JUDGMENT Hon’ble Arvind Kumar Tripathi (II), J.—Present first appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 18.12.1999 passed by the then Xth Additional District Judge, Agra in Original Suit No. 473/1990 between M/s Universal Art Press and State of Haryana and three others by which Court below has allowed the claim of plaintiff/respondent and decreed the suit for Rs. 5,16,525/- alongwith interest @ 18% with cost. Brief facts of the original suit are mentioned below; 2. M/s Universal Art Press, Agra has filed a suit against the State of Haryana through secretary in-charge, Lottery Department, State of Haryana, Chandigarh, (ii) State of Haryana through Collector, Chandigarh, (iii) Director, Haryana State Lotteries, Chandigarh, (iv) Sri Sube Singh C/o Controller of Printing and Stationery Department State of Haryana, Chandigarh, alleging that plaintiff is a registered firm and Vijay Kumar Bhargava is its partner. A tender was notified on 5.2.1986 by Director, Haryana State Lotteries for printing of lottery tickets. The conditions were that the papers on which the lottery tickets will be printed shall be supplied by Haryana Lottery Department and the unused papers shall be returned. The tickets who have won first and second price, will be sent to the press for verification and will be returned within a week after verification. The colour of the lottery tickets will be yellow and the design approved by the department will be printed. The yellow colour should be of that quality which cannot be changed easily. Security in the shape of bank guarantee of bills of the press will not be accepted. Tender once submitted will not be allowed to be withdrawn, altered or cancelled in part or in whole. In case of forfeiture of earnest money, the decision of the Controller of Printing and Stationery, Haryana, shall be final. The Controller of Printing and Stationery, Chandigarh, reserves the right to withdraw the work in part or the whole. In case, for any unforeseen changes warranted after placing the order, security will be released on receipt of bill complete with all delivery vouchers. Alongwith other conditions, it was also a condition that all disputes will be settled at Chandigarh. The delivery of the printed tickets will be taken by the representative of the Lottery Department at the press premises after carefully counting, checking the tickets and got packed and dispatched in his presence. Alongwith other conditions, it was also a condition that all disputes will be settled at Chandigarh. The delivery of the printed tickets will be taken by the representative of the Lottery Department at the press premises after carefully counting, checking the tickets and got packed and dispatched in his presence. The printer will not be responsible for the shortage of any kind at later stage. The printed tickets are to be delivered in the office of the department at Delhi duly packed in packets of ten thousand tickets each. After this tender, plaintiff filed its quotation @ Rs. 1,489/- per lakh lottery tickets and being the lowest quotation, he was given order on 12.5.1986 at Agra to print the tickets after there was a meeting in the chamber of Hon’ble Chief Minister, Haryana on 23.4.1986. Plaintiff was bound to supply the printed tickets within 21 days after getting the order but unfortunately, even after trying his best and making several phone calls to the department, he could not get the paper from the Department. Stipulated 21 days was going to lapse and departmental officers were pressurising for supplying the tickets with a threat that penalty will be imposed. Thus, plaintiff being a small entrepreneur, printed the tickets on the paper which was available with him and supplied the tickets before the date fixed for the draw of the lottery as Department failed to supply papers for printing of the tickets within stipulated 21 days. After that, the tickets were supplied from time to time and thereafter, plaintiff sent the bill to Haryana State for payment alongwith the chart but he was paid only Rs. 3,83,869/- against the total bill of Rs. 7,59,510/-. By filing the suit, plaintiff claimed that he is entitled to get Rs. 3,75,641/- the balance amount and also the amount of interest which he has paid to Panjab National Bank, Agra alongwith refund of Rs. 2,500/- which has been paid as advance at the time of contract. Before that, plaintiff had given notice under Section 80 CPC dated 6.2.1989 to the opposite parties for payment of his dues and after stipulated time, the suit was filed. 3. Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 have filed their written statement alleging that there was no assurance before the Chief Minister regarding supply of papers for the printing of tickets within 21 days of the printing orders. 3. Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 have filed their written statement alleging that there was no assurance before the Chief Minister regarding supply of papers for the printing of tickets within 21 days of the printing orders. According to condition No. 5 of the tender, covering the period 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1987, the paper for printing of tickets was to be supplied by answering defendants at the press premises at the cost of Lottery Department, Haryana. However, there was no condition of supply of papers before commencing of each year of printing of tickets. In terms of print order dated 12.5.1986, the due date for the supply of tickets to the Lottery Department was 4.6.1986. The papers were, however, received by the firm on 11.6.1986. The firm made delivery of printed tickets of first draw on 11.6.1986 instead of 4.6.1986 by using papers from their own stock. The firm could also have made delivery on due date by using its paper but deliberately delayed the supply of tickets. The supply was continued to be delayed despite the availability of departmental paper. The plaintiff was paid all its dues against the supply of printed lottery tickets and the bills of paper used from own stock due to them except the amount of Rs. 26,961/- being the difference in the rates and payment against the supply of tickets from 124th draw to 126th draw which remained under dispute because of the quality of paper used by the firm from their own stock. It will be paid after the decision conveyed by the high powered committee to the Lottery Department. Plaintiff was informed about this fact. 4. Defendant Nos. 2 and 4 submitted their written statement alleging that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit according to the terms and conditions of the tender for lottery ticket printing vide dated 5.2.1986. That all disputes will be settled at Chandigarh. Rs. 2,500/- has already been refunded to the plaintiff vide letter No. 2132, dated 25.3.1988. 5. The Court below has after perusal of pleadings of parties, framed following issues: (i) Whether the Court has jurisdiction to try the present suit? (ii) Whether the delay in delivery of printed lottery tickets was caused by plaintiffs or by defendants? (iii) Whether the suit is barred for the want of notice under Section 80 CPC? 5. The Court below has after perusal of pleadings of parties, framed following issues: (i) Whether the Court has jurisdiction to try the present suit? (ii) Whether the delay in delivery of printed lottery tickets was caused by plaintiffs or by defendants? (iii) Whether the suit is barred for the want of notice under Section 80 CPC? (iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the balance amount, if so on what rate? (v) Whether the deduction made by the defendants from the bills of the plaintiff is wrong and illegal, if so its effect? 6. Plaintiff has examined Sri Krishna Kumar Bhargava as PW 1 and Vijay Kumar Bhargava as PW 2. Defendants have examined Raj Kumar Sharma, Senior Sales Officer as D.W. 1, Sri I.S. Chahal, Assistant Controller Printing and Stationery Department, Haryana, Chandigarh as D.W. 2, Sri Kishan Lal Papneja as D.W. 3. Apart from the oral evidence, parties have also filed several documentary evidence which will be discussed later on, if required. 7. Issue No. 1 was decided, earlier, in favour of the plaintiff, as a preliminary issue on 26.3.1993 which was made part of the judgment. While deciding issue No. 2, it was held that the delay occurred due to the defendant’s act and thus, plaintiff is entitled to get the amount claimed. Issue No. 3 was decided in favour of plaintiff and it was held that notice has been properly given and there is no illegality in the notice. Issue Nos. 5,6 and 7 were decided in favour of the plaintiff and it was found that plaintiff is entitled to get Rs. 5,16,525/- from the defendants. Issue No. 4 was decided in favour of the plaintiff and it was also held that he is entitled to get interest @ 18% per annum during the pendency of the suit till the date of actual payment. Consequently, the suit was decreed and defendants were directed to pay Rs. 5,16,525/- alongwith simple interest @18% from the date of filing of the suit till the date of actual payment. Feeling aggrieved, present first appeal has been filed. 8. Heard Sri R.P. Dubey for the appellant and Smt. Anita Tripathi for the respondent. 9. Consequently, the suit was decreed and defendants were directed to pay Rs. 5,16,525/- alongwith simple interest @18% from the date of filing of the suit till the date of actual payment. Feeling aggrieved, present first appeal has been filed. 8. Heard Sri R.P. Dubey for the appellant and Smt. Anita Tripathi for the respondent. 9. The only point which was argued before us was that since the tender contained a clause that all the disputes shall be settled at Chandigarh, the Court at Agra had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 10. In respect of their claim, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision of New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, 2004(3) AWC 2230 (SC) and Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. v. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd., (2004) 4 SCC 671 . 11. Against this, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the case of ABC Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, Salem, AIR 1989 SC 1239 , Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and others v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and others, AIR 2006 SC 1828 and M/s Baldev Steel Ltd. v. M/s the Empire Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 2001 Del 391 , 12. Before entering into the merits of rival discussions and submissions, it will be pertinent to reproduce Section 20 of CPC which is quoted below : Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction- (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 2[Explanation].-A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in [India] or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place. 13. In the present case, much emphasis has been attributed to the condition in the tender which is condition No. 24 and reads as follows: “All disputes will be settled at Chandigarh” 14. In the case of New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others (supra) Apex Court has held that “normally under Clause (a) to (c) plaintiff had a choice of forum and cannot be compelled to go to the place of residence or business of the defendant and can file a suit at a place where the cause of action arises. If the defendant desires to be protected from being dragged into a litigation at some place, merely, because the cause of action arises there, it can save itself from such a situation by an exclusion clause.” 15. In the case of Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. v. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd. (supra), it has been held that “ it is not open to the parties to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the code. But where two Courts or more have under the code of civil procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or a proceedings, an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. 16. The Court below has decided that since it has not been written that the matters will be settled by Chandigarh Court only, hence, it cannot be said and this term does not mean that only Courts at Chandigarh have jurisdiction. 17. The jurisdiction of the Court in matter of a contract will depend upon the situs of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors. In the matter of a contract, there may arise cause of action of various kinds. 17. The jurisdiction of the Court in matter of a contract will depend upon the situs of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors. In the matter of a contract, there may arise cause of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract, the cause of action consists of making of the contract and of its breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed and the breach occurred. The making of the contract is part of the cause of action. A suit on a contract therefore, can be filed at the place where it was made. The determination of the place where the contract was made, is part of the law of contract. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have been performed or its performance completed. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on the contract is to be filed there and no where else. 18. When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause, it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away the jurisdiction of other Courts. Where an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific, then accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad-idem can be shown, the other Courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. 19. In the case of ABC Laminart Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court has held that “as regards ouster clause when words like ‘alone’, ‘exclusive’ and the like have been used, there may be no difficulty. 19. In the case of ABC Laminart Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court has held that “as regards ouster clause when words like ‘alone’, ‘exclusive’ and the like have been used, there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases, the maxim, ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ expression of one is the exclusion of another, may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all other from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore, to be properly construed.” 20. It has also been held in that case that “where the clause under which it was claimed that there was ouster of jurisdiction of Courts only stated that any dispute arising out of sale would be subject to jurisdiction of Court within whose jurisdiction order was placed but there were no exclusive words like ‘exclusive’, ‘alone’, and the like, other jurisdictions having connecting factors were not clearly, unambiguously and explicitly excluded.” 21. Under Section 23 of the Contract Act, the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is opposed to be public policy. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. Hence, there can be no doubt that an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy. If, therefore, it is found that the Condition No. 24 of the tender has absolutely ousted the jurisdiction of the Court at Agra, it would be against the public policy. However, such will be the result only if it can be shown that the jurisdiction to which the parties have agreed to submit had nothing to do with the contract. If on the other hand, it is found that the jurisdiction agreed would also be a proper jurisdiction in the matter of the contract, it could not be said that it ousted the jurisdiction of the Court. This leads to the question of the facts of this case as to whether Chandigarh would be proper jurisdiction in the matter of this contract. This leads to the question of the facts of this case as to whether Chandigarh would be proper jurisdiction in the matter of this contract. It would also be relevant to examine if some other Courts than that of Chandigarh would also have had jurisdiction in the absence of Condition No. 24 of the tender and whether that would amount to ouster of jurisdiction of the Court at Agra and would thereby affect the validity of the contract. 22. The jurisdiction of the Court in matter of a contract will depend upon the situs of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors. 23. A cause of action means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taking with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendants. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the rights sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is found. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. 24. In the case of Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and others (supra), it has been held that the Court has to read the entire plaint as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action and if it does, then the plaint cannot be rejected by the Court exercising the powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. It has been further held that a cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be proved for obtaining relief and for the said purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence. 25. It has been further held that a cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be proved for obtaining relief and for the said purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence. 25. In the case of M/s Baldev Steel Ltd. (supra), High Court of Delhi has held that from the foregoing, it would be seen that cause of action for suit had arisen in Delhi. Merely, because one of the standard printed terms of quotation, mentioned, subject to “Bombay jurisdiction,” it cannot exclude the Delhi jurisdiction. 26. So long as the parties to a contract do not oust the jurisdiction of all the Courts, which would otherwise have jurisdiction to decide the cause of action under the law, it cannot be said that the parties have by their contract ousted the jurisdiction of the Court. If under the law several Courts would have jurisdiction and the parties have agreed to submit to one of these jurisdiction and not to others of them, it cannot be said that there is a total ouster of jurisdiction. In other words, where the parties to a contract agreed to submit the dispute arising from it to the particular jurisdiction which would otherwise also be a proper jurisdiction under the law, their agreement to the extent they agreed not to submit to other jurisdictions cannot be said to be void as against public policy. If on the other hand, the jurisdiction they agreed to submit to would not otherwise being proper jurisdiction to decide disputes arising out of the contract, it must be declared void being against public policy. We have to examine that whether this would be the position in the instant case. 27. In the case of ABC Laminart Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the appellants were a manufacturer and supplier of metallic yarn under the name and style ‘Roopalon Metallic Yarn’ having its registered office at Udyognagar,Gujrat within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court of Kaira. The second appellant was a sister concerned of the first appellant doing business with it. The respondent was a registered partnership firm doing business in metallic yarn and other allied products at Salem. The first petitioner entered into an agreement with the respondent whereunder the appellants were to supply 5000 bobbins of Rupalon Metallic Yarn to the respondent @ Rs. The second appellant was a sister concerned of the first appellant doing business with it. The respondent was a registered partnership firm doing business in metallic yarn and other allied products at Salem. The first petitioner entered into an agreement with the respondent whereunder the appellants were to supply 5000 bobbins of Rupalon Metallic Yarn to the respondent @ Rs. 35/- per bobbin as stipulated in different clauses of the agreement. Clause 11 of the agreement provided that “Any dispute arising out of this sale shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction”. Disputes having arisen out of the contract the respondent filed a suit, in the Court of Subordinate Judge at Salem for recovery of certain amount. Appellants took a number of defences and also took a preliminary objection that a subordinate Court at Salem had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as parties by express contract had agreed to confer exclusive jurisdiction in regard to all disputes arising out of the contract on the Civil Court at Kaira. The trial Court found that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Clause 11 and accordingly it returned the plaint for presentation in the proper Court. On appeal, the High Court of Madras, allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the trial Court with a direction to take the plaint on file and dispose of the suits on merits on other issues. Against this order, matter reached the Apex Court and Apex Court has dismissed the appeal and held that while connecting factor with Kaira jurisdiction, was ensured by fixing the situs of the contract within Kaira, other jurisdictions having connecting factors were not clearly, unambiguously and explicitly excluded. That being the position, it could not be said that the jurisdiction of the Court at Salem which Court otherwise had jurisdiction under law through connecting factor of delivery of goods there at was expressly excluded. 28. In the instant case, there is clause in the tender notice that the delivery of the printed tickets will be taken by the representative of the Lottery Department at the press premises after carefully counting, checking the tickets and got packed and dispatched in his presence. It has also been mentioned that the printer will not responsible for the shortage of any kind at later stage. It has also been mentioned that the printer will not responsible for the shortage of any kind at later stage. This clearly goes to show that a representative of the Lottery Department will be there in whose presence, tickets will be checked and packed. This also goes to show that a part of cause of action arose at Agra. In view of this, it cannot be said that Courts at Agra has no jurisdiction to try/decide the suit in terms of Section 20 of CPC. It will be apt to reiterate the ouster clause again. It has been mentioned that ‘all disputes will be settled at Chandigarh’. It has not been mentioned that all disputes will be settled at Chandigarh Court only. This clause is silent whether the dispute shall be settled at Chandigarh Court or the administrative office of the concerned department. As has been held in the case of ABC Laminart Pvt. Ltd. (supra) this does not mean the exclusion of Courts at Agra. 29. In the case of New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others (supra) also the Apex Court has held that the intention of the parties can be culled out from use of the expressions “ only”, “alone”, “exclusive” and the like with reference to a particular Court. But the intention to exclude a Court’s jurisdiction should be reflected in clear, unambiguous, explicit and specific terms. In such case, only the accepted notions of contact would bind the parties. 30. From the above discussion, it is clear that the condition given in Condition No. 24 of the tender does not exclude the jurisdiction of Courts at Agra and it cannot be treated as an ouster clause of Agra Court. The Trial Court has correctly held that the suit was triable by Agra Court in spite of condition No. 24 of the tender. 31. No other point was pressed before us. 32. As a consequence, the appeal is liable to fail and is hereby dismissed. No orders as to cost. ——————