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2012 DIGILAW 235 (PAT)

Vishal Singh v. State of Bihar

2012-02-08

VIKASH JAIN

body2012
ORDER The present application has been filed for quashing the order dated 24.07.2009 passed by the learned Judicial Magtistrate Ist Class, Patna in Complaint Case No. 1599 (c) 2009 taking cognizance against the petitioner under Section 342, 379 and 452 IPC. 2. According to the complaint it has been alleged that the petitioner who is the Legal Manager of HDFC Bank Limited at Kolkata, along with some other persons entered the verandah of the complainant and obtained five post dated cheques after brandishing a country made pistol, in connection with the defaulted installments in relation to a vehicle taken by the opposite party on finance basis. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present complaint has been filed in retaliation to an earlier complaint filed by the HDFC Bank against O.P.No. 2 bearing Complaint Case no. C/36041/08 before the learned Magistrate at Kolkata in respect of which cognizance under Section 138 N.I.Act has also been taken on 18.12.2008 and summons issued. 4. Be that as it may, he submits that the parties have since arrived at a compromise and settlement in between themselves and no fruitful purpose will be served in continuing the instant prosecution proceeding. He relies on the decisions of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2003 SC 1386 [B.S.Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another] and 2008 (4) SCC 582 [Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab] in support of his plea that this Court invoking its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may quash the complaint notwithstanding that some of the offences alleged may not be compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. 5. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party No. 2 appears and has been heard. He has filed a counter affidavit annexing a copy of the memorandum of understanding dated 9.12.2011 which is on record. Learned counsel for the state also appeared and has been heard. 6. In B.S.Joshi’s case (supra) it has been clarified in para 8 of the judgment that “ if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing.” 7. Learned counsel for the state also appeared and has been heard. 6. In B.S.Joshi’s case (supra) it has been clarified in para 8 of the judgment that “ if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing.” 7. It has thus been observed in para 15 of the same judgment that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code can quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint without being limited by Section 320 Cr.P.C. in that regard. 8. In Madan Mohan Abbot’s case offences had been alleged under Sections 379, 406,409,418, 506/34 of the Penal Code of which Section 406 was not compoundable and the Court was considering quashing of FIR on account of compromise entered into between the parties. In this backdrop it was held as follows :- “5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which has been dismissed by the impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal one between two contesting parties and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the allegations made against the accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the proceedings in the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has on 11.1.2004 passed away and the possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be ruled out.” “6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.” 9. From the above it is clear that the powers exercisable under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are in no way curtailed or restricted by the terms of Section 320 Cr.P.C. In appropriate cases where compromise has been arrived at between the parties, what requires to be seen in such cases is whether or not the grant of relief to a party would jeopardize public policy. The mere fact that an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. need not by itself constitute a reason for denying relief. 10. This Court thus has no hesitation in holding that continuance of the prosecution proceedings would amount to an abuse of process and would serve no useful purpose except being a burden on the time of the Court. Admittedly, the dispute in the present case has arises primarily out of a previous transaction between two parties. As such, no public policy can be said to be involved in the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. In the interest of justice, therefore, this Court finds it a fit case in which to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and accordingly, the impugned order dated 24.7.2009 passed in Complaint Case No. 1599 (c) 2009 taking cognizance against the petitioner is hereby quashed. 12. This petition accordingly stands allowed. ?