JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar Sharma, J.—Challenge in this revision is to the order dated 15.4.2010 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh in Case No. 263.12.2009 Jamuna Prasad v. Anupam Vashishta and others and later case No. 2247 of 2010 whereby the protest petition filed by opposite party No. 2 against final report submitted by the police in case crime No. 207/09 under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act P. S. Banna Devi, Aligarh had been allowed and rejecting the final report cognizance against revisionists has been taken under Section 190(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. Facts germane to the revision are that the opposite party No. 2 filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh on 3.2.2009 wherein he stated that the marriage of his daughter Reena was solemnized with accused Anupam Vashishtha on 20.3.2006 in Aligarh and he spent Rs. 8.0 lacs in the marriage. The accused persons demanded a Honda City car at the time of marriage, else they would not marry. However, after much persuasion the marriage was performed. The accused persons after marriage pressurized Reena to get Honda City car from her parents and they used to abuse, maltreat, beat and extended threat to kill her. She narrated all this to her parents. She also told them that her husband had illicit relations with other woman at Ghaziabad and when she protested she was beaten by him saying that she should arrange Honda City car from her father, else he would not keep her. On 20.12.2006 Reena gave birth to a male child and in chhochhak a sum of Rs. 50,000/- were spent and that time also accused demanded Honda City car from the complainant. Her husband who is employed as Engineer in L.G. Company continued his demand. Several times the complainant alongwith his wife went to House No. 213H, Sector-17, Vasundhara, Ghaziabad to resolve the issue where accused persons also assembled, but on 17.7.2007 Anupam changed his residence and shifted in House No. 32, Sector-19, Vasundhara, Ghaziabad. Whenever, the complainant tried to lodge the report, Reena said that there is improvement in Anupam but he continued to hatch conspiracy in eliminating her. On 12.6.2008 the complainant alongwith his family had gone for Vaishno Devi darshan and after return on 19.6.2008 they got information that Reena had died. Whenever, the complainant tried to lodge the report, Reena said that there is improvement in Anupam but he continued to hatch conspiracy in eliminating her. On 12.6.2008 the complainant alongwith his family had gone for Vaishno Devi darshan and after return on 19.6.2008 they got information that Reena had died. When the complainant reached Mathura, the accused persons showed them discharge slip and death certificate of Fortis Hospital and said that Reena had died during surgery. After her cremation they returned back to Aligarh alongwith Reena’s son. On account of Reena’s death the complainant and his family were in shock and trauma and on further enquiry they came to know that she was firstly admitted in Kaushambi Hospital on 6.6.2008 but her husband suo motu got her discharged on 9.6.2008 and in critical condition she was kept at home. When her condition further deteriorated then in order to save him and misguide them he admitted her in Fortis Hospital, Noida in the night of 14/15.6.2008, where she died. The complainant further contended that under a conspiracy due to non-fulfillment of dowry demand, in order to grab insurance money and on account of illicit relations of Anupam with other women, Reena had been killed by the accused persons. The report of the complainant was not taken by the police. On 1.2.2009 at about 5 p. m. accused Avinash Chandra Sharma, SI Paras Ram Singh Yadav of Hathras alongwith 5-6 persons came at the house of complainant and tried to snatch Reena’s son Yash. On hue and cry several persons gathered there and accused persons beat his wife with kicks and fists and threatened to death if Yash is not handed over to them. The complainant reported this incident to D.M., S.S.P. And Inspector of P.S. Banna Devi. The complainant has mentioned that on 31.12.2008 he had also moved an application to C.O., Banna Devi, who passed orders for taking legal action, but the police had colluded with the accused persons and they are pressurizing for compromise. On this application, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh vide order dated 26.2.2009 directed the police to register and investigate the case. The complainant has mentioned that on 31.12.2008 he had also moved an application to C.O., Banna Devi, who passed orders for taking legal action, but the police had colluded with the accused persons and they are pressurizing for compromise. On this application, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh vide order dated 26.2.2009 directed the police to register and investigate the case. The investigation was conducted by S.O. Sunil Kumar Singh who recorded the statements of witnesses, visited the house of accused Anupam in Vasundhara (Ghaziabad) and collected information regarding ailment and treatment of the deceased and after completing the same submitted final report in the case, which was registered as case No. 263.12.2009 in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh. On notice of final report, the complainant filed protest petition and after hearing his counsel, the learned Magistrate rejected the final report through impugned order and took cognizance against the accused persons, who are husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law and sisters-in-law of the deceased. Aggrieved, the revisionists have come up in revision. 3. I have heard Sri D.S. Misra, learned counsel for the revisionists, Sri Rajesh Yadav, learned counsel for the complainant and Sri R.A. Misra, learned AGA for the State and perused the original record of the case carefully. 4. Learned counsel for the revisionists has submitted the following points in support of the revision: (i) that only the marriage of deceased with accused Anupam Vashistha was solemnized in Aligarh and no cause of action for instant crime arose in Aligarh so the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh had no territorial jurisdiction to pass an order on the application under Section 156 (3) CrPC; (ii) that the Aligarh police had no jurisdiction to investigate the case, because the deceased resided within the area of Ghaziabad district after marriage; (iii) that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh has no jurisdiction to entertain the protest petition or to take cognizance against the accused persons; (iv) that offence of dowry death is not made out against any of the accused as the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of Section 304-B I.P.C. Per contra learned counsel for the complainant and the learned AGA contended that offence of dowry demand and torture, harassment and maltreatment of deceased by accused persons is a continuing offence, so the Court at Aligarh is competent to take cognizance of the case. 5. 5. Firstly we would take up the issue of territorial jurisdiction of Aligarh Court regarding the instant case. In the case of Rajendra Ramchandra Kavalekar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 286 , the Apex Court has held that the same would be decided on the basis of place of occurrence of the incident and not on the basis of where complaint was filed. Mere fact that FIR was registered in a particular State is not the sole criterion to decide that no cause of action has arisen even partly within the territorial jurisdiction of another Court, the venue of enquiry or trial is primarily to be determined by the averments contained in complaint or charge-sheet. Similar view was expressed in Bhura Ram and others v. State of Rajasthan and another, (2008) 11 SCC 103 . In the instant case the allegations regarding cause of action would be deciphered from the allegations contained in the application of the complainant filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh under Section 156 (3) Code of Criminal Procedure. Perusal of this application clearly shows that the marriage of deceased with Anupam Vashisth was solemnized on 20.3.2006 in Aligarh. At that time groom was serving and residing in Vasundhara, Ghaziabad.The complainant has not averred a single word in his application that any of the accused demanded any dowry from him or from the deceased at his house situated in Aligarh after marriage. He has further stated that on 1-2 occasions he had gone alongwith his wife to Ghaziabad for pacifying the dispute regarding demand of Honda City car in dowry where the other accused had also assembled. He has not given any specific date of such meeting. According to complainant the accused persons demanded Honda City car in the marriage itself and they also stated that if the car is not given they would not marry. The complainant had shown his inability to meet this alleged demand of accused and after persuasion the marriage was solemnized. In this way the accused must have come to know that their alleged demand of Honda City car would not be fulfilled by the complainant. Even then the marriage was performed and the couple began their matrimonial life in Vasuandhara, Ghaziabad and within a year the deceased was blessed with a male child. In his application, the complainant contended that he spent about Rs. Even then the marriage was performed and the couple began their matrimonial life in Vasuandhara, Ghaziabad and within a year the deceased was blessed with a male child. In his application, the complainant contended that he spent about Rs. 50,000/- in chchochak, which are nothing but customary gifts/payments in connection with birth of a child given by the parents of bride and they are not covered within the ambit of the word “dowry” as observed by the Apex Court in the case of Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 8 SCC 633 , because the Hon’ble Court found that the word “dowry” should be any property or valuable given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. Siimilar view was taken by the Apex Court in the case of Ran Singh v. State of Haryana, (2008) 4 SCC 700. Thus, the cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry should not be so ancient, where after, the couple and the family members have lived happily and that it would result in abuse of the said protection. Such demand or harassment may not strictly and squarely fall within the scope of these provisions unless definite evidence was led to show to the contrary. However, in the instant case the complainant has changed his version saying that in the delivery of her daughter he had spent Rs. 50,000/-, in his protest petition. Perhaps he wants to say that on account harassment and torture of his daughter on account of dowry demand, the accused did not incur any expenditure at the time she gave birth to male child. This shows ill intention of the complainant to book the accused persons in the instant crime. This is not the case of the complainant that on account of maltreatment or cruelty with the deceased, the accused ever driven her out, or she was not provided essentials for her livelihood and she had to live at Aligarh on that score. Further, the evidence collected by the investigating officer clearly show that in the 1st week of June, 2008 the deceased fell ill and she had to undergo surgery in Kaushambi Medical Centre, Noida and when she developed high fever she was again admitted by her husband in Fortis Hospital, a renowned hospital of Noida for treatment, but she could not be saved and she breathed last on 19.6.2008. On getting the information about the demise of Reena, the complainant and his family had attended funeral at Mathura and was satisfied about the cause of death of the deceased. Thus, it is clear that no part of cause of action after marriage arose at Aligarh and if at all the alleged demand of accused persisted or deceased was being harassed, maltreated or tortured on this count, it was only at Vasundhara, Ghaziabad where the couple was living after marriage. In this connection we may usefully refer to the case of Y. Abrahim Ajith v. Inspector of Police, (2004) 8 SCC 100 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that cause of action having arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court where the offence was committed, could not be tried by the Court where no part of offence was committed. Paras-7 to 18 of the report are very much relevant for our purpose, which are as under: “7. Section 177 of the Code deals with the ordinary place of inquiry and trial, and reads as follows: “177: Ordinary Place Of Inquiry And Trial: “Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.” 8. Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the well-established common law rule referred to in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime. There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 of the Code which read as follows: “178. Place Of Inquiry Or Trial.—(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 9. “All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed”, as observed by Blackstone. A significant word used in Section 177 of the Code is “ordinarily”. Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Code. As observed by the Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1961 SC 1589 , L.N. Mukherjee v. State of Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1601 , Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and others v. Union of India and another, AIR 1963 SC 1620 and Mohan Baitha and others v. State of Bihar and another, 2001 (4) SCC 350 , exception implied by the word “ordinarily” need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand. 10. As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and another, AIR 1973 SC 908 , continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which arises out of the failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed. 11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, 1997 (5) SCC 30 . There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Sections 498A, 506 and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier the husband of the complainant went to the place where complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied. 12. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused. 13. While in civil cases, normally the expression “cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression “cause of action” is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases. 14. It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a Court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. 15. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in “cause of action”. 16. The expression “cause of action” has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts. 17. The expression “cause of action” is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a Court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another person. (Black’s Law Dictionary a “cause of action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In “Words and Phrases” (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. 18. In Halsbury Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows: “Cause of action” has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. “Cause of action” has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action”. 6. “Cause of action” has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action”. 6. Applying the above legal principles to the facts of the instant case, we find that no part of alleged offence was committed by any of the accused in Aligarh, so the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh could have refused to entertain the application for registration of the case. Likewise, the Aligarh police was not competent to investigate the case. It is relevant to note that in the final report, the investigating officer has in so many words stated that jurisdiction of the case lies with the Ghaziabad police. The learned Magistrate has not addressed himself at all on this issue in the impugned order and thus, the impugned order is without jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the complainant has placed reliance on the case of Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal and others, AIR 1999 SC 3499 , to contend the CJM, Aligarh was competent to take cognizance of the offence. A perusal of this report shows that a complaint was filed by the Chairman of the appellant company before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Gandhidham (Gujarat) alleging certain offences including the offence of cheating against another company located at Indore (M.P.) and its Directors. The Magistrate forwarded the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. The accused Directors approached the Gujarat High Court under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the complaint. A single Judge of the High Court quashed the complaint as also the order passed by the Magistrate thereon and then the complainant filed appeal before the Apex Court. The facts of the case in hand are entirely different. Here the petition of revisionists under Section 482 CrPC had already been disposed of by this Court and the order of the Magistrate directing registration of the case and to investigate the case to Aligarh police was not disturbed. The investigating officer after investigation submitting the final report has inter alia stated that the territorial jurisdiction of the case lies in district Ghaziabad. The complainant thereupon filed protest petition, which has been allowed by the CJM, Aligarh through impugned order and the final report submitted by the police has been rejected. The investigating officer after investigation submitting the final report has inter alia stated that the territorial jurisdiction of the case lies in district Ghaziabad. The complainant thereupon filed protest petition, which has been allowed by the CJM, Aligarh through impugned order and the final report submitted by the police has been rejected. The Apex Court in the above-noted case has held that without being apprised of the fuller conspectus a decision on the question of jurisdiction should not have been taken by the High Court at a grossly premature stage in a petition under Section 482 CrPC for quashing complaint, such is not the case here. 7. Now as regards the merits of the case it would be necessary to examine whether any of the alleged offence is made out from the allegations contained in the application of complainant under Section 156(3) CrPC or on the basis of evidence collected by the investigating officer during investigation of the case. At this stage, it will be appropriate for us to examine as to what are the ingredients of an offence punishable under Section 304B of the IPC. 8. The basic ingredients to attract the provisions of Section 304- B are as follows: (1) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or fatal injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (2) such death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (3) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (4) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry. (5) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. Alongside insertion of Section 304-B in IPC, the legislature also introduced Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which lays down when the question as to whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. In the facts of the instant case only ingredient No. (2) has been established, as the Smt. Reena suffered death within seven years of her marriage with Anupam Vashisth. In the facts of the instant case only ingredient No. (2) has been established, as the Smt. Reena suffered death within seven years of her marriage with Anupam Vashisth. The ingredient No. (1) is not at all proved even from the statement of the complainant or his family members. The voluminous medical evidence collected by the investigating officer clearly prove that the deceased was suffering from appendicitis, for which she underwent surgery in Kaushambi Medical Centre and discharged from there. However, later on she developed high fever and was again admitted for treatment in the night of 14/15.6.2008, where she expired on 19.6.2008. The doctor in Fortis Hospital, Noida has given immediate cause of her death as ‘Refractory shock with bradyarrythmia with asystole’ and the underlying cause of death has been noted as “Post-appendicetomy with abdominal sepsis with septic shock with multiple organ dusfunction syndrome.”. She was attended in the hospitals by her husband Anupam Vashisth and many lacs of rupees were spent in her treatment, which were borne by her husband may be through medi-claim policy of his employer. Without any proper basis or reason the complainant appears to have stated that her husband got her discharged suo motu and her post-operative care was not taken properly. After her death, the complainant and his family were informed and they participated in her funeral/last rites in Mathura. It appears that at that time the complainant did not make any complaint to any administrative or police authority regarding ‘dowry death’ of his daughter, but when the accused persons tried to take back the son of Anupam and deceased, he filed the application under Section 156(3) CrPC about six months after the incident. Thus, the complainant or the prosecution could not establish that the death of Smt. Reena was in any manner unnatural. 9. In the case of Biswajit Halder alias Babu Halder and others v. State of W.B., (2008) 1 SCC 202 , the Apex Court has observed as under : “22. The cruelty and harassment by the husband or any relative could be directly relatable to or in connection with, any demand for dowry. The expression “demand for dowry” will have to be construed ejusdem generis to the word immediately preceding this expression. Similarly, “in connection with the marriage” is an expression which has to be given a wider connotation. The cruelty and harassment by the husband or any relative could be directly relatable to or in connection with, any demand for dowry. The expression “demand for dowry” will have to be construed ejusdem generis to the word immediately preceding this expression. Similarly, “in connection with the marriage” is an expression which has to be given a wider connotation. It is of some significance that these expressions should be given appropriate meaning to avoid undue harassment or advantage to either of the parties. These are penal provisions but ultimately these are the social legislations, intended to control offences relating to the society as a whole. Dowry is something which existed in our country for a considerable time and the legislature in its wisdom considered it appropriate to enact the law relating to dowry prohibition so as to ensure that any party to the marriage is not harassed or treated with cruelty for satisfaction of demands in consideration and for subsistence of the marriage.” It is important to note that although the complainant had stated in his complaint that in the marriage itself the accused demanded Honda City car as dowry, but they showed their inability to fulfill their demand. The marriage was performed but the accused continued to press their demand through the deceased and they used to harass, maltreat and beat her on this count. However, no particular instance had been mentioned by the complainant in his application under Section 156 (3) CrPC or in his police statement. He had stated that several times he alongwith his wife had visited the house of deceased where the family of accused had also assembled and they tried to resolve the dispute regarding dowry demand and thereafter on 17.7.2007, accused Anupam Vashistha changed his residence in Vasundhara, but there is nothing on record to show that since thereafter the accused have ill-treated or tortured the deceased on account of their demand of dowry. The complainant has himself stated in his complaint that whenever he intended to make complaint, his daughter told him that Anupam Vashisth is improving. This fact itself suggests that the deceased was not being maltreated or harassed by any of the accused on account of their demand of Honda City car in dowry. The complainant has himself stated in his complaint that whenever he intended to make complaint, his daughter told him that Anupam Vashisth is improving. This fact itself suggests that the deceased was not being maltreated or harassed by any of the accused on account of their demand of Honda City car in dowry. Thus, the most important ingredient of Section 304-B IPC that ‘soon before’ her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry by any of the accused person is totally missing in the instant case. The allegations made in the complaint do not make out any case under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC or 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act. 10. In view of the aforestated reasons, I find that the Court at Aligarh had no jurisdiction to entertain the instant case and consequently the order of Chief Judicial Magistrate on the protest petition of the complaint rejecting the final report cannot be upheld. Had any case against the accused been made out for any of the alleged offences, this Court could have transferred the case to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad for proceeding further in accordance with law, but as stated earlier, the allegations of dowry demand or ‘dowry death’ of the deceased are not even prima facie established and the complainant’s application under Section 156 (3) CrPC appears to be motivated as the accused have tried to get back the custody of son of the deceased. Thus, the only option left for this Court is to quash the proceedings pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh. Resultantly, the revision is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the proceedings of Case No. case No. 2247 of 2010 (case crime No. 207/09) under Section 304-B, 498-A IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act P. S. Banna Devi, Aligarh are hereby quashed. ——————