Madathil Kayath Janardanan v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited
2012-12-17
A.M.KHANWILKAR, R.D.DHANUKA
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment R.D. DHANUKA, J. This Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks writ of mandamus to quash and set aside the order of dismissal dated 27th February, 2002 inflicted upon the petitioner as a measure of disciplinary action against the petitioner. 2. On 4th April, 1967 the petitioner was appointed as Operation Officer Grade II and was thereafter promoted to the Head Office as General Manager (Shipping) on 4th March, 1996. Some time in the year 1996, the respondent received a complaint with regard to the conduct of the petitioner and based on such complaint, conduct of the petitioner was under investigation. By letter dated 31st May, 1996, the respondent informed the petitioner that based on the complaint against petitioner for using river sand instead of sea sand for the land development and siding work, the committee was constituted for investigation which committee pointed out some lapses mentioned in the said letter. The Petitioner was called upon to offer his comments on the same. The Petitioner by letter dated 4th June, 1996 gave his reply to the said inter office memo dated 31st May, 1996. 3. On 21st September, 1996, the Chief Vigilance Manager after investigation submitted a report recommending appropriate disciplinary action against the petitioner on account of his failure to discharge his duty. In the month of January/February, 1998 the Central Bureau of Investigation registered a case against the petitioner and decided to investigate the matter. 4. By letter dated 14th August, 1998, the petitioner tendered his resignation to the Controlling Officer, Executive Director (Supplies) which was received on 25th August, 1998. By letter dated 11th September, 1998 respondent informed the petitioner that the resignation could not be accepted since his conduct was under investigation. Since 14th September, 1998, the petitioner stopped attending the office of the respondent. The respondent by letter dated 15th September, 1998 instructed the petitioner to report for duty as his resignation had not been accepted and also on the ground that his resignation letter was not addressed to the competent disciplinary authority who was the Chairman in his case. The Petitioner, however, by letter dated 16th September, 1998 claimed that he had ceased to be employee of the respondent. The Petitioner thereafter joined Reliance Petroleum Limited. 5.
The Petitioner, however, by letter dated 16th September, 1998 claimed that he had ceased to be employee of the respondent. The Petitioner thereafter joined Reliance Petroleum Limited. 5. On 16th January, 1999 the respondent issued charge-sheet to the petitioner (first charge-sheet) on the ground that the petitioner had been absent from the duty and committed willful insubordination of superiors and negligence in performance of duty. 6. The Petitioner did not appear in the departmental enquiry proceedings on various dates. The enquiry Officer forwarded a copy of the exparte proceedings to the petitioner to enable him to cross examine the witness. 7. In the year 1999, the petitioner filed Writ Petition (1825 of 1999) challenging issuance of charge-sheet dated 16th January, 1999 and initiation of disciplinary enquiries into the charges vide letter dated 24th June, 1999. By order dated 4th December, 1999, the Division Bench of this court dismissed the said writ petition (1825 of 1999). It was held that as per relevant rules 6.4(a) of the Personnel Manual (For Officers) the resignation of the Officer whose conduct is under investigation or against whom disciplinary action is intended to be taken should not be accepted without sanction of the authority competent to dismiss him. The Division Bench observed that perusal of the record clearly shows that the resignation was not accepted in view of the pendency of the investigation. The petitioner applied for modification of the said order dated 4th December, 1999. By order dated 7th December, 1999 the Division Bench of this court refused to modify the order dated 4th December, 1999, however, recorded a statement of the respondents that the petitioner would be allowed to cross examine the witness whose evidence had already been recorded. The Petitioner thereafter cross examined the witness examined by the respondent. 8. In view of the recommendations of the CBI, on 2nd June, 2000 the Chairman of the respondent initiated another disciplinary case by issuing a charge-sheet against the petitioner (second charge-sheet). On 21st August, 2000 in respect of the first charge-sheet, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report/finding in respect of the charge-sheet holding that the acts of misconduct against the petitioner had been proved. The Petitioner was held guilty of willful insubordination or disobedience, absence without leave and negligence in the performance of duty. 9.
On 21st August, 2000 in respect of the first charge-sheet, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report/finding in respect of the charge-sheet holding that the acts of misconduct against the petitioner had been proved. The Petitioner was held guilty of willful insubordination or disobedience, absence without leave and negligence in the performance of duty. 9. The enquiry report in respect of the second charge-sheet submitted on 16th October, 2001 however, reveal that the charges were not proved against the petitioner. The respondents thereafter issued show cause notice on 7th February, 2002 to the petitioner in respect of the first charge-sheet calling upon him to demonstrate as to why the penalty of dismissal should not be inflicted upon him as a measure of disciplinary action and as to why the proposed penalty should not be inflicted upon him. On 27th February, 2002, the Chairman issued order of dismissal against the petitioner in respect of the first charge-sheet. By order dated 27th February, 2002 the Chairman of the respondent dropped all charges levelled against the petitioner in respect of the second charge-sheet. 10. Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had already tendered his resignation to the Controlling Authority, Executive Director (Supplies) on 14th August, 1998. The Petitioner was not informed about any investigation being conducted against the petitioner prior to the date of his resignation. It is submitted that neither any preliminary enquiry was conducted against the petitioner nor any charge-sheet was drawn up by the respondent and thus the order of removal is vitiated. 11. The learned counsel places reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank and another Vs. Rajinder Lal Capoor (2008) 5 Supreme Court Cases 257. The learned counsel places reliance on the said regulations 3, 4 and 5 of Regulation 6 of UCO Bank Officers Employee (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 which was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank (supra). Para 29 and 30 of the judgment in the case of UCO Bank (supra) reads thus: "29. In terms of the 1976 Regulations drawing up of a charge sheet by the disciplinary authority is the first step for initiation of a disciplinary authority. Unless and until, therefore, a charge sheet is drawn up, a disciplinary proceedings for the purpose of the 1976 Regulations cannot be initiated.
In terms of the 1976 Regulations drawing up of a charge sheet by the disciplinary authority is the first step for initiation of a disciplinary authority. Unless and until, therefore, a charge sheet is drawn up, a disciplinary proceedings for the purpose of the 1976 Regulations cannot be initiated. Drawing up of a charge sheet, therefore, is the condition precedent for initiation of a disciplinary proceedings. We have noticed in paragraph 15 of our judgment that ordinarily no disciplinary proceedings can be continued in absence of any rule after an employee reaches his age of superannuation. A rule which would enable the disciplinary authority to continue a disciplinary proceedings despite the officers reaching the age of superannuation must be a statutory rule. A' fortiori it must be a rule applicable to a disciplinary proceedings. 30. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the employer may take resort to a preliminary inquiry, but it will bear repetition to state that the same has a limited role to play. But, in absence of the statutory rules operating in the field, resorting to a preliminary enquiry would not by itself be enough to hold that a departmental proceeding has been initiated." 12. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent on the other hand submits that under the rules 6.4(a) of the Personnel Manual (For officers) resignation of the officer whose conduct was under investigation or intended to be taken could not be accepted without sanction of the authority competent to dismiss him. The learned counsel placed reliance upon rule 6.4(c) also which provides that the resignation should be accepted by the competent authority. Rule 6.4 reads thus: "6.4 : Resignation: (a) Under no circumstances the resignation of an Officer whose conduct is under investigation or intended to be taken, be accepted if tendered without the sanction of the authority competent to dismiss him. (b) ................................ (c) Resignation should be accepted by the Competent Authority." 13. It is submitted that the competent authority in the case of the petitioner was Chairman of the respondent whereas the petitioner had tendered his resignation to the Controlling Officer, Executive Director (Supplies). It is submitted that the conduct of the petitioner was under investigation and thus the resignation could not have been accepted during the pendency of the investigation.
It is submitted that the competent authority in the case of the petitioner was Chairman of the respondent whereas the petitioner had tendered his resignation to the Controlling Officer, Executive Director (Supplies). It is submitted that the conduct of the petitioner was under investigation and thus the resignation could not have been accepted during the pendency of the investigation. It is submitted that this court in the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner has already interpreted rule 6.4(a) of the Personnel Manual (For Officers) applicable to the petitioner and has already held that the resignation of the petitioner was not accepted in view of the pendency of the investigation. This court also observed that the enquiry initiated by the Vigilance department being Vigilance Case No. VM/59 OF 1996/ER was pending against the petitioner since 1996. The petitioner not having challenged the said order passed by this court on 4th December, 1999, the said order has become final and the issue raised therein thus cannot be re-agitated by the petitioner in the present petition. It is submitted that the petitioner was fully aware of the pending investigation in respect of the conduct of the petitioner on the date of tendering his resignation. The Petitioner had submitted his reply to the letter dated 31st May, 1996 by which it was brought to the notice of the petitioner that the committee was constituted for investigation. 14. In our view, on perusal of the record, it is clear that the investigation with regard to the conduct of the petitioner was pending on the date of tendering his resignation and thus the resignation of the petitioner could not be accepted in absence of sanction of the authority competent to dismiss him, under rule 6.4(a) of the Personnel Manual (For Officers). The record also indicates that the resignation tendered by the petitioner to the Controlling Officer, Executive Director (Supplies) was not the competent authority in the case of the petitioner. Admittedly, no sanction order issued by the authority competent to dismiss the petitioner is forthcoming. In absence thereof, the resignation even if tendered does not take the matter any further. The Petitioner thus continued to be in service and was obliged to abide by the terms and conditions therefore.
Admittedly, no sanction order issued by the authority competent to dismiss the petitioner is forthcoming. In absence thereof, the resignation even if tendered does not take the matter any further. The Petitioner thus continued to be in service and was obliged to abide by the terms and conditions therefore. Further, the Division Bench of this court has already held that the investigation was pending against the petitioner since the year 1996 and has recorded a finding that the resignation was not accepted in view of the pendency of the investigation which finding has attained finality. The impugned order passed by the Chairman of the respondent dismissing the petitioner cannot be faulted with. 15. In our view the reliance placed by the petitioner on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank (supra) is misplaced. The Supreme Court was considering Regulations which provided for framing definite and distinct charges on the basis of the allegations against the officer employee before proposing to conduct an enquiry by the disciplinary authority. Considering the said regulation, the Supreme Court took a view that unless and until the charge-sheet was drawn up, the disciplinary proceedings for the purpose of 1976 Regulations could not be initiated. In our view, the facts before the Supreme Court in the said case are clearly distinguishable and the said judgment is thus not applicable to the facts of this case. 16. The Petitioner has not made any other submissions for consideration of this court. 17. In our view, there is no substance in the submissions made by the petitioner and the petition is devoid of any merits. We therefore, pass the following order: (a) Petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. (b) There shall be no order as to costs. (c) In view of the above order, Notice of Motion also stands disposed of. Petition dismissed.