JUDGMENT Ram Mohan Reddy, J. 1. First defendant's second appeal aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court allowing O.S. No. 72 of 2004 instituted by the respondent directing specific performance of an agreement of sale and the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court dismissing R.A. No. 24 of 2010 as a consequence of rejecting I.A. No. 1 to condone the delay of 832 days in filing the appeal. Respondent 1 instituted O.S. No. 72 of 2004 on 12-4-2004 before the Civil judge (Senior Division), Harihar for specific performance of the agreement of sale executed jointly by the defendants, agreeing to convey the suit schedule property for a valuable consideration on acknowledging receipt of part sale consideration. That suit when resisted by the appellant (since deceased during the pendency of this appeal represented by legal heirs) arraigned as defendant 1 and the second respondent none other than the son of the 1st defendant as defendant 2, by filing written statement, the Trial Court framed issues and the parties entered trial whence oral testimony was recorded from 21-3-2007 onwards. There afterwards the Trial Court in the premise of the pleadings, the evidence both oral and documentary, answered the issues and accordingly allowed the suit by judgment and decree dated 30-10-2007 directing the plaintiff to discharge the loan outstanding with M/s. LIC Housing Finance Limited, Mangalore and balance, sale consideration, if any, to pay to the defendants who are in turn were directed to execute and register the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and put him in possession of the suit schedule property failing which the plaintiff was reserved liberty to have the sale deed executed through a Court Commissioner and on securing execution of sale deed to put him in possession of the suit property. 2. The first respondent sued execution of the judgment and decree, in Execution Case No. 46 of 2007 on 10-12-2007 arraigning the defendants as judgment-debtors, whence the 1st J.D.R./appellants on notice, entered appearance through Counsel on 10-1-2008 and on 23-2-2008 filed objections stating that he would handover vacant possession of the suit schedule property within six months and execute the sale deed and that the decree-holder-plaintiff be directed to pay the balance sale consideration to him to the exclusion of his son the 2nd defendant/2nd judgment-debtor. The appellant-J.D.R. filed an affidavit dated 13-9-2010, undertaking to vacate the Suit Schedule Premises within 15 days as he had to shift the household articles and once again on 14-9-2010 filed another affidavit to the same effect. The failure to comply with the aforestated undertaking led to the Executing Court appointing a Commissioner to execute a sale deed which was registered on 2-6-2010. 3. The 1st judgment-debtor/1st defendant filed R.A. No. 24 of 2010 together with I.A. No. 1 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on 10-3-2010 to condone the delay of 832 days in filing the appeal, In the affidavit accompanying the application, it was stated on oath, that due to ignorance, old age, lack of knowledge and having not approached any lawyers for advise, did not prefer the appeal within the period of limitation though he suffered an order in Execution No. 46 of 2007 of the Executing Court to execute the sale deed on 15-2-2010. In addition it was stated that the order issuing delivery warrant by the Executing Court when carried in W.P. No. 30402 of 2010 by 1st judgment-debtor, this Court disposed off the petition with a direction to the lower Appellate Court to dispose of the application for stay within three weeks from the date of the said order. There afterwards the 1st judgment-debtor was examined as P.W. 1 and P.W. 7-documents marked as Exs. P. 1 to P. 7 on I.A. No. 1 for condonation of delay though the 1st judgment-debtor sought time to examine the doctor who treated him, nevertheless did not secure the presence of the witness and in the light of the time frame fixed by this Court for disposal of the application, the lower Appellate Court having considered the material on record declined to accept the explanation as sufficient cause for the inordinate delay and rejected the application and sequentially dismissed the appeal by judgment and decree dated 10-11-2010. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the lower Appellate Court recorded an incorrect finding that Exs. P. 1 to P. 7 were of recent origin; and that sufficient opportunity was not extended to the appellant to adduce evidence of the Medical Officer who treated him and; there being no negligence or inaction, the Court below was not justified in rejecting the application and sequentially dismissing the appeal. 5. P. 1 to P. 7 were of recent origin; and that sufficient opportunity was not extended to the appellant to adduce evidence of the Medical Officer who treated him and; there being no negligence or inaction, the Court below was not justified in rejecting the application and sequentially dismissing the appeal. 5. It is appropriate to extract paragraphs 3 and 4 of the affidavit accompanying I.A. No. I of 2010 to condone the delay filed by the appellant in R.A. No. 24 of 2010 before the lower Appellate Court, which reads thus: 3. After passing of decree due to ignorance, old age, lack of knowledge I have not approached any lawyers for advice. In the mean time the respondent has filed Execution No. 46 of 2007 on the file of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Harihar and obtained order to execute the sale deed on behalf of J.D.R. and Court in favour of DHR on 15-2-2010. After this order I approached some Advocates at Davangere and they have advised me to prefer an appeal against the order dated 30-10-2007 in O.S. No. 72 of 2004 otherwise my rights will be affected by that order. 4. Due to my age, retirement of service, ignorance and lack of advice from the Advocates at proper time I have not preferred an appeal before District Court with time. The delay in filing this appeal is not intentional but for bona fide reason. Hence the delay of 832 days in filing this appeal may kindly be condoned in the interest of justice and equity. If the delay is condoned no hardship is caused to other side. On the other hand if the delay is not condoned my valuable rights would be affected. 6. The appeal though required to be filed on 7-2-2008 after excluding the period for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, nevertheless was filed on 10-3-2010. Therefore, the appellant was required to show sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Court below over the delay in filing the appeal for the period from 7-2-2008 to 10-3-2010. Keeping in mind the dates of the exhibits supra, more appropriately Exs. P. 1 and P. 2 dated 6-3-2010, are the only relevant material to constitute sufficient cause for the delay, though such a pleading is not advanced in the affidavit accompanying the application to condone the delay. Ex. Keeping in mind the dates of the exhibits supra, more appropriately Exs. P. 1 and P. 2 dated 6-3-2010, are the only relevant material to constitute sufficient cause for the delay, though such a pleading is not advanced in the affidavit accompanying the application to condone the delay. Ex. P. 1 being an Outpatient Department chit and Ex. P. 2-the medical certificate are not in the direction of establishing sufficient cause for 832 days. Every days delay from 7-2-2008 is not explained. Material dates and particulars are not forthcoming. 7. Admittedly, Ex. P. 1 and Outpatient Department (OPD) slip while medical certificate-Ex. P. 2 are of even dated 6-3-2010, the certificate of Dr. Inamdar-Ex. P. 4 is dated 4-10-2010 and Exs. P. 5, P. 6 and P. 7 are the prescriptions dated 14-5-2010, 14-4-2010 and 20-4-2010 respectively, while Ex. P. 3 the outpatient chit of C.C. Hospital is dated 6-8-2007. Ex. P. 3 is of the year 2007 during the pendency of U.S. No. 72 of 2004 since allowed by judgment and decree dated 30-10-2007. 8. Yet again there is no dispute that the appellant entered appearance in Execution No. 46 of 2007 on 10-1-2008 through learned Counsel and filed a memo on 23-2-2008 signed by the appellant and his Counsel undertaking to vacate and handover vacant possession of the suit schedule property within six months and execute the sale deed while claiming entitlement to the balance sale consideration to the exclusion of the 2nd judgment-debtor. There is also no dispute that the appellant filed an affidavit dated 13-9-2010 undertaking to vacate the suit schedule property within 15 days since he wanted to shift his household articles which was accepted by the Executing Court. So also on 14-9-2010 the appellant filed another affidavit seeking time to vacate the premises in question by 23-9-2010 which was also accepted by the Executing Court. Therefore, the appellant through a learned Counsel actively participated in the proceeding before the Executing Court. 9. The certified copy of the order sheet maintained by the lower Appellate Court appended to the memorandum of appeal discloses that in view of the direction in W.P. No. 30402 of 2010 the lower Appellate Court held day-to-day proceedings from 25-10-2010 onwards, (sic)ore appropriately since the interim order of stay granted by this Court was to be in force until 30-10-2010. Despite grant of sufficient time the appellant was examined on 21-10-2010 and introduced in evidence Exs. P. 1 to P. 7 and though sought time to examine the doctor who treated him, nevertheless did not do so. 10. Regard being had to the sufficient cause set out in the affidavit, extracted supra, it is needless to State that the appellant did not plead either illness or the medical treatment as a cause for the delay in filing the appeal. The very fact that the appellant actively prosecuted the execution proceeding in E.P. No. 46 of 2007 right from 2008 onwards and filed affidavits undertaking to vacate and put the appellant in possession of the suit schedule property is a clear pointer and indicative of the fact that the appellant was fully aware of the consequences of such undertaking on solemn oath. 11. Though the learned Counsel makes a faint effort to submit that there was nothing to show mala fides or deliberate delay or dilatory tactics by the appellant and in equity was entitled to an order accepting the explanation as sufficient cause for the delay, I am afraid is without merit. Deliberate delay and dilatory tactics can be inferred from proved facts being none other than the appellants active participation through learned Counsel in the execution proceeding and the undertakings on oath, to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property before the Executing Court and having suffered an order of the Executing Court, had resulted in filing the appeal seeking condonation of delay of 832 days. The lower Appellate Court having kept in mind the totality of circumstances and evidence on record, in my opinion, justifiably rejected I.A. No. I of 2010 to condone the delay in filing the appeal and sequentially dismissed the appeal. 12. Appellant has filed Mis. No. 12331 of 2011 invoking Order 41, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for producing additional documentary evidence being a medical certificate dated 12-6-2011 of the Government Medical Officer certifying that the appellant suffered from an old case of Bells Palsy and his condition was serious and was required to be attended to by a helper from 2-1-2007 to December 2010. In the affidavit accompanying the application, the deponent states that R.A. No. 24 of 2010 when dismissed on the ground of being barred by time by refusing to condone the delay inspite of having urged that he was sick and unable to seek legal advise while the document certifying sickness was misplaced and could not be traced despite best efforts and having retrieved it presented the application. 13. Order 41, Rule 27 of CPC provides for production of additional evidence in Appellate Court by a party to the appeal only if: (a) Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted; or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence establishes that notwithstanding exercising of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after due diligence, produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed; or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause by reason of which the Appellate Court may allow. In the facts of this case and more appropriately the statement on oath of the appellant in the affidavit accompanying the application stating that he had misplaced the medical certificate dated 12-6-2011 and hence seeks to produce the same as additional evidence, there is no material forthcoming so as to comply with any of the conditions in Rule 27 of Order 41 of CPC. Even otherwise the appeal when dismissed on 10-11-2010 the certificate sought to be produced is dated 12-6-2011. In that view of the matter, the appellant has made a false assertion in the affidavit that the document was misplaced and could not be produced. That application deserves to be rejected. In the result, no substantial question of law arises for decision making in this appeal and accordingly dismissed, however without costs. Misc. Cvl. No. 12331 of 2011 is rejected as unnecessary.