JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. This writ appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order, dated 7.3.2007, passed by the learned Single Judge, in Civil Rule No. 409 of 1997, whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge set aside the order of punishment imposed upon the respondent writ petitioner vide order, dated 29.6.1995, Annexure-13 to the writ petition and the subsequent corrigendum, dated 10.10.1995, whereby some corrections were made, Annexure-14 to the writ petition, thus allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent writ petitioner. Heard Mr. S. Deb, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. T.D. Majumder, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants and Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent- writ petitioner. 2. The brief facts needed to be discussed for disposal of the appeal in hand are as follows: The respondent writ petitioner while working in the Abhanga Rehabilitation Plantation Centre (in short, hereinafter referred to as "Abhanga RPC") under the Tripura Rehabilitation Plantation Corporation Ltd, (hereinafter referred to as 'Corporation') was charged with an allegation of removing 40 bags of "Amrit" fertilizer from the godown of Abhanga RPC for his personal gain to the detriment of the Corporation. On the basis of the said charge arising out of the said incident on 13.3.1991, a police case was registered being Salema P.S Case No. 4(3)/91 under Sections 381/411 IPC against the respondent writ petitioner and thereafter he was arrested in connection with the aforesaid P.S. Case and tried for the offence alleged in the police case by the Court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kamalpur, North Tripura. 3. On completion of the trial, the learned trial Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the accused respondent-writ petitioner beyond reasonable doubt and a doubt arises whether the writ petitioner was involved with lifting the alleged 40 bags of "Amrit" fertilizer from the godown of the respondent Corporation and ultimately acquitted the respondent writ petitioner from the charge levelled against him by the judgment and order dated 31.3.1993, Annexure-1 to the writ petition. 4. As the respondent writ petitioner was detained in the judicial custody for more than forty-eight hours being arrested in connection with the aforesaid police case, he was placed under suspension vide order dated 2.5.1991. 4. As the respondent writ petitioner was detained in the judicial custody for more than forty-eight hours being arrested in connection with the aforesaid police case, he was placed under suspension vide order dated 2.5.1991. Thereafter, the Managing Director of the Corporation issued a Memorandum dated 3.7.1991, Annexure-5 to the writ petition, framing Article of Charge against the respondent writ petitioner along with list of documents and witnesses with a direction to the respondent writ petitioner to file the statement of his defence. 5. An enquiry was done by the Enquiry Authority following the procedure prescribed and the respondent writ petitioner was also provided opportunity to defend his case by way of filing written statement and cross-examine the witnesses produced by the presenting officer. On completion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer recorded the guilt of the respondent writ petitioner having found the charge proved and accordingly, sent his report to the Disciplinary Authority for passing appropriate order. The Disciplinary Authority, the appellant No. 2 herein, after going through the report of the Enquiry Officer and the documents incorporated therewith proposed for removal of the respondent writ petitioner from the service of the appellant Corporation and while proposing for removal from service, the respondent writ petitioner was also called upon to submit his representation as to the proposed penalty within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the said order and in response, the respondent writ petitioner made a representation to the Appellant No. 2, the Disciplinary Authority, stating, inter alia, that he may not be removed from service taking a drastic action and also for considering the fact that his family members are facing starvation. 6. Thereafter, taking into consideration the representation of the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority reviewed the proposed punishment and provided an opportunity to the respondent-petitioner for rectification and also ordered that the pay of the respondent writ petitioner, the accused officer, be reduced to the last stage with effect from 1.8.1995 in his pay scale of Rs. 830-2130/- for a specified period of five years, Annexure-13 to the writ petition, but subsequently, a corrigendum had to be issued on 10.10.1995, Annexure-14 to the writ petition, correcting the scale of pay of the respondent writ petitioner. 7. 830-2130/- for a specified period of five years, Annexure-13 to the writ petition, but subsequently, a corrigendum had to be issued on 10.10.1995, Annexure-14 to the writ petition, correcting the scale of pay of the respondent writ petitioner. 7. Being aggrieved by the order of punishment and the corrigendum issued thereto, the respondent writ petitioner made prayer to the Managing Director on 31.12.1995, Annexure-15 to the writ petition, for reviewing the order of punishment wherein he stated, inter alia, that he had no bad intention to remove 40 bags of 'Amrit' fertilizer from the godown for his personal gain to the detriment of the Corporation's interest, but he was compelled to do so due to his poverties, as during that period, his mother and younger brother fell seriously ill. In that representation, he had also given assurance to the Managing Director of the Corporation i.e. the Disciplinary Authority that he would not do any such type of work in future. 8. When the said representation for review is pending, the respondent writ petitioner filed the instant writ petition challenging the order of punishment and corrigendum thereto as stated supra which was registered as Civil Rule 409 of 1997. 9. After hearing the parties, the writ petition was allowed setting aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority by the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. Hence the writ appeal. 10. Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior Counsel while assailing the impugned judgment would contend that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the settled principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in a catena of decision to the effect that in a judicial review, a Court is not empowered to either reassess the evidence or express its own view regarding the nature of punishment, unless there are some procedural defect in the departmental proceeding. 11. He further submits that the learned Single Judge also failed to consider the principle laid down by the Apex Court relating to the acceptability of the earlier statement recorded in a criminal proceeding in a departmental proceeding which would be evident from the findings of the learned Single Judge regarding the evidence of witness of Mritunjoy Aich (P.W.2) in the departmental proceedings. 12. 12. According to him, a particular statement recorded earlier in a criminal proceeding, the same can be relied upon in a departmental proceeding providing the copy of the same to the accused officer so that he can cross-examine the witnesses produced by the Department and in the instant case, the said procedure has been followed by the Enquiry Officer and the respondents admittedly cross-examined the said witnesses. 13. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Srinath Gupta & Anr., (1996) 6 SCC 486 , particularly, paragraph- 13 and 14 of the said Report which are quoted as under : 13. The statements under Section 161 Cr.PC may not be admissible in the criminal trial, but the said statements can be produced in a disciplinary inquiry like the present. The person who made the statement has been examined before the Inquiry Officer. It was open to the witness to have stated orally the entire contents of what was recorded in his statement under Section 161 Cr. PC. Instead of following this time-consuming procedure, the said statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC was read over to the witness who admitted the contents thereof. In this way the earlier statement under Section 161 CrPC became a part of the examination-in-chief of the witness before the Inquiry Officer. It is not in dispute that the said statements were given to the respondent writ petitioner in advance and full opportunity was granted to the respondent to cross-examine the said witnesses. This being the case, its difficult to appreciate as to how the High Court could have come to the conclusion that he inquiry proceedings stood vitiated. 14. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, we are fortified by the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of Mysore Vs. S.S. Makapur (1963) 2 SCR 943 : AIR 1963 SC 375 . In that case also, statements of witnesses which had been recorded behind the back of the delinquent officer were taken on record and an opportunity of cross-examination was given. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the principles of natural justice had not been followed because of the admission in evidence of such statements. In that case also, statements of witnesses which had been recorded behind the back of the delinquent officer were taken on record and an opportunity of cross-examination was given. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the principles of natural justice had not been followed because of the admission in evidence of such statements. While allowing the appeal and rejecting the contention of the respondents therein, this Court in S.S. Makapur case at SCR p. 951 observed as follows : When the evidence is oral, normally the examination of the witness will in its entirely, take place before the party charged, who will have full opportunity of cross-examining him. The position is the same when a witness is called, the statement given previously by him behind the back of the party is put to him, and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is given to the party, and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine him. To require in that case that the contents of the previous statement should be repeated by the witness word by word, and sentence by sentence, is to insist on bare technicalities, and rules of natural justice are matters not of form but of substance. In our opinion they are sufficiently complied with when previous statements given by witnesses are read over to them, marked on their admission, copies thereof given to the person charged, and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine them. 14. In support of his contention that even on acquittal in a criminal proceeding, a departmental proceeding can be initiated on the same facts, but on different charges, he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 , wherein the Apex Court relying on its earlier decision in various cases held that acquittal in a criminal court is of no help and even on acquittal in a criminal case, a domestic enquiry can be held, the reasons being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are altogether different and such action cannot be treated as double jeopardy as mentioned in Article 20 of the Constitution of India. 15. He, however, submits that judicial review is permissible against the decision making process, not the decision itself. 15. He, however, submits that judicial review is permissible against the decision making process, not the decision itself. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. Vs. N. Balakrishnan, (2007) 9 SCC 755 and U.P. SRTC Vs. Suresh Chand Sharma, (2010) 6 SCC 555 . 16. In support of his contention, inter alia, that a writ Court has no power to re-appreciate the evidence of the witnesses in Departmental proceeding when there are some evidences and those were properly considered by the enquiry authority, he placed reliance in State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212 , particularly, para-9 of the said report, which is quoted hereunder : 9. It is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence which had been considered by the inquiry officer, a disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority. The finding of the High Court, on facts, runs to the teeth of the evidence on record. 17. He finally contended that this is not a case of no evidence, rather a case of some evidences, which would be evident from Exbt. P- 4 i.e. the statement of P.W.2 made at the time of preliminary enquiry and Exbt. P-8, the order of the Criminal Court proved by P.W. 4. Thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and order of disciplinary Authority is required to be restored. 18. On the contrary, Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner, a field worker of the respondent Corporation, has made an attempt to defend the judgment of the learned Single Judge contending, inter alia, that the respondent writ petitioner has been acquitted in a criminal proceeding and the order of punishment as consequence of domestic enquiry deserves to be set aside, as this is a case of no evidence. To prove his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on the evidence of P.W. 2, Mritunjoy Aich, a DR Worker of Abhanga RPC who gave a statement to the Deputy Manager on an earlier occasion and in the instant case, though he did not give any evidence independently, but the Enquiry Officer relied upon his earlier statement which is not permissible in law. He also contends that no evidence means no reasonable evidence, as would be evident from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4 Edition. 19. Mr. He also contends that no evidence means no reasonable evidence, as would be evident from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4 Edition. 19. Mr. Bhattacharjee while admitting the contention of Mr. Deb that in a judicial review, the Court can only interfere with a departmental proceeding where there are some procedural defects, would contend that in the instant case, as there is some procedural defects, the learned Single Judge interfered with the order of the disciplinary authority. 20. He further submits that the charge in both the criminal case and the departmental proceeding are same relating to the missing of some 40 bags of "Amrit" fertilizer. Therefore, when the judicial authority after considering the facts and circumstances of the case in its entirety in a trial acquitted the respondent writ petitioner, he cannot be punished in a departmental proceeding on the same set of charges. 21. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr, AIR 2006 SC 2129 , particularly, pararaph 31 and 32 of the said Report, which are reprodued hereunder: 31. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are on and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer, Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The Investigating Officer, Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by his judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 32. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenges the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed. 22. From the above submission of the learned Counsel for the parties, the questions fall for consideration are; (i) Whether an acquittal in a criminal proceeding is a bar for initiation of a disciplinary proceeding? (ii) Whether an earlier statement of a person can be subsequently relied upon in a departmental proceeding drawing attention to the maker of the statement or not? (iii) Whether the writ Court has the power for re-appreciation of the evidence recorded by the enquiry authority in a departmental proceeding when there are some evidence ? and (iv) Whether a delinquent officer is prejudiced for non-production of a document not relied upon by the enquiry authority in the disciplinary proceedings? 23. We have given our anxious thought to the points involved in the matter. and (iv) Whether a delinquent officer is prejudiced for non-production of a document not relied upon by the enquiry authority in the disciplinary proceedings? 23. We have given our anxious thought to the points involved in the matter. It is no longer res integra that there is a difference between a disciplinary proceeding and a criminal trial. In a disciplinary proceeding, the disciplinary authority considers whether the delinquent employee was negligent to his official duty and in a criminal proceeding, the Court decides whether the accused committed the penal offence or not. It is well settled now that both the criminal case and disciplinary proceeding can run simultaneously. (See Shafiqul Haque Mazumder Vs. Union of India & Ors, 2006 (4) GLT 614: (2007) 1 GLR 116). 24. In the instant case, the learned Counsel for the respondent writ petitioner tried to make out a case that the respondent writ petitioner being acquitted from the criminal case, he is entitled to be set at free from the charge made against him and thus, the punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceeding is liable to be quashed and, accordingly, according to him, the learned Single Judge rightly quashed the said order of punishment of the Disciplinary Authority. 25. He also tried to convince us that this is not a case of some evidence, rather this is a case of no evidence, more particularly when without recording the evidence of the P.W2 and 4, the presenting officer placed the earlier statement of those witnesses for their confirmation and the same was taken as evidence which is not permissible under law. 26. The learned Counsel for the appellants also tried to justify the action of the disciplinary authority on the ground that the Disciplinary Authority acted within his jurisdiction and the nature and character of a criminal case is different from that of disciplinary proceeding. Therefore, the order of acquittal has no consequence so far as the disciplinary proceeding is concerned in view of the decision in Nelson Motis Vs. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 711 which has been considered by the Apex Court in M.G. Vittal Rao (supra). 27. Therefore, the order of acquittal has no consequence so far as the disciplinary proceeding is concerned in view of the decision in Nelson Motis Vs. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 711 which has been considered by the Apex Court in M.G. Vittal Rao (supra). 27. It appears from the impugned judgment that while considering the decision in the disciplinary proceeding, the learned Single Judge re-assessed and re-appreciated the evidence of the witnesses, particularly, the witness, namely, Biswajit Debbarma (P.W3), Mritunjoy Aich (P.W2), a DR worker of Abhanga RPC, who handed over the key to the accused respondent writ petitioner and in whose presence, the accused officer, the respondent writ petitioner allegedly loaded the bags of fertilizers in jeep and also noted, inter alia, that the Enquiry Officer did not give any weightage to the fact that the prosecution did not produce the stock book to show stock of fertilizer in the godown on 13.3.1991 although the said stock book of Abhanga RPC was mentioned as one of the documents to be relied upon while furnishing the Article of Charge against the respondent writ petitioner as if the writ Court sits over in an appeal. 28. The learned Single Judge in his judgment also noted, inter alia, that from the deposition of Biswajit Debbarma, it is clearly revealed that it was one Mritunjoy Aich who also works in the said RPC had asked him to load the fertilizer bags in the vehicle and he further deposed that only Mritunjoy was present during the entire period of loading. Learned Single Judge also discussed about the evidence of Mritunjoy Aich stating, inter alia, that Mritunjoy Aich does not indicate that the writ petitioner obtained the key of the godown from him by making a false representation. The said witness apparently was present during the initial loading of the fertilizer bags but after loading of few bags, Mr. Aich left the RPC godown. Thus the said witness had not indicated that it was the writ petitioner who had taken away the fertilizer bags from the godown of the Corporation at Abhanga whereas from the evidence on record, it appears that the aforesaid Mritunjoy Aich has handed over the key to the delinquent officer, the respondent writ petitioner. 29. Aich left the RPC godown. Thus the said witness had not indicated that it was the writ petitioner who had taken away the fertilizer bags from the godown of the Corporation at Abhanga whereas from the evidence on record, it appears that the aforesaid Mritunjoy Aich has handed over the key to the delinquent officer, the respondent writ petitioner. 29. Therefore, according to us, the aforesaid view of the learned Single Judge is nothing but re-appreciation of the evidence which is not permissible as per the decision of the Apex Court in Ramesh Dinkar Punde (supra. 30. The Apex Court in M.G. Vittal Rao (supra) has considered the case of State of A.P. Vs. K. Allabakash, (2000) 10 SCC 177 and the case of Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 764 earlier decisions including the decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr., (1999) 3 SCC 679 , wherein the Apex Court held that there can be no bar for continuing both the criminal and disciplinary proceedings. 31. According to us, when both the criminal proceeding and the departmental proceeding can proceed simultaneously, there is no bar even to proceed with the departmental proceeding after acquittal in the criminal case. There is no doubt that when the facts and charge are identical and same in both the criminal trial and the departmental proceeding, then the departmental proceeding should be quashed, but this is not a case where the charges in both the cases are identical and same. In the instant case, the charge framed in the disciplinary proceeding is for misconduct, not for any penal offence, as it would be evident from the Article of Charge itself. For ready reference, Article No. 1 of the charge is reproduced hereunder : That the said Sri Bhaskar Choudhury, Field Worker (under suspension) while functioning under Abhanga R.P.C. under North Zone of T.R.P.C. Ltd. acted quite unbecomingly by removing 40 bags of Amrit fertilizer from the godown of Abhanga R.P.C. on 13.3.91 without authority with an ulterior motive for his personal gain to the detriment of Corporation interest. Thus Sri Bhaskar Choudhury, Field Worker (under suspension) is charged for serious misconduct. 32. Thus Sri Bhaskar Choudhury, Field Worker (under suspension) is charged for serious misconduct. 32. On the other hand, the charge framed in the criminal case under Section 381 of IPC is as follows : That you on 13.3.91 at about 6 p.m. at Avanga being servant i.e. an employee of Rubber Plantation Corporation Limited, Avanga office, as field worker committed theft by stealing property to it 40 (forty) bags of fertilizers (Amrit) in the possession of the said Rubber Plantation Corporation Ltd. at Avanga office store and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 381 of IPC and within my cognizance. 33. Therefore, it can be easily said that the charges in criminal proceeding and the departmental proceeding are not same and identical and when the charges are not same and identical, then the case of G.M. Tank (supra) has no application, rather distinguishable one. In view of the above, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner. 34. In Union of India Vs. Naman Singh Shekhawat, (2008) 4 SCC 1 , the Apex Court held that departmental proceeding can be initiated after acquittal by the criminal Court. However, the departmental proceeding should be initiated provided the department intended to adduce any evidence which could prove the charges against the delinquent officer. Therefore, initiation of proceeding should be bona fide and must be reasonable and fair. 35. In the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (supra), the Apex Court considered the point as to whether a statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC can be relied upon in a disciplinary proceeding as a part of examination in chief of the witness and held that the same can be relied upon after providing full opportunity to the accused officer and in the instant case, the accused officer respondent writ petitioner was provided the earlier statement of P.W2 as relied upon as examination-in-chief and also the accused officer admittedly cross-examined the said witness. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused officer, the respondent writ petitioner, in any way was prejudiced for reliance on the earlier statement recorded at the stage of preliminary enquiry. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused officer, the respondent writ petitioner, in any way was prejudiced for reliance on the earlier statement recorded at the stage of preliminary enquiry. More so, the respondent writ petitioner i.e. the accused officer did not raise his voice even before the enquiry authority while accepting the earlier statement of PW 2 as Exbt P-4 and the order of the Court in a criminal proceeding as Exbt P-8. 36. Therefore, according to our conscious opinion, the authority did not commit any procedural irregularity in the departmental proceeding, rather provided with all the opportunities to the accused officer respondent writ petitioner as he is entitled to as per law. And so far as the order of the disciplinary authority concerned, i.e. the order awarding punishment, it appears that even before awarding the punishment, the accused officer, the respondent writ petitioner was given proper opportunity to make his representation and accordingly, he made representation for reducing punishment. And even after punishment also, he has made an application for review of the order of punishment praying for imposing lesser punishment, meaning thereby, that the accused officer the respondent writ petitioner has accepted the order of the Disciplinary authority recording his guilt. Not only that, admittedly, he did not prefer any appeal before the appellate authority i.e. the Board of Corporation, rather straightway approached the writ Court for setting aside the order of punishment by filing the instant writ petition wherein the learned Single Judge passed the impugned judgment and order. 37. We are of the further opinion that when the employer has lost its confidence on one of his employee for his misconduct, and ultimately awarded punishment, it would not be proper either for writ Court or for appellate Court to sit over the said decision by way of appreciating the evidence on record, when there are some evidences. 38. As it is settled by this time that the writ Court is not an appellate forum, rather a forum of review only relating to a decision making process. Thus, the order of the learned Single Judge is required to be interfered with. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated 7.3.2007 passed in Civil Rule No. 409 of 1997 is set aside. Consequently, the order of the Disciplinary Authority is restored. The appeal is allowed, but there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.