Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, J.— Heard Sri R.K. Ojha, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Irshad Ali, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 and Sri Vivek Verma, learned counsel for the respondent University. The learned Standing Counsel has also been heard on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 3. The challenge in this writ petition is to the order passed by the Vice Chancellor of the respondent University whereby he has proceeded to decide the dispute relating to the election of office bearers of the Committee of Management of Gandhi Smarak P.G. College, Surjan Nagar, Jai Nagar, District Moradabad. Sri Ojha submits that the matter had been remanded by the High Court vide judgment dated 27th March, 2012 to the Vice Chancellor to decide the same after giving an opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties. It is thereafter that the impugned order has been passed which is bereft of any cogent reason and it proceeds on a misreading of the bye-laws of Gandhi Shiksha Prasar Samiti which ought to have been taken into consideration for the said purpose. Sri Ojha contends that such an order cannot be sustained and it deserves to be set aside. I have heard Sri Irshad Ali for the contesting respondent and he submits that he does not propose to file any counter affidavit at this stage and the matter can be disposed of finally on the basis of the findings already recorded by the Vice Chancellor. He submits that the elections set up by the petitioner have been found to be fictitious and therefore in the absence of any foundation for the alleged elections of the petitioner the Vice Chancellor was fully justified in answering all the issues against the petitioner. Sri Vivek Verma has also supported the impugned order. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having considered the aforesaid submissions raised, the Vice Chancellor has proceeded to frame the issues but while proceeding to consider the mode of election of the office bearers, has completely overlooked the relevant provisions of the bye-laws, namely, Clause 7 read with Clause 5 thereof which indicates direct and indirect representation of the office bearers and members of the Committee of Management. The Vice Chancellor has proceeded to assume that the elections ought to have been held by the General Body and the office bearers should also have been elected on the same date. The Vice Chancellor has proceeded to assume that the elections ought to have been held by the General Body and the office bearers should also have been elected on the same date. This by itself cannot be the basis for discarding the elections unless a finding is recorded that the elections have not been held in accordance with the bye-laws as referred to hereinabove. The Vice Chancellor has proceeded also on the basis that the observer who had been appointed had not attended the general meeting of 24.9.2011 and that he had only attended the meeting of the election of office bearers which was held on 2nd October, 2011. The default on the part of the Observer in not attending the meeting by itself cannot by itself invalidate the elections. The Observer had been fully informed and according to the order itself he had attended the meeting which was held on 2nd October, 2011. In the aforesaid circumstance what appealed to the mind of the Vice Chancellor seems to be something which was irrelevant to the controversy. The conclusion drawn that the election was not in accordance with the mandate of the rules of the society is a conclusion without even looking to the rules as mentioned hereinabove. Apart from this, the Vice Chancellor has commented that since there was no attendance sheet to indicate the presence of the members in the election therefore the same appeared to be striking. The parties had filed affidavits in support of their claims which has been referred to in the impugned order. The bye-laws of the society do not prescribe any particular procedure and if the affidavits had been filed then the Vice Chancellor ought to have assessed the same in the light of the claims set up by the parties and the resolution on which reliance has been placed. The approach of the Vice Chancellor therefore appears to be misdirected on this ground as well. Apart from this, whether the Newspaper had any wide circulation was a matter of enquiry which could have been made from the office of the District Information Officer who would be in a position to indicate the extent of circulation of such a newspaper. In the aforesaid circumstances to presume the absence of wide circulation would not be correct without obtaining such material. In the aforesaid circumstances to presume the absence of wide circulation would not be correct without obtaining such material. There is no provision under the bye-laws for sending notices by registered post and the only provision is under postal certificate. It is correct that under postal certificate provision has now been withdrawn by the Post-Office. Nonetheless, the correctness or otherwise could be assessed on the basis of the statement by the members themselves who have filed affidavits contending that they had attended the meeting. Sri Ojha submits that 80 members out of 143 had participated. The Vice Chancellor should have concentrated on this figure and should have carried out a verification in case it was required on the basis of the material that was placed before him. The Vice Chancellor has therefore proceeded to write an order on the basis of the issues framed but without adverting to the relevant aspects of the matter and has not given sustainable reasons. In the circumstances, as pointed out hereinabove, the impugned order of the Vice Chancellor dated 1.9.2012 is unsustainable and is hereby quashed. The Vice Chancellor shall decide the matter afresh after taking into account the provisions of the bye-laws specifically as observed hereinabove and after sifting the material on record including the evidence and affidavits that have been filed by either side. The Vice Chancellor shall decide the matter after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties as well within a period of two months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order before him. The writ petition is allowed. _____________