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2012 DIGILAW 234 (PNJ)

Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab

2012-02-10

SURYA KANT

body2012
JUDGMENT Mr. Surya Kant, J.: (Oral) - The petitioner seeks quashing of orders dated 5.10.2009 and 15.3.2010 (Annexure P-11 and P-12) whereby a sum of Rs.1 lac has been recovered out of his gratuity, towards his proportionate liability for payment of compensation to the family members of the deceased who died in a motor accident admittedly caused by the petitioner while driving a bus of the Punjab Roadways. The petitioner has now retired from the post of Driver. 2. The question to be determined is whether the petitioner who has been acquitted by the Court in the criminal case registered under Sections 279, 304-A IPC etc. be held liable to share proportional liability towards compensation paid by the State to the family members of the victim of the raid accident? 3. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner was on duty as driver on Bus No.PJG – 2820 from Ludhiana to Chandigarh route and a fatal accident was caused in which the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ludhiana passed an award of Rs.1,20,000/- with 12% interest in favour of the family members of deceased (Jang Singh). The accident led to registration of FIR No.181 dated 31.12.1996 under Sections 279, 304-A IPC at Police Station Sahnewal, District Ludhiana, however, the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ludhiana acquitted the petitioner in that case vide judgment dated 3.7.1999. 4. There was yet another accident caused by the petitioner while driving Bus No.PB-12-B-9605 on Jalandhar to Hoshiarpur route in which one of the victim suffered grievance injuries while the other died after some time. The second accident also resulted in the registration of FIR No.191 dated 28.10.2001 under Sections 279, 337, 338, 304-A IPC at Police Station, Adampur, District Jalandhar and in that case also, the petitioner was acquitted by the Appellate Court vide judgment dated 18.12.2009. 5. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, on the other hand, vide two separate awards held the petitioner and the State jointly liable and further held the petitioner responsible for causing the said accident due to his rash and negligent driving. Compensation was awarded to the injured and the family members of the deceased. 6. The resultant effect was that while the petitioner was held responsible for causing both the accidents due to his rash and negligent driving by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, the Criminal Court gave him the benefit of doubt and acquitted him of the charges. 7. Compensation was awarded to the injured and the family members of the deceased. 6. The resultant effect was that while the petitioner was held responsible for causing both the accidents due to his rash and negligent driving by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, the Criminal Court gave him the benefit of doubt and acquitted him of the charges. 7. There is indeed no dispute that the State/Department have paid the due amount of compensation to the claimants in terms of the aforestated awards. 8. The Disciplinary Authority served the petitioner with two chargesheets dated 15.4.2004 and 25.8.2005 (Annexure P-4 and P-5) and after considering his replies thereto, passed the impugned orders dated 5.10.2009 and 15.3.2010 (Annexure P-11 and P-12) ordering recovery of 1/3rd of the compensation amount paid to the claimants, referred to above. 9. This may be the appropriate stage to mention that both the chargesheets were issued to the petitioner under the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1970 which admittedly governed the petitioner in the matter of disciplinary action. Rule 5 of these Rules define Penalties (minor and major) and reads as follows:- “5. 9. This may be the appropriate stage to mention that both the chargesheets were issued to the petitioner under the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1970 which admittedly governed the petitioner in the matter of disciplinary action. Rule 5 of these Rules define Penalties (minor and major) and reads as follows:- “5. Penalties.- The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a Government employees, namely:- Minor Penalties (i) Censure; (ii) withholding of his promotion; (iii) recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by him to the Government by negligence or breach of orders; (iv) withholding of increments of pay; Major Penalties (v) reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the Government employee will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period, the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay; (vi) reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, post or service which shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the Government employee to the time-scale of pay, grade, post or Service from which he was reduced, with or without further directions regarding conditions of restoration to the grade or post or service from which the Government employee was reduced and his seniority and pay on such restoration to that grade, post or service; (vii) compulsory retirement; (viii) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government; (ix) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Government.” (emphasis supplied) 10. It may be seen that under Rule 5(iii), “recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government by negligence or breach of orders” is one of the prescribed minor punishment. 11. It is also not in dispute that a regular enquiry in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 8 of the 1970 Rules is required to be held only for imposition of a major penalty. 11. It is also not in dispute that a regular enquiry in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 8 of the 1970 Rules is required to be held only for imposition of a major penalty. A minor penalty, under the Rules, can be imposed after giving an opportunity of being heard, namely, on consideration of reply to the chargesheet though it is always imperative upon the Disciplinary Authority to pass a speaking order as the order of minor penalty also visits a Government employee with civil consequences. 12. The recovery of a pecuniary loss caused to the Government by ‘negligence’ or breach of an order is a minor punishment and can always be imposed on a Government employee by following the procedure prescribed under the 1970 Rules. Since the Rules do not contemplate any regular enquiry for the imposition of minor punishment, the impugned orders are in consonance with the 1970 Rules and meet the requirement of principles of natural justice as well. 13. Following the procedure laid down under 1970 Rules and relying upon the findings returned by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, the Disciplinary Authority came to the conclusion that the accidents were caused due to petitioner’s rash and negligent driving and he is responsible for causing pecuniary loss to the State Government. The Disciplinary Authority, however, decided to recover only a part of the pecuniary loss caused by the petitioner to the State Exchequer. 14. No conflict or contradiction need to be read into the acquittal of a driver by a criminal Court under Sections 279, 304-A IPC on one hand, or the finding of his rash and negligent driving by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on the other. It is well settled that parameters to be applied to prove a criminal charge, namely, the same must be proved beyond any doubt, are inapplicable for establishing tortious liability before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal or in a domestic enquiry where a finding of fact can be returned on the preponderance of evidence. 15. The issue as to whether or not the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the petitioner could not have refrained the Disciplinary authority from passing the impugned orders for the reason that such a finding had already been returned against him by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 16. 15. The issue as to whether or not the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the petitioner could not have refrained the Disciplinary authority from passing the impugned orders for the reason that such a finding had already been returned against him by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 16. The view taken hereinabove is consistent with the Division Bench decision in Sampuran Singh vs. The State of Punjab & another, 2009(3)SCT 137. The judgment of a co-ordinate Bench relied upon by the petitioner in Kulwant Singh Driver vs. Municipal Corporation, Amritsar and another, [2011(5) Law Herald (P&H) 939 : 2011(2) Law Herald (Acc.) 236] : 2011(3) RCR (Civil) 553 does not help him for more than one reasons. That was not a case where any disciplinary action in accordance with rules was held against the driver. The binding nature or a finding of fact given by the Civil Court/ Tribunal in a domestic enquiry, was also not expressly dealt with by the co-ordinate Bench. 17. This Court had an occasion to consider the entire case-law in Civil Writ Petition No.14130 of 2009 decided on 12.9.2011 [Karnail Singh vs. State of Punjab & others] wherein it was held that:- “(12). With all humility at my command, the decision in Jaswant Singh’s case (supra) does not appear to be the correct statement of law. It is apparent that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Depot Manager APSRT Corpn. or of the Division Benches in Jaswant Singh and Sampuran Singh Cases were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. (13). The unsuccessful defence plea taken by the Department/State Government to wriggle out of its liability, which was not accepted by the Tribunal while awarding compensation, is wholly inconsequential and irrelevant in the departmental action. The findings returned by the Tribunal on the question of ‘rash and negligent driving’ which have attained finality are binding in nature so far as the domestic enquiry is concerned. Similarly, the acquittal in a criminal case where the prosecution is obligated to prove charges beyond ‘reasonable doubt’ must be viewed differently. The standard of proof required in a criminal case, need not be the same for a Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act or the Disciplinary Authority under the Rules. Similarly, the acquittal in a criminal case where the prosecution is obligated to prove charges beyond ‘reasonable doubt’ must be viewed differently. The standard of proof required in a criminal case, need not be the same for a Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act or the Disciplinary Authority under the Rules. However, if the punitive action has been taken without following the prescribed procedure, the writ court can always annul the same though leaving it open to the Authority to proceed afresh in accordance with law unless held otherwise for the reason(s) depending upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case.” 18. Following the cited decisions in Sampuran Singh’s case (supra) and Karnail Singh’s case (supra), no interference in the impugned orders is called for. 19. Dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------