted that there has been inordinate delay in framing of Rules, as a result of which, most of the Law Graduates eligible to appear in the examination have crossed their age. Learned Advocate General, therefore, submitted that it is a fit case where one time relaxation be given to the candidates by fixing suitable cut-off so that candidates who were eligible at least on the date when Rule was framed may not be deprived of from appearing in the examination. 22. Mr. S. Piprawall, learned counsel appearing for the Commission, adopted that argument advanced by learned Advocate General and submitted that this relaxation cannot be treated as precedence for all the time. 23. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Jharkhand High Court, referred to Rule 5 of the Jharkhand Judicial Services Recruitment Rules, 2004 submitted that there is no provision of relaxation of age in the said rule. However, Mr. 23. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Jharkhand High Court, referred to Rule 5 of the Jharkhand Judicial Services Recruitment Rules, 2004 submitted that there is no provision of relaxation of age in the said rule. However, Mr. Singh submitted that having regard to the facts of the case and the fair stand taken by the learned Advocate General, there would be no difficulty in giving one time relaxation. 24. We appreciate the submissions made by the learned Advocate General and the learned counsel appearing for the Jharkhand High Court. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we have to decide what would be the cut-off date. 25. As noticed above, in the case of All India Judge's Association (supra), the Supreme Court issued specific directive for filling up the existing vacancies in subordinate Courts and in all levels latest by 31st March, 2003. A Division Bench of this Court also in Rajnish Mishra's case (P.I.L. Case) (supra), decided on 6.1.2003 directed the Government to finalize the Rule which was not finalized within time. It was only by Gazette notification dated 4.4.2005, Rule was published and notified. In our considered opinion, therefore, 31st March, 2003 shall be cut-off date for the reason that if the Supreme Court and the High Court orders would have been complied with, the Rule could have been published in March, 2003.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid paragraphs, it appears that: (a) Concession was given by the learned Advocate General for age relaxation; (b) Counsel for the Jharkhand Public Service Commission, Ranchi, has also adopted the argument, canvassed by the learned Advocate General and has pointed out that this relaxation may not be treated as precedent for all time to come; (c) The whole aforesaid decision was based upon the facts and circumstances of the case, especially in the light of specific directive for filling up the existing vacancies in subordinate courts as per the decision, rendered in the case of All India Judge's Association, as reported in AIR 2002 SC 1753 and the vacancies were to be filled up prior to 31st March, 2003. (d) Similarly, the aforesaid decision was based upon the facts, keeping in mind the direction, given in the Public Interest Litigation in th case of Rajneesh Mishra v. State of Jharkhand, as reported in 2003(1) JCR 443 (Jhr.). (d) Similarly, the aforesaid decision was based upon the facts, keeping in mind the direction, given in the Public Interest Litigation in th case of Rajneesh Mishra v. State of Jharkhand, as reported in 2003(1) JCR 443 (Jhr.). Thus, the decision, rendered by this Court in the case of Sanjeev kumar Sahay & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., as reported in 2008(3) JCR 267 , is based upon its own facts and concession, given by the Advocate General of the State of Jharkhand, whereas in the facts of the present case, no concession has been given by the State of Jharkhand. Similar was the observation, as stated herein above in the decision, rendered in the case of Public Service Commission v. Arvind Singh Chauhan, (2009) 9 SCC 135 , wherein at paraghraph no.23 it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in absence of any record of concession, made on the part of the appellant (Public Service Commission) and considering all the circumstances of the case, it is clear that the candidates over-aged on specified cut-off date, which makes their applications liable for cancellation. Thus, the appeal preferred by the Public Service Commission was allowed and the order, granting age relaxation was quashed. In view of the facts and aforesaid binding decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in view of the concession, given by the learned Advocate General and in the light of the particular facts of the case, the decision, as reported in 2008(3) JCR 267 was delivered by this Court whereas the facts of the present case are absolutely different and hence the said judgment if factually not applicable for deciding the issue, in question. 7. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in these writ petitions and, therefore, they are dismissed.